thing we can give you that you cannot to the same extent get while you are living separate. Probably that will commend itself to the judgment of the Ontario Bar before many years go by, because there is something abnormal in the division between the two. I am sure you cannot do without us and I am very sure we cannot be a fully rounded out and historic university until we possess, with as high a standard as any other, a faculty representing one of the oldest professions, and certainly a faculty that is germane to any conception of a university. We can do much for you. And you can do much for us. I feel further that with the claims that are opening up before you-claims that possibly in the rush of business to-day have not allowed you to see the great scope of your profession-we in the university may hold up ideals and standards before you greater than can be got anywhere apart from the university. Think of what international law, for instance, promises you. As you sat and listened this afternoon to the story of what has been done for Canada by international law, you may have thought what might be done in a great school of international law. If these opportunities which have been opened up for us are to be realised, for we hope that more and more war will cease and more and more there will be the appeal to reason led by legal men before the Courts of Arbitration, surely in Canada there should be a great school in which lawyers may be equipped through the resources of unified knowledge which can only be found in a great university. These men will then go out and take their places beside the other great lawyers of the world. Think not that I am in the slightest way saying anything against what has been done. But I believe that there is a future, and that future can never be fully entered upon until we come together again and the university and the practical teaching of law are more unified, when you round out our institution and when we enable you to carry yours to a higher standard.

It is with much pleasure I propose the toast to the profession.

OSGOODE HALL LIBRARY.

New Books: Constantineau, Treatise on the De Facto Doctrine, Toronto, 1910; Jarman, Treatise on Wills, 6th ed., London, 1910; Stimson, Popular Law Making, New York, 1910; Wilcox, Municipal Franchises, vol. I., Pipe and Wire Franchises, Rochester, 1910; Scottish Law Review, 18851909, Glasgow, 1885-1909.

Books Missing: Bower, Actionable Defamation, London, 1908; Jacobs, Railway Law, Montreal, 1909; Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction Beyond the Seas, Oxford, 1902; Macqueen, Husband and Wife, 4th ed., London, 1905; May, Fraudulent Conveyances, 3rd ed., London, 1908; Nellis, Street Railway Accident Law, Albany, 1904: Odgers, Law of Libel, 4th ed., London, 1905; Wallace & Williamson, Law of Patents, London, 1900; Wills, Circumstantial Evidence, London, 1902; Encyclopædia of Laws of England, 2nd ed., vol. 6, London, 1907.

Since the promulgation of the award of the Hague Court in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration between Great Britain and the United States much has been said and written concerning the fishing rights of the Americans in "Bays" as debated before and decided by that Tribunal; and as more or less confusion has been engendered by this extrajudicial discussion, it is desirable that an effort should. be made to dispel such confusion by a careful examination of the official record in the case.

The renunciatory clause of the Treaty of 1818 reads as follows:

"And the United States hereby renounce forever any liberty heretofore enjoyed or claimed by the inhabitants thereof to take, dry or cure fish on or within three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks or harbours of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America not included within the above-mentioned limits; provided, however, that the American fishermen shall be admitted to enter such bays or harbours for the purpose of shelter and of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood and of obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever."

By the Fifth Question submitted to the Hague Court, it was asked, "From where must be measured the three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks or harbours' referred to in the said Article?"

The parties to the submission had no difficulty in agreeing that in the case of unindented coasts the three miles should be measured "from the shore line at low tide." But what about the "Bays?" Must the construction of the

VOL. XXXI. C.L.T.-20

renunciation article be, as the United States argued, the same in bays as on other parts of the coast, or must the proscribed area begin, as argued by Great Britain, three miles from a line drawn across the waters of the bay from headland to headland? That was the crux judicum arising under Question V. of the submission; and it is obvious that its solution must have a very important bearing in International law and practice.

The contention of Great Britain before the Hague Court was that the phrase used in the renunciation clause "bays of . . . His Britannic Majesty's dominions" was to be understood in a geographical or cartographical sense; in other words that it was referable only to such bodies of water as were defined or shewn as "bays " on maps and charts at the date of the treaty; or (and this was a subsidiary argument presented with much force by Sir Robert Finlay and Mr. Ewart), if the phrase demanded interpretation in a juristic sense, that the only intelligible principle enunciated by writers on International law was that of Grotius, namely, that a bay was not to be known by the width of its headlands alone, but by the proportion that the width of its headlands bore to the extent of coast line within the headlands, and that this principle should be applied to the case. The contention of the United States was that the phrase in question must be read as including only those bays which were under the territorial sovereignty of Great Britain at the time of the treaty; and that waters were "territorial" only. if the headlands were six miles or less apart.

Recognising the feebleness of this interpretation as a matter of law, counsel for the United States had recourse to the conduct of the parties under the treaty, asserting that Great Britain had never in practice maintained the interpretation of the treaty asserted before the Tribunal, but on the contrary had always manifested a disposition to concede what the United States had claimed. Unfortunately, there was a great deal of truth in the assertion. And this brings us to a survey of the dealings of the parties under the treaty down to the time of the submission to the Hague Tribunal.

No difficulties arose between the parties to the Treaty until about the year 1839, when the mackerel began to disappear from the United States coast, and the fishermen of that

country sought access to the bays along the British American coast where these fish could still be had in large quantities. Asked by their fishermen concerning the right to fish in British American bays, the first answer made by the United States Government was to furnish them with a copy of the treaty. This was followed by the Government sending Lieutenant Payne out to the fishing grounds to ascertain what the fishermen were doing, and he found that they were of the opinion that they could fish in any of the bays in question so long as they did not go within three miles of the coast of such bays. This view he reported to his Government. Nothing, however, was done until 1841 when Mr. Stevenson, the United States ambassador at London, was directed to present the matter to the attention of the British Government. Strangely enough Mr. Stevenson, instead of advancing the views of his Government as to the proper limits of exclusion in respect of bays, informed the British authorities that the United States fishermen thought so and thus about their rights, and then offered some argument in support of what Mr. Ewart tersely characterised as "the fishermen's idea." Into that view the "territorial" theory did not enter. Mr. Stevenson's communication remained unanswered by the British Government; but the opinion of the law officers was taken, and it negatived the fishermen's contention. Nothing further appears to have been done until the seizure in the Bay of Fundy of the United States fishing vessel, "Washington," in 1843. Thereupon an exchange of very important diplomatic notes ensued. Mr. Everett, on behalf of the United States, while apparently prepared to admit the validity of the principle of construction put forward by the British. Government, argued against its application to the Bay of Fundy. In the end Lord Aberdeen, on the 13th of March, 1845, although asserting the application of the British contention to the Bay of Fundy, assented to a relaxation of the principle in favour of United States fishermen in that body of water. Before doing so, however, he had communicated with the Governor of Nova Scotia, who agreed that as Mr. Everett had admitted the validity of the British. contention as a whole, a relaxation of it might be permitted as to the Bay of Fundy, "provided it led to no other of a like nature." 1 However, the concession had been

'B. C. A. 139.