derlying the proper exercise of the judicial functions. The Judge is, to be sure, a public servant. But at the same time he is not called upon to respond to the popular opinion of the moment, as are members of the legislative body, and as, to a lesser degree, is the executive. It is the duty of a Judge to enforce what Mr. Justice Hughes has aptly characterized as "the fundamental will of the people," that is, the deliberate judgment of the people as embodied in the constitution and the laws. Now, everyone will recognize that the public sentiment of the moment may be hostile to the enforcement of some particular law or constitutional provision; that even a majority of the voters may be opposed to it, and that, rather than abide by it until it can be amended, they would like to see the Courts disregard it, and enforce as law whatever whim may be uppermost in the popular mind. Even a decision which is intrinsically just and right, as well as in accord with the law, may not be acceptable to the popular mood, especially when the people are inflamed by demagogic appeals against wealth and property rights. Yet we all know that it is the duty of a Judge to be deaf to popular clamor, however loud, or however considerable the proportion of citizens from whom it comes, and to determine the case before him strictly according to the provisions of law. It is clearly the duty of a Judge, if need be, to sustain the constitutional and legal rights of one individual as against the whole community or the whole State. There are doubtless great numbers among the Judges in America who would do this even though it might cost them their offices. But there are many who, conscientiously or otherwise, would listen to the popular voice and be guided by it, if such a system as is proposed for Arizona were to be put into operation; and certainly if a Judge should be recalled from office by reason of a just and right decision, the effect upon the integrity of the judiciary would be disastrous. It needs no argument to shew that the people en masse are not in a position to judge properly as to the merits of any particular case. They must generally lack both accurate knowledge of the facts and the necessary understanding of the principles of law; and even considerations of abstract justice are likely to be forgotten in times of public excitement.

History shews us that there have been two kinds of tyranny, the tyranny of the autocrat or of a ruling class, and the tyranny of the mob. Of the two the latter is by far the

worse.

Marat and Robespierre were creatures of the mob, and the atrocities perpetrated under their rule far exceeded those of the later Bourbons, bad as conditions were in their times. It was in the administration of "justice," that the tyranny of these revolutionary leaders was most obnoxious. Even in recent times the notorious Dreyfus case furnishes an example of judicial subserviency to popular prejudice, the injustice twice done by the Military Courts having been happily overruled by the Court of Cassation. In our own country, on the other hand, we still refer with admiration to the conduct of Marshall in according to Aaron Burr, when on trial for treason, every right to which the law entitled him, despite the high current of popular feeling against him.

The founders of the American republic, by committing the exercise of the functions of government to responsible officers elected by the people, or chosen by those so elected, and by the distribution of powers into the three branches of government, steered a safe course between the Scylla of autocracy and the Charybdis of "mobocracy" as Dr. Lyman Abbott has characterized it. They were notably successful in their undertaking to establish "a government of laws and not of men." The tendency of the recall provision in the proposed Arizona constitution is towards a government of men and not of laws; for it will be possible thereunder to remove a Judge from office because he enforces the law. We see no theory upon which either party in Congress can approve this provision, consistently with its declared principles; and, in our opinion, the rejection of the proposed constitution on this ground would be a wholesome rebuke to intemperate radicalism despite the fact that it might be ineffective to prevent Arizona from having a recall provision applicable to Judges, if her people really want it,-for one could be inserted by amendment as soon as the State government should be established. If, however, it seems wise to Congress and to the President to let the extreme radicals have their lesson now, as to how this sort of thing will work, we can only hope that it will be a lesson which will be remembered for all time.-Bench and Bar.

LAW SCHOOLS AND STANDARDS OF GENERAL EDUCATION. -The report of the United States Bureau of Education for

1910 shews a considerable increase in the number of students in American law schools. But it also shews that legal education still lags behind medical education. Half of the medical schools of the country require one or two years in college for admission; the medical course covers four years and a large percentage of medical graduates take a post-graduate course of a year or two in a hospital. With the exception of a dozen law schools of universites-and the law school of the University of Missouri is one of these twelve-the highest standard of admission is a high school course, and while the medical schools almost without exception require four years of attendance, one quarter of the law schools require only two years for a degree, and two, only one year. This, the report says, explains why there was a decrease of 5,555 in medical students in these schools from 1904 to 1910, and an increase of 5,261 in the law schools. The law schools which have courses of only one year or two years express much dissatisfaction with the requirement, but state that it is impossible for them to require longer courses while the door of admission to the bar itself is wide open. In those States which have established state boards of law examiners there is no difficulty in requiring full courses in law, but in States which still adhere to the method of examinations in open Court or by a special committee for individual applicants law schools are powerless to raise the standard of legal education.

Beginning with the school year 1911-12, the entrance requirements in Western Reserve University, Franklin T. Backus School of Law, will be the degree of A. B. or B. S.. University of Minnesota College of Law, two years of college work; University of Missouri School of Law, two years of college work; University of California, Hastings College of Law, one year of college work; University of Illinois College of law, one year of college work; University of Kentucky College of Law, one year of college work; Cornell University College of Law (for three years' course), one year of college work; University of Nebraska College of Law, one year of college work. Beginning with the school year 1912-13, the entrance requirements in University of California, Hastings College of Law, will be two years of college work; University of Colorado department of law, Colorado Law School, two years of college work; University of Denver Law School, one year college work; University of Kansas School of Law, one year of college work; University of Michigan department of

law, one year of college work. Since 1897 Harvard Law School has required an academic degree for admission.

LAW SCHOOLS AND LEGAL AID.-The University of Denver school of law, Colorado, has a department denominated a Legal Aid Dispensary. Work in it by the students is compulsory. Meritorious cases of persons who are unable to pay the fee ordinarily charged by attorneys are taken, and, under the direction of an experienced attorney and with the advice of members of the faculty, the students of the second and third year classes conduct the litigation. An Act of the General Assembly of the State of Colorado (chap. 183, 1909) permits students when acting for the dispensary, to appear in all Courts of the State to the same extent as if admitted to the bar, and the volume of business now in the dispensary is great enough to afford each student an opportunity frequently to represent clients in the Courts. In the School of Law of Northwestern University, Chicago, twenty students of the first, second, or third year classes are to be assigned for practical office and trial work as assistants in the Chicago Legal Aid Society, university branch. The number of hours of work from each student is to be determined by agreement with the superintendent of the society.

POLICEMEN HAVE RIGHTS.-One dark night a policeman, while patrolling his beat, noticed a door partly open. After summoning a fellow policeman, he pushed open the door, stepped through the doorway into the unlighted and dark interior, and was suddenly precipitated to the bottom of an unguarded freight elevator shaft. He died from the injuries received. His widow, alleging negligence in not having the shaft properly guarded as provided for by statute, brought suit to recover damages. Defendant contended that it owed no duty to a policeman. The Court of Appeals of New York in Racine v. Morris, 94 Northwestern Reporter, 864, holds that, as policemen are required at all times of the day and night to protect the rights of persons and property, intestate was lawfully in the building in discharge of his duties; and, since the statute in question was enacted for the protection of

all persons lawfully upon the premises of another, the duty imposed by the statute to guard elevator shafts was for intestate's benefit, and defendant was liable for failure to comply therewith.

ETIQUETTE IS FATAL.-Etiquette, we know, is prescribed for, and required by, good breeding, to be observed in social or official life; but since the case of State v. Flanakin, 54 Southern Reporter, 940, we are left in doubt as to the propriety of conventional decorum with a jury. Defendant was tried for murder, and the polite jury brought in a verdict reading as follows: "We, your jury, beg leave to return a verdict of manslaughter." Defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that the jury had failed to find him guilty or not guilty, and had brought in no verdict which would afford a sufficient basis for exception. The motion being denied, an appeal was taken. The supreme Court of Louisiana holds that the motion should have been sustained. The Court says: "The jury was expected by its verdict to answer the question, 'Is the accused guilty or not guilty? and it has not answered it." The result might have been different had the Judge been equally polite, and answered their beg leave to" with a kind, "Yes, sirs: you may," and then received the verdict.

SHORT WILLS.-Apropos of Mr. Harriman's short, simple will, it is of interest to note that Lord Mansfield found half a sheet of note paper ample for the disposal of his wordly possessions. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen's will began and ended in thirteen words. A dozen lines served to dispose of Lord Russell of Killowen's estate of nearly £150,000, while Lord Brampton, of the Court of Exchequer, the brother of Anthony Hope, disposed of his estate of nearly £142,000 in 400 words.

LAWYERS' INCOMES IN NEW YORK. The income of the average New York lawyer is no greater than that of a patrolman or a tradesman's clerk, according to figures compiled by