success depended upon moving with a body large enough to accomplish results. Instead of this, he sent, to perform the most important work, bodies so small as to be unable to destroy bridges, when guarded by a few companies of infantry and a couple of guns. And the damage done appears to have all been repaired by the time the raiders got back to camp. Hooker's criticism in this instance is quite just: "On the 4th, the cavalry column, under Gen. Stoneman, commenced its return. One party of it, under Gen. Kilpatrick, crossed the Aquia and Richmond Railroad; and the fact that on the 5th, the cars carried the rebel wounded and our prisoners over the road to Richmond, will show to what extent the enemy's communications had been interrupted. An examination of the instructions Gen. Stoneman received, in connection with the official report of his operations, fully sustains me in saying that no officer ever made a greater mistake in construing his orders, and no one ever accomplished less in so doing. The effect of throwing his body of cavalry in the rear of the enemy, and on his communications, at the time it was in his power to have done it, can readily be estimated. But instead, that important arm of the army became crippled to an extent which seriously embarrassed me in my subsequent operations. Soon after, Gen. Stoneman applied for and obtained a sick-leave; and I requested that it might be indefinitely extended to him. It is charitable to suppose that Gens. Stoneman and Averell did not read their orders, and determined to carry on operations in conformity with their own views and inclinations." XXXVI. HOOKER'S RÉSUMÉ OF THE CAMPAIGN. EARLY two years after this campaign, in his testi NEARLY mony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker thus speaks about the general result of the movement: "I may say here, the battle of Chancellorsville has been associated with the battle of Fredericksburg, and has been called a disaster. My whole loss in the battle of Chancellorsville was a little over seventeen thousand." "I said that Chancellorsville had been called a disaster. I lost under those operations, one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, and one ambulance." "In my opinion, there is nothing to regret in regard to Chancellorsville, except to accomplish all I moved to accomplish. The troops lost no honor, except one corps, and we lost no more men than the enemy; but expectation was high, the army in splendid condition, and great results were expected from it. It was at a time, too, when the nation required a victory." "I would like to speak somewhat further of this matter of Chancellorsville. It has been the desire and aim of some of Gen. McClellan's admirers, and I do not know but of others, to circulate erroneous impressions in regard to it. When I returned from Chancellorsville, I felt that I had fought no battle; in fact, I had more men than I could use; and I fought no general battle, for the reason that I could not get my men in position to do so; probably not more than three or three and a half corps, on the right, were engaged in that fight." And he repeats his understanding of his manoeuvring as follows: "My impression was, that Lee would have been compelled to move out on the same road that Jackson had moved on, and pass over to my right. I should add in my testimony that before leaving Falmouth, to make this move, I had a million and a half of rations on board lighters, and had gunboats in readiness to tow them up to points on the Pamunkey River, in order to replenish my provisions, to enable me to reach Richmond before the enemy could, in case I succeeded in throwing him off that line of retreat. When I gave the order to Gen. Sedgwick, I expected that Lee would be whipped by manœuvre. I supposed that he would be compelled to march off on the same line that Jackson had. He would have been thrown on the Culpeper and Gordonsville road, placing me fifty or sixty miles nearer Richmond than himself." Criticism upon such an eccentric summing-up of the results of the campaign of Chancellorsville, is too unprofitable a task to reward the attempt. But assuredly the commander of the gallant Army of the Potomac stands alone in his measure of the importance of the movement, or of the disastrous nature of the defeat. XXXVII. SOME RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, NEAR CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 5, 1863. To the Commanding Officer, Confederate Forces, Chancellorsville, Va. I would most respectfully request the privilege of sending a burial-party on the field of Chancellorsville, to bury the dead, and care for the wounded officers and soldiers of my command. Very respectfully, etc., JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General Commanding. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, MAJOR-GEN. J. HOOKER, Commanding Army of the Potomac. -- General, I have had the honor to receive your letter of yesterday, requesting permission to send a burial-party to attend to your dead and wounded on the battle-field of Chancellorsville. I regret that their position is such, being immediately within our lines, that the necessities of war forbid my compliance with your request, which, under other circumstances, it would give me pleasure to grant. I will accord to your dead and wounded the same attention which I bestow upon my own; but, if there is any thing which your medical director here requires which we cannot provide, he shall have my permission to receive from you such medical supplies as you may think proper to furnish. Consideration for your wounded prompts me to add, that, from what I learn, their comfort would be greatly promoted by additional medical attendance and medical supplies. I have the honor to be, Respectfully, your obedient servant, R. E. LEE, General. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, HIS EXCELLENCY A. LINCOLN, President of the United States. Have this moment returned to camp. your telegrams of eleven A.M. and 12.30. On my way received The army had pre viously re-crossed the river, and was on its return to camp. As Not to exceed it had none of its trains of supplies with it, I deemed this advisable. Above, I saw no way of giving the enemy a general battle with the prospect of success which I desire. three corps, all told, of my troops have been engaged. For the whole to go in, there is a better place nearer at hand. Will write you at length to-night. Am glad to hear that a portion of the cavalry have at length turned up. One portion did nothing. JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General. MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER. EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C., My dear Sir,- The recent movement of your army is ended without effecting its object, except, perhaps, some important breakings of the enemy's communications. What next? If |