Congressional Decisions. It is the purpose of this book to state the decisions of judicial tribunals rather than of legislative bodies. Each of the latter being the judge of the election of its own members, their decisions do not form binding precedents for each other, nor are they regarded with the deference which courts pay to each other's decisions so as to form a rule. But the cases of contested elections in the House of Representatives sometimes referred to as forming exceptions to the doctrines laid down in the preceding pages, really recognize them. A notable case is that of Cessna v. Myers, the report in which dealt with persons described as "migratory "-whose labor or occupation takes them frequently from place to place. The contestant claimed that three classes of persons who voted for the sitting member were non-residents-persons who went into the district for the purpose of working on the railroad, students who went there solely to pursue their studies, and paupers-and that their votes were consequently illegal. The report says: "It is true that, as was remarked in the outset, a former residence continues until a new one is gained. But in determining the question whether a new one has been gained, the fact that everything which constituted the old one-dwelling house, personal presence, business relations, intent to remain-has been abandoned is a most significant fact." Here, as in other parts of the report, the intent to abandon the old domicile and make the new place of occupa tion the residence, is recognized, and the conclusion was that "where no other fact appears than that a person, otherwise qualified, came into the election district for the purpose of working on the railroad for an indefinite period, or until it should be completed, and voted at the election, it may or may not be that his residence was in the district." The reception of the vote by the election officers, and the failure of the contestant, upon whom was the burthen of proof, to show that the intention and the other facts did not exist, was held to warrant the counting of the votes. It is to be observed that the persons whose votes were questioned had been in the district a much longer time than requisite under the state constitution. So that the question was one of intention, and the decision was, in fact that, in that respect, a prima facie case had been made out, which was not negatived. It was decided by the House of Representatives in the case of Baldwin v. Trowbridge, 2 Bartlett, 46, that a law passed by the Michigan legislature, during the war, allowing soldiers from that state to vote while absent, in the place where they happened to be at the time of the election, was valid, so far as members of congress were concerned, notwithstanding the constitution of Michigan provides that the voter shall reside ten days "in the township or ward" in which he votes. The majority of the committee on elections argued that the legislature of a state may fix the place of the election of congressional representatives independently of the state constitution, and the argument was based on the fourth section of the first article of the United States constitution, which says: "The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosing senators." This was construed as making the legislative act regulating the election of representatives, paramount to the state constitution when there is a conflict between them. Although this doctrine was strictly confined in its application to the election of representatives in congress, it was strongly combated, and since then several states have amended their constitutions so as to enable voters, otherwise qualified, to vote while absent from the state in the military service. Statutory Provisions. The states all have statutes providing the machinery for the general and local elections, and regulating, in detail, the manner of conducting them and determining the result. In most of these particulars they are substantially alike, but in some of the states rules are prescribed for construing the term residence as used in the constitutions. They are in accordance with the principles laid down in the preceding chapter. Thus in Ohio the statute defines residence as the place which one adopts as such with the present intention of remaining for an indefinite time, and not for some temporary object. If he has been absent, it must have been for some temporary purpose, with no intention of changing the residence or remaining away, and with the intention of returning. The additional test is provided in this state that the place where the family of a married man resides shall be regarded as his residence.1 In Kansas the voter, upon being challenged for want of residence, is required to swear to the same facts as constitute a residence in Ohio; if he has been absent, that while away, he regarded Kansas as his home, and did not vote in any other state or territory, and, as to his residence in the town in which he offers to vote, that he went there to make it his "home," and has been an "actual resident" therein for thirty days.2 The statutes of Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska and Oregan, contain substantially the same provisions. 4 5 6 . The language of some of the provisions, is, however, peculiar. Thus in the Kentucky statute, the "habitation" of a person is declared to be his voting residence, and it is provided that either removal to another state with the intention of residing there an indefinite time, or voting there though there be an intention to return, works a forfeiture of residence. The place where a mar 1. Revised Statutes of Ohio, Vol. I., page 770. 4. Statutes of Minnesota, 1878, 50. 5. General Statutes of Nebraska, 1873, 360. 6. General Statutes of Oregon, 1872, 568. ried man's family resides, unless temporarily, “is generally considered his residence," and if he transacts business in a place different from that in which his family lives, the latter is his residence. In Nebraska also, the residence is defined by statute to be the place in which the "habitation" of a person is found, and there is a proviso that, in all cases, six months "consecutive residence in the state shall be necessary to establish a residence." In Connecticut four months residence is necessary to entitle the party to registration.1 In Georgia the voter may be compelled to swear that he has lived in the state six months and "claimed it as his home."2 In Delaware the rule for determining the voter's residence is declared by the statute to be that removal to another state, or from one place to another within the state, with the intention of remaining at the place of removal an indefinite time, as a place of present domicile, shall forfeit residence notwithstanding "a floating intention to return at some future period."3 In Maine and Massachusetts the statute, without prescribing any mode for determining state residence, provides, as to wards in cities, that if the voter removes into a ward, in Maine within thirty days, and in Massachu 1. Revised Statutes of Connecticut, 1866. 2. Code of Georgia, 1873, 1306. 3. Code of Delaware, 1874, page 103. |