in Minnesota, where it was sought to invalidate an election held for the removal of a county, because, although a majority of those who voted were for the removal, they did not constitute a majority of all the registered voters in the county. It was held that this was unnecessary. A majority of those voting was sufficient. 1 And this may be stated to be the generally accepted doctrine in the absence of an express provision to the contrary. Angell & Ames on Corp., § 499-500; Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Monroe, 526; People v. Warfield, 20 Illinois, 163; People v. Gamer, 47 Ill., 246; People v. Wiant, 48 Ill., 263; Bridgeport v. Railroad, 15 Conn., 475; State v. The Mayor, 37 Mo., 272; and St. Joseph Twp. v. Rogers, 16 Wallace, 644, are among the authorities sustaining the doctrine that the requirement of a statute, providing for the election of officers or the decision of a question by popular vote, that a "majority of the voters" shall be necessary, is satisfied if a majority of all who take part in the election vote for any one candidate or for the propo * * * shall provide by general law for township organization, under which any county may organize whenever a majority of the legal voters of such county, voting at any general election, shall so determine.' The language admits of but one meaning, and that is imperative in its operation, and therefore it seems to me quite clear that to adopt the township organization there must be an affirmative vote of a majority of all the legal voters voting at the general election; and therefore, as the affirmative vote on the question submitted was less than a majority of all the legal voters, voting at the general election, the proposition to adopt township organization was defeated.” * * 1. Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn., 107; Bayard v. Klinge, 16 Minn., 249 ; Everett v. Smith, 22 Minn., 63. sition. It is not necessary that a majority of all legal voters in the district to which the election refers shall vote affirmatively, if the election be fairly held and all are afforded the option of voting. Where there is no constitutional or statutory provision requiring a majority to elect, a plurality is sufficient.1 Elections by a Minority. The case of Commonwealth v. Read, 2 Ashmead (Pa.), 261, decided that, if a quorum of a body authorized to elect an officer, be present, a minority of the vote, and.. even a single vote, cast in a legal manner, will prevail over the majority illegally cast, and if the majority decline to vote, the minority who do vote will elect. The question arose under a law of Pennsylvania authorizing the city and county board to elect a city treasurer by ballot. The board met, a quorum was present, and a majority adopted a motion to vote viva voce. The minority voted in this way under protest, with the exception of one member, who tendered a ballot and then retired. The court held that all the votes cast viva voce were illegal and could avail neither of the candidates for whom they were cast, and that if the jury were satisfied that the single legal ballot was received, the person for whom it was cast was entitled to the office. The number of legal votes cast is not conclusive upon the question of a 1. Cooley's Const. Lim., 619, 620; Augustin v. Eggleston, 12 La. An. 366. quorum; that may be shown by other proof. The court referred to the rule in the case of Rex v. Foxcroft, 2 Barr, 1017, decided in 1760, as applicable. There the elective body consisted of twenty-five, and out of this number twenty-one assembled; nine of these persons voted for Thomas Seagrave as town clerk; but twelve of them did not vote at all, and eleven protested against any election at that time. The question arising whether Seagrave was or was not elected, it was held by the Court of King's Bench that he was duly chosen; that the protesting electors had no way to stop the election, when once entered on, but by voting for some other person than Seagrave, or at least against him, and that whenever electors are present, and do not vote at all, they virtually acquiesce in the election made by those who do. Again, it has been held that if the corporate assembly be duly convened, and the majority vote for an unqualified person, after notice that he is not qualified, their votes are thrown away, and the person having the next majority, and not disqualified, is duly elected. (1 Willcock on Corporations, § 547; Claridge v. Evelyn, 5 Barn. & Ald., 81.) "If the majority of those present either refuse to vote, or vote in a manner different from that prescribed by law, (as by voting viva voce when the law requires them to vote by ballot,) we are of the opinion that a minority, composed even of a single member, is sufficient to make an election, and that consequently the presence of a quorum, when such an election is said to have taken place, is not required to be proved by the legal vote actually given, but may be established by other proof, etc. * * In all our public elections, those who neglect or refuse to vote according to law, are bound by the votes of those who do vote, no matter how small a minority those who vote are of the whole constituency." But in this connection see Regina v. Guardians of St. Martin's, 5 Eng. L. & Eq., 361. When Want of Notice Invalidates. In the case of Bolton v. Good, 12 Vroom, N. J. Rep., the relator asked leave to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto, to test the right of Good to hold an office to which the relator claimed to have been elected. The office contended for was that of city judge, who, under the city charter, was to be chosen every third year by the votes of the people, at the same time as the municipal officers were chosen. It appeared from the statement of the case, that as a question of law, there was some doubt as to whether a vacancy existed in the office at the time the relator claimed to have been elected, but that, as a matter of fact, the notice of election published, as required by the charter, did not name the office of city judge as among those to be voted for. The people, therefore, had no official information of the fact, and but twenty-nine, out of a poll of over eight hundred votes, were cast for city judge. The election officers refused to return these votes. It was held that this refusal was proper, and that votes cast by a few persons for an office, when the people have no official notification, and therefore, no presumable knowledge that an office is to be filled, can confer no title to the office. The same result, under similar circumstances, was reached in Foster v. Scarff, 15 Ohio S., 532. A vacancy was to be filled, notice of the election was not given, and a few votes only were cast for a single candidate. The court held the election void, and said: "We do not intend to hold, nor are we of opinion, that the notice by proclamation, as prescribed by law is per se, and in all supposable cases, necessary to the validity of an election; if such were the law it would always be in the power of a ministerial officer by his malfeasance to prevent a legal election. We have no doubt, that where an election is held in other respects, as prescribed by law and notice in fact is brought home to the great body of the electors, though derived through means other than the proclamation which the law prescribes, such election would be valid. But where, as in this case, there was no notice either by proclamation or in fact, and it is obvious that the great body of electors were misled for want of the official proclamation, its absence becomes such an irregularity as prevents an actual choice by the electors, prevents an actual election in the primary sense of the word, and renders invalid any semblance of an election which may have been attempted by a few, and which must operate, if it operate at all, as a surprise and fraud upon the rights of the many.' The case of People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y., 339, which |