lest ill-considered hostile demonstrations should interrupt negotiations and disappoint our hopes of peace.

On April 26th General Huerta accepted mediation and appointed delegates. The mediators, with representatives of General Huerta and of the United States, met at Niagara in Canada on May 20th. The mediators invited General Carranza to participate in the proceedings by appointing and sending delegates, and asked both parties to proclaim an armistice. The Huertista delegates appeared and General Huerta declared an armistice in accordance with the request of the mediators. General Carranza did not send delegates nor did he consent to an armistice. Notwithstanding this fact, the representatives of the three powers, of General Huerta and of the United States met in conference. The incident of the flag seems to have been brushed aside, and larger measures of a kind to restore order were considered. General Huerta agreed to withdraw as President and thus open the way for settlement. General Carranza, however, was unwilling and continues so at the present writing to send delegates or to participate in a conference which would discuss the internal conditions of Mexico, as he regards such questions as matters solely for the people of Mexico to determine. He has been, however, willing to discuss the flag incident and to make adequate reparation, as the constitutional President of Mexico.

It cannot be said, however, that the labors of the mediators have been in vain, for a continuation of hostilities between the United States, on the one hand, and General Huerta and his supporters, on the other, has been prevented, and a protocol, agreed to by the representatives of the United States and of General Huerta, was drawn up and signed by the mediators and the delegates on June 24, 1914. This protocol is as follows:

Article 1.-The provisional government referred to in the protocol No. 3 shall be constituted by agreement of the delegates representing the parties between which the internal struggle in Mexico is taking place.

Article 2.-(a) Upon the constitution of the provisional government in the City of Mexico the Government of the United States of America will recognize it immediately, and thereupon diplomatic relations between the two countries will be restored.

(b) The Government of the United States of America will not in any form whatsoever claim a war indemnity or other international satisfaction.

(c) The provisional government will proclaim an absolute amnesty to all foreigners for any and all close political offenses committed during the period of civil war in Mexico.

(d) The provisional government will negotiate for the constitution of international

commissions for the settlement of the claims of foreigners on account of damages sustained during the period of civil war, as a consequence of military acts or the acts of national authorities.

Article 3.-The three mediating governments agree on their part to recognize the provisional government organized as provided by section 1 of this protocol.

As far as the United States and General Huerta's government are concerned, the differences between them appear to be adjusted. The internal questions are relegated to the Mexicans for such decision as they may deem proper to take. The mediators therefore adjourned on June 30th, in order to allow the representatives of the contending Mexican factions to come together and agree upon terms acceptable to them, with the understanding that the mediators will reassemble in order to put the agreements into formal and final shape. Whether the adjournment is temporary or sine die, it is impossible to say at present. In any event there appears to be no immediate prospect of a resumption of hostilities against General Huerta's government, and representatives of Latin America have been called into conference to settle American controversies.

THE ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT

From time to time the Platt Amendment is referred to as indicating the policy which the United States should adopt toward the Latin American states in and bordering on the Caribbean Sea and to the north of the Panama Canal. In view of this fact, it seems proper to state the origin and nature of the amendment, the purposes for which it was devised, and the interpretation put upon it by the United States and accepted by Cuba, so as to see whether the amendment is capable of a larger usefulness in the field of international relations.

It frequently happens that persons in public life are credited with projects which they did not originate, and naturally so, as the superior must needs accept responsibility for a line of conduct which he carries out, even although it may have been proposed in the first instance by a subordinate. The authorship is merged in the result. This is necessarily so in questions of administration. It should not be so in questions of policy outlined by the head of a department, either as regards the President, whose approval is necessary, or as regards Congress, whose action is required for legislation.

The so-called Platt Amendment is a striking example of this. It was thought out by Mr. Root as Secretary of War. It was contained

in all its essentials in Secretary Root's letter of instructions, dated February 9, 1901,1 to General Wood, the Military Governor of Cuba. This important document, which gives in detail the reasons for the proposed amendment, was submitted by President McKinley to his cabinet and approved by the President and his advisers, and thus approved, was handed by President McKinley, in the presence of the Secretary of War, to the late Senator Orville H. Platt, of Connecticut, to be introduced into Congress and incorporated in the legislation required for the transfer of Cuba to its people. Senator Platt introduced the amendment, as requested, and it is attached as a proviso to the act of March 2, 1901, entitled "An act making appropriation for the army for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and two."

The amendment was formally communicated by the Military Governor, acting under instructions of the War Department, to the Cuban convention, then in session, assembled to draft a constitution for the young republic, and it was briefly and officially interpreted by Mr. Root as Secretary of War in a despatch, dated April 3, 1901, to the Military Governor and by him communicated to a committee of the constitutional convention. On June 12, 1901, the amendment was adopted, in expressis verbis, by the convention as an appendix to the constitution. The constitution was promulgated, with the amendment as an integral part thereof, and went into force on May 20, 1902. The Military Governor transferred the government of Cuba to its people on May 20, 1902; the American army of occupation withdrew on the afternoon of the same day; and on May 22, 1903, a treaty was concluded between Cuba and the United States, incorporating the Platt Amendment, in expressis verbis, which, approved by the Senate, was proclaimed as the law of the land on July 2, 1904.

It is believed that the sequence of events thus briefly stated shows that the amendment originated in the War Department; that its author was the then Secretary of War, Mr. Root; and that Senator Platt, possessing the confidence of the administration, introduced the amendment which bears his name, an amendment thought out, drafted, and incorporated in the Cuban constitution by the initiative and skill, the wisdom and foresight of Mr. Root when Secretary of War. It is not the purpose of the present comment, however, to question the services rendered by Senator Platt, but it seems eminently proper to state, by way of introduction, that the amendment, which bears his honored name-and 1 See Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, 1899-1903, pp. 187 et seq.

properly enough, because it was introduced by him as an amendment to the Army bill-was nevertheless the work of Mr. Root.

But to return to the subject in hand. The determination of the United States that Cuba should be free and independent was stated in clear and unmistakable terms in the joint resolution of Congress, approved by President McKinley April 20, 1898, authorizing him to use the land and naval forces of the United States against Spain, and the authorization was coupled with an express disclaimer to acquire the island which the army and navy of the United States were to free from Spain. The relevant portions of the resolutions are:

First, that the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent. *

Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island.

As a result of the use of the land and naval forces of the United States for the purposes set forth in the joint resolution, Spain was forced to renounce any and all claims to Cuba, and in the first article of the treaty signed December 10, 1898, between the two countries, commonly called the Treaty of Paris, Spain "relinquishes all claims of sovereignty over and title to Cuba." The island was taken in trust by the United States for the people of Cuba and was occupied by the armed forces of the United States until such time as reforms had been made, a constitution framed, and a government organized of a kind to justify the United States in withdrawing its army and transferring the government of the island to its people.

As this period was approaching, the Secretary of War, within whose jurisdiction the island lay, considered the terms upon which the transfer could be made and the conditions upon which the independence and prosperity of Cuba would depend in the future, as it seemed evident that Cuba might not be able to maintain its independence without a guarantee thereof on the part of the United States. Mr. Root considered, as stated in his instructions, dated February 9, 1901, to the Military Governor, that the government should be one "based upon the peaceful suffrages of the people of Cuba, representing the entire people and holding their power from the people, and subject to the limitations and safeguards which the experience of constitutional government has shown to be necessary to the preservation of individual rights." After stating the traditional policy of the United States that we "would not under any circumstances permit any foreign power other

than Spain to acquire possession of the island of Cuba," he then said that

The United States has, and always will have, the most vital interest in the preservation of the independence which she has secured for Cuba, and in preserving the people of that island from the domination and control of any foreign power whatever. The preservation of that independence by a country so small as Cuba-so incapable, as she must always be, to contend by force against the great powers of the worldmust depend upon her strict performance of international obligations, upon her giving due protection to the lives and property of the citizens of all other countries within her borders, and upon her never contracting any public debt which in the hands of the citizens of foreign powers shall constitute an obligation she is unable to meet. The United States has, therefore, not merely a moral obligation arising from her destruction of Spanish authority in Cuba, and the obligations of the treaty of Paris for the establishment of a stable and adequate government in Cuba, but it has a substantial interest in the maintenance of such a government.

We are placed in a position where, for our own protection, we have, by reason of expelling Spain from Cuba, become the guarantors of Cuban independence and the guarantors of a stable and orderly government protecting life and property in that island. Fortunately the condition which we deem essential for our own interests is the condition for which Cuba has been struggling, and which the duty we have assumed toward Cuba on Cuban grounds and for Cuban interests requires. It would be a most lame and impotent conclusion if, after all the expenditure of blood and treasure by the people of the United States for the freedom of Cuba and by the people of Cuba for the same object, we should, through the constitution of the new government, by inadvertence or otherwise, be placed in a worse condition in regard to our own vital interests than we were while Spain was in possession, and the people of Cuba should be deprived of that protection and aid from the United States which is necessary to the maintenance of their independence.

Mr. Root then proceeded to state the conditions essential to the establishment of law and order in Cuba, upon the acceptance of which the United States could properly base its guarantee of the independence of Cuban sovereignty. He said:

The people of Cuba should desire to have incorporated in her fundamental law provisions in substance as follows:

1. That no government organized under the constitution shall be deemed to have authority to enter into any treaty or engagement with any foreign power which may tend to impair or interfere with the independence of Cuba, or to confer upon such foreign power any special right or privilege without the consent of the United States. 2. That no government organized under the constitution shall have authority to assume or contract any public debt in excess of the capacity of the ordinary revenues of the island after defraying the current expenses of government to pay the interest. 3. That upon the transfer of the control of Cuba to the government established under the new constitution Cuba consents that the United States reserve and retain the right of intervention for the preservation of Cuban independence and the main