possession does not pass from Thompson & Duncan until this note and interest is paid in full, and the said Thompson & Duncan can have full power to declare this note due and take possession of said seeder, No. 3096, at any time they may deem themselves insecure, even before maturity of said note." Hetd, that the instrument was not a negotiable promissory note, and that defendant could set up a failure of consideration therefor as a defense. See Third Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 25 Minn. 531; Broughton v. Sherman, 21 id. 431. Even in the case of negotiable instruments the better doctrine would seem to be that a partial want or failure of consideration may be shown in defense in an action upon them in the hands of the original holder, or of those who stand in his shoes. Harrington v. Stratton, 22 Pick. 510. But whatever may be the rule in case of negotiable instruments, it is well established that a partial want or failure of consideration, as through a breach of warranty, may properly be pleaded and proven in defense by way of reduction of the damages recoverable upon a non-negotiable contract or in

usury, and derived no benefit from it, the plea of usury must be overruled. That A. was to be regarded as the lender of the money, although B. failed to disclose his principal and took the notes in his own name. That plaintiff could still recover though B. be regarded as the lender, since the substitution of the new security purged the loan of the taint of usury in his hands as an innocent assignee. That the statutes of Iowa relative to usury have not modified the foregoing rules of law. U. S. Circ. Ct., April, 1881. Palmer v. Call. Opinion by McCrary, C. J. (7 Fed. Rep. 737.)

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

USURY TAKING BY AGENT NOT IMPUTABLE TO PRINCIPAL WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE - SUBSTITUTED OB

LIGATION TO INNOCENT PARTY. - (1) If an agent in good faith makes a loan for another and without the knowledge or authority of his principal, and for the agent's own benefit exacts more than legal interest, the loan is not thereby rendered usurious. Tyler on Usury, 103; Condit v. Baldwin, 21 N. Y. 219; Lloyd v. Scott, 4 Pet. 205; U. S. Bank v. Waggener, 9 id. 378; Jones v. Berryhill, 25 Iowa, 289; Dagnall v. Wigley, 11 East, 43; Solarte v. Melville, 7 Barn. & Cress. 430; Coster v. Dilworth, 8 Cow. 299; Smith v. Marvin, 27 N. Y. 137; Bell v. Day, 32 id. 165; Baxter v. Buck, 10 Vt. 548; Muir v. Newark Ins. Co., 16 N. J. Eq. 537; Conover v. Van Mater, 18 id. 486; Rogers v. Buckingham, 33 Conn. 81; Hopkins v. Baker, 2 P. H. (Va.) 110; Gokey v. Knapp, 44 Iowa, 32; Wyllis v. Ault, 46 id. 46; the result summed up in 17 Alb. LJ. 116; Barretto v. Snowden, 5 Wend. 181. (2) Where a usurious obligation is passed for value to an innocent purchaser without notice of the usury, who afterward takes a new and substitute security for the debt, there being no taint of usury in the second transaction, the plea of usury to the substituted obligation cannot be sustained. Powell v. Waters, 8 Cow. 669; Kent v. Walton, 7 Wend. 257; Dix v. Van Wyck, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 522; Smedburg v. Simpson, 2 Sandf. 87; Smedburg v. Whittlesey, 3 Sand.Ch. 323; Smalley v. Doughty, 6 Bosw. 66; Houghton v. Payne, 26 Conn. 396; Brown v. Waters, 2 Ch. Cas. 209; Bearce v. Barstow, 9 Mass. 45; Campbell v. McHarg, 9 Iowa, 357; Wendlebone v. Parks, 18 id. 546. (3) A. placed $10,000 in B.'s hands to loan. B. made the loan to the defendant, giving him $8,000, retaining $2,000 as commission, and receiving in his own name defendant's note for $10,000, with semi-annual interest notes of $500 each. B. retained custody of the notes, but recognized them as the property of A., who received the interest, but knew nothing of the usury, and gave B. no authority to retain any bonus out of the sum loaned, or take more than legal interest therefor. The plaintiff purchased the notes in good faith at their face value without knowledge of the usury in the original loan, and afterward, through B. & Co., made a new contract with the defendant by which he advanced him $1,000, surrendered the note, and received from him the note now in suit for $11.000. Plaintiff did not know that B. & Co. retained $500 of the $1,000 he advanced as commission for procuring the re-loan. The defense of usury being set up in suit to foreclose the mortgage given to secure the note, held, that as neither A. nor the plaintiff had any knowledge of the

it. Held, (reversing the decision of Bacon, V. C., 43 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 470) that the plaintiff had no copyright in the title "Splendid Misery;" that the want of evidence as to invention, by the author, of the title of the plaintiff's story would itself have been sufficient to disentitle the plaintiff to relief; that there must be something original in a work in order to give the author any copyright in it, and that inasmuch as the title of the book had been used before, it could not be said that the author of the plaintiff's story had originated its title. Semble, that there can be no copyright in the title of a book, but that in the case of a taking of the title of another man's book for the purpose of passing off the second book as the work of the author of the former book, an action will lie on the ground of fraud. Weldon v. Dicks (39 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 467; L. R., 10 Ch. Div. 247), overruled, so far as it decided that there was copyright in title of a book, but approved so far as it decided that there might be a trade-mark in such title. Ct. Appeal May 24, 1881. Dicks v. Yates. Opinions by Jessel, M. R., and James and Lush, L. JJ., 44 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 660.

DEED

RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF PREMISES-NOTICE OF COLLATERAL DEED CONTAINING COVENANTS. — A conveyance in fee of building land was made to a purchaser, subject to a restrictive covenant contained in a collateral deed binding the purchaser and his assigus not to erect upon the land any building other than a private dwelling-house. The land was afterward leased, and the lessee erected upon it a corrugated iron building as an art studio for ladies. Held, in an action by the original vendor, against the lessee, that the erection was an infringement of the covenant, as being in no way appurtenant to a private dwelling-house, and that any representation by the lessor to the lessee that there was no restrictive covenant, did not protect the lessee from being affected with constructive notice of the lessor's title. A purchaser who has notice of a deed which necessarily affects the vendor's title has notice of the contents of such deed, and is not excused from the consequences of not having examined it by reason of the vendor having, in answer to inquiries, represented that the deed did not prejudicially affect the property to be conveyed; but notice of a deed which does not necessarily affect the property to be conveyed, e. g., of a marriage settlement, is not constructive notice of the contents of the deed if the purchaser is told at the same time that such deed does not affect the property to be conveyed. Dictum of Turner, L. J., in Wilson v. Hart, 14 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 499; L. R., 1 Ch. App. 463, observed upon. Cases referred to,

Jones v. Smith, 1 Harr. 43; Carter v. Williams, L. R., 9 Eq 678: Cole v. Sims, 22 L. T. Rep. 132, 277; Talk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774. Ch. Div., May 13, 1881. Putman v. Harland. Opinion by Jessel, M. R., 44 L. T. Rep. (N.S.) 728.

NUISANCE -MAINTENANCE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE HOSPITAL BY PUBLIC BOARD. - The appellants, a body duly constituted under the Metropolitan Poor Act, 1867, pursuant to an order of the local government board, and under the powers given them by that act, built a hospital which they used for the reception of persons suffering from smallpox and other infectious diseases. The respondents, who were the owners and occupiers of land adjacent to the hospital, brought an action against the appellants, alleging that the hospital was so constructed as to be a nuisance to them, and the jury found that it was so in fact. Held (affirming the judgment of the court below) that as the act did not authorize any interference with private rights, nor necessarily require any thing to be done under it which might not be done without causing a nuisance, the fact that the appellants had acted bona fide in discharge of their duties under the act, and in pursuance of the orders of the local government board, was no defense to the action. Cases referred to, Rex v. Pease, 4 B. & Ad. 30; Hammersmith R. Co. v. Brand, L. R., 4 H. of L. 171; Rex v. Burnett, 4 M. & S. 272; Barnes v. Baker, 1 Ambl. 158; Anonymous, 3 Atk. 750; Rex v. Sutton, 4 Burr. 2116; Rex v. Vantandillo, 4 M. & S. 73; Clowes v. Staffordshire W. Co., L. R., 8 Ch. 126. House of Lords, March 7, 1881. Managers of Metropolitan Asylums District v. Hill. Opinions by Lord Chancellor Selborue and Lords Blackburne and Watson, 44 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 653.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-BEFORE LITIGATION,

BETWEEN SOLICITOR AND SURVEYOR CONSULTED BY HIM NOT PRIVILEGED. - Where a solicitor is consulted by a client in a matter as to which no dispute has arisen, and applies to a surveyor or other third party for information necessary that the solicitor may give legal advice to the client, the communications between the solicitor and third party are not privileged from discovery in legal proceedings subsequently commenced by or against the client. By their affidavit of documents the defendants stated that they objected to produce some of the documents set forth in the second part of the first schedule, on the ground that they consisted of confidential correspondence between their former solicitors and their present solicitors, and their former estate agent and surveyor and their present estate agent and surveyor. Held (reversing the decision of Bacon, V. C.), that the defendants must produce the correspondence, except such, if any, as the defendants should state by affidavit to have been prepared confidentially after the dispute had arisen between the plaintiff and defendants, and for the purpose of obtaining evidence and legal advice for the purpose of the action. Wilson v. Northampton & Banbury Junction R. Co., 27 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 507; L. R., 14 Eq. 477, observed upon. Ct. of App., April 6, 1881. Wheeler v. La Marchant. Opinions by Jessel, M. R., and Brett and Cotton, L. JJ., 44 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 682.

The Association will reconvene at three o'clock P. M., when the following will be the order:

Annual Address. Hon. Stanley Matthews, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Report of the Committee on Prizes. John I. Gilbert, Chairman.

Essays will be read by members of the Association, as follows: William M. Ivins, of New York, subject: "Municipal Government;" Nathaniel C. Moak, of Albany, subject: Experts and Expert Testimony; Richard L. Hand, of Elizabethtown, subject: "Some Thoughts on the Law of Agency;" J. H. Hopkins, of "A Glance at Certain Rights, Rochester, subject: State and National;" Sheldon T. Viele, of Buffalo, subject: "State Legislation and Charity Organization," and others upon subjects to be announced.

All members of the Bar are invited to attend the afternoon session.

At half-past six o'clock P. M., the annual dinner will be had at the Kenmore Hotel.

Tickets may be procured at the Kenmore Hotel. By order of the Committee of Arrangements. PEYTON F. MILLER, Chairman.

CHARLES J. BUCHANAN, Secretary.

WILLIAMSON'S BOOK OF DEEDS.

The Book of Deeds, containing Forms of Deed for each State and Territory, with full acknowledgments for husband and wife. By Edward H. Williamson, conveyancer, compiler of the "Synopsis of Testamentary Laws." F. & J. W. Johnson & Co., Philadelphia, 1881. Pp. 119. WELL printed and apparently well constructed manual. In giving a form for this State, what is called a 66 fee simple deed "is set forth, -a full covenant deed. This form is very little used in our State, It is a simple warranty deed being the most common. impossible to judge of the merits of such a book by merely looking over its pages, but if it is accurately compiled it will prove of considerable practical value.

Pocock's LAW OF COSTS.

The Principles of the Law of Costs under the Judicature Acts. By William Archbutt Pocock, Esq., of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. London: Reeves and Turner, 1881. Pp. XV, 144.

This is a very concise and well arranged manual of the new English law of costs, containing the orders and rules, with citations and quotations from opinions. It must be valuable to the practitioners for whom it is designed.

LYON AND REDMAN'S BILLS OF SALE.

The Law of Bills of Sale, with an Appendix of Precedents and Statutes. Third edition. By George Edward Lyon and Joseph Haworth Redman, of the Middle Temple. Esquires, Barristers-at-Law, joint authors of "A Concise View of the Law of Landlord and Tenant." London: Reeves and Turner, 1881. Pp. xxii, 277.

We commended this work on the appearance of the second edition. See 16 Alb. L. J. 123. The work is

revised and partly re-written. The demand for it is a demonstration of its merits. It seems a very convenient and trustworthy manual, of principal interest of course to English lawyers.

CORRESPONDENCE.

KANSAS PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAW.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Hon. E. J. Phelps, in his address to the American Bar Association, says: "The laws relating to the trade in intoxicating liquors have occupied a large and increasing share of the attention of Legislatures." But he does not mention the late laws on the subject in Kansas.

We had thought that the liquor laws of Kansas were among the most prohibitory in the country. In November, 1880, an amendment to the Constitution was adopted by the people as follows: "The manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors shall be forever prohibited in this State, except for medical, scientific and mechanical purposes." The Legislature at the session of 1881, passed "An act to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, except for medical, scientific and mechanical purposes, and to regulate the manufacture and sale thereof for such excepted purposes. "By the act a druggist may obtain a permit for selling for the excepted purposes by giving a bond for $2,500, conditioned "that he will neither use, sell, barter nor give away any of the liquors." A manufacturer for the excepted purposes must give a bond of $10,000, conditioned "that for any violation of the provisions of this act said bond shall be forfeited." The act also provides that "all places where intoxicating liquors are manufactured, sold, bartered or given away in violation of this act, or where intoxicating liquors are kept for sale, barter or use in violation of this act, are hereby declared to be common nuisances." Every person who shall by the gift, sale or barter of intoxicating liquors cause the intoxication of any person or persons, shall be liable for and compelled to pay a reasonable compensation to any person who may take charge of and provide for such intoxicated person, and $5 per day in addition thereto for every day such person shall be kept in consequence of intoxication, to be recovered by civil action in any court having jurisdiction."

This law is enforced all over the State except in three or four of the largest towns. There is a strong sentiment in favor of appointing a State constabulary to enforce the law everywhere. It was perhaps an oversight in the president of the association that he did not notice this law.

OTTAWA, Kansas, September 5, 1881.

F. W.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

T. P. H. of Le Roy, N. Y, is referred to sections 158, 159 and 147, Code Criminal Procedure, for an answer to his query on page 180, vol. 24, Alb. L. J. Respectfully yours.

JAMES A. DOUGLAS. DELHI, N. Y., September 5, 1881.

THE

NOTES.

Kentucky Law Journal for September — its third number- contains six original leading arti cles contributed by members of the bench and bar. Among them we read with special interest one by Mr. Charles B. Seymour, on Digests and Indexes. The writer says: "It is not appropriate to omit a decision on negligence from the head 'Negligence' and put it under the head Telegraph,' because the negligence was committed by a telegraph operator. As some reviewer says, 'a decision on larceny ought not to be put under the title 'cow,' because that animal was the thing stolen.'" We cannot assent to this. "Telegraph" is an important and independent topic in a digest, and cases of negligence in respect to telegrams should be placed under it, with only a cross reference under "Negligence." The same is true of "Carriers" and "Negligence." Judge Buckner contributes an important article on the Law of Murder; Mr. George M. Davie one entitled "Are Parents and Children liable to support each other?" and Hon. Walter Evans one on Separate Estates of Married Women in Land. We think the editor, in an article entitled "The Authorship of the Codes of Practice," puts it too strongly when he says: "Most lawyers have a vague idea that the New York Code was evolved entirely from the master mind of Mr. David Dudley Field, and that all our other American Codes are but slightly altered copies of that famous statute. But although Mr. Field is certainly entitled to much credit for his able and vigorous efforts to carry into effect the great pleading and practice reforms embodied in our Codes, their main features had long before received elaborate discussion in England and were quite familiar to wellinformed lawyers there and in this country. Except as to some minor details, Mr. Field's work was not creative, but collative. That he should be generally accorded the sole credit of creating the Code of New York, merely because he had a main share in framing it, is absurd. But it is a fact, and well illustrates the popular fallacy that every effect is to be ascribed to but one cause, whereas every effect has really an infinite number of causes. The substance of the New York Code was the work of a generation of lawyers-not of any one man." So far as we know Mr. Field's voice was the earliest raised on this continent in favor of codification. Certainly it was so raised half a century At all events, although Mr. Field in preparing the New York Code had associates, yet it is not correct to say that this work was "collative." There was nothing to "collate." It was the first formularization. It was a work of construction and creation, so far as the expression of the principles goes. The "minor details" consisted in making the first statute on this subject, ab ovo. It remains to this day essentially the. best ever made, so far as it went, and all other Codes in this country, so far as we know, sprang from it.

ago.

The Albany Evening Times contains the most frequent and the most intelligent remarks upon legal topics of any of the newspapers that come to our notice. -The Journal of Jurisprudence and Scottish Law Magazine, for September, contains interesting articles on Liability for Dogs, and Unpopularity of Lawyers. It does us the honor to copy our recent article on Cicero. - Mr. Peachy R. Grattan, the venerable reporter of the Virginia Court of Appeals is dead.

States is lying dead at the hand of an assassin. The career of President Garfield illustrates the contrasts and the possibilities of American life. The canal boy became the President. The hero who passed unscathed through the fiery storm of Chickamauga, died on the anniversary of that battle by a bullet from the pistol of a cowardly fanatic. Mr. Garfield's character was typical of all that is best in morals and intellect. Scholar, statesman, hero, christian; mingled strength and sweetness; honesty, modesty, candor, magnanimity, cheerfulness, courage, patience; the powers of a man, the gentleness of a woman; as wise as the serpent, as harmless as the dove;

"His strength was as the strength of ten,
Because his heart was pure."

What a precious legacy is this life to his country! Here is a career that may be pointed to with unmixed pride. His fame is secure. His name will be associated with the names of Washington and Lincoln. His family will be the tender care of the nation. Blessings and honor upon his memory! Undying gratitude for his example !

This event affords the most shocking reflections and the gloomiest fears to every good citizen, disconnected from the love and sympathy which the whole country have borne toward the victim. It shows how weak are all civil defenses against disorder, and how the wild beast in man is more dangerous than the wild beast without. The recent vile attempt to assassinate the assassin, and the mutterings of vengeance heard on every hand are evidences that the restraints of society are flimsy at best, and that the spirit of revenge that inspired the crime against the President is too rife in the organized community, and only needs occasion to bring it out. Men must learn that revenge is not justice; it is the grossest injustice. "Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord." While society will crush the reptile that stung the President, all must be done with calmness, deliberation, dignity and order. Those who would usurp the office of Justice must equally perish by her sword.

The annual meeting of the New York State Bar Association, in this city, on the 20th inst., was attended by some forty lawyers. (Let none of our lay brethren make any irreverent remarks upon the singular correspondence of the number with that of the heroes of a favorite tale of our childhood.) The attendance was highly respectable if not numerous. Very properly, on account of the death of the PresiVor 24-No. 13

241

dent, no business was transacted except that of indispensable routine, and the papers and the annual address were handed in, without reading, to be printed in the annual report. We shall publish Mr. Moak's essay on Experts and Expert Testimony, next week. This week we give much of our space to Mr. Justice Matthews' address. We regret that we could not have listened to it from the lips of the accomplished author. But we have carefully read the address, and feel sure that it will amply repay others for their reading. It is full of just and suggestive thoughts, couched in felicitous phraseology. It arrays some cogent reasons why the bar should not go out of business. The author's tribute to Henry Stanbery-an Ohio man, of course - is an eloquent and touching passage. The only fault we have to find with the address is confined to the opening paragraph. It was scarcely necessary for Mr. Justice Matthews to assure his audience that he did

not invite himself to deliver this address. But why he should have feared "the perils of criticism," or what are the secret reasons why he desired to "face the representatives of the bar of this great imperial State," or why he should have deemed it necessary to remind us that he claimed "the gracious courtesies of our hospitality," and deprecated "malice and uncharitableness," we cannot conceive. So far as we know, there never has been any unjust or unkind criticism of the eminent gentleman, in this State. Some of us have thought his talents better adapted to the bar than the bench, and that Ohio had her share of representation on the ultimate Federal bench before his appointment, and have fearlessly and urgently said so. But nothing of personal unkindness or depreciation, and all in admiration of his exceptionally brilliant talents. Certainly there is nothing so novel and unfamiliar in the address itself as to excite hostile criticism. As to facing our bar, there certainly were not enough of them present to intimidate a man of Mr. Justice Matthews' experience, and not enough to counteract any feeling of general hostility, if any such existed. And as to courtesy, we are not in the habit of treating our guests discourteously, as by this time no doubt our eminent guest has discovered. If Mr. Justice Matthews imagines that there is any want of candor to acknowledge his merits, or any disposition to view his judicial career with severity, in this quarter, he is greatly mistaken. To hint at the possibility of such a thing seems to us to have been unjust to his hosts. should achieve the greatest success as a judge, still there are a vast number who will continue to believe that his appointment was a violence against the spirit of the Constitution. But that there is now or ever was any unworthy feeling of personal enmity toward him in this State we emphatically deny.

If he

"Let us destroy an insane murderer as we do any one or any thing else whose continued existence threatens the general safety." "The attempt deserves the same punishment as the crime." These two sentences are selected from a paper by Mr. Ed

ward B. Hill, in the September number of the American Law Review, entitled "The Punishment of Attempts and the Defense of Insanity in Capital Cases." They are the essence of six pages of argument. This is the most blood-thirsty doctrine that we ever heard of. It amounts to this: if a raving maniac attemps to kill another person, and does not succeed, nevertheless let him be hanged! We believe Mr. Hill may justly demand a patent for this doctrine; certainly no one will dispute the originality of the invention. At the same time, that any man should seriously entertain such doctrines goes far to justify an acceptance of the dogma of total depravity, in particular cases. If such monstrous ideas require any serious refutation, it is sufficient to say that it is not necessary for the safety of society to " destroy" insane murderers. If they are not to be treated humanely and medicinally, they may at least be shut up inexorably for life. But nothing short of "life for life" will satisfy this mid-summer philanthropist ! It might be worth while to inquire how Mr. Hill would get along with the problem of an ultimate recovery of the insane man if he were permitted to live. According to his theory, if a sane and virtuous man becomes insane through disease, and in that state kills somebody, he is at once to be hanged, without giving him a chance to get well, because "his continued existence threatens the general safety." Then again, Mr. Hill's logic does not hold together very well. He tells us in one breath that the moral responsibility is nothing; the danger to the "general safety" is every thing; and the next breath he tells us that an unsuccessful attempt is just as heinous as the actual commission, because "no one attempts a crime without intending its success!"

Mr. Levi Bishop writes to a Detroit newspaper on this subject as follows: "The insanity dodge is becoming somewhat unpopular, though there are still some who insist upon it. Let it be once well understood that the rope is the appropriate medicine for this pretended disease as an excuse for crime, and we shall soon hear the last of it." This is a little ambiguous. What does "it," the last word, refer to- to "the insanity dodge," or to the crime of murder? If to the former, it is undoubtedly true that if hanging shall be prescribed as the inevitable fate of insane murderers, lawyers will not take the trouble to set up the unavailing plea. But if it refers to the latter, we answer that comparatively few murderers defend on this ground, because the plea admits the killing. It strikes us that Mr. Bishop is a little immoderate.

Now to compare these intemperate vagaries with the views of a man of moderation, and of experience in law and in the treatment of the insane, take some expressions of Prof. John Ordronaux, New York State Commissioner in Lunacy, published in the current number of the Criminal Law Magazine. "Inasmuch as the question involved in the trial of

an insane man is not vengeance so much as protection to the community, and since hanging him cannot be shown by any principle of logic to be capable of deterring any other lunatic from repeating a similar act, it follows that the hanging becomes, on the part of the community, purely an exhibition of public vengeance, all the more indefensible in this day when asylums abound in which such persons may be indefinitely confined." "No wonder is it that Chancellor Kent says that the 'principle advanced by Littleton and Coke, that a man shall not be heard to stultify himself, has been properly exploded, as being manifestly absurd and against natural justice.""

Having spoken thus unreservedly in condemnation of Mr. Hill's views, it is due to him to say that we entirely agree with him in his estimate of the moral effect of such acquittals for insanity as that of General Cole, in this State, in which case the jury said they found the prisoner sane the moment before and the moment after the killing, but were in doubt as to his sanity at the instant of the killing, and asking for further instructions, the judge charged the jury that if they had a rational doubt, founded upon the evidence, and could believe such

doubt to be well founded upon such a condition of the case, they must give the prisoner the benefit of the doubt. This was a very clever device to shift the odium of the acquittal from the jury to the judge, and it fully succeeded. It is such verdicts as this, and those in the cases of Sickels, Macfarland, Buford and Currie, that bring dishonor upon the administration of justice, and induce men to adopt such extreme and unrighteous views of the right of society to take human life as are set forth in Mr. Hill's paper. So Mr. Ordronaux says: "The law of vicarious atonement by blood seems to be so deeply implanted in the nature of man, that when all other sources of satisfaction fail, nations, like individuals, rush to mutual destruction as the ultima ratio." It may be that the true mean between Mr. Hill's savage justice and the wretched sentimentality exhibited in the Cole case, is to be found in a new French procedure, whereby one acquitted for insanity is to be restrained in an asylum for a fixed time, varying according to the nature of the offense charged, but never intentionally extending to the duration of life, and discharged only by a tribunal especially charged with that duty. A writer in the Kentucky Law Journal says this "seems rational, just and practicable," "to compromise fairly between the rights of society and the rights of the insane,” and “does not so shock our humane feelings as to make it distasteful to the people and therefore impossible of application."