If The Vienna Juristische Blætter reports the following: "Caroline J., a waiter in the service of Colonel P., took a blank check from his check-book, and had her son fill it for an amount of 200 florins, date it, sign Colonel P.'s name to it, and present it to S. M. Rothschild for payment. As the filling of the blank was very awkwardly done, and as the signature did not in the least resemble that of Colonel P., the forgery was discovered by the cashier and notice of non-payment. In an action to recover the amount of the note, because of alleged negligence, held (Miller, Earl and Danforth, JJ., dissenting), that plaintiff was properly nonsuited; because as there was no evidence that the maker was insolvent, it did not appear that plaintiff sustained any damage. The court said: "It is by no means clear that the maker of the note is discharged. Where a note is payable at a bank an entire failure to present it for payment does not discharge the maker. Wal-payment refused. The parties were indicted, and cott v. Van Santvoord, 17 Johns. 248; Green v. Goings, 7 Barb. 652; Caldwell v. Cassidy, 8 Cow. 271. the maker has not sufficient funds in the bank the omission to present it is of no consequence. If he has funds then he can plead it by way of tender, and is relieved from liability only for interest and costs. And even if the bank fails with the funds in its hands, this is no defense to the note. Ruggles v. Patten, 8 Mass. 480; Fenton v. Goundry, 13 East, 473; Turner v. Hayden, 4 B. & C. 1. The bank is in such cases regarded, simply as the agent or depositary of the maker of the note or acceptor of the bill, and he alone suffers by its failure, and his promise to pay is not discharged. In this respect only, a note or bill payable at bank differs from a check. Therefore if there had been no presentment whatever, and the bank had failed with sufficient funds of the maker in its hands to pay the note, the maker was still liable." This is exactly contrary to Lazier v. Horan, 23 Alb. L. J. 150, and to the opinions of the principal text writers. The three cases last cited do not support the opinion, but are only to the same effect as the first three. There are however dicta to support it in Rhodes v. Gent, 5 B. & A. 244; Silver v. Henderson, 3 McL. 165; Wallace v. Mc Connell, 13 Pet. 143. the lower court directed a verdict of acquittal, on R. & R. 291; In Ash v. Guie, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 11 Pitts. L. J. 449, it was held that a lodge of Freemasons is ordinarily not a partnership. The court said: "It would seem that there must be a community of interest for business purposes. Hence, voluntary associations or clubs, for social and charitable purposes, and the like, are not proper partnerships, nor have their members the powers and responsibilities of partners. Pars. on Part. 6, 36, 42. A benevolent and social society has rarely, if ever, been considered a partnership. In Lloyd v. Loaring, 6 Ves. Jr. 773, the point was not made, but Lord Eldon thought the bill would lie on the ground of joint ownership of the personal property in the members of a Masonic lodge; there was no intimation that they were partners. Where a society of Odd Fellows, an association of persons for purposes of mutual benevolence, erected a building, which was afterward sold at sheriff's sale in satisfaction of mechanics' liens, in distribution of the A singular case on the "measure of prudence," is Bloomington v. Perdue, Illinois Supreme Court, 1st June, 1881, 13 Cent. L. J. 39. It was there held in an action by a young lady against a city to recover damages for an injury to the uterus, caused by a fall on a defective sidewalk, that on the question of the plaintiff's freedom from negligence, instructions which do not refer as a standard of caution to "what ordinary young ladies would do," but to the conduct of "an ordinarily prudent person," and of "a woman of common or ordinary prudence," are not faulty in respect to the standard referred to. The defendant proved that the plaintiff did not take proper care of herself after the injury, by remaining quiet, as showing negligence on her part, in-proceeds it was said, that as respects third persons, creasing the injury. On cross-examination of the physicians called by the defense, the plaintiff proved, over defendant's objection, that an unmarried woman, not informed of the anatomy of the womb, could not be expected to act as promptly and intelligently as one understanding it, or as a medical man would; and that it was a common thing for women to suffer from a displacement or injury of the organ spoken of, without themselves knowing the trouble. Held, that there was no error in allowing the evidence. the members were partners; and that lien creditors, who were not members, were entitled to preference as against the liens of the members. Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle, 151. Had the members been called joint tenants of the real estate, the same principle in the distribution would have applied. In Flemyng v. Hector, 2 M. & W. 172, Lord Abinger stated the difference between a body of gentlemen forming a club and meeting together for one common object, and a partnership, where persons engage in a community of profit and loss, and each partner has the right of property in the whole, and in any ordinary transaction, may bind the partnership by a credit. He held that a club and its committee must stand on the ground of principal and agent, and that the authority of the committee depends on the constitution of the club, which is to be found in its own rules. After noting the rules of the club, in the case before him, he says: 'It therefore appears that the members in general intended to provide a fund for the committee to call upon. I cannot infer that they intended the committee to deal upon credit, and unless you infer that that was the intention, how are the defendants bound?' A mutual beneficial society partakes more of the character of a club than of a trading association. Every partner is agent for the partnership, and as concerns himself he is principal, and he may bind the others by contract, though it be against an agreement between himself and his partners. A joint tenant has not the same power, by virtue of the relation, to bind his co-tenant. Thus, one of several co-adventurers in a mine has not, as such, any authority to pledge the credit of the general body, for money borrowed for the purposes of the concern. And the fact of his having the general management of the mine makes no difference, in the absence of evidence, from which an implied authority for that purpose can be inferred. Ricketts v. Bennett, 56 Eng. C. L. 685; 4 M. G. & S. 686. Here there is no evidence to warrant an inference, that when a person joined the lodge he bound himself as a partner in the business of purchasing real estate and erecting buildings, or as a partner, so that other members could borrow money on his credit. The proof fails to show that the officers or a committee, or any number of members, had a right to contract debts for the building of a temple, which would be valid against every member from the mere fact that he was a member of the lodge. But those who engaged in the enterprise are liable for the debts they contracted, and all are included in such liability who assented to the undertaking, or subsequently ratified it. Those who participated in the erection of the building by voting for and advising it are bound the same as the committee who had it in charge. And so with reference to borrowing money. A member who subsequently approved the erection or borrowing could be held on the ground of ratification of the agent's acts." ORDINANCES, REASONABLE AND UNREASONABLE. N Ward v. Mayor and Aldermen of Greenville, 8 that a town ordinance prohibiting licensed retailers of spirituous liquors from selling such liquors between six o'clock P. M. and six o'clock A. M., is unreasonable and invalid. The court said: "It was decided in Smith v. Knoxville that an ordinance of Knoxville forbidding the sale of liquors by retailers after nine o'clock P. M. was valid, and in Maxwell v. Jonesboro, MS., that an ordinance restrain ing retailers from selling after dark, was valid." "The State recognized the retail trade in liquors as legal, on condition that the retailer pays for the privilege and procures a license. This license confers upon him the right to sell for one year, subject of course to the general laws of the State, declaring it unlawful to sell on specified days and at specified places. With these exceptions the retailer has the authority of the State to follow his trade, day or night, for a year. How much of this time can he be forbidden to devote to his trade by the exercise of the police powers of a municipal corporation, without an unreasonable or oppressive infringement of his right? We have seen that it has been held that a limitation of the exercise of his right to daylight is not unreasonable or oppressive. In view of the peculiar nature of the trade, there is sound reason in prohibiting its exercise during the night time. But what is there in the trade which makes it necessary, for the preservation of good order and quiet, that it should not be carried on for two hours before dark and for two hours after daylight? It must be borne in mind that a municipal corporation has no power, under the pretext of a public regulation, to prohibit the exercise of a right conferred by the State. Whenever this is done, and to whatever extent, the prohibition, merely as a prohibition, is unreasonable, oppressive and invalid. The only reason which we can see for restraining the trade for two hours before dark, and for two hours after daylight, is simply for the purpose of prohibition to that extent. The reason may be a sound one when viewed simply as a prohibitory measure; it might be equally sound if the prohibition was total and absolute. But the State has virtually forbidden a municipal corporation to exercise its police powers for purposes of prohibition merely. To be legitimate the prohibition must be so restricted as not to interfere unreasonably or oppressively with the rights conferred by the State. We are of opinion that a prohibition which deprives a party of several hours of daylight, in which he is forbidden to exercise a right conferred by the State, is unreasonable and oppressive." The editor of the American Reports appends the following note: "In Grills v. Mayor, etc., 8 Baxt. 247, the same was held by an ordinance prohibiting such dealers from selling on court days, or on days when any fair or public show is held, or on the days of college commencement. "The following ordinances have been held unreasonable and invalid: To require a railroad company to keep a flagman by day and a red lantern by night at an ordinary street crossing. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37; S. C., 16 Am. Rep. 611. Prohibiting the sale, without license, of lemonade at a temporary stand. Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307; S. C., 9 Am. Rep. 576. Requiring druggists to furnish quarterly statements showing kinds and quantities of alcoholic liquors sold, and to whom. City of Clinton v. Phillips, 58 Ill. 102; S. C., 11 Am. Rep. 52. Exacting a fee of five cents for every sale of hay or other produce within the city. Kip v. City of Paterson, 26 N. J. L. 298. Prohibiting a gas company from opening a paved street for the purpose of connecting houses with their main. Commissioners v. Gas Co., 12 Penn. St. 318. Requiring owners of theaters to pay the city constable two dollars for every night of his attendance at public performances therein. Waters v. Leech, 3 Ark. 110. For the arrest and confinement in the caboose over night of all free negroes found out after 10 o'clock. Mayor v. Winfield, 8 Humph. 707. Requiring a license fee from hucksters. Dunham v. Trustees, 5 Cow. 462. Prohibiting auctioneers to sell after sundown. Hayes v. City of Appleton, 24 Wis. 542. Forbidding the sale, without a license, at temporary stands, of lemonade, ice cream, cakes, pies, cheese, nuts or fruits. Barling v. West, 29 id. 307. Subjecting non-resident owners of estrays to a penalty. Town of Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427. Forbidding cattle, swine and horses from running at large in streets, unless such ordinance is specially authorized by charter. Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 522. Prohibiting sale of beer, ale or other intoxicating liquors, in a less quantity than twentyeight gallons at one time, unless specially authorized by statute. Com. v. Turner, 1 Cush. 493. Inflicting a penalty for selling pressed hay without inspection, such sale being tolerated by statute. Mayor v. Nichols, 4 Hill, 209. Authorizing police officers to make arrests, without warrant, for breaches of ordinances not committed in their presence. Pesterfield v. Mayor, etc., 3 Cold. 205. Exacting that all slaughtering shall be done for a certain period at a certain building, the owners of which shall be paid a fixed price for the privilege by those slaughtering. City of Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90. Forbidding porters, runners, hack men, draymen, expressmen, omnibus agents and drivers, from approaching within twenty feet of any wharf or depot on the arrival of any steamboat or train, unless requested by a passenger; it being shown that such approach was arranged for by agreement between a railroad and an omnibus company. Nafman v. People, 19 Mich. 352. Forbidding any but inhabitants of the city to take fish in a navigable river within the city limits. Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391. Forbidding sale of goods on Sunday, but allowing it by Jews. City of Shreveport v. Levy, 26 La. Ann. 671; S. C., 21 Am. Rep. 553. Punishing the wanton injury of private shade trees. Goshen v. Crary, 58 Ind. 268. Granting a franchise to build and maintain a toll-bridge across a river flowing through a city. Williams v. Davidson, 43 Tex. 1. Requiring milk-dealers to pay a license fee for each cart run by them. Chicago v. Bartree, Ill. App. Ct., January, 1881. Prohibiting farmers, gardeners, etc., from selling vegetables grown by them, in the streets, without license. City of St. Paul v. Træger, 25 Minn. 248; S. C., 33 Am. Rep. 462. "The following ordinances have been held reasonable and valid: Fixing the price at which private citizens may tap public sewers. Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2 Grant, 291. Prohibiting carriages from standing in a street more than fifteen minutes, in connection with a police regulation that a space of thirty-five feet about the door of a particular place of public entertainment must be kept clear. Com. v. Robertson, 5 Cush. 438. Subjecting every dogowner to a fine of $100 for the biting of any person by his dog outside the owner's inclosure. Com. v. Steffee, 7 Bush, 161. Levying a tax of $150 on every retailer of spirituous liquors. Mayor v. Beasley, 1 Humph. 232. Prohibiting restaurants to be kept open after ten o'clock at night. State v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426. Prohibiting awnings before doors, unless authorized by mayor and aldermen. Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161. Prohibiting the removal of sand, stone or earth from the lake shore within 100 feet of high-water mark. Clason v. City of Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316. Forbidding the driving of horses on a trot or gallop in the streets. Com. v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 462. Compelling boats with damaged corn or putrid substances on board, or coming from any place infected with malignant or contagious disease, to anchor in the middle of the river, and not to land until examined by the city physician. Dubois v. City Council of Augusta, Dud. 30. Forbidding keeping more than fifty-six pounds of gunpowder, and requiring it to be kept in tin or copper, under penalty of $50 to $500. Williams v. City Council of Augusta, 4 Ga. 509. Making it a penal offense to sell spirits in quantities of a quart or more to be drunk on the premises where sold, when inconsistent with the State law. Adams v. Mayor of Albany, 29 Ga. 56. Fixing a retailer's liquor license fee at $500. Perdue v. Ellis, 18 id. 586. Forbidding keeping open a confectionery on Sunday after nine o'clock A. M. City of St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94. For punishing vagrants. City of St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 id. 61. pelling closing of dram shops at nine o'clock P. M. Smith v. Mayor, 3 Head, 245. Making it penal to sell goods on Sunday. City Council v. Benjamin, 2 Strobh. L. 508. Making it penal for unlicensed retail grocers to have spirituous liquors on their premises. City Council v. Ahrens, 4 id. 241; Heisenbrittle v. City Council, 2 McMull. 233. Authorizing commissioners to vacate leases of market stalls. City Council v. Goldsmith, 2 Speer, 428. To close dram shops from half-past ten P. M. to five A. M. State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 215. Prohibiting swine running at large. Com. v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221; Com. v. Bean, 14 Gray, 52. Prescribing certain streets as route for travel of omnibuses and hacks, and excluding such vehicles from other streets. Com. v. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562. Prohibiting the employment of any but a licensed person in removing offal and house dirt from a city. Vandine, Petitioner, 6 Pick. 187. Requiring license in order to sell certain commodities in certain streets. Nightingale, Petitioner, 11 id. 168. Forbidding new burial ground within a city. City Council of Charleston v. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 306. Requiring butchers to be licensed and to pay $200 therefor. St. Paul v. Coulter, 12 Minn. 41. Forbidding obstruction of street cars by other vehicles. State v. Foley, 31 Iowa, 527; S. C., 7 Am. Rep. 166. Taxing vehicles hauling into and out of a city, under a statutory authority to tax vehicles used within the city. City of St. Charles v. Noble, 51 Mo. 122; S. C., 11 Am. Rep. 440. Permitting the closing of a draw-bridge across a navi Com gable river in a city every ten minutes for the passage of persons and vehicles, and forbidding any attempt by navigators to pass the draw when so closed. Chicago v. McGuin, 51 Ill. 266; S. C., 295. Forbidding wagons loaded with perishable produce to remain in streets within limits of a market more than twenty minutes between eleven A. M. and four P. M., unless permitted by superintendent of market. Com. v. Brooks, 109 Mass. 355. Compelling hackmen, etc., to observe the orders of the police as to the stands which they and their vehicles may take while waiting for employment near any railway station. City of St. Paul v. Smith, Minn. Sup. Ct., December, 1880. Imposing a license tax on vehicles using the streets, and a fine for disobedience. City of St. Louis v. Green, 70 Mo. 562. An ordinance authorizing the mayor to grant licenses to such persons as in his judgment shall appear proper and best calculated to secure to the inhabitants of the city pure and wholesome milk,' and prohibiting the sale of milk by others in the city, and making unauthorized sale a misdemeanor. People ex rel. v. Mulholland, 82 N. Y. 324.” Our Code of Civil Procedure, sections 1027 and 1028, describes who are qualified to serve as jurymen. Among other qualifications they must possess, the jury man must be (§ 1027, sub. 4) "in the full possession of his natural faculties, and not infirm and decrepit.” (Sub. 5) Free from all legal exceptions, of fair character, of improved integrity, of sound judgment, and well informed." If any twelve men should enjoy these qualifications the verdict they would give would command respect, and if all jurors were of like kind, the outcry against jurors, juries, and jury trials would cease. There are few communities that have an entire dearth of the material described in sections 1027 and 1028 of the Code; and if the proper selection was made, less complaint would be made of the system. The present evils of the system have their inception in making the list and in the exemptious granted. The supervisor, town clerk, and assessors of each town are the persons who shall make the selection of the jury. "They must select from the last assessment-roll of the town, and make a list of the names of all persons whom they believe to be qualified to serve as trial jurors. The first question in making the list is to have good, true, and qualified men to serve, and the intent of the Legislature to have such men selected and serve is apparent. The list of the qualifications give the juror a standing in the community, and if each juror drawn in our trial courts fully possessed the qualifications prescribed, the system would receive praise instead of blame. The juror should be a representative man; the interest of the body politic should be as much to him as his own private affairs. The jury in ancient times were such the knights of the vicinage, or were men skilled in the laws and customs. The privilege of exemption granted so many men is one great cause of so much dissatisfaction with jury trials. Upon what principles of right so many classes of men are relieved from jury duty it is difficult to imagine. Section 1030 of the Code has fourteen subdivisions or classes of exemptions, and the time may come, if the present reckless tendency continues, when mechanics, farmers, merchants and gentlemen will petition for exemption from this duty, leaving the courts without any material to draw from to make their list. The whole section of exemptions from jury classes of citizens otherwise qualified to do their duty duty should be stricken from the Code, compelling all as members of the community in administering justice to each other. Attorneys and counsellors-at-law would make, according to the theory of Mr. Dodge, the best class of jurors, and there is no just reason why they should not serve as such. The only reasonable excuse given for their exemption is that they are officers of the court, employed actively in the litigation of the courts. Yet if their exemption was removed and they were compelled to perform such duties they could do so without in any way conflicting with the rights of their clients or the interests of their adversaries. In our villages, where a fire company or company of the National Guard is in existence, men, who would make good jurors, openly say that they became members thereof for no other purpose than to be exempt from jury duty. They pay their fines and dues and never go to a fire or attend a drill or review, during the whole term of their service. Yet these same meu are very anxious, when coming into court to have their wrongs adjusted, that they get a good jury; they doing all in their power to avoid their duty as neighbors and fellow-citizens. There are certain men and officers that are in justice and in law disqualified by virtue of their offices and positions in the government. The governor and other officers of the State; members of the Legislature, and judges and officers of the court. These are but a small fraction of the large number who are qualified but exempt, and it is proper that they should not only be exempt but disqualified. But the large class of exemptions is overdone. That the jury system has deteriorated none can gainsay. It is to-day in principle the same grand institution it was in the days when it supplanted wager of battle, and if it could be brought back to the plane it deserves, and was intended to occupy, and in which statutory law places it, it would again deserve and receive the praise the old law-writers gave it. Men are anxious that justice should be done in the courts. Our judiciary is honest and efficient; our bar is learned and capable, but our jurors are below medium. The fault lies not in the system, but in the selection of the juror, and the exemption from duty of a large class of good men, and until the proper men are selected the verdicts of our jurors will continue to be subjects of reproach. Let the manner of drawing jurors, and exemptions from jury service, be revised. Strike out all exemptions. Let none but the best men be selected, and the jury system will command as much respect as it now S. L. S. receives blame. case in that court, by the party at whose instance the removal was made, is not a waiver of the question of jurisdiction of the State court. Defendant, who had pleaded to the merits, obtained leave to, and did, demur to the jurisdiction. Held, a withdrawal of the plea to the merits. IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States an order transferring the cause, in accordance with their petition, to the United States Circuit Court. This motion was denied. On July 6, the date upon which the plaintiff in error filed his plea, and after said plea had been filed, the defendants in error caused an order to be entered dismissing their petition for the removal of the cause filed for the Northern District of Illinois. The opinion May 31, and immediately filed another for the same states the case. WOODS, J. This was an action of replevin brought by Frederick W. Huidekoper, John N. Dennison and Thomas W. Shannon, in the Circuit Court of Cook county, Illinois, at its May term, 1877, to wit, on May 22, 1877, against Charles Kern, the plaintiff in error, to recover the possession of one thousand tons of old railroad iron, which they claimed was wrongfully detained from them by Kern. The writ of replevin was issued on May 23, 1877, and upon the same day was served by the coroner of the county, who received from the plaintiffs in replevin a statutory bond, and delivered to them the possession of the iron. The summons was made returnable at the next term of the court, which began on the third Monday of June. The declaration, which was filed une 30, alleged that plaintiffs were the owners, and lawfully entitled to the possession of certain goods and chattels, to wit, the iron in controversy, which formerly had been in track of the Chicago, Danville & Vincennes railroad, but that it was then lying along the Mud Lake track, near Twenty-fourth street, in the city of Chicago, and that it was of the value of eighteen thousand dollars; that on May 9, 1877, Kern, the plaintiff in error, had wrongfully taken possession of said iron, and still detained the same from them. Kern, on July 6, 1877, pleaded that he was the sheriff of Cook county, and that he held the iron by virtue of two certain executions against the Chicago, Danville & Vincennes Railroad Company, levied on the same, both issued upon judgments in the Superior Court of Cook county, one in favor of the Bank of North America, and the other in favor of one John McCaffrey, for the aggregate sum of about eleven thousand dollars. That as such sheriff, on or about May 1, 1877, the said writs being then in full force and unsatisfied, he took said iron and detained the same in execution of said writs, and that at the time of the levy the iron was the property of the Chicago, Danville & Vincennes Railroad Company. On May 31, 1877, the plaintiffs filed in the court their petition to remove said cause to the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The petition alleged that the defendant, Kern, was a citizen of the State of Illinois, and that the plaintiffs at the institution of the action were, and still continued to be, citizens of States other than the State of Illinois; that the amount in controversy in the suit exceeded five hundred dollars, and there had been no trial of the suit, and the same could not have been tried before the term at which said petition was filed; and that the suit involved a controversy between citizens of different States, which could be wholly determined as between them. The petition was accompanied by the bond required by the statute of the United States. On June 2 the court denied the petition for removal, on the ground that it was prematurely presented and filed; that at that date no declaration had been filed, the defendant was not in court, and was not required to appear until the third Monday of June. On June 30 the petition of the defendants in error and their bond for the removal of the cause being still on file, and the time for the appearance of the plaintiff in error having passed, the defendants in error filed their declaration, and immediately moved the court for purpose, containing the same averments, together with a bond, as required by the statute. This petition was also denied by the State court. Nevertheless, on July 27, 1877, the plaintiffs below filed a transcript of the record of the cause in the clerk's office of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, the term of said court prescribed by law to begin on the.first Monday of July being then current. On November 14, 1877, the said term of the United States Circuit Court still continuing, that court made an order approving the filing of the said record on July 27 preceding. On June 5, 1878, the counsel of the plaintiffs below moved the United States Circuit Court that an order be entered declaring that the cause had been removed from the Circuit Court of Cook county, and that the Circuit Court of the United States had exclusive jurisdiction thereof by reason of such removal, and that the cause be placed on the trial calendar of the court. The court sustained the motion and directed an order to be made in accordance therewith. On June 26, 1878, the defendant below, by his attorney, entering special appearance for that purpose, filed a written motion in the United States Circuit Court for the dismissal of said action. This motion was overruled. At the July term, 1878, of the Circuit Court of Cook county, that court still claiming jurisdiction of the cause, notwithstanding the proceedings for its removal above recited, the plaintiffs below filed in that court a replication to the plea of the defendant, in which they alleged that said railroad iron at the time of the levy was the property of the plaintiffs, and not of the railroad company, as alleged in defendant's plea. On November 12, 1878, the defendant below moved in the Circuit Court of the United States for leave to file a plea to the jurisdiction, which, after argument of counsel, was granted. Thereupon, on the same day, he filed the following plea: "The defendant, by E. Walker, his attorney, comes and prays judgment of the said record herein filed, because he says that the plaintiffs first instituted their said action of replevin in the Circuit Court of Cook county, in the State of Illinois, which said court has exclusive original jurisdiction of said action, and caused the clerk of said State court to issue a summons against the said defendant and a writ of replevin, under which said last-named writ the property described in said writ and declaration was seized by the officer of said court and delivered to the said plaintiff. "That said writs were made returnable to the June term of said court, A. D. 1877, at which said term the said defendant appeared and filed his plea to said declaration. "The said defendant further shows that long after the filing of the said transcript of record in this court the said plaintiffs, to wit, at the May term, A. D. 1878, filed in the said Circuit Court of Cook county their replication to the said defendant's plea, and at said term of said State court prosecuted their said action to a final hearing, and such proceedings were thereupon had in said action that afterward, to wit, at said May term, to wit, on the 5th day of June, A. D. 1878, the said defendant, by the consideration and judgment of the said Circuit Court of Cook county, recovered a judgment against the said plaintiffs for the return to him of the property described in said decla |