Will you guarantee us against them?" - a question which I had no authority to answer. The inherent weakness of our position is this: we do not want to rob China ourselves, and our public opinion will not permit us to interfere, with an army, to prevent others from robbing her. Besides, we have no army. The talk of the papers about "our preeminent moral position giving us the authority to dictate to the world" is mere flap-doodle.

Anxious, therefore, as I am, to get away from Peking, I cannot help fearing that if we retire with Russia, it will end in these unfortunate consequences: Russia will betray us. China will fall back on her non possumus, if we try to make separate terms with her. England and Germany being left in Peking, Germany by superior brute selfishness will have her way, and we shall be left out in the cold.

If it were not for our domestic politics, we could and should join with England, whose interests are identical with ours, and make our ideas prevail. But in the present morbid state of the public mind towards England, that is not to be thought of — and we must look idly on, and see her making terms with Germany instead of with us.

It seems to me, if we can get the Chinese Government, or its clearly authorized representatives, back to Peking, we ought at least to initiate our negotia

tions there, even if, later on, we should transfer them to Shanghai or elsewhere. We ought to pay all possible civility to Li Hung Chang, to Prince Ching, and anybody whom we accept as negotiators. If we could send Li to Tientsin in a U.S. vessel, I should be inclined to do it. He is an unmitigated scoundrel, of course, thoroughly corrupt and treacherous. But he represents China and we must deal with him; and it is certain that it has been hitherto to our advantage to deal with him, with Liu-Kan-Yih, and with Chang-Chih-Tung, as if we trusted them.

Has the President come to any conclusion as to who shall represent us in negotiating with China? Conger, I take it for granted, will be one. Rockhill might help. If he is to send any one from here, I think very well of Low. I have thought that he might like to send John Barrett. Moore would be an admirable man if he could get away.

The Special Commissioner selected to act with Mr. Conger was Mr. W. W. Rockhill, who exerted a strong influence in favor of the humane methods advocated by his Government and succeeded in greatly modifying the demand for blood. The nine culprits were punished, as the United States, in

common with other powers, insisted they must be, but the punishment was meted out by Chinese authority, and in three cases, notably that of the chief instigator of the attacks on foreigners, Prince Tuan, execution was not insisted upon, but only banishment and degradation in rank. In three cases the guilty men were beheaded, while three others were graciously permitted to commit suicide.

The question of indemnity was not settled until the 30th of September, 1901, but it was in large measure due to the benevolent policy of President McKinley that the sum which was finally agreed upon, 450,000,000 taels (about $334,000,000), was not double that amount; that China escaped dismemberment; and that the "door" was allowed to remain "open.",

CHAPTER XXXII

RENOMINATION AND REËLECTION

HE campaign year of 1900 found the Ameri

TH

can people in complacent mood. In marked contrast with 1896, when everybody wanted a change, the people were well content. In the former campaign the Republicans were urging, as a remedy for the hard times of that period, a change from a low to a high tariff; the Democrats wanted to remedy the same thing by a change from a gold to a silver standard; Sound-Money Democrats were changing their party allegiance; business men were changing from a position of apathy to one of intense eagerness for participation in political affairs; from East to West, from North to South, in every city, town and village and even on the farms, there was a bubbling and sizzling of doctrines and theories and "isms," a seething mass of contradictions all thrown into the political cauldron for the common purpose of an escape from conditions then existing. It was a period when restless discontent, confused by the clamor of discordant voices, was groping its way toward the light. The Democratic leaders pointed in the direction of Free Silver, as the path to salvation; the

Republicans pointed to Sound Money and Protection. The people accepted the lead of the latter, and by the very simple device of keeping its promises, the party demonstrated the wisdom of its advice.

The passage of the Dingley Bill caused no such party upset as did its predecessor of 1890. The leaders, learning by experience, wisely placed the law upon the statute books as quickly as possible after the election, thereby giving it an opportunity to prove its usefulness before the next contest. The ensuing prosperity was agreeable to everybody. No fine-spun arguments of theoretical economists could overcome the fact that prosperity had come, that it came in the wake of the Dingley Law, that this result had been predicted by the Republicans under the leadership of McKinley, and that the promise of the party had been fulfilled. Accordingly, with everybody satisfied except the theorists, the Tariff dropped out of sight as a bone of contention in 1900.

For a similar reason the currency question no longer absorbed the public mind. The Free-Silver wave had reached its crest and the craze was subsiding. To the masses it had made a certain appeal as a possible means of restoring good times. When they saw the reawakening of business, the reëstablishment of confidence, the vindication of our national credit, the flow of money into the West, making