On Sunday, April 24, the Secretary of the Navy went to the White House for consultation with the

President. As the result, the following cable message was sent:

DEWEY, HONGKONG

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1898.

War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.

LONG.

On the same day Dewey had sailed from Hongkong in accordance with the requirements of British neutrality. He received the message on the 26th, and on the 30th his squadron stood off the Island of Luzon at Subig Bay. Close examination failed to reveal the presence of the Spanish fleet at that point as expected, and the squadron sailed for Manila Bay in the evening. On the next morning, May 1, at 5.30 Commodore Dewey, on the flagship Olympia, followed by the Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord, and Boston, in the order named, sailed boldly into Manila Bay and with slight damage to his ships and only seven men wounded, destroyed the entire

Spanish fleet of ten vessels, silenced three shore batteries, and held in his possession the harbor of Manila. Thus, in less than a week from the declaration of war, thanks to the foresight of the President and the Department of the Navy, the first demonstration was given to Spain of the utter futility of resistance to the demands of the United States.

The second demonstration, completing the lesson, was to follow only two months later. The proclamation of a blockade of Cuban ports found a powerful squadron at Key West, under Rear-Admiral Sampson, ready to undertake that duty and the other equally important one of intercepting the Spanish fleet, then concentrated at the Cape Verde Islands, under Admiral Cervera. This fleet, the strength of which was overestimated both by the United States Navy Department and by the Spanish Admiral himself, consisted of the Cristóbal Colón, a battleship of the second class, and the Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquendo, and Vizcaya, armored cruisers supposed to be comparable with the New York and Brooklyn in speed and efficiency, though slightly smaller. In addition there were three torpedo-boat destroyers, a new kind of craft the possibilities of which were then unknown but greatly feared. There were also three torpedo

boats and two colliers. It was expected that to this fleet would be added the Pelayo, a powerful battleship of the first class, and the Carlos V, an armored cruiser. It was not then known in the United States that the last two ships were not ready, that the Colón lacked her big guns, that the Vizcaya and Oquendo had defective guns, that the ammunition was bad, and that the Vizcaya, to use the words of Cervera himself, could "no longer steam" and was "only a boil in the body of the fleet." On the contrary, the people of the entire Atlantic seacoast were for several weeks in a state of terror lest this powerful navy should suddenly descend upon their harbors, capture New York and Boston, and bombard all the other cities!

Admiral Sampson, supported by Captains Evans, Taylor, and Chadwick, strongly urged an immediate attack on Havana-a feat which, doubtless, could have been accomplished with a brilliancy rivaling Dewey's achievement. But the Navy Department-wisely, as the event proved - did not wish to risk the crippling of the fleet until the Spanish squadron had been disposed of, particularly in view of the lack of docking facilities which would have made repairs difficult. The Administration also realized that there were no United States troops available to hold the city if captured. The effective

blockade of Cuban ports and a sharp lookout for the Spanish ships were therefore insisted upon as the proper policy.

On April 29 the Spanish fleet left the Cape Verde Islands and for two weeks kept the Navy Department in a fever of uncertainty. On May 11 Cervera appeared at Martinique, and on the 19th, in spite of the vigilance of the swift scout ships of the American navy, sailed into the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. On June 1, Admiral Sampson arrived off Santiago and "established a blockade so strict that the Spanish sentinel could hear the cries of the watch on the American ships." 1

The "bottling-up" of Cervera's fleet made necessary a quick change in the plans of the army. Instead of devoting the summer to organizing, drilling, and disciplining the newly recruited forces with a view to sending them to Cuba in October, after the rainy season was over, it became necessary to send an army at once to invest Santiago, and, by coöperating with the navy, to reduce the city, capture or destroy the Spanish fleet, and thus secure control of the entire eastern end of the island.

General William R. Shafter was placed in command and ordered to embark his troops at Tampa, Florida, on the morning of June 8, which he did 1 John D. Long, The New American Navy.

in the midst of indescribable confusion, due to inexperience and the lack of transports; but, owing to a false rumor of the near presence of one of the dreaded Spanish ships, the expedition did not sail until the 14th. The story of this expedition is a sad tale of incompetence, lack of direction, miserable equipment, and blundering, redeemed only by the bravery and determination with which certain officers and most of the soldiers fought their way to victory in spite of the handicaps which one third of a century of unpreparedness had forced upon them. The army was finally landed, and after sharp engagements at El Caney and San Juan, the city of Santiago was "well invested, but with a very thin line," to quote from a dispatch from General Shafter dated July 3. In the same message the general announced that he was "seriously considering withdrawing about five miles," and told of the illness of General Young, General Wheeler, and himself. This discouraging message was received at the White House after a night of intense anxiety in which the President awaited tidings from the front until daylight. It was the darkest hour of the war. Yet simultaneously with this dispatch to the War Department, General Shafter, in spite of his forebodings, sent a message to the Spanish commander demanding his surrender.