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struction, but for the exercise of legislative discretion. The harmonies and discrepances of the different systems are thus presented in a single view; and the best opportunity afforded of correcting errors, and introducing gradually homogeneous and consistent regulations on these vital interests of the Union.

Moreover, it embraces a large collection of decisions, many of which have never before appeared in print, and are valuable from their general applicability as well as the fidelity with which they are reported. Before the publication of regular reports in our country, many questions of the highest moment were litigated and decided in our courts, which form rules of property; and it is no inconsiderable present to the profession to embody these, in an authentic form, as well as to add to some of the cases now in print, reports more full, exact, and satisfactory.

Again, large extracts are introduced from the civil, the French, and other foreign law. The utility of this part of the work cannot escape the observation of the profession. The civil law, modified by French and Spanish ordinances and usages, constitutes the basis of the law of Louisiana and the territory of the Floridas. These portions of the Union are daily becoming more and more interesting, in a commercial view, to all the states. The law, which there regulates civil and commercial rights and remedies, is of great practical importance to emigrants, to merchants, and to relatives residing in distant regions. Unlike the other states, in which a common jurisprudence, that of the common law prevails, these territories are perpetually presenting unsuspected differences not only in rights, but in the administration of remedies, which require to be accurately known, in order to avoid embarrassing and often fatal mistakes. Lawyers, therefore, in every part of the Union, will gladly accept any means of assisting their inquiries on these subjects, and will find ready answers to many questions. Fortunately for Louisiana, no inconsiderable portion of her civil jurisprudence has been reduced into a systematic code, whose basis is that admirable performance, the Napoleon Code. Mr Livingston is now executing, under her patronage, a Digest of her Criminal Jurisprudence; and from the portions, which we have been permitted to inspect, we have no difficulty in saying, that it is a work of singular acuteness and philosophical precision, and in the highest degree creditable to his genius and industry. Such works have been occasionally disparaged by the exclusive admirers of the common law, and still more so by the overheated zeal and extravagance of some of the advocates of codes; but we fech a confidence, that they are so useful and convenient, that they will, at no distant period, attract the attention of the legislatures of other states, and gradually lead to great improvements in the science of legislation, as well as in the actual administration of the law.

But it is not in this view alone, that the civil and foreign law have claims upon those, whose province it is to cultivate the study of the common law. The civil law itself is an inexhaustible treasury of general principles, solid distinctions, and just doctrines, applicable to the concerns of a busy commercial age, and especially to every species of commercial contracts. The common law has indeed appropriated to itself, without a fair acknowledgment, many principles of this admired jurisprudence. Our law of contracts rests on this basis, and has become equitable only so far as it has ceased to be feudal, and liberal so far as it has been drawn from Roman fountains. The splendid panegyric of Gibbon, in the fortyfourth chapter of his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, is not a mere vainglorious boast, but is supported by facts. The vain titles of the victories of Justinian,' says the historian, 'are crumbled into dust; but the name of the legislator is inscribed on a fair and everlasting monument. Under his reign, and by his care, the civil jurisprudence was digested in the immortal works of the Code, the Pandects, and the Institutes; the public reason of the Romans has been silently or studiously transfused into the domestic institutions of Europe, and the laws of Justinian still command the respect or obedience of independent nations.' Dr Brown, a very competent judge, in one of the notes to his Brief Sketch of the Civil Law, says, 'I scarcely ever yet have met with a point, not connected with the feudal law, in which, if English books did not satisfy the doubt, I have failed to find its resolution in the civil law. Can it then be doubted, that an incorporation of such of the civil law principles, as are illustrative of the common law, into an Abridgment, is of great value to students, and especially to those, who wish to acquire philosophical views of jurisprudence, and aspire to something beyond the reach of an ordinary attorney? The author well remarks, that

' A complete system of law and equity, best calculated to preserve the power of the magistrate and the rights of the people, is the last thing men attain to in society. Peter the Great soon understood everything in the civilized parts of Europe, but the laws; and because he could not understand them, he never ceased to prefer the despotism of Turkey, "where the judges are not restrained by any methods, forms, or laws." Ancient Greece, though eminent in other sciences, never had such a system. The reason is seen in the almost infinite variety, extent, and combination of ideas, founded in nature, experience, and cultivated morality, so essential in forming and completing such a system. It is very clear, that a great republic, in which there is room for talents; in which thoughts and actions are not restrained by religious or political despotism; in which education is encouraged, and moral character is esteemed; in which the law rules, and not the sword; in which each one asserts his rights by law, and not by force; and in which there is representation, jury trial, and a free press, is the natural field of law and equity; but to produce these in perfection, there must be a national character. The rules of law and equity, in important matters, must be uniform, and pervade the whole nation.' Introd. pp. 14, 15.

We have adverted to the impracticability of giving, within the ordinary compass of a review, an analysis of this extensive and various work, and therefore select a few extracts from it as examples of the manner and style of the author, to give our numerous professional readers an opportunity to form a correct estimate of the infinite labor, patient perseverance, and extensive learning of the author. He has taken frequent occasion, in the course of the work, to introduce critical and concise commentaries, on abstract points of law, and elaborate discussions of questions, that have often perplexed and divided the minds of the bar and the bench. These are usually termed notes and comments, generally brief, but when it is necessary, extended

and elaborate.

The first example of these discussions we find in volume first, chapter ninth, article twentysecond, in eighteen sections, on the questions, often arising and often contested in practice, When does an express promise exclude an implied one? and When may the plaintiff recover on the common counts? In these sections the author cites nearly a hundred select authorities. Не observes, that cases, in which these questions arise, are very numerous, and that he should notice as many of them as might be proper, to illustrate the general principles, on which this class of cases is decided. The leading principle is laid down by Buller J. who observed, The law raises an implied promise because there is no security given by the party; but if the party chooses to take security, there is no occasion for the law to

VOL. XXIII. NO. 52.

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raise a promise; promises in law only exist, where there are no express stipulations between the parties.' We regret, that limits do not allow us to insert here the very able discussion of this subject by the author.

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The discussion of another disputed point, is found in chapter twentyfourth, article fourth, in twentyfive sections; it arises on the question, Is a chose in action assignable in its nature at common law, or when there is no statute on the subject? to which we refer, as well worthy of the attention of our legal readers.

The author in this discussion clearly shows, that the doctrine in relation to negotiable contracts is different in our several state jurisdictions.

His summary views of a few leading cases, in several important branches of the law and equity, are the condensed result of a critical and minute examination. In volume sixth, chapter one hundred and ninetythird, he has given, in fortyfive articles, a synopsis of pleadings. The nature and object of this synopsis, or summary of pleadings, is very concisely and well described, in the seventeenth division of his Introduction. This synopsis, at large, best explains itself, and, perhaps better than any other plan, will enable the lawyer, and especially the student, to see at once the extent and the various bearings of the several parts of pleadings on each other. On this and other wide spread branches of the law, when many readers may be confused, and in a degree lost in numerous volumes of minute matters and distinctions, such views and results, well made, may be extremely useful; but they must be well made, by one thoroughly master of the subjects, who has long been in the practice of abridging, of taking such views, and of forming such results.

Volume fourth, chapter one hundred and fourteenth, article thirtyfirst, contains a summary view of select authorities, on the subject of executory estates. This, too, appears to be the result of an extensive examination made in lation to all kinds of contingent and executory estates, created by way of uses or trusts, 'y wills, by common conveyances, or otherwise, accompanied with his own views respecting such estates.

A summary view of the most material points of difference between law and equity, is illustrated and supported by many select authorities, in chapter first, article seventh, sections from the thirtythird to the fortyfourth, and is apparently the result of a minute examination of those differences; from which view he draws the following conclusion, which appears in his fiftyfirst This preliminary sketch of principles and cases in equity, has been introduced since 1801, when equity decisions in America were of but little importance, which since have vastly increased. Such principles and cases, therefore, will be considered in detail, in a considerable degree, in several parts of this work relating to contracts and proceedings in chancery. Except in chapters two hundred and twentyfifth and two hundred and twentysixth, especially appropriated to them, they will be found in chapters also embracing matters in law, in several instances. Law and equity in the United States, are in no small degree mingled together, often in the same cause; except in two or three states, in the same volumes; and in several states, especially in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, &c. equity is frequently administered by law courts and jurors. And in New York, now, equity powers may be by the legislature vested in the circuit judges, in eight circuits, and in the county courts, or such other subordinate courts as the legislature may direct, subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Chancellor. So in the highest and lowest courts in Virginia, law and equity powers seem to be blended in the same hands. In this work the object has been, and will be, to adopt the English system of equity as far, and as far only, as it has been adopted by the highest authorities in our own country; a system, highly valuable when we separated (July 4th, 1776), and, for some years after, but which now subjects a vast proportion of English property to almost total uncertainty, and lately induced one of the eminent men of England to observe, “It is a disgrace to the nation." This uncertainty is owing to several causes, but mainly to a vast number of volumes, published since our separation, containing numerous decisions on equity principles, made by different men, repeatedly variant, and often contradictory. Still worse, these volumes, many of them the productions of inferior lawyers, are replete with obiter opinions, dictums, seems soes, leanings, inclinings, &c. not only of high judicial officers, but also of inferior

section.

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Though this trash (so the sound law of the land views it), in fact, is no rule of property or conduct, yet it has a great influence; ignorant and indolent judges catch at it; and counsel, engaged in bad causes, seize on it, and, with much ingenuity, make a great deal of it; a similar pernicious effect have the hasty nisi prius notions, of late years, published by wholesale. It requires not the spirit of prophecy to foresee, that, in no very long period, the rules of property must become as uncertain, in such a state of things, as in the most despotic governments. If the minute and peculiar features of each new case must be allowed to produce new rules of property, not known in law, and against law,

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