conviction, that the power of declaring war, and of creating the means of defence and offence, those high attributes of sovereignty, upon the due exercise of which depend the welfare and often the existence of nations, should reside with those, who have the deepest interest at stake, and who are the least likely to abuse it. Accordingly they placed it in the hands of the representatives of the people, that so the military force of the country, instead of being the creature of an arbitrary and irresponsible will, should be the offspring of the same popular and deliberate legislation, which originates every other measure connected with the general good. Jealousy of military power has ever been a practical feeling in this country. Its influence was felt by the colonies, and was among the exciting causes of the Revolution; and it required all the difficulties, and even occasional desperation of the struggle, to restrain it from embarrassing all the measures of the war. The continental Congress, it is true, standing on high and central ground, and comprehending the full responsibility of the cause it was directing, often gave signal proofs of an elevation above all narrow prejudices, when the fate of that cause was in jeopardy; and once or twice confided to General Washington an almost dictatorial power. The war of the Revolution ended in 1783. In April, 1785, the military establishment of the United States was fixed at one regiment of infantry, and two companies of artillery, or about 800 men. Thus the nation, two years after a protracted and exasperated struggle with one of the most powerful kingdoms of Europe, while most important relations were still unsettled, and with a host of unquiet and formidable neighbors upon its interior frontiers, whose excited spirits could not subside into peace, like those of more civilized nations, at the bidding of a treaty, stood nearly divested of every means of organized defence. While we recognise a strong cause of this abandonment of self protection, in the exhausted condition of the country, we may likewise discern in it that cautious policy, pushed somewhat to an extreme, which regarded soldiers as useless and even dangerous, when not required for immediate service. About two years after this period, the military establishment was augmented by 700 men, and remained thus until 1790, when, under the new constitution, it was fixed at one regiment of infantry, and one battalion of artillery, embracing 1216 men. The President was at the same time authorized to call into service such militia, for the defence of the frontiers, as he might deem necessary. In 1791 the establishment was again increased by the addition of another regiment of infantry, and the President was empowered to raise 2000 levies, as they were termed, in lieu of the militia he had before been authorized to call out. In 1792, the infantry was still further augmented by three additional regiments, one of which was so organized, as to embrace a squadron of four troops of light dragoons. In 1794 eight hundred men were added to the artillery, which was thenceforward to be styled the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers. These several additions to the establishment fixed in 1790, formed a force of about 6000. They who are familiar with the history of those times, will recollect, that it was a period of constant and increasing hostility with the Indians, who, as we have before remarked, did not bury the tomahawk, at the general pacification which terminated the Revolution. Our frontiers were drenched with the blood of our unprotected settlers. General Washington, then President, at each session of Congress, reiterated his strong and eloquent representations of these barbarities, and urged the necessity of investing the Executive with power to protect the defenceless and chastise the aggressors. But a distrustful and improvident policy, which seemed to perceive no danger so great, as that which might arise from placing an army at the disposal of the Executive, dealt out the means of defence with such a sparing hand, that it was not until one or two abortive campaigns, and two or three deieats, marked with unprecedented carnage, showed the irresistible necessity of more liberal and vigorous measures, that the President was enabled to bring the war to a successful close. But it was not from the Indians alone that we at that time had danger to apprehend. Our seaboard was not secure from insult; and the angry recrimination, which then marked our negotiations with Great Britain, whose navies governed the ocean, admonished us that we were too vulnerable on that frontier. The President was accordingly directed by the act of March, 1794, to fortify the principal ports on the coast. Twenty different points were indicated by the act, among which, it appears, 350 pieces of ordnance were to be distributed. The President was about the same time directed to establish three or four arsenals, with magazines and armories connected with them.* * There are now in the United States, two national armories, and eleven national arsenals. The armories are at Springfield, Massachusetts, and at Harper's Ferry, Virginia. The arsenals are at Watertown, Massachusetts; Watervliet and Rome, New York; Baltimore, Maryland; Washington, District of Columbia; Richmond, Virginia; Augusta, Georgia; Frankford and Pittsburg, Pennsylvania; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; and Detroit, Michigan Territory. Arms and accoutrements are manufactured at the two armories, 79,259 of the former having been made in the course of the last three years. Accoutrements, gun carriages, &c. are made at many of the arsenals, while some of them are used merely as depots. There are no public founderies for ordnance, the supply being obtained by contracts from private founderies, of which there are a sufficient number in the United States to answer all demands. Lead is obtained in ample quantities from the public mines. 3000 men. In May, 1796, the military establishment was again fixed, embracing the corps of artillerists and engineers, two companies of light dragoons, and four regiments of infantry, or about This establishment continued the same throughout the remainder of General Washington's administration. Mr Adams came to the presidency amid the growing troubles with France, and his administration was marked from its commencement to the termination of these troubles, with frequent and extensive augmentations of the military force. The alarm of the nation was doubtless great; and the confidence of Congress in the Executive appears to have been in proportion. It was a striking conversion from the chary and mistrustful policy of 1792 and 1793, when an enemy, covering our very thresholds with slaughter, could induce only tardy and scanty measures of defence, to the confiding liberality of this period, when, in order to resist an enemy, not yet openly declared, and separated from us by the Atlantic, the nerve and strength of the nation were placed at the disposal of the Executive. In April, 1798, an additional regiment of artillerists and engineers was raised; and in the following month, the President was invested with power to raise, during the recess of Congress, 10,000 men for the term of three years, and to accept of any company or companies of volunteers, which might be offered for service. The latter clause would appear to have conferred a power commensurate with the force of the entire militia, provided the spirit of volunteering had prevailed to that extent. About one year after this, the President was conditionally authorized, in the language of the act, to organize and cause to be raised,' * an additional military force, to consist of twentyfour regiments of infantry, one regiment and one battalion of riflemen, a battalion of artillerists and engineers, and three regiments of cavalry. The same act limited the number of volunteers which could be accepted by the President under the indefinite act of 1798, to 75,000. The amount of force, including regulars and militia, which the several foregoing acts empowered President Adams to raise, under certain exigencies, supposed no doubt to exist, considerably exceeded 100,000 men. The difficulties with France were adjusted in 1800, when this formidable army was reduced to four regiments of infantry, two regiments of artillerists and engineers, and two troops of light dragoons. Again, in 1802, under the pacific auspices with which Mr Jefferson had begun his administration, the military establishment was still further diminished, being fixed at one regiment of artillerists, two regiments of infantry, and a corps of engineers, or about 3,000 men. By the same act, the engineers, being formed into a separate corps, were stationed at West Point, and made to constitute a military academy, thus laying the foundation of that excellent institution, which is now flourishing with so much credit and usefulness to the country. We shall not now pause to indulge ourselves in such remarks, as this allusion to its origin might naturally suggest. No change was made in the force of the military establishment from 1802 till nearly the close of Mr Jefferson's administration. In April, 1808, our disputes with Great Britain having become aggravated by several incidents, which particularly affected the interest and honor of the country, an additional military force was authorized, to consist of five regiments of infantry, one regiment of light artillery, and one regiment of light dragoons, augmenting the establishment already on foot by about 6000. The act creating this augmentation, contained a clause, which required that every officer, appointed under it, should be a citizen of the United States, or,' as it adds with superfluous precision, ' one of the territories thereof.' Previously to this time, many foreigners had been introduced into our service, some of whom, it is believed, had not even taken the oath of allegiance. The recruiting under this act was suspended about a year after * The inversion of phraseology here exhibited, is one among the many proofs, which might be selected, to show the great looseness of the language used in our military legislation. ward, in consequence probably of the arrangement with Mr Erskine, the British minister, and was not renewed, although this arrangement was soon disavowed and annulled, until within about six months before the declaration of war. Shortly after this renewal, early in 1812, Congress passed an act, authorizing an additional military force of 25,000 men, to consist of ten regiments of infantry, two regiments of artillery, and one regiment of light dragoons. In the beginning of 1813, twenty additional regiments of infantry, or 20,000 men, were authorized; and in the beginning of 1814, three additional regiments of riflemen. No further augmentations were made to the regular force during the war. It would appear from the foregoing acts, that the nominal regular force on foot, during the war of 1812, was between 60,000 and 70,000. It is not probable, however, that the establishment ever approximated to an efficient fulness. The recruiting service held out powerful inducements to enlist, the bounties having been enlarged, until the recruit, besides his monthly pay of eight dollars, was offered fifty dollars when enlisted, an additional fifty when mustered, and twentyfour dollars and 320 acres of land at the expiration of his term of service; and we believe there was no want of men; but the pressing exigencies of the war, transferring the raw soldier immediately from the rendezvous to the scene of action, left no time for the operation of that preliminary discipline, which gives cohesion and permanency to a body of men. Hence battalions, which marched from the rendezvous complete as to numbers, before they reached the frontiers were often reduced to meagre detachments. Peace was ratified with Great Britain in February, 1815; and among the subjects which first engaged the attention of Congress, was that of reducing the army to the proper standard of peace. Accordingly, on the third of March following, the military establishment was fixed at 10,000 men. Again, in 1821, it was still further reduced, being diminished to 6000, which is the number on foot at the present time. Such is a brief sketch of the legislation, which has affected the numerical force of our army, from the commencement of our government. It is a dry statement, but it suggests some interesting reflections. The manner in which the country threw off its armor at the close of the Revolution, and stood among the nations of the earth, probably a solitary instance, without any organized means of defence; although it bore the sem |