where is such an equity system to end? It is also absurd to publish thousands of mere dictums, and leanings, &c. when there are published more legal decisions of high and full courts, than any man can read to good purpose. As to equity cases, they have become almost infinitely numerous, and but a small part of them are of much value or use in the United States; hence they are in this work very briefly stated, except Federal cases in chapter two hundred and twentyfifth. But references to equity cases are very numerous, so that, when one shall have occasion to use or study them, he will find them largely referred to; and if each equity case be decided on the minute and peculiar circumstances of it, equity cases must increase a vast deal more than law cases, and when each case is so decided, it can be of but little use in other cases; cases in law, and especially in equity, varying as human faces vary.' Vol. 1. pp. 107, 108. In chapter two hundred and twentyfifth, the author takes an historical view of equity in the American colonies, and observes that there was no uniformity in it. We must, therefore, look in vain for a uniform system in our numerous states.' 'But in the constitution of the United States, we have laid a solid foundation for such a system, which well provides for carrying into effect the judicial powers of the Union, in federal cases, as well on principles of equity as principles of law. The equity mentioned in that constitution, is undoubtedly some uniform general code of equity; and it is equally certain, we can find this code nowhere but in England, or in the English decisions in equity, we have in English books in this country. The practice in the Supreme Court of the United States, in which alone such a uniform plan can grow up in our country, is full confirmation of this opinion; for it is in those books alone it looks for authorities; at most the exceptions are so few as not to deserve attention.' 'In that court it will slowly grow up to a high state of perfection.' 'It is true, that court consists of seven judges, and some think equity must be administered by a single judge; but this idea has no foundation in nature or experience. Not in nature, for a correct moral conscience, or sense of right and wrong, ever has been, is, and will be, as uniform and steady in its office and trust, as instinct or attraction. Were it not so, there would be a great defect in the noblest part of the Deity's works. Not in experience, for examine the equitable decisions, depending on the moral perceptions of the mind, made by the Hindoo judge, four thousand years ago, and the other side of the globe; so of the Roman judge in the days of Cicero or Justinian, in another quarter of the world; and we find them made in a manner, in which the moral and correct American judge now fully acquiesces. So experience in our own country teaches the same thing. • The people of the United States, when they formed that national constitution, never once attempted to place these federal powers in equity, in a single judge, in the dernier resort; but placed them in a Supreme Court, never expected to consist of fewer than five judges. Experience further teaches, that the judges of this court have been as often unanimous in their decisions in equity, as in their decisions in law. Equity is necessarily a system of rule and discretion. Discretion, as it depends on the particular circumstances of each case; there can be no settled rule without destroying equity itself, and reducing it to positive law. On the other hand, it is going too far, to have equity without rule. This may destroy all law, and leave the decision of every case solely in the breast of the judge.' Vol. VII. pp. 516, 517. His compendium of the rules of evidence, in volume third, chapter eightieth, is plain and concise, and embraces the general principles of this great branch of the law. The principles of law and equity, in relation to baron and feme, are expounded by the author, with great ability and acuteness, in chapter nineteenth; and in volume fifth, chapter one hundred and seventyfifth, article second, are stated the cases in which they must be joined or not, in suits by or against them. In the course of the work, the reader will find many brief summaries, like those just referred to, in which the rule of law is clearly and concisely stated, with brief expositions of the reasons of the law; these will be of great value to the profession in the hurry and bustle of practice, when they are often compelled to decide, before they have had leisure to examine many books. P In various parts of the work, the author has occasion to give his views of the true construction of constitutional and statute law; his commentaries on these are the fruits of professional discipline, familiar acquaintance with our history, and sound judgment. We select, as an example, chapter fortyeighth, in which he gives his construction of the article in the Bill of Rights, prefixed to the constitution of Massachusetts, called the third article, and of the act of March fourth, 1800, on the same subject. By this article is established; 1st. That all religious taxes must be " for the institution of the public worship of God, and for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality;" nor has the legislature power, by this article, to enjoin provisions, or means, for the support of any other description; nor to support these, where provision is volun tarily made; nor to enjoin attendance on any other, nor on these, only where the party can conscientiously and conveniently attend; and each religious society has the sole right to elect their public teacher, and to contract with him.' Vol. 11. pp. 329, 330. The author restricts the enforcing power of the legislature to Protestants, and contends, that, according to the invariable meaning of this article, none but public Protestant teachers are to receive legislative support. This he considers sectarian. In section fifth, it is stated, 'that all monies assessed and paid by any one, " for the support of public worship, and of the public teachers aforesaid," (that is, said public Protestant teachers), shall, if he require it, be applied to support the public teacher of his own denomination; so that the party's right to carry his tax from the parish or precinct in which it is raised, exists only among different sects. If a teacher be not Protestant and public, or if he neglect to teach either piety, religion, or morality, it is a question, whether he be within the provision. If so, in every case, where a minister, calling himself of a different denomination, brings assumpsit for monies had and received, to recover monies raised in another parish, the question may be raised if he be, 1st, A public Protestant teacher? 2dly, If he be such a teacher of piety, religion, and morality? And 3dly, If of a different denomination from the parish, in which such monies are assessed and raised? If he fails in any of these points, can he recover? Thence can a Jewish, Hindoo, Mahometan, or Catholic teacher recover? It has been decided, that none but Protestant teachers can.' p. 330. In the sixth section, he notices the act of March fourth, 1800, requiring each parish, if able, to be constantly provided with a public Protestant teacher of piety, religion, and morality,' and that any contract made by any town, parish,' &c. ' with any such public teacher,' chosen by it, shall be binding; and after noticing its conformity with the article in the bill of rights, so far as it applies only to such as are Protestant teachers, he ob serves, • In the latter part of this act, provision is made, that a man's tax, assessed in an incorporated religious society, may, at his request, " be applied to the support of the public teacher of his own religious sect," where he usually attends, and where he belongs. This provision is, perhaps, broader than the constitution; for this provision does not require the public teacher, who is to receive the man's tax, to be a Protestant, or to be a teacher of piety, religion, and morality; but it is enough, to satisfy this provision, that the man, paying the tax, be of a different denomination, and pay it to the teacher of his sect. Now a Jew may be taxed in a Congregational parish, and within the words of the act, be, at the time of voting or raising the tax, of a different sect from such parish; may belong to a Jewish society, and usually attend public worship there, and prove this by a formal certificate from his society. If he do this, he may, on this act, apply his tax, or have it applied to his Jewish public teacher. This is liberal, and on the true principles of toleration; but it may be empowering individuals to apply their taxes assessed for the support of religion, and to the support of religious teachers, in a way not contemplated in the constitution; and, therefore, if a Jew be taxed in a Protestant parish, and its committee refuse an order, for paying his tax over to his Jewish teacher, it is a question, if that teacher can, in assumpsit, or any other action, recover it.' p. 331. After examining the several views, presented in the discussion of these constitutional and statute provisions, he concludes by observing in section eighth, that The people, in forming the constitution, meant to support, by law and taxes, public Protestant teaching of piety, religion, and morality; and to leave all other religions to be supported by voluntary donations, or contracts of individuals, and not that the legislature should lay and enforce any taxes, to support these other religions, directly or indirectly, though the tax should enforce voluntary contracts in regard to them.' p. 333. In chapter one hundred and first, article fifth, he gives the rules of construction of covenants, contracts, wills, &c. on general principles of law. His construction, in each case, is concise, plain, and supported by authorities. This part of the work is not found in any other, at one view, and must be very useful, as it is a collection of the best authorities, which can be consulted on the construction of written instruments. In a few pages, there is presented to the reader the substance of what is scattered over several hundered pages of the work, in the different articles, where the construction of wills, contracts, &c. was considered. The judgment and skill of the author are conspicuous through the work, in his manner of abridging cases; this is an art difficult to be acquired, and essential to the successful execution of the task he had undertaken. Habitual practice, long experience, untiring patience, sagacity, and discrimination, are qualifications, combined in few individuals, and all these are necessary. To condense and compress into a small compass, cases minutely and diffusely reported in the modern fashion, to reject redundances, retrench verbiage, and immaterial circumstances, and, at the same time, to perceive and preserve all the cardinal points, the material facts, and the unbroken course of argument, is a rare and difficult art. This work contains many examples of the experience and skill of the author, in executing this part of his duty. A few only, among the thousands of cases abridged, can be noticed. Windham v. Chetwynd, reported in 1 Burr. 414, takes up seventeen pages in the reporter's volume. The abridgment of it, which the author has given in chapter one hundred and twentyseventh, reduces it more than nine tenths. This case contains all the most important law on this head [credibility of a witness to a will or devise]. It was decided, on a special verdict, finding that the testator had charged the residue of his real and personal estate, with payments of his debts and legacies, and that A, B, and C were witnesses to the will; and that, at the time they attested it, and at the time of his death, they were creditors to the testator in account, but were paid off, before they were examined to prove the will. After two arguments, the court decided, that they were good and credible witnesses, at the time of the attestation. Hence this was a good will of lands within the statute of fraud, 29 Ch. II. But Lord Mansfield and the court decided as above, and said, the said statute is silent as to the capacities of witnesses; "credible" presupposes the evidence given, and so is never used as synonymous to "competent." After the competence of a witness is allowed, the consideration of the credibility arises, and not before. The word credible, in a statute, can mean no more, than that the credibility of the witness is to be weighed; but this credibility is no part of the necessary form, in the attestation of wills, and said, the word credible, in the statute, was probably used as a word of course, and misapplied; that, at the time this act was passed, there was no law, whereon a question could arise to the competency of a witness, at the time of knowing the fact he came to testify, but only where he was competent or credible at the time of the examination. Whether a witness to a will was competent or credible, at the time of examination, cannot be a question; for he may die, or become interested before that time. What objections, then, to a witness are good or not, must be left to the judges, on the circumstances of the case. 1st. On the ground of the case. 2dly. On the authorities. First, on the ground of the case; the power of devising ought to be favoured : |