Street Railway Co. v. Murray et al. signal light, approached the crossing. The driver of the street car then made every effort to get his car across the tracks and avoid a collision, but the railway train struck the rear platform of the street car, after the whole of said car, except the rear platform, had passed over the crossing, and thereby Mr. Murray received injuries from which he shortly thereafter died. The case was tried to a jury, and a verdict rendered against both defendants. A motion was made for a new trial, which was overruled, and judgment entered on the verdict. On petition in error to the circuit court, which then had jurisdiction, the judgment was affirmed. Thereupon the case was brought here by petition in error on part of the street railway company, and by cross petition on part of the railroad company. J. W. Warrington and E. W. Kittredge, for plaintiff in error. There are two questions which arise upon the charges given and refused. The first is: Whether the statute which provides especially for gates and watchman at dangerous crossings, Revised Statutes, sections 247a and 2476, and the provisions of section 2 of the act of May 4, 1891, 88 O. L., 582, which relates generally to crossing of a steam railroad by a street railroad, being in pari materia, should be construed together. If so, are not the provisions of the former, being special, relating to a class of crossings where gates and watchman are requisite, exclusive of the provisions of the latter? Do not the provisions of the act referred to, of 1891, refer only to crossings where no gates or watchman are required or maintained? Street Railway Co. v. Murray et al. The second question is: Whether, if the act of 1891 applies to a crossing where gates and a watchman are maintained, is the failure to comply with the requirement to stop and send forward the conductor of a street car, under all circumstances per se, negligence, or is the violation of the law under the circumstances a fact competent to be considered by the jury with all the other evidence in the case, in determining whether the defendant was guilty of negligence? The legislation, both of the state and the city, provided the special means of preventing collisions at this particular crossing by requiring the establishment of the gates and the constant presence of the watchman whose duty it was to control and regulate the safe transit of the traveling public across the steam railroad tracks. It is well settled that several acts in pari materia, and relating to the same subject, are to be taken and comprised together in construing them; because they are considered as having one object in view, and as acting upon one system. It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious. 1 Ohio St., 20. There is also another familiar principle in the construction of statutes, expressed by this court in the case of Crawford v. McGregor, 44 Ohio St., 631. It should be observed that the plaintiff's cause of action against the street railway company, as alleged in the petition, was not all for the violation of this statutory duty. In this respect the case was like that of the B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Whitacre, 35 Ohio St., 629. Street Railway Co. v. Murray et al. But what we contend, and all that we contend for, is that, under the issues as they were made in this case, the failure of the street railway company to stop its car, and send an employe forward, and to do the other things required by the statute, was a fact which, in connection with all the other facts in the case, and disclosed by the evidence, should have been submitted to the jury for their determination of the question whether the street railway company exercised the degree of care which the law required of it, or whether it was guilty of negligence which was proximate cause the of the injury. Blamares v. Railroad Co., L. R., 8 Exch., 283; Wakefield v. Railroad Co., 37 Vt., 330; Meek v. Pennsylvania Co., 38 Ohio St., 632; Kempfle v. K. Ice Co., 84 N. Y., 488; Horn v. Railroad Co., 54 Fed. Rep., 301; Railway Co. v. Elliott, 28 Ohio St., 340; Railroad Co. v. Whiteacre, 35 Ohio St., 627. Whether a failure to stop the street car is always and absolutely a wrongful act amounting to negligence depends upon the question whether any circumstances will excuse the failure to observe the requirements of the statute. In our judgment, there is no solid distinction between one's obligation to perform a duty imposed upon him by statute and a duty imposed upon him by common law. Bower v. Peete, L. R. 1, Q. B. Div., 321. Bateman & Harper and Harmon, Colston, Goldsmith & Hoadley, for defendant in error. The street railway act was passed subsequently to the act regulating the duty of the steam railway company, at crossing, and must be presumed to have had in view the provisions of that act. And inasmuch as it does not limit its operation, as to Street Railway Co. v. Murray et al. cases provided for by the steam railway act, the intent of the legislature must be assumed to be as expressed. The steam railway act was passed April 15, 1889, 86 O. L., 367. The street railway act was passed March 4, 1891, 88 O. L., 581. If either may be said to operate to modify the provisions of the other, in the nature of amendment or repeal, such necessarily would be the case as to the street railway act, having been passed subsequently to the steam railway act. If either was repealed or amended by the operation of the other it must be the first act, and that only to the extent to which it is inconsistent with the later. There is no inconsistency in the two acts. In the matter of the probate of Hathaway's will, 4 Ohio St., 383; Woodbury v. Berry, 18 Ohio St., 456. The street and steam railway companies have their several and appropriate duties; the statute regulates both. As a common carrier the street car company has no right to rely upon the faithfulness or care of another company and its servants, over which it has no control and for which it can provide no regulation. It is sufficient that each should take the hazard of its own servants, and it would be unjust to subject one to the neglect or misconduct of the servants of the other, and the statutes were intended to hold each to its duty and responsibilities. Railway Company v. Schneider, 45 Ohio St., 678; Euton v. Railroid Co., 129 Mass., 364; Hayes v. Railroad Co., 111 U. S., 235; Pepper v. Sidwell, Admr., 36 Ohio St., 454; Hammerly v. Kramer, 12 Ohio St., 252; Youngstown v. Moore, 30 Ohio St., 133; Fox v. Spring Lake Iron Co., 89 Mich., 387; Railway Co. v. Taylor, (Ky.) 17 S. W. Rep., 198; Paulson v. Ward, (N. Dar.) 58 N. W. Rep., 792; Bicknell v. Spier, 27 N. Y., 386; Ladoga Street Railway Co. v. Murray et al. v. Linn, (Ind. App.,) 36 N. E. Rep., 159; Spengler v. Kaufman, 43 Mo. App., 5; Horn v. Railroad Co., 54 F. R., 301; Pennsylvania Co. v. Rethged, 32 Ohio St., 66; Salisbury v. Herschenroder, 106 Mass., 158; Billings v. Breinig, 45 Mich., 65; Correll v. Railroad Co., 38 Iowa, 120; Lloyd v. Perry, 32 Iowa, 146; Dodge v. Railroad Co., 34 Iowa, 276; Railroad Co., v. Stebbing, 62 Md., 504; Keim v. Union Railway & Transit Company, 90 Mo., 314; Faith v. Railway Co., 105 Mo., 437; Weber v. Railway Co., 100 Mo., 194; Seimers v. Ison, 54 Cal., 418; Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, section 13a; Central Railroad and Banking Company v. Smith, 78 Ga., 694; Railroad Co. v. Boggs, 101 Ind., 522; Hazard Powder Company v. Volger, 58 Fed. Rep., 152; Railroad Co. v. Voelker, 129 Ill., 540; Piper v. Railroad Co., 77 Wis., 247; Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn., 323; Kelly v. Railroad Co., 75 Mo., 138. We insist, therefore, that both upon reason and authority, when the law commands acts to be done or omitted by a railway company, by way of con serving the public safety, a duty is thereby imposed upon it in behalf of each individual composing the public, and a breach of that duty constitutes negligence in law, and, if injury shall have resulted therefrom, gives to the person injured the right of action for the amount of such injury against the delinquent company; and that the company has no dispensing power by which it can substitute other precautions in place of those prescribed by law. BURKET, J. The errors assigned and relied upon, arise upon the charge of the court to the jury as given, and refusal to charge as requested. The general charge as to the liability of the street |