b. Agreements to do that which it is the policy of the law to prevent. (a) Agreements which injure the state in its relations with other states. UNITED STATES v. GROSSMAYER. 9 WALLACE (U. S.), 72.-1869. [Reported herein at p. 215.] GRAVES v. JOHNSON. 156 MASSACHUSETTS, 211.-1892. [Reported herein at p. 891.] (B) Agreements which tend to injure the public service. TRIST v. CHILD. 21 WALLACE (U. S.), 441.— 1874. Bill to enjoin defendant from withdrawing the sum of $14,559 from the United States Treasury, and for a decree commanding him to pay complainant $5000, and for general relief. Defense, illegality. Decree for complainant. Defendant appeals. Defendant, having a claim against the United States for services, made an agreement with complainant's father (to whose rights as partner and personal representative complainant succeeded) that he should take charge of the claim and prosecute it and it discloses a cunningly-devised plan to cheat and defraud. 'Whenever any contract conflicts with the morals of the time and contravenes any established interests of society, it is void as being against public policy.' Story, Conf. Laws, sec. 546. Surely a contract that cannot be performed without deception and fraud conflicts with the morals of the time, and contravenes the established interest of society. There was no error in instructing the jury that this contract is fraudulent and void as between the original parties to it. In this connection, see McNamara v. Gargett, 68 Mich. 454; 36 N. W. Rep. 218, wherein the Supreme Court of Michigan held a similar contract void as being against public policy. True, in that case the contract is said to be a gambling contract, but it is declared to be against public policy on other grounds." — Given, J., in Merrill v. Packer, 80 Iowa, 542. before Congress, and receive as compensation 25 per cent of whatever sum Congress might appropriate. The father, and after his death, the complainant, prosecuted the claim with the result that Congress appropriated the sum of $14,559 to pay it. Defendant refused to pay the 25 per cent stipulated and complainant filed this bill in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. From the evidence it appeared that personal solicitations were used to carry the bill, but there was no evidence that bribes were offered or contemplated. MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE. The court below decreed to the appellee the amount of his claim, and enjoined Trist from receiving from the treasury "any of the money appropriated to him" by Congress, until he should have paid the demand of the appellee. This decree, as regards that portion of the fund not claimed by the appellee, is an anomaly. Why the claim should affect that part of the fund to which it had no relation, is not easy to be imagined. This feature of the decree was doubtless the result of oversight and inadvertence. The bill proceeds upon the grounds of the validity of the original contract, and a consequent lien in favor of the complainant upon the fund appropriated. We shall examine the latter ground first. Was there, in any view of the case, a lien? It is well settled that an order to pay a debt out of a particular fund belonging to the debtor gives to the creditor a specific equitable lien upon the fund, and binds it in the hands of the drawee. Yeates v. Groves, 1 Vesey, Jr. 280; Lett v. Morris, 4 Simons, 607; Bradley v. Root, 5 Paige, 632; 2 Story's Equity, § 1047. A part of the particular fund may be assigned by an order, and the payee may enforce payment of the amount against the drawee. Field v. The Mayor, 2 Selden, 179. But a mere agreement to pay out of such fund is not sufficient. Something more is necessary. There must be an appropriation of the fund pro tanto, either by giving an order or by transferring it otherwise in such a manner that the holder is authorized to pay the amount directly to the creditor without the further intervention of the debtor. Wright v. Ellison, 1 Wallace, 16; Hoyt v. Story, 3 Barbour's Supreme Court, 264; Malcolm v. Scott, 3 Hare, 39; Rogers v. Hosack, 18 Wendell, 319. Viewing the subject in the light of these authorities, we are brought to the conclusion that the appellee had no lien upon the fund here in question. The understanding between the elder Child and Trist was a personal agreement. It could in nowise produce the effect insisted upon. For a breach of the agreement, the remedy was at law, not in equity, and the defendant had a constitutional right to a trial by jury. Wright v. Ellison, 1 Wallace, 16. If there was no lien, there was no jurisdiction in equity. There is another consideration fatally adverse to the claim of a lien. The first section of the act of Congress of February 26, 1853, declares that all transfers of any part of any claim against the United States, "or of any interest therein, whether absolute or conditional, shall be absolutely null and void, unless executed in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses after the allowance of such claim, the ascertainment of the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant therefor." That the claim set up in the bill to a specific part of the money appropriated is within this statute is too clear to admit of doubt. It would be a waste of time to discuss the subject. But there is an objection of still greater gravity to the appellee's case. Was the contract a valid one? It was, on the part of Child, to procure by lobby service, if possible, the passage of a bill providing for the payment of the claim. The aid asked by the younger Child of Trist, which indicated what he considered needful, and doubtless proposed to do and did do himself, is thus vividly pictured in his letter to Trist of the 20th February, 1871. After giving the names of several members of Congress, from whom he had received favorable assurances, he proceeds: "Please write to your friends to write to any member of Congress. Every vote tells, and a simple request may secure a vote, he not caring anything about it. Set every man you know at work. Even if he knows a page, for a page often gets a vote." In the Roman law it was declared that "a promise made to effect a base purpose, as to commit homicide or sacrilege, is not binding." Institutes of Justinian, lib. 3, tit. 19, par. 24. In our jurisprudence a contract may be illegal and void because it is contrary to a constitution or statute, or inconsistent with sound policy and good morals. Lord Mansfield said (Jones v. Randall, 1 Cowper, 39): "Many contracts which are not against morality, are still void as being against the maxims of sound policy." It is a rule of the common law of universal application, that where a contract express or implied is tainted with either of the vices last named, as to the consideration or the thing to be done, no alleged right founded upon it can be enforced in a court of justice. Before considering the contract here in question, it may be well, by way of illustration, to advert to some of the cases presenting the subject in other phases, in which the principle has been adversely applied. Within the condemned category are: An agreement to pay for supporting for election a candidate for sheriff, Swayze v. Hull, 3 Halsted, 54; to pay for resigning a public position to make room for another, Eddy v. Capron, 4 Rhode Island, 395; Parsons v. Thompson, 1 H. Blackstone, 322; to pay for not bidding at a sheriff's sale of real property, Jones v. Caswell, 3 Johnson's Cases, 29; to pay for not bidding for articles to be sold by the government at auction, Doolin v. Ward, 6 Johnson, 194; to pay for not bidding for a contract to carry the mail on a specified route, Gulick v. Bailey, 5 Halsted, 87; to pay a person for his aid and influence in procuring an office, and for not being a candidate himself, Gray v. Hook, 4 Comstock, 449; to pay for procuring a contract from the government, Tool Company v. Norris, 2 Wallace, 45; to pay for procuring signatures to a petition to the governor for a pardon, Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152; to sell land to a particular person when the surrogate's order to sell should have been obtained, Overseers of Bridgewater v. Overseers of Brookfield, 3 Cowen, 299; to pay for suppressing evidence and compounding a felony, Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wilson, 347; to convey and assign a part of what should come from an ancestor by descent, devise, or distribution, Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Massachusetts, 112; to pay for promoting a marriage, Scribblehill v. Brett, 4 Brown's Parliamentary Cases, 144; Arundel v. Trevillian, 1 Chancery Reports, 87; to influence the disposition of property by will in a particular way, Debenham v. Ox, 1 Vesey, Sr. 276; see also Addison on Contracts, 91; 1 Story's Equity, ch. 7; Collins v. Blantern, 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 676, American note. The question now before us has been decided in four American cases. They were all ably considered, and in all of them the contract was held to be against public policy, and void. Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & Sergeant, 315; Harris v. Roof's Executor, 10 Barbour's Supreme Court, 489; Rose & Hawley v. Truax, 21 Id. 361; Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 16 Howard, 314. We entertain no doubt that in such cases, as under all other circumstances, an agreement express or implied for purely professional services is valid. Within this category are included, drafting the petition to set forth the claim, attending to the taking of testimony, collecting facts, preparing arguments, and submitting them, orally or in writing, to a committee or other proper authority, and other services of like character. All these things are intended to reach only the reason of those sought to be influenced. They rest on the same principle of ethics as professional services rendered in a court of justice, and are no more exceptionable. But such services are separated by a broad line of demarcation from personal solicitation, and the other means and appliances which the correspondence shows were resorted to in this case. There is no reason to believe that they involved anything corrupt or different from what is usually practiced by all paid lobbyists in the prosecution of their business. The foundation of a republic is the virtue of its citizens. They are at once sovereigns and subjects. As the foundation is undermined, the structure is weakened. When it is destroyed, the fabric must fall. Such is the voice of universal history. 1 Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, 17. The theory of our government is, that all public stations are trusts, and that those clothed with them are to be animated in the discharge of their duties solely by considerations of right, justice, and the public good. They are never to descend to a lower plane. But there is a correlative duty resting upon the citizen. In his intercourse with those in authority, whether executive or legislative, touching the performance of their functions, he is bound to exhibit truth, frankness, and integrity. Any departure from the line of rectitude in |