and requesting the person to whom it was addressed to deal with them. This case is one where it is eminently proper to heed the injunction of Justice Foster in the opinion in Lyman v. Robinson (14 Allen, 254): "That care should always be taken not to construe as an agreement, letters which the parties intended only as preliminary negotiations." We do not wish to be understood as holding that a party may not be bound by an offer to sell personal property, where the amount or quantity is left to be fixed by the person to whom the offer is made, when the offer is accepted and the amount or quantity fixed before the offer is withdrawn. We simply hold that the letter of the appellants in this case was not such an offer. If the letter had said to the respondent, we will sell you all the Michigan fine salt you will order, at the price and on the terms named, then it is undoubtedly the law that the appellants would have been bound to deliver any reasonable amount the respondent might have ordered,- possibly any amount, or make good their default in damages. The case cited by the counsel, decided by the California Supreme Court (Keller v. Ybarru, 3 Cal. 147), was an offer of this kind with an additional limitation. The defendant in that case had a crop of growing grapes, and he offered to pick from the vines and deliver to the plaintiff, at defendant's vineyard, so many grapes then growing in said vineyard as the plaintiff should wish to take during the present year, at ten cents per pound on delivery. The plaintiff, within the time and before the offer was withdrawn, notified the defendant that he wished to take 1900 pounds of his grapes on the terms stated. The court held there was a contract to deliver the 1900 pounds. In this case, the fixing of the quantity was left to the person to whom the offer was made, but the amount which the defendant offered, beyond which he could not be bound, was also fixed by the amount of grapes he might have in his vineyard in that year. The case is quite different in its facts from the case at bar. The cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellants (Beaupré v. P. & A. Tel. Co., 21 Minn. 155, and Kinghorne v. Montreal Tel. Co., U. C. 18 Q. B. 60) are nearer in their main facts to the case at bar, and in both it was held there was no contract. We, however, place our opinion upon the language of the letter of the appellants, and hold that it cannot be fairly construed into an offer to sell to the respondent any quantity of salt he might order, nor any reasonable amount he might see fit to order. The language is not such as a business man would use in making an offer to sell to an individual a definite amount of property. The word "sell" is not used. They say, "We are authorized to offer Michigan fine salt," etc., and volunteer an opinion that at the terms stated it is a bargain. They do not say, we offer to sell to you. They use the general language proper to be addressed generally to those who were interested in the salt trade. It is clearly in the nature of an advertisement, or business circular, to attract the attention of those interested in that business to the fact that good bargains in salt could be had by applying to them, and not as an offer by which they are to be bound, if accepted, for any amount the persons to whom it was addressed might see fit to order. We think the complaint fails to show any contract between the parties, and the demurrer should have been sustained. By the Court. The order of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law. § 8. The offer must be intended to create, and capable of creating, legal relations. KELLER v. HOLDERMAN. 11 MICHIGAN, 248.-1863. Action on a three-hundred-dollar check which had been drawn by defendant in favor of plaintiff, on a bank which had refused to honor it. The facts concerning the check were, that it was given for a fifteen-dollar watch, which defendant kept until the day of trial, when he offered to return it, but plaintiff refused to receive it; that the whole transaction was a frolic and banter, the plaintiff not expecting to sell nor the defendant intending to buy the watch at the sum for which the check was drawn; and that the defendant when he drew the check had no money in the banker's hands, and had intended to insert a condition in the check that would prevent his being liable upon it, but had failed to do so. Judgment was rendered against him for the amount of the check, whereupon he appealed. MARTIN, C. J. When the court below found as a fact that "the whole transaction between parties was a frolic and a banter, the plaintiff not expecting to sell nor the defendant intending to buy the watch at the sum for which the check was drawn," the conclusion should have been that no contract was ever made by the parties, and the finding should have been that no cause of action existed upon the check to the plaintiff. The judgment is reversed, with costs of this court and of the court below. The other Justices concurred. McCLURG v. TERRY. 21 NEW JERSEY EQUITY, 225. — 1870. THE CHANCELLOR: The complainant seeks to have the ceremony of marriage performed between herself and the defendant in November, 1869, declared to be a nullity. The ground on which she asks this decree is, that although the ceremony was actually performed, and by a justice of the peace of the county, it was only in jest, and not intended to be a contract of marriage, and that it was so understood at the time by both parties, and the other persons present; and that both parties have ever since so considered and treated it, and have never lived together, or acted towards each other as man and wife. The bill and answer both state these as the facts of the case, and that neither party intended it as a marriage, or was willing to take the other as husband or wife. These statements are corroborated by the witnesses present. The complainant is an infant of nineteen years, and had returned late in the evening to Jersey City, from an excursion with the defendant and a number of young friends, among whom was a justice of the peace, and all being in good spirits, excited by the excursion, she in jest challenged the defendant to be married to her on the spot; he in the same spirit accepted the challenge, and the justice at their request per formed the ceremony, they making the proper responses. The ceremony was in the usual and proper form, the justice doubting whether it was in earnest or in jest. The defendant escorted the complainant to her home, and left her there as usual on occasions of such excursions; both acted and treated the matter as if no ceremony had taken place. After some time the friends of the complainant having heard of the ceremony, and that it had been formally and properly performed before the proper magistrate, raised the question and entertained doubts whether it was not a legal marriage; and the justice meditated returning a certificate of the marriage to be recorded before the proper officer. The bill seeks to have the marriage declared a nullity, and to restrain the justice from certifying it for record. Mere words without any intention corresponding to them, will not make a marriage or any other civil contract. But the words are the evidence of such intention, and if once exchanged, it must be clearly shown that both parties intended and understood that they were not to have effect. In this case the evidence is clear that no marriage was intended by either party; that it was a mere jest got up in the exuberance of spirits to amuse the company and themselves. If this is so, there was no marriage. On this part of the case I have no difficulty. I am satisfied that this court has the power, and that this is a proper case to declare this marriage a nullity. SHERMAN v. KITSMILLER, ADM'R. 17 SERGEANT AND RAWLE (PENN.), 45. — 1827. § 9. Acceptance must be absolute and identical with the terms of the offer. MINNEAPOLIS AND ST. LOUIS RAILWAY v. MR. JUSTICE GRAY. The rules of law which govern this case are well settled. As no contract is complete without the mutual assent of the parties, an offer to sell imposes no obligation until it is accepted according to its terms. So long as the offer has been neither accepted nor rejected, the negotiation remains open, and imposes no obligation upon either party; the one may decline to accept, or the other may withdraw his offer; and either rejection or withdrawal leaves the matter as if no offer had ever been made. A proposal to accept, or an acceptance, upon terms varying from those offered, is a rejection of the offer, and puts an end to the negotiation, unless the party who made the original offer renews it, or assents to the modification suggested. The other party, having once rejected the offer, cannot afterwards revive it by tendering an acceptance of it. Eliason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 225; Carr v. Duval, 14 Pet. 77; National Bank v. Hall, 101 U. S. 43, 50; Hyde v. Wrench, 3 Beavan, 334; Fox v. Turner, 1 Bradwell, 153. If the offer does not limit the time for its acceptance, it must be accepted within a reasonable time. If it does, it may, at any time within the limit and so long as it remains open, be accepted or rejected by the party to whom, or be withdrawn by the party by whom, it was made. Boston & Maine Railroad v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224; Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463. The defendant, by the letter of December 8, offered to sell to the plaintiff two thousand to five thousand tons of iron rails on certain terms specified, and added that if the offer was accepted the defendant would expect to be notified prior to December 20. This offer, while it remained open, without having been rejected by the plaintiff or revoked by the defendant, would authorize the plaintiff to take at his election any number of tons not less than two thousand nor more than five thousand, on the terms speci |