But I do not consider that, because all donations to the uses mentioned in the act are commonly known as gifts, the word "gifts" in the title expresses the same meaning as the words "grants, bequests, and devises" in the body of the act, nor connotes or sug gests the larger purpose and object indicated in the body of the act. It will be presumed to have the same meaning in the title that it has in the body of the act, where, plainly, it is used as having a different meaning than the words "grants, bequests, and devises." The decree must be reversed, and a decree entered in this court generally agreeably with the prayer of the bill; but, unless counsel can agree upon its terms, the extent to which the trustee ought equitably to account must be left a matter for further consideration.

STEERE, BIRD, and STONE, JJ., concur with OSTRANDER, J.

BROOKE, C. J. My Brother OSTRANDER holds the act in question invalid because of the alleged insufficiency of its title. The title reads: "An act relative to gifts for religious, educational, charitable and benevolent purposes." This court has three times passed upon the precise question raised.

In People v. Kelly, 99 Mich. 82, 57 N. W. 1090, the court had under consideration an act entitled "An act relative to disorderly persons." It was said:

"The precise contention is that the title gives no information as to what acts constitute a disorderly person, and that the third offense of which the defendant was found guilty is not expressed therein. This objection to the law is not well founded."

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In Soukup v. Van Dyke, 109 Mich. 679, 67 N. W. 911, the title under consideration was: "An act relative to justices' courts in the city of Grand Rapids." The court said: "We think the general words 'An act relative to justices' courts in the city of Grand Rapids' are used to indicate the general purpose of the legislation. * * The provision requiring the object to be expressed in its title has not received a construction which renders it necessary that the title be as full as the act itself."

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Again in the case of People v. Worden Grocer Co., 118 Mich. 604, 77 N. W. 315, this court, in considering an act entitled "An act in relation to the manufacture and sale of vinegar," said:

"It is contended that the title to the act does not express any object; that the act was intended to prevent deception in the sale of vinegar, or to prevent adulteration of vinegar, but that no such object is expressed in the title. # We think this contention sufficiently answered by what was said by this court in Soukup v. Van Dyke, supra."

Much of the most important legislation upon our statute books has been enacted under titles similar to the one in question. Some

instances follow:

"An act relative to levies and sales in execution, in certain cases." Act No. 274, P. A.

"An act relating to negotiable instruments." Act No. 265, P. A. 1905.

this state." Act No. 293, P. A. 1909. "An act in relation to the public health in

"An act in relation to the sale of corn syrup." Act No. 123, P. A. 1903.

of timber or other property from state tax lands." Act No. 145, P. A. 1903.

"An act relative to the unauthorized removal

"An act in relation to the use of preservatives in food products." Act No. 7, P. A. 1905. "An act relative to the cost of bonds to be furnished by state officers." Act No. 311, P. A. 1905.

"An act relative to agreements, contracts and combinations in restraint of trade or commerce.' Act No. 329, P. A. 1905.

"An act in relation to acquiring title to real estate by adverse possession." Act No. 46, P. A. 1907.

"An act relative to the maintenance and con

struction of hospitals and sanitoria within the counties of this state and to provide a tax to raise moneys therefor." Act No. 139, P. A. 1909.

"An act relative to wills executed without the state." Act No. 45, P. A. 1911.

"An act relative to proceedings against and the liquidation of delinquent insurance corporations." Act No. 216, P. A. 1911. "An act relating to the conduct of hotels, inns and public lodging houses." Act No. 188, P. A. 1913.

In addition to the foregoing there are others. This list is sufficient, however, to indicate the breadth and importance of the legislation enacted under titles subject to the exact infirmity which my Brother holds fatal to the act in question. Many of these acts are penal in character and directly affect the liberty of the individual. Others deal with the public health, fix property rights, and define and provide penalties for illegal methods of doing business. Many of these acts have been before this court for construction; no attack having been made upon their several titles. To agree with my Brother's conclusion would be to overrule the three cases above cited, to adopt a new and much stricter rule of construction, and (by inference) to make invalid a mass of legislation of the greatest importance. It is true that the act in question does change an old and well-settled policy of this state. That fact, however, does not militate against its validity. Legislative changes are constantly being made to meet varying conditions, and it is the duty of the court to give effect to legislation, where the legislative intent is clear and no constitutional provision offended.

It should be noted that, under constitutional provisions practically identical with our own, the states of Pennsylvania and Kentucky have had for many years acts similar in character to our own under titles, subject to the same alleged infirmity. The fact that the title may be said to be broader than the

enactment thereunder does not affect its validity. Under our own decisions, I am satisfied that the title to the act in question is

sufficient.

It is said that the word "gifts" in the title is insufficient to cover the language "gift,

street of the town, and the larger part of the business is transacted in the two blocks immediately east of the railway crossing. The railroad station is 1,480 feet south of the crossing, and there is a slight upgrade from the crossing to the station. From 150 to 400 people cross the tracks at this crossing every day, a large number of them going to the mill, elevator, and other buildings to the west of the track. A continuation of the street is also the main highway to the wellsettled farming country lying to the west of town.

The mill and elevator are separated by a distance of from 20 to 23 feet, and this is narrowed by a platform on the side of the mill, used for loading and unloading and for access to the building. Both the mill and elevator are operated by water power from the Logan river, the dam being close to the mill. There is a direct conflict in the testimony as to whether a box car was standing on the side track near the south end of the elevator, but the jury evidently found that the car was there and obstructed the view. From the center of the main line to the center of the side track at the crossing is 14 feet 10 inches. The ground slopes upward slightly from the driveway between the mill and elevator to the railway. Parties desiring to load or unload at the mill would drive north between the mill and elevator, but in order to return were compelled to drive beyond the mill and make a sharp turn, coming back through the driveway by which they entered. There is a sharp curve in the railroad north of the elevator, so that looking north from the mill platform, and from the turning place still further north, a view of the railroad can be had extending to the northwest for more than half a mile, and the view of the track from immediately west of the crossing is cut off by the elevator. There is a dam with 8 feet fall close by the mill on the west, and this and the machinery of the mill made the locality of the driveway more or less noisy. On the morning of the accident Zell Craig, accompanied by his mother, Catherine Craig, drove to the mill with a grist, unloaded it upon the platform, drove north to the turn, and came back through the driveway. There was a strong wind blowing, but there is a conflict as to whether it was from the north or south. There is testimony that one of the horses that Craig was driving was a broncho, which was not well broken; but this we think is not material, since there is no proof of fractious or unruly conduct on the part of this animal at this time. The estimates as to the speed of the train vary from 25 to 35 miles per hour; but we are satisfied from the proofs that it was running at least at the rate of 30 miles as it approached the crossing. The proof is that the statutory signals were given, and the court so instructed the jury. The testimony on behalf of plaintiff as to other material facts is substantially, as follows: One witness, who was in the black

smith shop in the center of the block east of the crossing on the north side of the street, said that he heard the train whistle for the crossing, and afterwards give a danger whistle before the team was struck, and that he did not see the team or wagon until after the collision. The next witness was the plaintiff, who testified as to local surroundings, the age of his son, and his ability to labor. He also gave facts as to the other members of his family and the pecuniary loss sustained by the death. The third witness, who stood at the door of the blacksmith shop, testified that he saw the team come up over the railroad and saw the wagon cut in two by the train; that at the time the team was being driven over the crossing it was "just coming over in a little trot."

On the part of the defendants, the miller, who helped Craig to unload the grist, testified that while he was on the mill platform, and after Craig had started the team north in order to turn, he heard the train coming south whistle at the Logan bridge (which is half a mile north), and afterwards heard it whistle again for the crossing; that Craig turned and drove back between the mill and elevator, with the team walking; that after he passed the mill, and just after he began to make the turn to the crossing, he used his. whip on the horses, and continued to use it until he was struck by the engine. He also testified that there were no obstructions to the view north of the mill from the turn, except a little clump of trees about half way between the Logan bridge and the trestle bridge near the whistling post.

One Behn, who was driving a team for the millowner, was leaving the mill for the crossing just as Craig drove into the driveway. The witness drove his team to a point about 30 feet west of the side track, when he heard the whistle and stopped. He waited for the train to pass. He testified that he saw Craig start to whip his horses as he turned to go up to the crossing; the horses were trotting; that he saw him look to the north as he went up the grade onto the crossing at about the switch track. The witness shouted as loudly as he could to him to stop, as he passed him. Craig was then about 8 or 10 feet away from him. He did not see the train until it was east of the elevator.

Mr. Lyons, proprietor of the mill, was in the mill near an open window in the southHe testifies that he saw the east corner. team as it came south of the mill. As it approached the crossing Craig drove faster. He turned his head to the north as he cleared the side track, and as he turned back he applied the whip. He says "the woman made a grab for his arm or the lines," and the horses passed onto the main line on a gallop. The team passed the engine, and it struck the wagon. There was no box car beside the elevator. Cross-examination: He first saw the train south of the elevator, and the

whipping when Craig was going upon the switch track about 25 or 30 feet from the main line.

The engineer of the train testified that the bell was ringing continuously between the whistling post and the crossing; that he saw the team and wagon on the track when he was about 100 feet away and immediately applied the emergency air. Another witness, the postmaster, who was 50 feet east and 60 or 70 feet south of the crossing, testified that he did not see the team until it was practically right upon the side track. Craig then was urging and whipping the horses, and they were on a gallop. The fireman testified that he rang the bell continuously from the whistling post until they reached the crossing and that the train was going about 30 miles per hour.

Another witness was unloading garbage into the river southwest of the mill and about 100 feet west of the crossing. His attention was attracted by the manner in which Craig was driving past him towards the crossing; that he was whipping the horses and urging them on, driving right by the heads of the team of the witness; witness heard the train when it whistled for the crossing, saw it through the driveway between the elevator and the mill, and saw it again as it came past the elevator. The Craigs were then just starting to go across the track. He saw Craig look towards the train just as he was driving upon the track. The city marshal was standing in the creamery building, which is situated a little more than 100 feet west of the railroad track, and south of the highway, a little further west than the mill. He heard the train whistle, and saw a team coming from the mill towards the crossing. The driver seemed to be hurrying his team to get across the railway track and the crossing ahead of the train. He heard the emergency whistle and heard the bell rung.

Four assignments of error are discussed in the appellants' brief. They are: (1) That the defendants were not guilty of negligence; (2) that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence; (3) that the court erred in rejecting evidence in support of the counterclaim for damages; and (4) that the verdict is excessive.

[1] Defendants claim that the evidence does not warrant the inference that the speed of the train exceeded 30 miles per hour at the time of the accident, and insist that, since the statutory warnings with bell and whistle were given, even though the actual speed was 35 miles per hour, as one witness testified, this alone is not evidence of negligence. It is also said that, since trains had been running at this rate of speed at that point for over 30 years, this was the customary and usual rate, and attention is called to the fact that there was no ordinance

within the corporate limits. It is insisted that a fast rate of speed cannot of itself be negligent, citing cases and quoting the opinion of Judge Lake in Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Wendt, 12 Neb. 76, 10 N. W. 456, to the effect that:

"Speed alone, unconnected with any other fact or circumstance, and more especially where it is not shown to have been unusual, has never, that we are aware of, been held sufficient to show gross negligence."

This opinion, however, also states that a rate of speed entirely reasonable at some places and under some circumstances might evince a reckless disregard for the rights of persons and property at another. The latter principle is also stated by Judge Lake in his opinion in Meyer v. Midland P. R. Co., 2 Neb. 319, 335. The Nebraska cases cited in support of the theory that the rate of speed is no evidence of negligence show that in each case the facts were that the trains were running in the open country, outside of the limits of any city or village, and the language used applies to such conditions.

Defendant railroad also contends that, since it complied with the terms of the statute with respect to sounding the whistle and ringing the bell, it must be held free from negligence. We cannot take this view. The fact that certain precautions have been deemed necessary at all public crossings is no indication that further precautions are not demanded by the exercise of ordinary care at other places, where obstructions to the view or other circumstances render a crossing more dangerous. Ellis v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 138 Pa. St. 506, 21 Atl. 140, 21 Am. St. Rep. 914. The true principle is that a railroad company must use such care and precaution as ordinary prudence indicates. They must exercise greater care and greater vigilance in cities or towns, where crossings are frequently used by large numbers of people, than at ordinary crossings in the open country. The degree of care which the law requires to be exercised must be commensurate with the probability of danger. In some instances in cities and villages ordinary care and prudence demand that gates be erected, or flagmen stationed, or electric bells or signals installed, while in other cases all that would be necessary would be to lessen the speed of the train, or give continuous signals of its approach, or both. Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 12 Sup. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed. 485.

The jury evidently found that the defendant should have better safeguarded the crossing, or the rate of speed, considered in connection with all the other circumstances, was a negligent one. We are satisfied that the latter conclusion is upheld by the evidence. There is no proof that the deceased knew of the customary rate of speed at which this train was run at that point, and, no matter how long the practice of so running the train