LANDLORD AND TENANT-Continued.
A debtor filed a petition to open a judgment on the lord cannot be enforced. (Super. Ct.) Taylor v.
ground of an agreement made with the deceased Fuller, 215.
creditor; this was sustained by one competent wit-
ness and denied by the creditor's executor; Held,
the court did not err in refusing to open judgment.
See MAGISTRATE'S JUDGMENT.
JUDGMENT NON OBSTANTE VERE
See PRACTICE. Gordon v. Norton. 201.
JURISDICTION. Where a bill is brought by
a stockholder, owning one share, of the value of fifty
dollars, in a railroad, to enjoin his company and
other railroads, holding a majority of stock of the
former, to restrain an unlawful appropriation of val-
uable land belonging to his company, by one of the
other companies, the matter in controversy is the
value of the property and franchises of the company,
alleged to be interfered with, and not the plaintiff's
stock, and hence there is jurisdiction in the federal
Circuit Court. (U. S. C. C.) Taylor v. Junction R.
R. Co., 166.
A mere promise by a lessor that certain repairs
asked shall be made "before any more rent is
due," given in response to an assertion by the les-
see, at the time of paying the first advance instal-
ment of rent, due by the terms of an oral lease, that
she would pay no more rent until the repairs were
made, does not make the repairs a condition prece-
dent to the recovery of rent after the first instal-
ment. (Super. Ct.) Bradley v. Citizens' Trust &
Surety Co., 479.
LEASE. See BAILMENT. (Super Ct.) Cobb v.
Deiches, 228; MINING LEASE. Bannan v. Graef, 350.
LEGACY. Interest on. See INTEREST. (Super.
Ct.) Eichelberger's Estate, 260.
LIBEL. The jury have the right to determine the
law and the facts in indictments for libel as in other
cases, but in civil cases the court is bound to instruct
the jury as to whether the publication is libelous,
supposing the innuendoes to be true; and if that in-
JURY. A jury, which has once separated, after struction is disregarded the verdict will be set aside
the evidence has closed, cannot be brought together as contrary to law. (Super. Ct.) Moore v. Leader
again for the consideration of the case; when, Publ. Co., 570.
therefore, a jury has sealed a verdict and separated A publication impeaching the character of a per-
and, on the opening of the verdict in court, a juror son engaged in trade is libelous per se.
announces his disagreement, the jury must be dis- Johnson, 297.
charged. Kramer v. Kister, 392.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. The advice of a
justice of the peace cannot justify a defendant in an
action for malicious prosecution. (Super. Ct.) Auer
v. Mauser, 40.
A justice, who illegally orders or causes the arrest
of a citizen, is liable in damages, but is entitled, be-
fore being sued, to the thirty days' notice provided by
the Act of March 21, 1772. (Super. Ct.) Ross v.
Hudson, 43.
A charge of fraud, even if it do not impute an in-
dictable offence, when applied to a person engaged
in trade is libelous. Id.
The words, "You are a first-class fraud and of the
first water," contained in a letter which in the ordi-
nary course of business comes into the hands of a
third person are libelous. Id.
While a newspaper is privileged to print accounts
of civil or criminal proceedings in the courts, if the
publication be a plain straightforward statement of
the particular case or literal quotations of the re-
cord, yet if a sensational style is adopted and the
plain object of the publication is to attract atten-
the privilege is lost. (Super. Ct.) Moore v. Leader
Publ. Co., 570.
Where it is agreed that whatever is due to the
defendant in an action before a justice shall be
credited in the judgment, even after entry, such tion rather than impart information the benefit of
agreement does not allow the defendant to bring an
action for said amount, but if execution be issued
without such credit, his remedy is to apply to the
justice for the proper credit on the judgment. (Su-
per. Ct.) Wills v. Little, 404.
There is no rule of law which forbids the jury, in
an action for libel, to give nominal damages only,
where there is no evidence of actual injury to the
Set-off before. See SET-OFF; WAIVER. (Super. plaintiff in his business or social relations or other-
Ct.) Wills v. Little, 404.
wise. Palmer v. Leader Pub. Co., 556.
An award of nominal damages for a publication
libelous per se is not necessarily absurd; nor does
an award necessarily imply any reflection upon the
character or reputation of the plaintiff. Id.
LACHES. Where a deed conveying land is made
in consequence of fraudulent representation by the
grantee, and the grantor, two years later, discovers
the fraud, but retains the purchase money and does
LIEN. Of magistrate's judgment entered in
nothing to assert title or have the fraud judicially Common Pleas lost on appeal. See MAGISTRATE'S
ascertained until ten years thereafter, within which JUDGMENT. (Super. Ct.) Belber . Belber, 10.
time the grantee, with the knowledge of the grantor, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. In an action by
improves and develops the land, and dies, the gran- a wife for inducing her husband to leave her, the
tor is guilty of such laches as will bar a proceeding fact that statements made by the defendant which
on her part to set aside the deed. Inlow v. Christy, induced the departure were made at a time so long
515.
prior to bringing the action, that an action for slan-
LANDLORD AND TENANT. In Philadel- der based on them would be barred, will not be a
phia one magistrate may lawfully, since the Act of bar, especially where the statements were not the
February 5, 1875, exercise the jurisdiction for the sole means employed to induce the husband to de-
recovery of premises vested by the Act of March part. Gernerd v. Gernerd, 49.
21, 1772, in two justices of the peace. (Super. Ct.) A married woman, so far as regards her claims
Gallagher v. Maclean, 172. ORLADY and PORTER, against all but her husband, must sue within the
JJ., dissent.
time which would have been the limit of her right
Where a tenant leaves his family in leased prem- of action if she were a feme sole. (Super. Ct.)
ises and the landlord permits them to remain dur- Hicks's Estate, 117, 248.
ing the absence of the tenant, a claim for wages of Where a grantor remains in possession of land
the wife at the suit of the tenant against the land-conveyed by him, and there has been a fraudulent
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Continued.
description of the land in the deed, the statute of
limitations does not run against him until discovery
of the fraud or such notice as may put him upon in-
quiry. Davis v. Monroe, 489.
That an applicant is a foreign corporation is a
good reason for refusing to grant it a license. Id.
LIQUOR LICENSE. While a liquor license is
a personal privilege, and not an asset of the estate
In ejectment, where it appears that the land was of the holder, yet the fact that a license has been
conveyed by the defendant, more than twenty-one granted to sell liquor at a particular place may in-
years before action brought, to the ancestor of the crease the value of what an administrator or exe-
plaintiffs, by deed duly recorded, the defendant may cutor may have to sell; if, therefore, an executor
show, by the justice of the peace who took the ac- instead of endeavoring to sell the lease and good-will
knowledgment of the deed, that at its execution the of a saloon, appropriates it to himself he will be sub-
defendant had refused to sign it, as it would deprive ject to a surcharge of whatever the good-will and
him of his home, when he was assured, both by the opportunity of procuring a transfer of the license
grantee and the justice that the part of the tract in may be worth. Buck's Estate, 25.
suit and of which defendant has kept continuous
possession, was not included in the deed; that upon
faith of these representations, and not being able
to read, he had executed the deed knowing nothing
of the fraud perpetrated upon him until the bringing
of the suit. Id.
MAGISTRATE. See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
(Super. Ct.) Gallagher v. Maclean, 172.
MAGISTRATE'S JUDGMENT.
A magis-
trate's judgment, although a transcript thereof be
filed in the Common Pleas, loses its lien immediately
on the filing of an appeal, within the proper time.
(Super. Ct.) Belber v. Belber, 10.
Where the equitable title has been conveyed to a
trustee by a sufficient deed and it is afterwards
sought to set aside the deed on the ground of fraud, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. To sustain an
the case falls within the statute of limitations of action for malicious prosecution, the defendant must
April 22, 1856, sec. 6, as an attempt to enforce an have proceeded with malice and without probable
implied trust, for the conveyance to the trustee ex- cause. (Super. Ct.) Auer v. Mauser, 40.
tinguished the express trust, which can only be re- All relevant matters, whether arising before or
vived by enforcing the implied trust arising ex male- after the prosecution was begun, which tend to show
ficio, the proceeding to enforce which must be the cause and motive of the prosecution, are admis-
within five years from the discovery of the fraud. sible in evidence. Id.
Inlow v. Christy, 515.
Where it is shown that a prosecution was termin-
Under the ated by a conviction, that fact is ordinarily sufficient
Act of Congress of March 3, 1851, sec. 3, which pro- proof of probable cause, but if by acquittal or dis-
vides that "the liability of the owner or owners of charge, it is prima facie evidence of want of such
any ship or vessel, for any embezzlement, loss or cause; the effect of both conviction and acquittal
destruction by the master, officers, mariners, pas-may, however, be rebutted; the former has, however,
sengers or any other person or persons of any prop- the greater probative force. Id.
erty, goods or merchandise shipped or put on board The return of "ignoramus" is a sufficient termina-
of such ship or vessel, or for any loss, damage or tion of the prosecution, to support an action, unless
injury by collision, or for any act, matter or thing, it has been falsely or fraudulently procured by or
loss, damages or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or in- on behalf of the accused, and the question whether
curred without the privity or knowledge of such it has been so procured is for the jury. Id.
owner, or owners, shall in no case exceed the amount A defendant in malicious prosecution may show
of the interest of such owner or owners respectively the circumstances of its termination and that it was
in such ship or vessel, and her freight then pend- without his knowledge or concurrence; he may show
ing," the defendants should be permitted in an action by the district-attorney what led to the finding of
against them to recover for death caused by the the grand jury, but cannot introduce evidence of
negligence of their servants in charge of a tug, to what was his intention as to the future. Id.
show the value of the tug and the respective pro- The advice of a justice of the peace cannot pro-
portions of ownership in it and the court after ap-tect a defendant in an action for malicious prosecu-
propriate instructions to the jury should direct them, tion. Id.
if they find for the plaintiff, to find specially in ad- A prosecutor who has made an honest mistake and
dition the value of the tug and the proportionate begun a prosecution with probable cause is not
ownership of the several defendants. Loughin v. bound to press for a conviction when he finds out
McCaulley, 519.
his mistake and he may, accordingly, when proceeded
against for malicious prosecution, show that the
verdict of not guilty in the criminal case was the
result of the abandonment by him of the prosecution.
Kramer v. Kister, 392.
To set up the limited liability provided for by the
Act of Congress of March 3, 1851, it is not necessary
that defendants' interests in the vessel be trans-
ferred to a trustee. Id.
LIQUOR LAW. A license may be refused
without assigning any reason, if it appear that the
decision is the result of consideration. (Super. Ct.)
Re Application of Sperring, 37.
Associate judges, unlearned in the law, may grant
or refuse a liquor license without the concurrence
of the president judge. Id.
A writ of prohibition to restrain a license court
from granting licenses will not be issued. DeWalt's
Petition, 114.
The right to sell liquor is not one of the rights
growing out of citizenship. (Super. Ct.) Application
of Peter Schoenhofen Brewing Co. for License, 402.
MANDATE. The mandate of the governor in a
capital case is an execution within the meaning of
the Act of May 19, 1897. Com'th v. Hill, 73.
Origin of the issue of a mandate by the governor. Id.
MARITIME LAW. The Act of Congress
which confers a maritime right cannot be overridden
by a statute or by the Constitution of a State.
Loughin v. McCaulley, 519.
See LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Loughin v. Mc-
Caulley, 519.
MARRIAGE. Where a man thus addresses a
woman, "Would you be willing to marry me in this
way that you and I are to live together until death
MASTER AND SERVANT-Continued.
separate us? I take you to be my wife, and you take an appliance with which the plaintiff, an employé,
me to be your husband," to which the response is, must work, is delegated by the employer to another
"Yes, sir, until death separate us." And this is fol- employé, who is authorized to instruct the plaintiff
lowed by the occupancy by the woman of a house when the appliance is ready for use, if, after being
provided by the man, and where the man regularly instructed by the other employé that the appliance
came, when duties which kept him away from home is safe, the plaintiff goes to work, and, in conse-
most of the time, permitted him, up to the time of quence of the insufficient condition of the appliance
his death, by the birth of a child, registered with is, without negligence on his part, injured, the em-
health officer by his father's name, and as the child ployer is liable. McGroarty v. Wanamaker, 541.
of the mother, and an open acknowledgment of the
woman by the man as his wife, there is sufficient
evidence to justify the finding of a marriage. Com-
ly's Estate, 51.
Evidence that, before an alleged marriage, the al-
leged wife had lived in illicit relations with men
other than the alleged husband, or had been di-
vorced, is not admissible where the question is, did
the marriage take place. Id.
As consideration for contract. See ANTE-NUPTIAL
CONTRACT; STATUTE OF FRAUDS. Flory v. Houck,
A vice principal for whose negligence an em-
ployer is liable to other employés must be either
(1) one in whom the employer has placed the entire
charge of the business, or of a distinct branch of
it, giving him not mere authority to superintend
certain work or workmen, but control of the busi-
ness, exercising no discretion or oversight of his
own; or (2) one to whom he delegates a duty of his
own which is a direct, personal and absolute obli-
gation from which nothing but performance can re-
lieve him. Prevost v. Citizens' Ice & Refrigerating
Co., 185.
A chief engineer in a factory is not a vice prin-
cipal, even though in the absence of the general
manager he has authority to "hire men for short
MARRIED WOMAN. The Act of June 8, 1893,
does not deprive a married woman of the power to
mortgage her estate for the debts of her husband,
or of any other person. Siebert v. Valley National jobs." Id.
Bank, 319.
The prohibition of the second section of the Act
with reference to the suretyship or guarantorship
of a married woman covers the creation of a gen-
eral or personal liability, and is a limitation on the
increased contractual power given by the Act, not
a limitation of powers already possessed by a mar-
ried woman. Id.
A judgment confessed by a married woman is pre-
sumably valid. Stahr v. Brewer, 356.
A master is not bound to supervise work which he
has ordered to be performed; therefore, if an em-
ployé receives from the proper official of a corpora-
tion particular instructions as to the performance
of a piece of work in the line of his employment,
and directs another, a co-employé, to do the work in
a different way, which results in his injury, the mas-
ter is not liable. Id.
Where there is testimony that it is the duty of a
conductor or brakeman, not a member of the crew
Where a married woman seeks to invalidate a of the train on which he is riding, who sees pas-
judgment, on the ground of her coverture, she must sengers leaving the train without having surrender-
show not only the fact of marriage, but also the ed their tickets, to notify some one of the crew to
circumstances which relieve her from liability. Id. collect the tickets, if such employé, passing through
A married woman confessed a judgment. She or out of a car either to give notice or to collect
showed by petition and depositions that her husband tickets, negligently pushes or jostles a passenger,
had used her name in buying, selling and encum-the railroad company is liable for the injury in-
bering properties, that she knew of the use of her flicted. Schimpf v. Harris, 59.
name, but was not familiar with the business and In an action to recover for an alleged illegal dis-
furnished no money for the purchase of property, charge, it is error to charge that, unless the plain-
that she signed what papers she was requested to, tiff was wanting in knowledge or skill or habitually
and gave the judgment at her husband's request to failed to exercise the same in the employment of the
secure a debt of the husband arising in his trans- defendant, he may recover the contract wages, for
actions in land: Held, it was for a jury to say the duty of the employé is to exercise the required
whether the transactions of the husband were really knowledge and skill continuously while in service,
for the wife, and whether she received considera-
tion for the judgment, or whether her name was a
mere cover. Id. See HUSBAND AND WIFE.
and while a slight or occasional omission to exercise
the highest degree of knowledge and skill might not
justify a discharge, yet it is going too far in the
other direction to say that a failure in perform-
ance of duty must be habitual to bar a recovery of
contract wages. Peltz v. Printz Bros., 250.
MASTER AND SERVANT. It is the duty
of an employer to furnish his workmen with suit-
able appliances and to keep them in reasonably safe
condition; and if an accident happen to a servant
through the breaking of an appliance, caused by a
defect which the master could have discovered by
the exercise of reasonable care, the master is liable. term. He may hold himself in readiness to perform
McGuigan v. Beatty, 277.
Where an employé is discharged without sufficient
cause before the end of his term of employment, he
may, prima facie, recover his wages for the full
and recover as for performance; and even if bound
Where there is evidence that an employé was to make a reasonable endeavor to obtain employ-
injured through the breaking of a rope, rotten ment, the burden of showing that he obtained or
through use, which allowed an elevator weight to might have obtained it is on the employer.
fall upon him, and also that a block, which if in Ct.) Heyer v. Cunningham Piano Co., 14.
place might have prevented the fall of the weight, MEASURE OF DAMAGES. The measure of
had been long absent from its place, the question of damages, in the case of a change of grade, is the dif-
negligence on the part of the master is for the jury, ference, based on the average value of properties in
especially where there is no evidence that the mas- the neighborhood, between the value of the proper-
ter had ever inspected the rope. Id.
ties before and that after the change took place.
Where the matter of the sufficiency of repairs to (Super. Ct.) Grier v. Homestead, 18.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES-Continued.
MECHANICS' LIEN- Continued. Where, under the rules of an exchange, it is the A tenant in common who is also contractor for duty of one party, on receiving notice of the other's the improvement of the jointly owned premises default, to buy or sell, as the case may be, at or be- may, in good faith, waive the right of lien, both as fore the next open board thereafter, when a party, to himself and sub-contractors, but if the contract after such notice, neglects to obey the rule, the dam-containing the waiver is not in good faith, but for ages recoverable by him are to be measured by the the purpose of misleading and so defrauding the price of goods on the day the sale should have been sub-contractors and material-men, it will be invalid made and not by the price obtained at an actual sale on account of the fraud. Id. made after the time when, by the original contract, the goods should have been delivered. (Super. Ct.) Gill v. O'Rourke, 67.
The cost of future municipal improvements cannot be considered as an independent item of damages in the opening of a street. Albertson v. Philadelphia, 96.
A contractor will not lose his right of lien where he has, in conformity with the contract, actually sup plied material for a building and the architect has removed the material, and material supplied by other persons has been placed in the building in its stead before the lien has been filed. Murphy v. Liberty National Bank, 151.
In an action to recover for injuries caused by A contract between contractor and owner that the the negligence of a carrier, compensation, allowing former "will not suffer or permit any lien . . . . to plaintiff for pain and suffering she has undergone be put or remain upon the buildings . . . . for any in the past and is likely to undergo in the future, work or labor done, or materials furnished under and for any permanent injury the jury may deem or in pursuance of this contract or by reason of any she has suffered, and any expense which she has been other claim or claims against him that can or put to in obtaining relief, is a correct measure of might in any way affect, impair or take priority to damages. Smedley v. H. M. & F. P. R. W. Co., 169. the lien . . . . of the mortgages executed in favor of Where a person is so injured by the negligence the company as being upon each of the . . . respecof another that he will require the services of a tive premises," does not deprive a sub-contractor of nurse for the rest of his life, the probable cost of his right of lien. Gordon v. Norton, 201. such an attendant is an element of damages. Baker . Hagy, 299.
In an action under the statute for the assessment of damage to land by the construction of a railroad, consequential cannot be distinguished from direct damages. See EMINENT DOMAIN. Rudolph v. Penna. Schuylkill Valley R. R. Co., 377.
There is no rule of law which forbids the jury to give nominal damages only where there is no evidence of actual injury to the plaintiff in his business or social relations or otherwise. (Super. Ct.) Palmer v. Leader Publishing Co., 556.
A new trial may be granted for inadequacy of damages found by the jury. Id.
Limitation of damages to value of vessel. See LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Loughin v. McCaulley,
MERGER. An agreement to convey land is not always completely merged in a deed made in pursuance of the contract. (Super. Ct.) Lehman v. Paxton, 194.
Where a contract of sale stipulates for a conveyance clear of encumbrances and the deed contains no such warranty or stipulation, the deed supersedes the contract to the extent that the deed includes the provisions of the contract, but the provisions not included remain in force by virtue of the original contract, and the agreement to convey free of encumbrances remains an enforceable obligation. Id.
Where, by agreement of sale, the purchaser of realty contracts to assume the payment of certain mortgages thereon, the undertaking is not nullified by a deed, executed in pursuance of the agreement, which does not refer to the mortgages. (Super. Ct.) Blatz v. Denniston, 197.
MECHANICS' LIEN. To prevent the filing of a lien there must be an express covenant against A merger of one corporation with another canliens or a covenant, resulting as a necessary impli- not be made by the boards of directors without legcation from the language employed, so clear that islative authority. Temperance Mut. Benef. Ass'n the mechanic or material-man can understand it. Home Friendly Society, 451. without consulting counsel; if the contract be so MILK. See PURE FOOD LAW. worded as fairly to be subject to another construction, it will not bar the right of the sub-contractor to file a lien. Gordon v. Norton, 201.
Where there are blocks of buildings so different in size, style, material or location that the materials or labor going into them may be readily distinguished, the lien claimant may file a separate claim against each block apportioned among its own constituent houses, although all the blocks are erected by one contractor, under one contract with the same owner and upon the same tract of land. Id.
Com'th v. HufMINING LEASE. When in a mining lease it is provided that the defendants shall mine and ship each year as much coal as will produce a rental of $5000 at the rate of rent designated, "unless prevented from doing so by any unavoidable accident or occurrences beyond their control," it is a sufficient defence to an action for rent that the "defendants mined out all the coal so that no available or workable coal was left; that many of the veins were faulty and large sums of money were expended A mechanics' lien cannot be upheld for the cost of in cutting through the faults and in driving tunnels, removing an old building bodily, and without detach- and in prosecuting their investigation in the veins ment, and placing it upon another foundation. The aforesaid, until all the coal was mined out and shiplabor performed in such work is neither in the con-ped away and paid for by the lessees; that during struction, alteration nor repair of a building. (Su- the time they worked and mined coal in said lands per. Ct.) Eichleay v. Wilson, 525.
Where one named in a lien as contractor is really owner, the lien may, under the Act of June 11, 1879, P. L. 122, be amended, but the amendment will not affect intervening rights of terre tenants. Bohem
they paid an annual rental of more than $5000 and they continued such annual payments until the coal as aforesaid was exhausted." Bannan v. Graef, 350. MORTGAGE. A married woman is not deprived of the power to mortgage her estate for her husband's debts, or for those of any other person,
by the Act of June 8, 1893. Siebert v. Valley Na- street while making a change of grade thereon, is
tional Bank, 319.
A purchase money mortgage need not be in the
names of vendor and vendee in order to convey re-
cord notice. Jeanes v. Hizer, 331.
liable to one who is hurt in using the street by fall-
ing from one grade to the other, unless he is guilty
of culpable negligence or want of ordinary care, and
the burden of showing such want of care is on the
J. having agreed to purchase land owned by him in municipality. Bauerle v. Philadelphia, 97.
common with his brothers and sisters, a deed was Liability for care of street on city map and used
made conveying the land to C., who, by another by the public, although not "legally" opened. See
deed conveyed to J. No money passed to C., though, STREETS. (Super. Ct.) Kane v. Philadelphia, 99.
both deeds contained the usual receipt. Both deeds The supply of water is not a sovereign duty of a
were executed, delivered and recorded at the same municipality, and where it does supply water the
time. Simultaneously J. made a mortgage to his bro- municipality stands on the same footing as an indi-
ther A., which recited that it was to secure A. s share vidual or a private corporation. (Super. Ct.) Rieker
of the purchase money. J. borrowed the rest of the v. City of Lancaster, 160.
price from X. and gave him a mortgage for the The assent of the mayor to the establishment of
sum. This was recorded a week before A.'s mort- a schedule of water rates, reported by the proper
gage. W. became assignee of X.'s mortgage: Held, committee and approved by both branches of coun-
(1) the A. mortgage was a purchase money mort- cil, is not essential where the municipal charter
gage and had priority; (2) that the statement in A.'s provides that councils may transact business by or-
mortgage that it was given for a portion of the pur- der or resolution. Id.
chase money was sufficient to put W. on inquiry and
hence was notice to him. Id.
Ordinance book of, as evidence. See EVIDENCE.
(Super. Ct.) Grier v. Homestead, 18.
MURDER. Verdict in case of. See CRIMINAL
LAW. Com'th v. Kaiser, 26.
Where a mortgage is executed under an agreement
that it shall not be binding unless signed by all the
parties named therein as mortgagors, such signature
is a condition precedent to its enforcement against NATIONAL BANK. Attachment against, ef-
those who actually sign. Brown v. McCreight, 471. fect of U. S. R. S., § 5242. See ATTACHMENT. (C.
It is a good defence to a scire facias sur mort- P.) Com'th v. Long, 199; (C. P.) Conway v. Schall, 328.
gage, even against an assignee without notice, that
NEGLIGENCE. Plaintiff driving at night ran
it was agreed by parol at the time it was given that into a pile of cinders left extending eight or ten
it was to be held only to secure the payment of cer- feet into the highway by a paving company, a little
tain obligations. Myerstown Bank v. Roessler, 413. more than an hour before the accident a policeman
The assignee of a mortgage takes subject to the passed the place and found a red light, placed at the
equities of the mortgagor, even if he take it with-end of the pile at an elevation of five feet, burning;
out notice thereof, not having made inquiry of the fifteen minutes later it was seen, by another person,
mortgagor. Id.
While a sale in partition will discharge the lien
of a mortgage on an undivided interest, the mere
fact that the partition proceedings are pending will
not affect the mortgagee's right to proceed on the
mortgage. Lawrence v. Koon, 89.
A mere suggestion that a sci. fa. does not aver
affirmatively the grant of letters to the plaintiff,
who sues as administrator, is not sufficient to pre-
vent judgment. Id.
Combination of mortgage and insurance. See Un-
ited Security Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ritchey, 491.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE. Griffith v. Griffith,
447; Railroad Mortgage. (Super. Ct.) Tarbell's Ap-
peal, 192.
apparently going out; it was out when the plaintiff
came: Held, there was no evidence of negligence on
the part of the city. Mills v. Philadelphia, 397.
One who sees in the highway a dangerous obstruc-
tion, which he can avoid by a slight detour, and, in-
stead of making the detour, attempts to go over the
obstruction and is injured, is guilty of contributory
negligence. Boyle v. Borough of Mahanoy City, 423.
The reasonable care which the law exacts of all
persons, in whatever they do involving risk of injury,
requires pedestrians on the footways of public streets
to look where they are going. Shallcross v. Phila-
delphia, 545.
When it appears that an obstruction, which, the
plaintiff alleges, was the cause of a fall and its con-
MOTIVE. See EVIDENCE. Com'th v. Cornelly, sequent injuries, was plainly visible to her, had she
been intent on her steps, and the general condition
MUNICIPALITY. The taxing power exercis- of the sidewalk was, at the time of the accident,
able within its corporate limits may be legally dele-known to her, a non-suit is properly entered. Id.
gated to a municipality. Jermyn v. Fowler, 387.
Where a change of grade of a street has been di-
one, has been guilty of contributory negligence in
using the street is a question for the jury. Bauerle
v. Philadelphia, 97.
A municipality is not liable for the neglect of one rected, but the street has only in part been raised
using the highway, as a place of deposit of building to the new grade, whether a traveler, who receives
materials, to give notice at night of the obstruction injuries from falling from the new grade to the old
unless the neglect be so long continued that notice
of it may be implied. Mills v. Philadelphia, 397.
Where an alley by its use becomes in fact a public
street, the duty of the municipality is to give to it
the attention that a public street requires. Musick
v. Borough of Latrobe, 209.
It is negligence for a city while changing the
grade of a street not to bar access thereto. Id.
A municipality is liable for neglect to prop-
erly supervise electric wires suspended over its
streets, and the fact that a wire has been maintained
in the same position many years is no reason that it
should so continue indefinitely without inspection.
Mooney v. Luzerne Borough, 279.
A municipality is liable for injuries resulting from
neglect to exercise a careful supervision over the
adjustment and regulation of the electric wires sus-
pended over its streets, although there are individ-
uals or corporations upon whom also rests a duty
of supervision. Mooney v. Luzerne Borough, 279. Where an electric wire sagged and was cut by a
A municipality, which does not bar or pole off a member of the borough council, who wrapped one
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