section unless facts stated upon which application based: Maxwell v. McDowell, 50-391.

Section does not authorize order that respondent be required to deposit papers in clerk's office: Mills v. Lumber Co., 139-524.

Order of judge reversing order of clerk with reference to production of papers is discretionary matter, but motion may be renewed and new order obtained, Ibid.

Person will not be ordered to allow inspection of paper writing if party making request knows contents thereof: Sheek v. Sain, 127-266— and an order allowing others than defendant to inspect paper writing in possession of plaintiff is erroneous, Ibid.

Motion to nonsuit plaintiff for not producing books or papers under section can not be made unless previous order of court obtained for production of same: Graham v. Hamilton, 25-381.

Due notice is notice sufficient to enable a party to have document present when called for: McDonald v. Carson, 95-377. As to answer to the rule to produce papers, see Ward v. Simmons, 46-404; Fuller v. McMillan, 44206. Appeal lies from order requiring person to allow inspection of paper writings: Sheek v. Sain, 127-266. Notice hereunder to party in action is in law notice to his attorney: Banking Co. v. Walker, 121-115.

In action by stockholder of corporation to set aside as fraudulent an assignment of contract by corporation plaintiff entitled to inspect books of corporation in order to obtain information upon which to frame complaint: Holt v. Warehouse Co., 116-480; Justice v. Bank, 83-8; but see Branson v. Fentress, 35-165.

Section merely referred to in Bernhardt v. Brown, 122-587; Coates Bros v Wilkes, 92-387; Morrow v. Allman, 65-510; Murchison v. McLeod, 47241.

1657. Production on trial. The courts shall have full power, on motion and due notice thereof given, to require the parties to produce books or writings in their possession or control which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, and if a plaintiff shall fail to comply with such order, and shall not satisfactorily account for his failure, the court, on motion, may give the like judgment for the defendant as in cases of nonsuit; and if a defendant shall fail to comply with such order, and shall not satisfactorily account for his failure, the court, on motion as aforesaid, may give judgment against him by default.

Code, s. 1373; R. C., c. 31, s. 25; 1821, c. 1095; 1828, c. 7.

Court has power to order production of papers which contain evidence pertinent to issue and which are in possession or control of adverse party: Whitten v. Tel. Co., 141-361; McDonald v. Carson, 94-497; McLeod v. Bullard, 84-515; McGibboney v. Mills, 35-163; Scarborough v. Tunnell, 41-103. Generally if party dwells in another town than that in which trial had, service of notice upon him at place where trial had, or after he has left home to attend court, to produce papers, not sufficient: Beard v. R. R., 143-136.

Contents of paper writing can not be proved by parol unless notice has been given to adverse party who has same in possession to produce it on trial: Murchison v. McLeod, 47-239; Ivey v. Cotton Mills, 143-198.

As to sufficiency of affidavit accounting for nonproduction of paper ordered to be produced upon trial, see Fuller v. McMillan, 44-206.

Court can not, under this section, order production of papers by defendant on application of plaintiff where no complaint filed: Branson v. Fentress, 35-165.

Under section, no affidavit necessary in order to obtain order for production of papers in possession of adverse party: McDonald v. Carson, 95-377-but court has power, on motion and due notice, to require production of papers or books which contain evidence pertinent to issue, Ibid.

Due notice is notice sufficient to enable party to have documents present when called for, Ibid. When papers are produced hereunder they are competent evidence for all legitimate purposes: Austin v. Secrest, 91-214; Fertilizer Co. v. Taylor, 112-141.

Court below excluded paper writing which plaintiff "alleged was a substantial copy of the greater part of his letter to defendant,'' when defendant was not notified to produce original: Ivey v. Cotton Mills, 143189.

1658. Admission of genuineness procured. Either party may exhibit to the other, or to his attorney, at any time before the trial, any paper material to the action, and request an admission in writing of its genuineness. If the adverse party, or his attorney, fail to give the admission within four days after the request, and if the party exhibiting the paper be afterwards put to expense in order to prove its genuineness, and the same be finally proved or admitted on the trial, such expense, to be ascertained at the trial, shall be paid by the party refusing the admission, unless appear to the satisfaction of the court that there were good reasons for the refusal.

Code, s. 578; R. C., c. 31, s. 82; R. S., c. 31, s. 86; 1821, c. 1095; 1828, c. 7; C. C. P., s. 331. Admission in writing under section that instrument is genuine does not preclude comments by counsel as to truth of contents suggested by its appearance, fact of being written by amanuensis, etc., Knight v. Houghtalling, 85-17.

1659. Scale of depreciation. Contracts solvable in Confederate currency may be discharged according to the following scale of depreciation of Confederate currency, the gold dollar being the unit and measure of value, from November first, one thousand eight

hundred and sixty-one, to May first, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-five:

This scale applies to the time of contracting and not to the times. said debts become due.

Code ss. 2495, 2496; 1866, c. 39, s. 1; 1866-7, c. 44. Cases construing section and amendments thereto: Coggins v. Flythe, 113-102; Young v. Kennedy, 95-265; Grant v. Reese, 94-720; Depreist v. Patterson, 92-402; Jennings v. Copeland, 90-572; White v. Jones, 88-166; Wilson v. Powell, 86-230; Brickell v. Bell, 84-82; Melvin v. Stevens, 84-78; Derr v. Stubbs, 83-539; Green v. Barbee, 84-69; Drake v. Drake, 82-443; Palmer v. Love, 82-478; Boykin v. Barnes, 76-318; Holt v. Patterson, 74-650; Farmer v. Willard, 71-284; Wooten v. Sherrard, 71-374; Bryan v. Harrison. 69-151; Cable v. Hardin, 67-472.

For evidence in indictment for enticing minors from state, see section 3630. For evidence in cases of hunting by night, see section 3462. For evidence necessary in cases of disposing of mortgaged property, see section 3435. For evidence in indictments for secreting seamen, see section 3557. For students as witnesses against lewd women, see section 3353 For evidence to convict of seduction, see section 3354. For what necessary to allege and prove in prosecutions for selling seed cotton, see section 3812. For evidence in prosecution for selling liquor in local option territory, see section 2060. For evidence in cases of gaming, see Gaming Contracts. For evidence in suits against sureties on official bonds, see Bonds. For recitals in tax deeds as evidence, see section 2909. See Burnt and Lost Records. For proof of loss of baggage, see Innkeepers, section 1914. For certified copies of judgments as evidence, see section 569. See Commissioners of Affidavits. Vouchers evidence of payment by administrator, see Administration, section 101. For evidence against principal as against surety, see section 285.

CHAPTER 35.

FENCES AND STOCK LAW.

I. LAWFUL FENCES.

1660. Fences to be five feet high. Every planter shall make a sufficient fence about his cleared ground under cultivation, at least five feet high, unless otherwise provided for in this chapter, unless there shall be some navigable stream or deep water-course that shall be sufficient, instead of such fence, and unless his lands shall be situated within the limits of a county, township or district wherein the stock law may be in force.

Code, s. 2799; R. C., c. 48, s. 1; 1777, c. 121, s. 2; 1791, c. 354, s. 1. Proof that plaintiff's fence is a "good, ordinary'' one, such as his neighbors have, does not dispense with statutory obligations: Runyan v. Patterson, 87-343.

Plaintiff whose fence is insufficient not entitled to damages for defendant's stock breaking through it: Ibid; Jones v. Witherspoon, 52-555. What is a sufficient lawful fence, or proper substitute therefor, is a question of law: State v. Lamb, 30-229. Whom the word "planter'' herein comprehends, see State v. Taylor, 69-543; see State v. Bell, 25-506. A pasture field is not "cleared ground under cultivation:" State v. Perry, 64-305.

Cases referring to section: State v. Anderson, 123-708; State v. Bloodworth, 94-918; Farmer v. R. R., 88-564; Roberts v. R. R., 88-560; State v. Staton, 66-640; State v. Waters, 51-276.

1661. Four and a half feet in certain counties. A fence four and one-half feet high shall be a lawful fence in the counties of Cumberland, Currituck, Cherokee, Burke, Rutherford, Yancey, Wilkes, Caldwell, Duplin, Jackson, Alleghany, Davidson, Harnett, Henderson, Wake, Craven, Richmond, Davie, Bladen, Northampton, Washington, Randolph, Robeson, Tyrrell, Brunswick and Lenoir: Provided, this section shall not apply to stock law fences. 1889, c. 175; 1891, c. 36; 1891, c. 233; 1905, c. 333.

1662. Four feet in certain counties.

A fence four feet high shall be a lawful fence in the counties of Carteret, Pamlico, Hyde, New Hanover, Buncombe, Madison and McDowell.

1885, c. 304; 1887, c. 66; 1889, c. 390; 1903, c. 66; 1903, c. 211.

1663. Water-courses, on application to commissioners, made. Any five electors, residents of the same county, may apply to the board of commissioners of the county, at any regular meeting of the same, by written petition praying that any water-course, or any

part of any water-course, in the county, may be made a lawful fence. Notice of such petition shall be posted forty days at the courthouse door, by the clerk of the board before such petition shall be acted. upon. Upon the hearing of such petition, the board of county commissioners is authorized to declare any water-course, or any part of any water-course to which the petition applies, a lawful fence. And the several acts of the general assembly, declaring certain watercourses, in part or in whole, lawful fences, are so far repealed as to enable the board of commissioners of any county to declare any of such acts or parts thereof, to be null and void in said county. Any order made under this section shall be of record and signed by the chairman, and may be rescinded by the board of commissioners at any regular meeting.

Code, ss. 2808, 2809, 2810; 1872-3, c. 98. See section 1660.

II. JOINT FENCES.

1664. Jointly maintained. Where two or Where two or more persons shall have lands adjoining, which shall be either cultivated or used as a pasture for stock, the respective owners of each piece of land shall make and maintain one-half of the fence upon the dividing line. Code, s. 2800; 1868-9, c. 275, s. 1.

1665. Jointly paid for, when. Where the owner of one piece of land shall have chosen neither to cultivate his land, nor to pasture, nor to permit his stock to run on it, if he shall afterwards do either, without so enclosing such stock that they cannot enter on the lands of such adjoining owner, he shall refund to such owner one-half the value at that time of any fence erected by him on the dividing line. Code, s. 2801; 1868-9, c. 275, s. 2.

1666. Value of dividing fence ascertained, how. The value of such fence shall be ascertained as follows: Either owner may summon the other to appear before any justice of the peace of the township in which the dividing line is situate; or if it be situate in more than one townshp, then before any justce of the peace of any township in which any part of it is situate. In his summons he shall name a certain day, not less than five days after the summons, for the appearance of the defendant; he shall also state the purpose of the summons to be the adjustment of all matters in controversy respecting the dividing fence between the parties. The justice shall hear the complaint and defense. If the facts be found such as entitle either party to demand contribution of the other, the justice shall call on the complainant to name an indifferent person, qualified to act as a juror of the township, and if the complainant refuses