SHIPPING. See, also, "Marine Insurance." Bottomry and respondentia. 1. Where a charter party provides that, "if vessel should be lost after discharge of outward cargo, one half of this charter shall be considered due and payable," as after the completion of the outward voyage only one half of the freight is still unearned, and so liable to be lost by reason of a maritime risk, only that portion of the total freight can then be hypothecated under a bottomry bond.-Brett v. Van Praag, (Mass.) 31 N. E. 761. 2. When such charter party also provides for a payment on account of freight at the outward port, such payment is to be charged against that part of the freight which is already earned.-Brett v. Van Praag, (Mass.) 31 N. E. 761. 3. Demurrage previously earned is not "freight," within the meaning of a bottomry bond covering the "vessel, her tackle, apparel, furniture, and freight, as per charter party."Brett v. Van Praag, (Mass.) 31 N. E. 761. Slander. See "Libel and Slander." SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. not assume or agree to pay said mortgage, but if it does its title shall thereby become perfect;" that if defendant "shall fail to pay said principal bonds on or before maturity, then" defendant "shall convey said property to" plaintiff. After giving the mortgage and bonds, A. conveyed to defendant as agreed, and defendant occupied the premises during the 10 years, paying the interest on the bonds, but did not pay the principal, and afterwards refused to convey to plaintiff. Held, that the several instruments constituted but one contract, and, on default of defendant to pay the mortgage, it would be compelled to convey the land to plaintiff.-Claypool v. Board School Com'rs City of Indianapolis, (Ind. Sup.) 31 N. E. 665. Stale demand. 4. The incorporators of a company organized to construct cars under a patent agreed that any patentable inventions in regard to the cars that might be originated by any member of the company should be patented for the benefit of the company. The business proving unprofitable, the company assigned all its property and rights to an assignee, who did not carry on the business. Fourteen years later, after the patents owned by the company had expired, one of the said incorporators, in connection with a third person, obtained a patent for an improvement in said cars. Held that, after a lapse of 20 years after the execution of said agreement, a court of equity would not enforce it, as to said patent, in favor of the grantee of said assignee. 37 Ill. App. 289, affirmed.-Montgomery Palace Stock Car Co. of Illinois v. Street Stable Car Line, (Ill. Sup.) 31 Contracts enforceable Statute of N. E. 434. frauds. Tender by complainant. 1. Rev. St. 1881, § 5117, which declares that 5. A purchaser of land cannot obtain an ena wife shall not enter into any executory con- forcement of his contract where he neither tentract to sell, convey, or mortgage her land un-ders the purchase price, nor brings the money less her husband join therein, necessarily means into court, nor offers to pay it.-Short v. Kieffer, a written contract, since no other contract re- (Ill. Sup.) 31 N. E. 427. lating to real estate is valid and enforceable under the statute of frauds; and hence a parol contract for the sale of the wife's land, entered into by her husband as her agent, whose au- See "Intoxicating Liquors." thority also rested in parol, is absolutely void, and will not be specifically enforced, though there has been a part performance by the vendee.-Percifield v. Black, (Ind. Sup.) 31 N. E. See "Specific Performance," 4. 955. Cloud on complainant's title. Spirituous Liquors. Stale Demand. STARE DECISIS. Validity of statute. the people, if originally doubtful, has been determined by direct and incidental recognition for 20 years, and is not an open question.-Linck v. City of Litchfield, (II. Sup.) 31 N. E. 123. 2. A vendor who had not stipulated that the premises should be free from incumbrances had a perfect chain of title from the United States, the only cloud being an uncanceled mortThe validity of Rev. St. 1891, c. 24, art. 9, gage made contemporaneously with, and to se- $54, relating to the organization of cities and cure, a series of promissory notes, which were villages, which authorizes a city to adopt said barred by the statute of limitations. The mort-article by ordinance without requiring a vote of gagee was dead, and his estate was solvent, and had been finally settled. His widow and heirs at law had executed a quitclaim deed of the premises to the vendor. Held, that the vendor was entitled to have the contract specifically enforced, there being no evidence that the mortgage or notes had been assigned, and it being chown that the vendor had offered to leave in the hands of the vendees, until this alleged cloud could be removed, an amount of the purchase money sufficient to indemnify them against any claim that might be made by any possible assignee, but the decree should provide for and render effectual the proposed indemnity.-Rife v. Lybarger, (Ohio Sup.) 31 N. E. 768. Reconveyance. 8. A. agreed to convey to defendant board of school commissioners certain property, subject to a mortgage to be placed thereon to secure bonds, payable to plaintiff in 10 years, with interest, representing the purchase price, which was paid to A. by plaintiff. The contract provided that defendant would pay rent for the property for 10 years, "which rent shall be paid by taking up the said interest coupons on said bonds as they mature;" that defendant "does STATE LEGISLATURE. Reapportionment of legislative districts. 1. Const. art. 3, § 4, requiring an enumeration of the inhabitants of the state to be made at the end of every 10 years, and providing that the senate and assembly districts "shall be so altered by the legislature at the first session after the return of every enumeration, and that such senate district shall contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of inhabitants, * and shall at all times consist of contiguous territory, and no county shall be divided in the formation of a senate district, except such county shall be equitably entitled to two or more senators," and section 5, requiring that the members of the assembly "shall be apportioned among the several counties, * * as nearly as may be, according to the number of their respective inhabitants," each county being entitled to one member, neces * sarily vest a discretion in the legislature in making the apportionment, and it cannot be interfered with by the courts unless it is plainly and grossly abused. Andrews and Finch, JJ., dissenting. 19 N. Y. S. 978, and 20 N. Y. S. 97, reversed. 20 N. Y. S. 293, affirmed.-People v. Rice, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 921; Same v. Board Sup'rs Monroe County, Id.: In re Horn v. Board Sup'rs Oneida County, Id. 2. Under Const. art. 3, §§ 4, 5, requiring an enumeration of the inhabitants of the state to be made under the direction of the legislature at the end of every 10 years, and providing that the senate and assembly districts shall be reapportioned "by the legislature at the first session after" such enumeration, where a legislature fails to direct an enumeration at the end of a period of 10 years, and there is therefore no reapportionment, the power to direct an enumeration is not suspended until the expiration of the next 10 years, but it is the duty of the next legislature to direct an enumeration, and of the legislature at the first session after it is made to make the reapportionment, and such duty rests on each succeeding legislature until it is performed. -People v. Rice, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 921, 20 N. Y. S. 293, affirmed; Same v. Board Sup'rs Monroe County, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 921; In re Horn v. Board Sup'rs Oneida County, Id. 3. An extraordinary session of the legislature called by the governor is not a part of the regular session of the same legislature which has been adjourned without day, and so terminated, and the state may at such session be apportioned into senate and assembly districts, according to an enumeration of the inhabitants made after the adjournment of the regular session, under Const. art. 3, §§ 4, 5, providing that an enumeration shall be made under the direction of the legislature at the end of every 10 years, and that the legislative districts shall be reapportioned "by the legislature at the first session after" the enumeration.-People v. Rice, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 921, 20 N. Y. S. 293, affirmed; Same v. Board Sup'rs Monroe County, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 921, 20 N. Y. S. 97, reversed; In re Horn v. Board Sup'rs Oneida County, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 921. 4. In determining whether the legislature has abused its discretion in making the apportionment, the court will consider the difficulty of the legislature to agree on an apportionment act, arising from local pride, commercial jealousies and rivalries, diverse interests among the people, together with a difference of views as to the true interests of the localities to be affected, and other conditions which might make compromise and conciliation necessary in order to accomplish any result at all. Andrews and Finch, JJ.. dissenting. People v. Rice, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 921; Same v. Board Sup'rs Monroe County, Id.; In re Horn v. Board Sup'rs Oneida County, Id. 5. The court in determining whether an apportionment act is unconstitutional, because of inequalities between population and representation, and should be declared void, may consider the result which may follow an affirmative decision, such as the facts that every enumeration and apportionment act may be brought before the courts for review by any citizen at any time during the 10 years between enumerations, that greater inequalities exist in the next preceding apportionment act, which, if the act under consideration is unconstitution al, is even more so, and the fact that this would leave only an act over a quarter of a century old under which to hold an election; also the fact that every county in the state but two has acquiesced in the act under consideration, and done everything necessary to proceed to an election under it.-People v. Rice, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 921; Same v. Board Sup'rs Monroe County, Id.; In re Horn v. Board Sup'rs Oneida County, Id. 6. Even if the constitution could be held to require the exclusion of persons of color not taxed, an apportionment act would not be held unconstitutional because they were not excluded, in the absence of proof of injury to the other inhabitants, since, if the same proportion of whites to colored persons not taxed existed in all the legislative districts, no one could be injured, and the court would not presume that they did not so exist.-People v. Rice, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 921; In re Horn v. Board Sup'rs Oneida County, Id.; People v. Board Sup'rs Monroe County, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 921, 19 N. Y. S. 978, reversed. 7. The fact that in apportioning the 128 members of the assembly the apportionment act of 1892, (Laws 1892, c. 397,) after apportioning to each county the full number it is entitled to by the ratio between population and representation, awards the several remaining members in some few instances to counties which have a less surplus over their ratio than others, does not show an abuse of legislative discretion which will warrant the court in declaring the act unconstitutional, it appearing that the legislature was not influenced by partisan considerations, and also that such counties by the census showed an increased population. Andrews and Finch, JJ., dissenting. 19 N. Y. S. 978, and 20 N. Y. S. 97, reversed.-People v. Rice, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 921; Same v. Board Sup'rs Monroe County, Id.; In re Horn v. Board Sup'rs Oneida County, Id. STATES AND STATE OFFI- Appeal by state, see "Appeal,” 16. 1. Where the entry of the state on land for excavation is wrongful, the state is liable for all trespasses while excavating committed by the contractor with the acquiescence of the agents of the state.-Colman v. State, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 902. Auditing claims. board of claims to hear and determine the 2. Under Laws 1885, c. 345, authorizing the claims for damages of persons owning land bor dering on Seneca lake, occasioned by reason of the overflow of water caused by the state dam at Waterloo, and other prior legislation, the effect of which is, while providing for the maintenance of the said dam and other improvements, not to raise the natural level of the water, the question of allowance of such claims must be determined with reference solely to the natural level, and not with reference to whether it would be lower than it is if the dam were not there, or if the improvements in deepening and widening were considered.-Bower v. State, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 894. 3. Act 1884, c. 60, which extends the time in which claims formerly cognizable by the state board of audit could be filed with the board of claims to three months after the passage of the act, does not, either by itself or in connection with the act of 1883, give a reasonable time in which to file such claims.-Parmenter v. State, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 1035. Limitations. 4. Assuming the constitutional prohibition against the payment of any claim against the state "which, as between citizens of the state, would be barred by lapse of time," to mean that the general statutes of limitation respecting the rights of private citizens as between themselves should be referred to for the purpose of determining the period of limitations as against the state, irrespective of the particular legislation affecting the right to file a particular claim, then Act 1888, c. 541, which empowers the board of claims to pass on the claim of a person arising out of a contract with the state, but whose rights had been cut off by Act 1884, Interest. c. 60, within four years and eight months from of time.-Parmenter v. State, (N. Y. App.) 31 the accrual of his cause of action, is a valid ex-N. E. 1035. ercise of the legislative power, for the general law applicable to citizens as between themselves fixed the period of limitations in similar cases to six years.-Parmenter v. State, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. Ě. 1035. 5. Laws 1876, c. 444, created the state board of audit, whose duty it was to hear all private claims against the state, without any limitation as to the time when they accrued. Laws 1883, c. 205, substituted in place of the board of audit the board of claims, and limited persons whose claims had accrued more than two years before the passage of the act, and who had not filed them with the state board of audit, to less than eight weeks in which to so file them, and thus obtain their transfer to the board of claims. Held that, assuming Const. art. 7, § 14, which prohibits the auditing or payment of any claim against the state, "which, as between citizens of the state, would be barred by lapse of time," to empower the legislature to curtail the statute of limitations against the state in the same manner as those relating to private citizens, then the act of 1883 is void, because the cutting down of an unlimited period of time in which to file a claim and bring an action to less than eight weeks after the passage of the act does not leave a reasonable time in which to learn of the passage of the statute, to elect what course to pursue, and to carry out such election; and therefore Act 1888, c. 541, which empowered the board of claims to pass on the claim of a person coming within this class, is not void as permitting such board to revive and audit a claim which, as between citizens of the state, would be barred by lapse 6. Under Act 1888, c. 541, which empowers the board of claims to pass on the claim of the legislative printer arising under a contract with the state, the board does not overstep its jurisdiction in awarding interest on such claim. -Parmenter v. State, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 1035. STATUTES. Knowledge of passage, see "States and State 1. Laws 1890, c. 249, § 2, providing that proceedings by the city of New York to acquire real estate for public use shall be according to the provisions of Laws 1883, c. 490, and all payments for said property, and for expense of acquiring the same, shall be made in the manmentioned act, is not in conflict with Const. ner and out of the money provided in said lastart. 3, § 17, declaring that no act shall be passed, making any existing law a part of said act, or be applicable under it, except by inserting it in such act. 20 N. Y. S. 68, affirmed.-People v. Lorillard, (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 1011. Validity. 2. In determining the validity of a statute, the court will not pass upon the motives of the legislature in its enactment.-Parker v. State, (Ind. Sup.) 31 N. E. 1114. .1124 1891, p. 39.. .1128 1891, p. 199. 543 411..... 630 Quincy, § 12. St. 1888, ch. 347 630 .1120 1891, p. 199, §§ 51, 56, 57, 118 547 Salem, § 7. St. 1836, ch. 42... 630 MASSACHUSETTS. .1116 LAWS. 1807. 798 1941. .1127 1944.. 53 GENERAL STATUTES. 1803, ch. 14.. 708 1964. 734 1822, ch. 110, § 12. Boston City 2310. Amended by Laws Ch. 48, §§ 1-4....... 734 Charter.. 630 1883, pp. 153, 154................ .823, 832 Ch. 63, § 118....... ......1068 1824, ch. 52.. 638 2484. 942 Ch. 89, § 12.. 719 1886, ch. 42, § 7. Salem City 2485. 461 Ch. 90, §§ 34, 35.... 638 Charter. 630 2491 469 Ch. 101, §§ 15, 16......................... 731 1836, ch. 128, § 6. Lowell City $2496. $2508. 3043 945 Ch. 114, § 10. 646 Charter... 630 77 Ch. 115, § 7.. 646 1840, ch. 87, §§ 4, 5.. 646 ................ 352 Ch. 123, § 1. 646 1854, ch. 322, § 1.. 646 ........ 57 1855, ch. 12.. 646 357 PUBLIC STATUTES. 1855, ch. 449, §§ 5, 6.. 646 .... 3099.. 4467 $$ 3859-3866, 3868. $4020... $ 4026. 464 Ch. 27, § 124. $$ 4273 et seq., 4276, 4279..671, 672 $4302 $$ 4388, 4389.. $$ 4467, 4468..... § 4904 et seq. $ 4921... $$ 5002-5094. 5117. 5119.. 5208........ 5276.. 570 Ch. 47, § 4. .1112 Ch. 52, § 18. 1056 Ch. 70, § 2.. 70 Ch. 105, § 17... ........ REVISED STATUTES 1888. 787 Ch. 129, § 10. 862 Ch. 130, § 15.... Ch. 136, § 19. .... .647, 687 1872, ch. 337, §7.. 642 1873, ch. 154, §§ 20, 24.. 697 1877, ch. 372, § 166.. ..1068 1881, ch. 172, §§ 6, 10...... ........ 711 1883, ch. 223, § 17. 718 1885, ch. 183.. 291 1885, ch. 266, § 12.. .287, 771 1885, ch. 814, § 13................ 721 1886, ch. 140... 713 ..... ... 302 700 706 ....... 721 1887, ch. 214, § 73. 711 287 1887, ch. 270.. ..6, 7, 303 721 1887, ch. 270, § 1. .647, 727 ...729, 730 1887, ch. 270, § 2. .655, 727 454 Ch. 146, §§ 9, 10, 41... 458 Ch. 151, § 2, cl. 4 Ch. 151, §§ 13, 16. Ch. 152, § 10.. Ch. 153, § 6. 832 Ch. 155, § 53. .1047 Ch. 156, § 19. ...1118 Ch. 157, § 15. 577 Ch. 157, §§ 26, 80, 81, 103...650, 651 707 708 1887, ch. 270, § 3. Amended by St. 1888, ch. 155......... 727 653 1887, ch. 290, § 1.. 387 .709, 710 1887, ch. 364... 634 ....... ...... 716 1887, ch. 382, § 3.. 645 1888, ch. 429, § 9. 290 687 1889, ch. 316.. 699 ..... 726 1889, ch. 411, §§ 9, 26. Pitts 481 field City Charter........ 630 1890, ch. 440, § 5.... 687 ......... 1891, ch. 220, § 1...... 654 532 Ch. 160, § 13. 687 1891, ch. 416, § 1........................... 687 646 NEW YORK. 713 ... |