or for good cause shown the injunction may be revived. High, Inj. § 41. The cases cited by appellants' counsel are to the effect that, if the order in this case had been made in term time, an appeal would lie. No fault is found with those decisions, but they have no application here. What is here said is in harmony with the ruling in Lucan v. Cadwallader, 114 Ill. 285, 7 N. E. Rep. 286. It was at one time thought, without having carefully examined the act approved June 14, 1887, entitled "An act to provide for appeals from interlocutory orders granting injunction or appointing receivers," that it might, by construction, authorize this appeal. That, however, was a misapprehension, and that act is not now relied upon in the argument of counsel for appellants, as in any way authorizing the granting of the appeal in this case. The appeal will be dismissed at the cost of the appellants.

RAZOR V. RAZOR.1

(Supreme Court of Illinois. June 17, 1892. APPEAL-REVIEW-HUSBAND AND WIFE-EVIDENCE-DEED ON CONDITION.

1. A general objection to the ruling of the circuit court in giving and refusing instructions will not be considered on appeal, where no specific errors in that regard are pointed out. 39 Ill. App. 527, affirmed.

2. In an action by a wife against her husband on a written agreement by him to invest the proceeds of certain land sold by her, in a house to be deeded to her, the admission of evidence to the effect that, by oral agreement, she was to select the house to be bought, and the sale of her property was to be for cash, is not error prejudicial to defendant, where the only defense made to the action is that the written agreement was obtained from him through fraud. 39 Ill. App. 527, affirmed.

3. A stipulation in a deed from a husband to his wife, that "when she shall cease to live as his wife" the title shall revert to him, does not cause the title to revert on the wife's committing adultery. 39 Ill. App. 527, affirmed.

Appeal from appellate court, third district.

Assumpsit by Gertrude B. Razor against Frederick Razor. Plaintiff obtained judg

ment, which was affirmed by the appellate

court. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J. E. Pollock, A. J. Barr, and A. J. Stapleton, for appellant. F. R. Henderson, for appellee.

WILKIN, J. This is an action of assumpsit, begun, by attachment, in the circuit court of McLean county, by appellee against appellant. The parties are husband and wife. It seems that prior to their marriage he had deeded to her certain residence property in Leroy, in said county, the deed containing this stipulation: "It is agreed by and between the grantor and grantee that the said Gertrude Gibbs shall marry and shall live as the lawful wife of said Frederick Razor, and, when she shall cease to live as his wife, the property herein described shall revert to the grantor, or to the heirs of his body." The marriage took place in

Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bar.

on the following instrument in writing: "Lerov, Ill., Jan. 18, 1890. I, Fred Razor, of Leroy, ill., do agree to and with my wife, Gertrude Razor, that, in consideration of her signing a deed of conveyance to our home place,--being lot two (2) of lot seven (7) of the subdivision of the southeast quarter of section twenty-one, (21), town 22 N., R. 4 east, in Leroy, McLean county, Ill.,-this day executed, I do agree to invest the proceeds of said sale in a honse in Bloomington, Illinois, and to have the same deeded to said Gertrude B. his

Razor, to be owned by her. FRED X

mark

RAZOR. Witness: A. RUTLAGE." The property described in the writing is the same deeded to the wife before the marriage. The declaration alleges the execution and delivery of said instrument to the wife, and that, in consideration thereof, she signed a deed conveying said property, but the defendant had refused to comply with his said agreement to reinvest the proceeds thereof for her benefit. The general issue was pleaded, with an agreement that any proper defense might be proved thereunder. A trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $2,000 and costs of suit.

This appeal is from a. judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the circuit court. The submission here is upon the same briefs and arguments filed in the court below, which are largely devoted to a discussion of the evidence.

A general objection is made to the ruling of the circuit court in giving and refusing instructions, but no specific error in that regard is pointed out. For that reason the appellate court declined to examine and pass upon the instructions, and we think very properly. It is no part of the duty of courts of review to search out errors in a record upon which to base a judgment of reversal. Our attention not being called to any erroneous instruction given, or proper one refused, we will assume that none such were given or refused.

plaintiff, over the objection of defendant, On the trial the court permitted the to prove that, by a verbal agreement between herself and husband, she was to select the Bloomington property in which the investment should be made; also, that the Leroy property was to be sold for cash. This ruling is assigned for error. Even if the evidence had been incompetent, it does not appear that the defendant was injured by its admission. He does not claim that the selection of property had anything to do with his failure to make the investment, or that he was willing to make it in any property whatever. Nor does he pretend that he was willing to invest the proceeds of the conveyed property when he received the same in cash, or that he could not have invested the notes or other evidences of indebtedness actually received by him for the property conveyed. His defense is that the agreement was obtained from him through fraud, and that, by reason of the subsequent misconduct of the plaintiff, the

consideration for the same had failed. We do not, however, regard the admitted evidence as incompetent. It is not claimed that the contract, as evidenced by the writing, is so vague and uncertain as that it could not be enforced without the aid of parol testimony, nor that the evidence objected to tended to contradict or vary the terms of the writing. "Where the agreement in writing is expressed in short and incomplete terms, parol evidence is admissible to explain that which is per se unintelligible, such explanation not being inconsistent with the written terms." 1 Greenl. Ev. § 282; 2 Whart. Ev. § 1026.

The defendant sought to introduce evidence which he claimed would tend to prove that the plaintiff had been guilty of adultery after her marriage with him, which was, on objection by counsel for plaintiff, excluded. This ruling is also assigned as error. The contention of appellant is that, under the stipulation in the deed from himself to plaintiff below, the title to the Leroy property would revert to him upon her committing adultery. That stipulation bears no such construction, but, if it did, the offered evidence would have had no relevancy to the issues in this case. It was not necessary that the plaintiff should be the owner of the Leroy property absolutely in order that her signing a deed to it should constitute a sufficient consideration for the agreement to reinvest the proceeds in her name.

On the question of fraud the jury found against the appellant. The judgment of the appellate court upon that and all other controverted questions of fact is conclusive against him. No errors of law appearing in the record, the judgment of the appellate court must be affirmed.

BEVAN V. ATLANTA NAT. BANK.1 (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 17, 1892.) ACTION ON NOTE-FORGERY-EVIDENCE-CROSS

EXAMINATION-WITNESSES.

1. In an action against an administrator on a note signed by intestate and another person, the defense being that the note was a forgery, it is competent, after the introduction of evidence tending to show the genuineness of intestate's signature, to prove his statements to the effect that he had helped the other maker of the note, and that he did not think he would lose anything by it.

2. Where a witness has testified to the genuineness of a signature, it is proper, on cross-ex amination, to show him other admittedly genuine signatures of the party, and to ask him whether he based his opinion on said genuine signatures, and whether the spelling of these signatures was not different from that of the contested one. 39 Ill. App. 577, reversed.

3. The other signatures shown such witness are not admissible in evidence, since the genuineness of a signature cannot be proved or disproved by comparison.

4. In an action on a note alleged by defendant to be a forgery, the fact that witnesses hold similar notes, which are also claimed to be forgeries, cannot be shown as affecting their credibility, since it does not give them any direct interest in the result of the action. 39 Ill. App. 577, affirmed.

1 Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bar.

Appeal from appellate court, third district.

Assumpsit by the Atlanta National Bank against John L. Bevan, administrator of the estate of Alice Williams, deceased, upon a promissory note. Plaintiff obtained judgment, which was affirmed by the appellate court. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

Beach & Hodnett, for appellant. F. L. Capps and Blinn & Hoblit, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. This is an action of assumpsit brought by the Atlanta National Bank against John L. Bevan, administrator of the estate of Alice Williams, deceased, upon a promissory note for $1,000, which purported to be executed by C. E. Pratt and Alice Williams. To the declaration the defendant pleaded the geueral issue sworn to, and upon a trial the plaintiff recovered a judgment for the amount due on the note, which judgment was affirmed in the appellate court. No complaint is made against the decision of the court in instructions, but it is claimed that the court erred in its rulings in the admission and exclusion of evidence, and upon this ground it is insisted that the judgment is erroneous. The note in controversy bears date May 1, 1888, payable GO days after date, to the order of Atlanta National Bank, signed, “C. E. Pratt, Alice Williams. No question was raised in regard to the execution of the note by Pratt, but, as to the execution of the instrument by Alice Williams, on the one hand it is claimed by plaintiff that the note contains her genuine signature, while on the other hand the defendant, the administrator of her estate, claims that the signature of Alice Williams to the note is a forgery.

Stephen A. Foley, a witness for the plaintiff, testified, against the objection of the defendant, that he had a conversation with Alice Williams at Atlanta in July or August, 1888, which was, in substance, as follows: "We were talking about family affairs, and finally we came to Charlie, and I asked her if she thought that she would be likely to lose anything by Charlie. I meant Charles E. Pratt. She said she would not. She did not think sbe should. Charlie had been very good to her, even better than her own children. She said to me, 'You know I have assisted Charlie, and I don't think I will ever lose anything by it.'" It is claimed that the testimony has no reference to the note, and hence is inadmissible. It is true that the note was not mentioned, but it was proper to show the relation existing between the two parties; also that Mrs. Williams had assisted Pratt, and that she did not anticipate any loss on account of the assistance rendered; and it was for the jury to determine whether the assistance she had rendered had reference to the note or to some other transaction. We do not regard the evidence entitled to much weight, but, at the same time, we think it was competent for the consideration of the jury in connection with the other evidence.

On the trial the plaintiff called as a wit

ness Sylvester Hoblit, who testified that he had seen Alice Williams write, and was acquainted with her signature, and, upon being shown the note in controversy, he testified that the signature of Alice Williams was her genuine signature. On cross-examination the following questions were asked the witness: "Question. You may now examine a note dated Atlanta, Ill., July 14, 1884, for $50, and state whether or not that is one of the signatures of Alice Williams that you saw her make, and upon which you base your knowledge of her handwriting. (Note shown to witness, marked 'No. 3, L. E. W.') Q. If there is any difference in the sig. nature of Alice Williams upon that note and the signature of Alice Williams on the note in controversy, you may state in what that difference consists. Q. You may examine the note shown to you dated October 10, 1884, signed by Alice Williams, and state whether or not that is another of the notes you saw her make, and upon which you base your knowledge of her signature. (Marked No. 4, L. E. W.,' for identification by stenographer.) Q. If there is any difference between the signature of Alice Williams upon the note last shown you and the signature to the note in controversy, you may state in what particular it exists. Q. You may examine the note shown to you of date June 1, 1887, with the name of Alice Williams signed to it, and state if that is another of the notes you saw her make, and upon which you base your knowledge of her signature. Q. If there is any difference between the signature of Alice Williams upon that note and her signature upon the note in controversy, you may state what it is. (Note marked No. 5, L. E. W.,' by stenog rapher for identification.) Q. Is it not true in all of the notes you saw her sign, and which have been shown to you, and to which your attention has been called, she wrote her name 'Allie Williams?' Q. Is it not true that there is a difference between the signature of Alice Williams on all of these notes you saw her sign, and to which I have called your attention, and upon which you, in whole or in part, base your knowledge of her signature, and the signature of Alice Williams on the note in controversy? Q. Is it not true in all the notes you saw her sign, and to which your attention has been called here, and upon which you say you base your knowledge of Alice Williams' handwriting, she spells her name different from the way it is spelt in the note in controversy?" The plaintiff objected to the several questions, the court sustained the objection, and the defendant excepted. Similar questions were asked other witnesses, and the court made a like ruling. claimed by the defendant that Mrs. Williams, in the execution of notes and papers, signed her name "Allie Williams," while the note involved was signed "Alice Williams." Under such circumstances, we are induced to think the rule of cross-examination adopted by the court was too restricted. The several notes which the witnesses had seen Mrs. Williams execute, upon which they predicated their opinion that the signature to the note in question

It was

was genuine, were produced and shown the witnesses. Now, if in the execution of all of these notes Mrs. Williams made her given name "Allie" instead of “Alice,` no reason is perceived why it was not competent to establish such fact on crossexamination, for the purpose of testing the soundness of the opinion given by the witnesses that the signature to the note in question was genuine. In many cases, in order to ascertain the truth and arrive at a correct result, it is necessary that considerable latitude be given in the crossexamination of witnesses in order to test the accuracy of their evidence. The genuineness of the signature to the several notes to which the attention of the witness was called was not in controversy, and the purpose was not to prove a signature by comparison, but, as was done in Melvin v. Hodges, 71 Ill. 425. to test the accuracy of the witness' opinion or judgment which had in the direct examination gone to the jury. If the witnesses called by the plaintiff to prove that the signature of Mrs. Williams in the note in question predicated their judgment, in whole or in part, upon signatures to notes they saw her sign, and the signatures to these notes differed from the signature in the note in question, it seems plain that the defendant had the right to call out that fact in cross-examination, as it was a fact proper for the consideration of the jury in determining what weight they should give to the opinion of the witnesses who gave their opinion that the note was genuine.

The defendant offered in evidence the notes which were exhibited to the several witnesses in cross-examination, but the plaintiff objected, and the court sustained the objection, and this decision of the court is relied upon as error. We perceive no ground upon which the notes were admissible in evidence. The law is well settled in this state that the genuineness of a signature to a note or other instrument in writing cannot be proved or disproved by comparing it with another signature admitted to be genuine. Kernin v. Hill, 37 Ill. 209; Massey v. Bank, 104 III. 330. It is true that the evidence was not offered for comparison of hands, but that did not obviate the difficulty. There are cases where certain evidence may be competent for one purpose, but incompetent for another; but here we do not regard the offered evidence competent for any purpose, and, had it been admitted, its effect on the jury could not have been other than prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff.

It

Several of the witnesses of the plaintiff were asked, on cross-examination, whether they held notes signed by Pratt and Mrs. Williams, where the genuineness of her signature was disputed, or were interested in any bank which held such notes, and the court excluded the evidence. is not claimed that the holding of such a note, or having an interest in the bank which held such a note, would disqualify the witnesses from testifying in the case; but the claim is that the witnesses were interested, and the evidence was competent as affecting their credibility. It is always

competent to show, on cross-examination, that a witness is interested in the result of the suit; but here the witnesses had no direct interest in the result of the suit; the interest, if any, was so remote that we do not regard the ruling of the court regarding the evidence as erroneous. For the error indicated the judgment of the circuit and appellate courts will be reversed, and the cause remanded.

WOOD V. WILLIAMS.1

(Supreme Court of Illinois. June 17, 1892.) LIMITATIONS-WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF DEBT-CONCEALMENT OF CAUSE OF ACTION.

1. A letter which merely recites what has been done under a contract, which it assumes to have been previously made, and which does not state all the terms of the contract, is not an "evidence of indebtedness in writing," within the meaning of Rev. St. c. 83, § 16, which provides that actions on bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, written leases, written contracts, or other evidences of indebtedness in writing, may be begun within 10 years after the cause of action accrues. 40 Ill. App. 115, affirmed.

2. A person against whom a cause of action has arisen on account of the fraudulent conduct of his agent is not guilty of fraudulent concealment of the cause of action, so as to prevent the statute of limitations from running, by the fact that his said agent conceals the fraud. 40 Ill. App. 115, affirmed.

Appeal from appellate court, third district.

Assumpsit by Samuel D. Wood against Robert E. Williams and one Burr, who was not served. The action was brought to recover money given by plaintiff to defendants for investment, and invested by them in a mortgage, which turned out to be forged. The statute of limitations was pleaded. Defendant Williams obtained judgment, which was affirmed by the appellate court. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Rayburn & Barry, for appellant. John M. Scott and C. L. Capen, for appellees.

SCHOLFIELD, J. Two questions are presented by the arguments made in this case: First. Is the letter set out in the third count of appellant's declaration a contract or instrument in writing, within the meaning of section 16 of the statute of limitations? Second. Is the replication of the fraudulent concealment of the cause of action, as pleaded, an answer to the plea of the statute of limitations? Both were answered in the negative by the courts below, and, in our opinion, they were correctly so answered.

1. Section 16 of the statute of limitations is: "Actions on bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, written leases, written contracts, or other evidences of indebtedness in writing shall be commenced within ten years next after the cause of action accrued. * *

The

words, "other evidences of indebtedness in writing," by a familiar rule of construction, do not extend to a different class than that intended by the preceding par

Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bar.

ticular enumeration, (Potter, Dwar. St. 275; Sedg. St. Const. 423,) and can therefore have been intended to include only contracts whereof the parties intended to put the evidence in writing at the time they were made, and hence can have no application to verbal contracts sought to be proved by subsequent admissions in writing. The letter set out in the third count of appellant's declaration is as follows: "Bloomington, Ill., July 17, 1882. Mr. Milner Brown, Delavan, Ill.-Dear Sir: We have to-day drawn papers for a loan of $2,500, to be secured on 160 acres of improved farm in Livingston county, valued at $6,400. The security is ample. We made the papers payable to Samuel D. Wood, and the loan bears 7 per cent. annual interest, payable July first, each year. We get no commission from the borrower, and, as agreed with you, Mr. Wood will receive six and one-half per cent. interest. net to him, and the other one-half of one per cent. per annum, when interest is paid, comes to us, for our trouble and expense in the matter. The title is all right, and the papers will be back here in a day or two, and, if convenient, you may send us the amount on the receipt of this, and oblige, yours, truly, WILLIAMS & BURR. A. B." It is very clear that this does not purport to be the statement of a contract in writing previously made, nor does it profess to be itself the contemporaneous expression of a contract then being made. It assumes that a contract has been previously made, and it is a narrative of what has been done under such a contract. It assumes a previously understood relation between appellant and Brown, to whom the letter is addressed; and it expressly says there was a previous agreement between Brown and appellee, and it assumes that by that agreement the time for which the loan was to run was fixed, and also that it was thereby determined by whom the expenses incidental to the performance of the contract were to be borne, and by whom the interest to become due on the loan was to be collected, for these were indispensable to making the loan, and they are not alluded to in the letter. The only thing that remained to be done by appellee (and that that even remained to be done is inferred only) was the delivery of the note and mortgage to appellant. It is therefore impossible that the letter could have been intended to be the evidence of a contemporaneous contract, and in no view could it be evidence of a contract previously made, unless accompanied with parol evidence supplementing its omissions; but then, in legal estimation, the contract would be a verbal contract. Bish. Cont. § 164, and cases cited.

The cases cited by appellant are not analogous. In Barney v. Forbes, 118 N. Y. 580, 23 N. E. Rep. 890, there were express present undertakings of the parties, fully set out in the letters. In Bank of Owenboro v. Western Bank, 13 Bush, 526, there was, first, a request in writing, by the cashier of the appellant bank addressed to the cashier of the appellee bank, that the latter bank would invest "some means" for it "in good paper at thirty,

sixty, ninety, or one hundred days' time;" then there was the reply of the cashier of the appellee bank that he had, on that day, invested as requested, followed by subsequent explanations by letter, and so the writings clearly evinced the beginning and each successive step in a finally consummated contract. In Bradstreet v Everson, 72 Pa. St. 124, the writing expressly acknowledged the receipt for collection of the acceptances, and this amounted, in legal effect, to an undertaking to collect. In Critzer v. McConnell, 15 II. 172, the receipt stated that "Bonesteel had received the money of McConnell for the purpose of being used to purchase for him, and in his name, a certain judgment specified, and in the receipt Bonesteel agreed to procure a transfer of the judgment to McConnell in ten days, or to return the money; the judgment to be by McConnell transferred to Bonesteel at any time within one year after his paying him three hundred and thirty-six dollars therefor;" and thus it was the complete statement of a present undertaking. In Riddle v. Hoffman's Ex'r, 2 Pen. & W. 224, the receipt contained an express undertaking of the party signing to collect. In Ames v. Moir, 130 Ill. 582, 22 N. E. Rep. 535; Plumb v. Campbell, 129 III. 101, 18 N. E. Rep. 790; Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 34 Ill. 389; Dunning v. Price, 56 Ill. 338; Abrams v. Pomeroy, 13 Ill. 133; McCloskey v. McCormick, 37 111. 66; and Memory v. Niepert, 131 Ill. 623, 23 N. E. Rep. 431,-cited by counsel for appellant, there were distinct present undertakings expressed in the instruments in question, and no case has been cited that is analogous to the present case, and we do not believe that any well-considered case can be found where a writing like this letter has been held, of itself alone, to be sufficient evidence of a written contract, or sufficient "evidence of indebtedness in writing." as those words are employed in our statute, supra.

2. The replication to the plea of the statute of limitations is as follows, (omitting formal beginning:) "Because he says that the several causes of action, and each and all of them, were fraudulently concealed by the defendants from the knowledge of the plaintiff until within five years before the commencement of this suit. That said defendants, as agents of the plaintiff, accepted and undertook to loan $2,500 for plaintiff, to be secured on 160 acres of improved farm land in Livingston county, Ill., valued at $6,400. That the security should be ample and the title all right. That the defendants, in consideration of the annual payment to them by plaintiff of one half of one per cent. on said $2,500 during continuance of the loan, undertook to make said loan on the security aforesaid, to look after and care for the same, to collect the annual coupons of the borrower each year as they fell due. That defendants did not loan said money, but, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, gave said $2,500 to Woodrow and Fursman, who were defendants' agents in soliciting and making loans. Fursman, acting in the place of said defendants, as their agent, without the knowledge of the plaintiff took said $2,

500 given him by defendants, and turned over to defendants certain papers purporting to be the note of Patrick Carey for $2,500, 7 per cent. interest, dated July 15, 1882, due July 1, 1887, payable to plaintiff, and the mortgage purporting to have been executed by Carey and wife to secure said note on the S. E. quarter of Sec. 1, T. 29 N., R. 7 E., 3d P. M., in Livingston county, Ill. That said papers were not the note and mortgage of said Carey and wife, but were false, fraudulent, and forged, and had been forged by said Fursman while representing the defendants. That defendants afterwards delivered through this agent to the plaintiff the forged note and mortgage, and then and there falsely stated and represented to the plaintiff that they had loaned said $2,500 to Patrick Carey, and the note was the note of Patrick Carey for $2,500, due July 1, 1887. And said defendants falsely stated and represented to the plaintiff that another paper, which they had at the same time delivered to the plaintiff, was the application of the said Patrick Carey for said $2,500. That defendants stated that they would send the mortgage as soon as the record should be completed. That on September 4, 1882, they delivered to the plaintiff a false, fraudulent, and forged mortgage, and falsely stated and represented to plaintiff that it was the mortgage of Patrick Carey and wife to plaintiff, and that they had just received the same from the recorder's office. That the defendants, in July, 1883, paid to the plaintiff a sum of money equal to the amount of interest that defendants were to collect for plaintiff, and took up the interest coupon, thereby falsely representing that they had collected the interest of said Patrick Carey. That the defendants, in July, 1884, and on or about July 1st of each year thereafter, up to the year 1889, paid to the plaintiff a sum of money equal to the amount of interest defendants were to collect for plaintiff on the sum to be loaned aforesaid, and upon which payment defendants took up the interest coupon, thereby falsely represeuting that they had collected it from said Patrick Carey. Plaintiff believing the statements and representations of the defendants to be true, and relying and acting on said statements as true, he made no examination to discover whether said statements and representations were true or false, and did not discover that defendants had not loaned said money, $2,500, as they had undertaken, until November 1, 1889, when be learned for the first time that said papers were false, fraudulent, and forged, it being soon after Fursman had disappeared. That, because of the relation existing between the plaintiff and the defendants, the plaintiff could not, by reasonable diligence, discover that any or either of the said causes of action existed in his favor against said defendants before the time he made the discovery aforesaid."

It will be observed that there is no averment here that appellees knew, before 1889, that the note and mortgage were forged, or that the money which they paid to appellant as interest upon the loan was paid