designation on account of political or personal services of persons not believed to be wholly unfit. It is a way which custom has sanctioned of paying political debts. Men who would scorn to take a dollar of the public money without right will not hesitate to place a personal or political friend in a situation where he receives the public money without giving full consideration for it. The private political debt is paid by quartering the creditor upon the public Treasury. Is the office thus solicited and passed over to a friend any less a bribe because it is not a gift which can be valued in lawful money? Is the person who thus imposes an unfaithful servant upon the public less guilty of his pecu lations than the criminal himself? Is it any salve to the conscience to say that if your man had not been accepted perhaps under the present system a more incompetent person would have been?

"PATRONAGE" SHOULD NOT EXIST.

But the point which I make here has a graver and deeper significance than any question concerning the method of using the patronage system as it now exists. I maintain that such a system has no right to an existence in this Republic. The three great departments of this Government are distinct and independent, each sufficient for its appropriate sphere, and all necessary for a harmonious whole. Each department is also a check upon the other, and those who are charged with duties in one cannot properly interfere with those who are charged with different duties in another. The executive department overshadows the others; the duties with which it is charged are the entire execution of the laws and the negotiation of treaties; and for the proper discharge of these duties that department is responsible to the people and to the representatives of the people. Congress should furnish the means for the performance of these duties, and, as the representatives of the people, should see that they are well performed. They should keep watch and ward over this mighty executive power and see that it is used only for the proper administration of the Government of the Republic, and not for corruption, for personal ambition, for perverse partisanship, or for any form of tyranny.

Above all things the body exercising the legislative power, supervising the exercise of all other powers, and without whose cooperation no other powers can be exercised-that which holds the purse and which alone can authorize the use of the sword-should never surrender its independence, collectively or individually, to the department which merely administers without the power to provide itself with the means of administration. We should never forget that in the Republic the representatives of the people are nearest to "the

primal springs of empire," which are the people themselves, and should never relinquish or compromise their independence while performing their high duties.

Believing this, I must express the conviction that it was an unfortunate hour for the Republic when the representatives of the people abdicated their high functions and consented to become the recipients and dispensers of what is called "executive patronage." That is, they beg the Executive, who is charged with the faithful execution of the laws, to seek its instruments in such a manner that the members of the legislative bodies can pay their political debts by designating the persons to whom the executive and administrative offices should be given. Each office thus bestowed is a link in this chain of "executive patronage.'

But the Executive should have no patronage. The word "patronage" implies a bestowal by favor of what would not be obtained by the recipient by desert. That department should seek the most capable persons to transact the business of the people. Its high offices became degraded when their chief consented that they should be the instruments of such base uses. This surrender first introduced the sordid element into our politics, and caused the high tone of honor, high character, and eminent talent to begin to disappear from what has been becoming more and more a dishonored and dishonorable arena. When members of Congress became brokers of offices, as well as legislators, all their acts and votes began to bear the suspicion of being commercial transactions. This unholy alliance between the executive and legislative departments, which the Constitution created to be distinct, separate, and independent, has wrought no good to either. It is an intermingling of the personnel of the two which the law does not allow. It has paralyzed the executive in the administration of the Government by destroying its independence. It has prevented the revenues from being collected and caused the public moneys to be squandered. It has imported the alien curse of "patronage" into a Government which ought to give an open career to all. In a republic, which must always be divided into parties, it has debased their contests into struggles as to which partisans shall fill the public offices, instead of developing a noble strife for the success of principles and measures upon which the prosperity of the country is believed to depend. More than any one cause it has tended to estrange one portion of the nation from another, and to embitter the feuds and inflame the passions which at last lighted the fires of civil war.

Now, when this long and bloody conflict has ended, and the grass is growing over its graves; when the Republic is being reconstructed upon the principles of the immortal Declaration, its

original corner-stone, it has seemed to me wise that in matters of administration we should also return to the principles upon which our fathers set this Government in motion. I would rease the executive to its original independence and remit the Legislature to its appropriate sphere. What the bill proposes is simply to furnish means to the Executive to obtain, independent of dictation from any quarter, competent and faithful persons to perform the duties required of that department by the Constitution and the laws. This is the origin, the aim, and the scope of this measure. The commissioners and their assistants are the eyes, the ears, and the mind of the Executive for the selection of instruments; they have no power, no patronage; they can neither reward friends nor punish enemies. It is true that they may not do their work as all would wish it to be done; they can be but men, and consequently fallible instruments; but no one can deny that they will be better than no instruments at all. Even if this board should degenerate into a partisan machine, yet in course of time it must become the instrument of different parties; and it seems to me better, if our offices are to be filled with partisans, that we should secure the best material of each party by this mode of selection, instead of some of the worst, as we do now. And it is the worst of bad logic as well as the poorest of compliments to say to the President that because he may fail to select the four men best qualified for this board, that therefore he should not have the aid which this bill gives him, but be obliged to select through the present more fallible and less impartial instruments the more than forty thousand officers within the scope of this measure. same rule applies to each one of the forty thousand that those who argue against me seek to apply to each one of the four. The false logic is too apparent, and the corrupt motive which advances such sophistry cannot escape detection. Under the present system the range of selection is confined to the personal and political friends of the politicians who push their favorites. Under the proposed system the choice must be made from the whole American people. The constituency is as numerous as the nation. Why should not the Republic have the choice of its best sons for its service, instead of being obliged to grope around among the refuse for its servants? Why should it not go at once into its vigorous forests of native growth for its timber, instead of endeavoring to pick out some passable stick here and there from among the political driftwood of its periodical freshets?

The

I have heard it said by a member of a former Congress, I might say more than one-I say nothing of any member of the present Congress-that he thought he could choose better officers for his district than any board of examiners whatever. Each of such former mem

bers might have spoken, not his belief only, but the truth. In no case have I been disposed to question it, but it never seemed to have occurred to those former members that the selection of executive and administrative officers was no part of their constitutional duty. It was just what they were elected not to do. They had no more right to claim or exercise any portion of the executive power than of the judicial. I can fill a volume of quotations from the fathers to show how unwarranted by authority or tradition such a claim is on the part of members of the Legislature. It is one of the many corruptions that have threatened to change the character if not destroy the existence of this Government by the intermingling of the functions of the branches which the Constitution created as separate and declares to be distinct. The evil of some of these attempts has been so glaring that they have been cut off by penal statutes. One was the seeking of contracts by members; another, the use of influence at the Departments for any purpose for a consideration, and the soliciting of offices for hire of money. It has been found necessary to purge Congress of these corrup tions by prohibitory and penal statutes. So far have these statutes gone as to prohibit a member of Congress from being solicitor for a claimant in the Court of Claims, from acting as attorney for any claimant before any Department or public officer, and even from arguing a case in court for a fee in which the Government is a party. The great, the chief of these corruptions which yet remains unprohibited and unpunished is the attempt to gain control of appointments to office, the wielding of the so-called executive patronage and the exercise thereby of a share in the executive power.

LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE DUTIES SHOULD NOT BE INTERMINGLED.

Upon this subject I speak only for myself. I do not know that the opinions of any other member will in this respect coincide with mine. I do not intend that my words shall express a criticism upon either the language, the opinions, or the conduct of any other member. The constituency which I have the honor to represent, not inferior to any other constituency in any respect, elects one of the Representatives of the people in the Congress of the United States. It is his duty to scan closely the measures proposed by the executive department, to vote for furnishing means for carrying on the Government according to the views of the Administration when convinced that these demands are warranted by law and are in other respects reasonable and proper, and for denying them when not needed or when the means might be used for improper purposes. In the district and among the people I represent the Government of the United States is felt through its officers of customs and

internal revenue; indeed, few districts acknowledge the tax-gatherer's presence by larger contributions; and is welcomed by its postal conveniences, the presence of its judges, and its occasional and somewhat fitful aid to commerce and manufactures. It shares with all other districts an equal right in making laws for the whole country, and sends a Representative here for that purpose. But it is no more a part of that Representative's duty to seek and dispose of executive offices than to solicit pardons for traitors or condemned criminals. It is a part of his duty to prevent the appointment of incompetent persons by general law if he can, if not by personal remonstrance.

But if, as a matter of personal or political favor, he goes to the State Department to beg a consulate, or perhaps something higher, for a friend, or to the Treasury for an office within its gift, he is made to feel, if his natural instincts are not sensitive enough to be impressed before going there, that he surrenders his independence as a legislator when he accepts the gift, and that the person and the power which grants his request will not be slow to claim his assistance in the Capitol when it is needed. I know there are ingenious ways for covering up this barter. The Secretary may say that he defers to the superior means of knowledge and to the judgment of the member in selecting his appointee, and may claim the member's vote upon an exceptional measure upon the ground of allegiance to party. But, nevertheless, the bargain is made. Perhaps I could select as good executive and administrative officers in my district as any board of examiners could choose for the Government, but | when I am tempted to enter upon this business I am checked by the reflection that I should be a mere volunteer. The people have not charged me with it; the Constitution does not require it of a legislator; the Executive has not yielded it; and its exercise would seriously interfere with the performance of my proper duties.

The Constitution contains a clause in restraint of bribery; the laws enacted to carry that clause into effect are full of penalties upon the use of money and the receipt of it by and among legislators. I do not see the difference be tween the bestowal of the gift of the nomination to an office upon a member, to be passed over to his friend, a political creditor, and the largess of a measure of coin for the same purposes. It may be a peculiarity of my own mental vision, but I cannot think that I am doing my country service by becoming the almoner of my party in the distribution of administrative offices when at the same time I am assuming obligations to the executive power which are inconsistent with my position as an independent legislator. It is my duty to aid the Government in procuring the best service that its salaries will bring, in every district and

in all localities where the flag floats; and that result I am endeavoring to secure by general law with such persistence and ability as have been allotted me. But no provision in the Constitution, no law, no healthy custom, authorizes the blending of the legislative and executive duties in this illicit manner. I do not belong to the executive department, nor has that department any claim upon me as a Representative to relieve it from the proper and responsible exercise of its duties, or to stifle my criticism or choke my opposition to their improper exercise, by inviting or permitting me to share its power. If I perform the duties with which I am charged under the Constitution, I must stand aloof from the other departments of the Government, and exercise the utmost vigilance which I possess, and which my constituents expect of me, to see that the officers of the other departments perform the duties which the Constitution and the laws require of them; and if the laws are weak and insufficient, to urge a remedy by new and wise legislation, which, with regard to one defect, I believe I am now doing.

THE PRACTICE AND ITS RESULTS IN THE FIRST FORTY YEARS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

We all know how in the early days of the Republic appointments to civil office were the subjects of personal care and supervision by the President and heads of Departments. The correspondence as to the character, fitness, integrity, and patriotism of candidates was thorough and exhaustive. When the testimony concerning qualifications was balanced or doubtfula personal acquaintance was not unfrequently sought, and its results determined the choice. The exercise of this intelligent care produced its legitimate results. For the first forty years of the existence of this Government under the Constitution no people ever had a more faithful and efficient body of public servants. Frauds, peculations, and defalcations in the civil service were almost unknown, and so heinous was the offense deemed that the few perpetrators in almost every instance fled the country. Personal supervision by responsible and capable chiefs was possible in those days when the numbers of the force were few. The service was honorable; its members were respected; removals for cause were few; political opinions were not deemed a cause; and though every commission limited the term of office to the pleasure of the President it was practically for life. Under that system the reve nues were faithfully collected, the public money honestly kept and disbursed; our prosperity increased; the direct and indirect taxes, save the customs, were removed; the Government. although generally called an experiment, gained the confidence of the people and of the world; its credit was strengthened and remained unim paired; its revenues were increased; its debts incurred in its two great struggles for existence extinguished.

congressmen, and in some States even judges, by the popular choice. This reform is limited to an hunibler sphere, though one which vitally affects the public interests. It simply provides that skill and vigor in striking straight out from the shoulder when brought to bear in behalf of either party in a strife to capture a ballot-box or to smash it, shall not be considered evidence of the champion's qualifications for an office in the appraiser's department of a custom-house or a clerkship in the State Department; and that alacrity and facility in doing the dirty work of a party shall not entitle the person adorned by these qualities to a place where he shall handle the public moneys. I have no fear that the persons who seek these lesser places will be too learned or too competent. Young men who seek the great prizes of life will not imprison their energies or capacities in this limited sphere. We shall not coax distinguished scholars, adorned with university honors, into post office clerkships, or make them custom-house weighers or whisky gaug

guards over him as well as over the smugglers he would favor, and peculation becomes impossible except by actual crime. Each is a watch over the other, and if one becomes a thief, detection will be quick and punishment certain. I do not deny that large sums have been diverted from the Treasury by the connivance of the higher officers, but it has been done with comparative impunity only when they have had the designation of their subordinates, who have been in fact their accomplices.

WHAT SORT OF AN ARISTOCRACY IT CREATES.

ers.

FIDELITY IN THE MINOR OFFICES WILL SECURE INTEGRITY IN THE HIGHER.

But it is objected that as this measure deals only with the inferior offices it will not check the thieving which the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BUTLER] alleges is chiefly performed by those of higher grade. He insinuates, although he has not directly asserted, that the deficiencies in the revenue are owing more to the vices of collectors and assessors than to the clerks and subordinates. But if their clerks and subordinates are honest, faithful, and diligent how can their superiors be dishonest without detection? No one knows better than the gentleman from Massachusetts that the money is not stolen after it comes into the hands of these great officers or into the coffers of the State. These magnates do not boldly commit grand larceny with comparative impunity, for they are surrounded by too many checks to make this kind of appropriation safe. It would be as great folly for them to make such an attempt as it would be for a covetous commander of a department in war time to put his hand into the military chest and convey the contents to his own pocket. Such great embezzlements cannot be effected without a back door to his headquarters and con venient and pliable aids, quartermasters, commissaries, sutlers, and storekeepers-his creatures, ready and willing to join in the public plunder.

If the dishonest collector cannot have his choice of instruments; if, on the other hand, all his subordinates are selected for their honesty and capacity by men over whom he can have no influence or control, then they are

insignia of hereditary nobility. But alas for the comparison! Within the scope of this bill there are not a hundred officers whose salaries are over $3,000 a year, and the average is less than $1,200. These are filled with hard-worked drudges, whose hours of toil are from six to ten each day. An aristocracy of deputy collectors, clerks, inspectors, mailagents, Indian agents, letter-carriers, lighthouse keepers, and tide waiters! It is true that the bill provides means for obtaining the best persons for these places; but he who can see an aristocracy in this host of subalternsin the offensive or dangerous meaning of that term-must be in that calenture of the brain which can discern green fields in the waves of the sea or observe men as trees walking. It is a mirage of an over heated intellect.

If such an aristocracy were created by this measure we should see the flower and cream if it here in Washington. Its lords would be the poor clerks who perform dusty drudgery in the Departments, and beg and beseech us for an additional twenty or ten per cent. of pay in order that they may meet their board and grocery bills; and the queens of that dangerous society would be the poor women who clip and count the paper currency in the Treasury, or copy records in the Patent Office. These "bloated aristocrats" on $1,800 a year, and these "flaunting ladies" on $900, may disturb the dreams of the gentleman from Illinois, [Mr. LOGAN,] but the constitution can withstand their insidious plottings. Although we deal only with subalterns, there is not enough in this aristocratical notion to bring out of it a new farce of "High life below stairs." It runs itself into the ground without comicality.