when made of the Butea frondosa, &c., and the dice-playing, &c., which forms part of the Râgasûyasacrifice. In the fifth the subjects are the relative order of different passages of the Sruti, &c., the order of different parts of a sacrifice, as the seventeen animals at the Vâgapeya, the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and the respective force of the words of the Sruti, the order of mention, &c., as determining the order of performance. In the sixth we read of the persons qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for prescribed materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory rites, the Sattra-offerings, things proper to be given, and the different sacrificial fines. In the seventh is treated the mode of transference of the ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic text, others as inferred by 'name' or 'sign.' In the eighth, transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed 'sign' or by the predominant 'sign,' and cases also where no transference takes place. In the ninth, the discussion begins with the adaptation (Ûha) of hymns, when quoted in a new connection, the adaptation of Sâmans and Mantras, and collateral questions connected therewith. In the tenth the occasions are discussed where the non-performance of the primary rite involves the preclusion' and nonperformance of the dependent rites, and occasions when rites are precluded, because other rites produce their special results, also Graha-offerings, certain Sâmans, and various other things, as well as different kinds of negation. In the eleventh we find the incidental mention and subsequently the fuller discussion of Tantra, where several acts are combined into one, and Âvâpa, or the performing an act more than once. In the twelfth there is the discussion on Prasanga, when the rite is performed with one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference, on Tantra, cumulation of concurrent rites (Samukkhaya), and option. It is easy to see from this table of contents that neither Plato nor Kant would have felt much the wiser for them. But we must take philosophies as they are given us; and we should spoil the picture of the philosophical life of India, if we left out of consideration their speculations about sacrifice as contained in the Pûrva-Mîmâmsâ. There are passages, however, which appeal to philosophers, such as, for instance, the chapter on the Pramânas or the authoritative sources of knowledge, on the relation between word and thought, and similar subjects. It is true that most of these questions are treated in the other philosophies also, but they have a peculiar interest as treated by the ritualistic PûrvaMîmâmsâ. Pramanas of Gaimini. Thus if we turn our attention first to the Pramânas, the measures of knowledge, or the authorities to which we can appeal as the legitimate means of knowledge, as explained by the Pûrva-Mîmâmsâ, we saw before that the Vedântists did not pay much attention to them, though they were acquainted with the three fundamental Pramânas -sense-perception, inference, and revelation. The Pûrva-Mîmâmsâ, on the contrary, devoted considerable attention to this subject, and admitted five, (1) Sense-perception, Pratyaksha, when the organs are actually in contiguity with an object; (2) Inference (Anumâna), i. e. the apprehension of an unseen member of a known association (Vyâpti) by the perception of another seen member; (3) Comparison (Upamâna), knowledge arising from resemblance; (4) Presumption (Arthâpatti), such knowledge as can be derived of a thing not itself perceived, but implied by another; (5) Sabda, verbal information derived from authoritative sources. One sect of Mîmâmsakas, those who follow Kumârila Bhatta, admitted besides, (6) Abhâva, not-being, which seems but a subdivision of inference, as if we infer dryness of the soil from the not-being or absence of clouds and rain. All these sources of information are carefully examined, but it is curious that Mîmâmsakas should admit this large array of sources of valid cognition, considering that for their own purposes, for establishing the nature of Dharma or duty, they practically admit but one, namely scripture or Sabda. Duty, they hold, cannot rest on human authority, because the 'ought' which underlies all duty, can only be supplied by an authority that is more than human or more than fallible, and such an authority is nowhere to be found except in the Veda. This leaves, of course, the task of proving the superhuman origin of the Veda on the shoulders of Gaimini; and we shall see hereafter how he performs it. Sûtra-style. Before, however, we enter on a consideration of any of the problems treated in the Pûrva-Mîmâmsâ, a few remarks have to be made on a peculiarity in the structure of the Sûtras. In order to discuss a subject fully, and to arrive in the end at a definite opinion, the authors of the Sûtras are encouraged to begin with stating first every possible objection that can reasonably be urged against what is their own opinion. As long as the objections are not perfectly absurd, they have a right to be stated, and this is called the Pûrvapaksha, the first part. Then follow answers to all these objections, and this is called the Uttarapaksha, the latter part; and then only are we led on to the final conclusion, the Siddhânta. This system is exhaustive and has many advantages, but it has also the disadvantage, as far as the reader is concerned, that, without a commentary, he often feels doubtful where the cons end and the pros begin. The commentators themselves differ sometimes on that point. Sometimes again, instead of three, a case or Adhikarana is stated in five members, namely: : 1. The subject to be explained (Vishaya). 2. The doubt (Samsaya). 3. The first side or prima facie view (Pûrvapaksha). 4. The demonstrated conclusion (Siddhânta); and 5. The connection (Samgati). This is illustrated in the commentary on the first and second Sûtras of the Mîmâmsâ1, which declare that a desire to know duty is to be entertained, and then define duty (Dharma) as that which is to be recognised by an instigatory passage, that is by a passage from the Veda. Here the question to be discussed (Vishaya) is, whether the study of Duty in 1 Sarvadarsana-samgraha, p. 122; translation by Cowell and Gough, p. 180; Siddhanta Dîpikâ, 1898, p. 194. Gaimini's Mîmâmsâ is really necessary to be undertaken. The Pûrvapaksha says of course, No, for when it is said that the Veda should be learnt (Vedo -dhyetavyah), that clearly means either that it should be understood, like any other book which we read, or that it should be learnt by heart without any attempt, as yet, on the part of the pupil to understand it, simply as a work good in itself, which has its reward in heaven. This is a very common view among the ancient Brâhmans; for, as they had no written books, they had a very perfect system for imprinting texts on the memory of young persons, by making them learn every day a certain number of verses or lines by heart, without any attempt, at first, of making them understand what they learnt; and afterwards only supplying the key to the meaning. This acquisition of the mere sound of the Veda was considered highly meritorious; nay, some held that the Veda was more efficacious, if not understood than if understood. This was in fact their printing or rather their writing, and without it their mnemonic literature would have been simply impossible. As we warn our compositors against trying to understand what they are printing, Indian pupils were cautioned against the same danger; and they succeeded in learning the longest texts by heart, without even attempting at first to fathom their meaning. To us such a system seems almost incredible, but no other system was possible in ancient times, and there is no excuse for being incredulous, for it may still be witnessed in India to the present day. Only after the text had thus been imprinted on the memory, there came the necessity of interpretation or understanding. And here the more |