the posteriority of the Sâmkhya, as a system of philosophy.

It is important here to remember that the Sâmkhya not only declared for the authority of the Veda, but had never openly rejected it, like Brihaspati or Buddha. It is quite another question whether it really carried out the spirit of the Veda, particularly of the Upanishads. That Samkara, the great defender of Vedantism, should deny the correctness of the interpretation of the Veda, adopted by Kapila, proves after all no more than that a difference of opinion existed between the two, but it would show at the same time that Kapila, as well as Samkara, had tried to represent his philosophy as supported by passages from the Veda. To judge from a passage in the beginning of the Sâmkhya-kârikâs it might seem indeed that Kapila placed his own philosophy above the Veda. But he really says no more there than that certain remedies for the removal of pain, enjoined by the Veda, are good, and that other remedies enjoined by philosophy are likewise good; but that of the two the latter are better, that is, more efficacious (Tattva Kaumudî, v. 2). This does not affect the authority of the Veda as a whole, as compared with philosophy or human knowledge. We must not forget that after all it is Sruti or revelation itself which declares that all remedies are palliative only, and that real freedom (Moksha) from all suffering can be derived from philosophical knowledge only, and that this is incomparably higher than sacrifices or other meritorious acts (Sâmkhyapravakana I, 5).

Authority of the Veda.

What authority Kapila assigns to the Veda may be gathered from what he says about the three possible sources of knowledge, perception, inference, and Âptavakana, that is the received, correct, or true word, or, it may be, the word of a trustworthy person. He explains Âptavakana in v. 5 by Aptasruti, which clearly means received revelation or revelation from a trustworthy source. However the commentators may differ, Sruti can here mean the Veda only, though, no doubt, the Veda as interpreted by Kapila. And that the Veda is not only considered as equal to sensuous perception and inference, but is placed by him on an even higher pedestal, is shown by the fact that Kapila (Sûtras V, 51) declares it to be self-evident, Svatahpramânam, while perception and inference are not, but are admitted to be liable to error and to require confirmation.

Though it is true, therefore, that with the true Sâmkhya philosopher the Veda does not possess that superhuman authority which is ascribed to it by Bâdarayana, I cannot bring myself to believe that this concession on the part of Kapila was a mere artifice to escape the fate which, for instance, befell Buddha. There are many passages where Kapila appeals quite naturally to Sruti or revelation. In I, 36 he appeals to both Sruti and Nyâya, reasoning, but in many places he appeals to Sruti alone. That revelation is to be looked upon as superior to experience or sensuous perception is stated by him in so many words in I, 147, where we read There is no denial of what is established

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by Sruti.' Again, when the Nyâya philosophy tries to establish by reasoning that the organs of sense are formed of the elements, Kapila squashes the whole argument by a simple appeal to Sruti. They cannot be so formed,' he says, 'because Sruti says that they are formed of Ahamkâra, self-consciousness (II, 20) '.'

Other passages where the authority of Sruti is invoked as paramount by Kapila, or supposed to be so by the commentator, may be found in SâmkhyaSûtras I, 36; 77; 83; 147; 154; II, 20; 22; III, 15; 80; IV, 22; &c.

Samkhya hostile to Priesthood.

There is one passage only in which a decidedly hostile feeling towards the Brâhmanic priesthood may be discovered in Kapila's Sûtras, and it seems full of meaning. Among the different kinds of bondage to which men are liable, but ought not to be, is one called Dakshinâ-bandha, bondage arising from having to offer gifts to priests, which seems to be condemned as superstitious and mischievous 2.

As springing from the great mass of philosophic thought accumulated in the Upanishads, the Sâmkhya, like the Vedanta-philosophy, was probably at first considered as neither orthodox nor unorthodox. It was simply one out of many attempts to solve the riddle of the world, and even the fact that it did not appeal to a personal Lord or creator, was evidently at first not considered sufficient to anathematise it as unorthodox or un-Vedic. It was probably

But are not the elements mere Vikâras of Ahamkâra? 2 See Tattva-samâsa 22; Sâmkhya-kârikâs 44.

at a much later time when the Vedânta and other systems had already entrenched themselves behind revelation, or the Veda, as the highest authority even on philosophical questions, that other systems, having been proved un-Vedic, came to be considered as objectionable or unorthodox, while the Vedanta, as its very name implied, was safe under the shadow of the Veda. I know that other scholars maintain that with the Sâmkhya any appeal to the Veda was an afterthought only, and not an essential part of the original system, nay, not even quite honest. We may admit that the Sâmkhya has no need of the Veda, but why should it appeal to it even on indifferent questions, if the Veda had not been considered by it as of supreme authority. It is possible that there may have been originally a difference between Sruti, revelation as not human, and Âpta-vakana, authoritative tradition as human, and that with Kapila the Veda was treated at first as coming under Âptavakana. But however this may be, unless our conception of the development of Indian philosophy, as we catch glimpses of it now and then in the course of centuries, is entirely wrong, it must be clear that, in the present state of our knowledge, to call one channel of philosophic thought, whether Sâmkhya or Vedanta, in the form in which it has reached us, more ancient than the other, would be mere playing with words.

Parallel development of Philosophical Systems.

The result of this desire to fix dates, where dates > are impossible, has often proved most mischievous. Scholars of recognised authority have arrived at and given expression to convictions, not only widely

different, but diametrically opposed to each other. The chief cause of this confusion has been that, by a very natural tendency, we always wish to arrange things Nacheinander or in causal connection, instead of being satisfied with taking things as Nebeneinander, parallel and formed under similar conditions, springing from a common source and flowing on side by side in the same direction.

A reference to the history of language may make my meaning clearer. No one would say that Greek was older than Latin. Greek has some forms more primitive than Latin, but Latin also has some forms more primitive than Greek. It is true that we know literary productions in Greek at a much earlier time than literary productions in Latin, nor would any Sanskrit scholar deny that the Sutras of Bâdarâyana are older than the SâmkhyaSutras, as we now possess the two. But for all that, Greek, as a language, cannot be a day older than Latin. Both branched off, slowly it may be and almost imperceptibly at first, from the time when the Aryan separation took place. In their embryonic form they both go back to some indefinite date, far beyond the limits of any chronology. In India we may learn how, like language, religion, and mythology, philosophy also formed at first a kind of common property. We meet with philosophical ideas of a Vedântic character, though as yet in a very undecided form, as far back as the hymns of the Rig-veda; they meet us again in the Brahmanas and in some of the Upanishads, while the Sâmkhya ideas stand out less prominently, owing, it would seem, to the ascendency gained at that early period already by the Vedanta. Instead