The Buddhi of the Sâmkhya is a cosmic principle independent of the Self, and meant to account for the existence of the light of reason in the whole universe; while in the Nyâya-philosophy it signifies the subjective activity of thought in the acquisition of knowledge, or in the lighting up and appropriating of the inert impressions received by the senses. This knowledge can come to an end and vanish by forgetfulness, while an eternal essence, like the Buddhi of the Sâmkhyas, though it may be ignored, can never be destroyed.

Âtman.

In answering the question, What is knowledge, Gotama declares in this place quite clearly that real knowledge belongs to the Atman only, the Self or the soul. It cannot belong to the senses and their objects (Indriyârtha), because knowledge abides even when the senses and what they perceive have been suppressed. Nor does knowledge belong to the Manas, which is but the instrument of knowledge, but it arises from the conjunction of Âtman (Self) with Manas (attention), and on the other side of Manas with Indriyas (senses). Manas is the instrument, and the wielder of that instrument, like the wielder of an axe, must be some one different from it; this, according to the Nyâya, can only be the Self who in the end knows, who remembers, who feels pain and pleasure, who desires and acts.

Memory.

Memory, Smriti, has not received from Indian philosophers the attention which it deserves. If it is treated as a means of knowledge, it falls under Anubhava, which is either immediate or mediate,

and then called Smriti. Every Anubhava is supposed to leave an impression or modification of the mind, which is capable of being revived. There is another manifestation of memory in the act of remembering or recognising, as when on seeing a man we say, This is he, or This is Devadatta. Here we have Anubhava, knowledge of this, joined with something else, namely he or Devadatta, a revived Samskâra, impression, or Smriti. The subject of memory is more fully treated in III, 113, and the various associations which awaken memory are enumerated as follows:

I. Attention to an object perceived;

2. Connection, as when the word Pramâna, proof, recalls Prameya, what has to be proved;

3. Repetition, as when one has learned a number of things together, one calls up the other;

4. A sign, as when a thing recalls its sine quá

non;

5. A mark, as when a standard reminds one of its bearer;

6. Likeness, as when one body recalls a similar body;

7. Possession, as when a property reminds us of its owner;

8. Belonging, as when royal attendants remind us of the king;

9. Relation, as when a disciple reminds us of the teacher, or kine of a bull;

10. Succession, as when the pounding of rice reminds one of sprinkling ;

II. Absence, as of a wife;

12. Fellow-workers, as when one disciple reminds us of the co-disciples;

13. Opposition, as when the ichneumon recalls the snake;

14. Pre-eminence, as when investiture with the sacred string recalls the principal agent, the Guru or teacher;

15. Receiving, as when a gift reminds one of the giver;

16. Covering, as when a sword reminds one of the sheath;

17. Pleasure and pain, each of which recalls the occasioner of it;

18. Desire and aversion, reminding us of their

causes;

19. Fear, reminding us of what is feared, such as death;

20. Want, which makes us think of those who can supply our wants;

21. Motion, as when a shaking branch reminds us of the wind;

22. Affection, reminding us of a son, &c.;

23. Merit and Demerit, which make us reflect on joys and sorrows of a former life.

Such lists are very characteristic of Hindu philosophy, and they show at the same time that it is a mistake to ascribe them exclusively to the Sâmkhyaphilosophy. Though they do not add much to our knowledge of the fundamental tenets of Indian philosophy, they show once more how much thought had been spent in the elaboration of mere details; and this, as we are told in this case by the commentator himself, chiefly in order to stir up the thoughts of the learners, Sishyavyut pâdanâya, to independent activity.

Knowledge not Eternal.

The important point, however, which Gotama wishes to establish is this, that knowledge, though belonging to the eternal Self, is not in itself eternal, but vanishes like any other act. He also guards against the supposition that as we seem to take in more than one sensation at the same time, as in eating a cake full of different kinds of sweets, we ought to admit more than one Manas; and he explains that this simultaneousness of perception is apparent only, just as the fiery circle is when we whirl a firebrand with great rapidity, or as we imagine that a number of palm-leaves are pierced by a pin at one blow, and not in succession, one after the other. Lastly, he states that the Manas is Anu, infinitely small, or, as we should say, an atom.

More Prameyas.

While the third book was occupied with the first six of the Prameyas, or objects to be known and proved, including the whole apparatus of knowledge, such as Atman, Self or soul, Indriyas, senses, Manas, mind, central sensorium, Buddhi, understanding, and Sarira, body, and therefore gave rise to some important questions not only of metaphysics, but of psychology also, the fourth book which is devoted to the remaining six Prameyas, such as (7) Pravritti (activity), (8) Dosha (faults), (9) Pretyabhâva (transmigration), (10) Phala (rewards), (11) Dukkha (pain), and (12) Apavarga (final beatitude), is naturally of a more practical character, and less attractive to the student of the problems of being and thinking. Some questions, however, are treated in it which

cannot well be passed over, if we wish to give a full insight into the whole character, and the practical bearing of the Nyâya-philosophy.

Though this philosophy is supposed to represent Indian logic only, we have already seen enough of it to know that it included almost every question within the sphere of philosophy and religion, and that its chief object was the same as that of all the other systems of Indian philosophy, namely salvation.

Life after Death.

One of the seven interesting subjects treated here is Pretyabhâva, literally existence after having departed this life, and this is proved in a very short way. As the Self has been proved to be eternal, Gotama says (IV, 10) it follows that it will exist after what is called death. Some of the objections made to this tenet are easily disposed of, but nothing is said to establish what is meant by transmigration, that is being born again in another world as either a human or as some other animal being, or even as a plant.

Existence of Deity.

Another important subject, if it is not passed over altogether, is treated by Gotama, as it was by Kapila, incidentally only, I mean the existence of a Deity. It comes in when a problem of the Buddhists is under discussion, namely, whether the world came out of nothing, and whether the manifestation of anything presupposes the destruction of its cause. This is illustrated by the fact that the seed has to perish before the flower can appear. But Gotama strongly denies this, and reminds the opponent that