CERVERA AND BLANCO 799 During the night of July 2 Shafter laid the situation before his division commanders. The nature of the discussion was not made public, but next day he sent a despatch to Washington saying that Santiago could not be taken with the force then on shore, and that it might be necessary to fall back to higher ground until reënforced. Meanwhile, he tried the effect of a stern demand on the Spanish commander, the suggestion, as it was currently reported, of General Wheeler. At noon on the 3d he sent a summons for surrender, threatening to bombard the city with his heavy guns in case of refusal. These pieces were not in position, but the enemy did not know it. General Toral, in command since the 1st, when Linares was wounded, began to parley. The demand was not granted, but the departure and destruction of Cervera's fleet on this day restored the spirit of the Americans. They extended their lines and had the city completely invested within a week. On the 10th they began a bombardment which had the effect of renewing the negotiations. The city was now in genuine distress; the fleet was destroyed, the water supply was cut off, and supplies were low. On the 17th Toral accepted terms and handed over most of eastern Cuba, the victors agreeing to transport to Spain the Spanish soldiers surrendered in it, 22,700 in number. The capitulation gave great relief to the American army, men and officers. There was much malarial fever and dysentery in the ranks and a few cases of yellow fever of a mild type. Another week of fighting might have thrown the entire force into panic. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SPANISH SQUADRON Surrender of Santiago. Position of Admiral Cervera saw himself bottled up in the harbor with great dismay. He opposed from the first the expedition to the West Indies and would have got away at the earliest moment, but coaling was slow and General Blanco feared that his army, already near the point of mutiny, would take it for abandonment by their country and break out in disorders, to subdue which must occasion the spilling of much blood. Thus was allowed to pass the first days of the blockade, when a successful sortie was most possible. The army in Cuba thought a second fleet would be sent to drive off Sampson's ships and then to unite with Cervera to sweep all opposition from the seas; but the higher officers, naval and military, knew how futile was this hope. The arrival of Shafter added to their discouragement, and some of the guns of the squadron were landed to strengthen the land defenses. Marines were also sent to the trenches, and Captain Bustamente, leading a detachment of 500, lost his life on July 1 in defending San Juan Hill. June 24 Cervera, by cable, had been placed under command of Blanco, who ordered him to aid in the defense of the city until surrender seemed inevitable and then to go out in the best manner possible. This contingency was believed to have arrived on the evening of July 1, but the admiral hesitated on account of what he believed the useless loss of life. At dawn on the 2d he unwillingly directed his fires to be lighted and called his sailors on board. A few minutes later all his doubts were resolved by peremptory instructions from Havana to make the sortie. Blanco felt it would be a blot on Spanish honor to allow the ships to fall into the hands of the enemy without a blow. All day Saturday, July 2, the steam rose in the gauges. Sunday morning it was at the highest point, and all the preparations were Cervera's Plans for the Sortie. complete. Cervera gave the order of proceeding. Like a brave officer he took the lead in the Maria Teresa, with the Vizcaya, Colon, and Oquendo following in order at intervals of 800 yards, all armored cruisers of the modern type. Behind them at 1000 yards came the torpedo-boat destroyers, the Furor and Pluton, the third destroyer which set out from the Cape Verde islands having fallen behind through disablement. He proposed to turn westward when outside, try to ram the Brooklyn on the west end of Sampson's line, draw the other American ships to him, and thus give the ships that came later an opportunity to break through and escape. Such tactics would mean the loss of the Teresa, but they might save the rest of the squadron. The start was made from the inner harbor at 9:15 A.M. That morning the American ships were in a crescent, the ends three miles apart and two and a half miles respectively from the shore. Farthest west was the Brooklyn, Commodore Schley's Position of flagship, a fast and powerful cruiser. Next to her was the Amerithe Texas, a second-class battleship, then the Iowa and can Ships. Oregon, first-class battleships, and on the eastern end of the crescent was the Indiana, also a first-class battleship. The Gloucester, a converted yacht, was midway between the Indiana and the shore, while the Vixen, another small ship, was a mile and a half west of the Brooklyn. The heavy battleship, Massachusetts, was coaling at Guantanamo, and the cruiser, New York, Admiral Sampson on board, was eight miles away, near Siboney, for a conference between the admiral and General Shafter. Cervera had thus by accident selected a moment favorable to his project; for two of the best ships in the blockade were off their stations, which, in view of Sampson's excellent tactics, was all the good luck of that nature the Spaniard could expect. At 9:30 o'clock the Teresa was sighted going at full speed. Schley, in actual command, signalled, "Clear ship for action," and "Close up." Sampson soon saw what was happening, signalled the attack, and made all speed for the fray. Only the Oregon had full steam up, and for a few minutes the other ships were outstripped by the enemy. The Teresa made straight for the Brooklyn, which at 1400 yards turned eastward, made a great loop, and came back to the west in a course THE SPANISH FLEET DESTROYED 801 parallel to the flying Teresa. By this time the other Spanish snips were outside. Instead of scattering, they followed their admiral along the shore, each engaged with the American ship which, sailing in a parallel course farther out at sea, happened to be nearest to her. Thus the action resolved itself into a series of magnificent duels between powerful ironclads, metal ringing on metal, while the cannon roared, the great engines throbbed, and the air was filled by the clouds of smoke which rushed from the overcharged boilers. The Spaniards' aim was bad, or their powder poor, for their shots went wild or fell short, while the American gunnery was excellent. It was more than the enemy could stand, and the explosion of shell after shell in his vessels showed that he was losing the fight. The Teresa, in the thickest of the battle, first showed signs of weakening. At 10:15 she ran for the beach six and a half miles from the harbor, a complete wreck. Five minutes later the Oquendo, in even worse condition, repeated the mancuver and settled in the sand half a mile west of the Teresa. The Furor and Pluton, last out of the harbor, were raked by the small guns of the American ships and engaged by the Gloucester at short range with great courage. They quickly succumbed and sank before they could reach the beach. The other Spanish ships, the Vizcaya and Colon, passed the first danger zone with a faint hope of escape. They were pursued by the Brooklyn, Oregon, Texas, and Iowa, whose rising fires ever increased their speed. At 11 o'clock the Vizcaya, shot-ridden and sinking, turned to the shore and ended her course twenty miles from Santiago. The Iowa and Texas halted to receive her surrender and rescue her drowning crew, while the Brooklyn, Oregon, and New York, which was now coming up, held on after the Colon, six miles in the lead. The pursuers held their fire and crowded on all possible steam. At 12:23 the Brooklyn and Oregon were in range and opened fire. At 1:15 the Colon gave up the struggle and ran toward the shore. She was nearly uninjured, but her crew opened her sea valves, and she sank before the victors could prevent it. Thus four hours after Cervera began his dash the last of his ships was destroyed, 323 of his crew were killed, 151 were wounded, and 1782 were prisoners, he himself being among the last-named and on board of the Iowa. Sampson lost one man killed and one wounded, and his ships were uninjured. He himself, because of his unlucky position at the beginning, was not in the fight, but pursued it as fast as his swift cruiser, the New York, could move, and came up in time to be present at the surrender of the Colon. Santiago was hardly taken before rumors of peace negotiation were heard. One effect was to hasten the departure of an expedition against Porto Rico. The government desired to occupy the island in order to hold it as war indemnity, and all Expedition men agreed that if Spain gave up Cuba she should be Porto Ricoforced to relinquish the last of her American colonies. against Accordingly, General Miles set out on July 21, landed on the southern shore of the island, and occupied town after town, encountering the most perfunctory resistance. In two weeks the southern and western parts were taken, with an American loss of 3 killed and 40 wounded. The march of victory, to the disgust of the soldiers, was interrupted by the tidings that an armistice had been made on August 12. Error of Linares. REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR IN CUBA In June, 1898, Spain had 196,000 troops in Cuba, of whom 36,000 were in Santiago province. General Blanco had distributed these to restrain the revolutionists, and did not concentrate them against the greater danger of the American invasion. General Linares had 6500 at his disposal in and around Santiago, but on July 1 he put only about 1200 into the fights of El Caney and San Juan Hill. In the evening of that day he began concentration, and next morning had nearly 3000 men on his lines. Late on the 3d, Colonel Escario with 4000 fresh troops arrived from the region west of the city. In view of the hardly won victory on the Ist, it seems that the result might have been otherwise if this concentration had occurred earlier. The destruction of Spain's naval power isolated her army in Cuba and made surrender inevitable. The American soldiers then began Humanity. to feel sympathy for men who were so suddenly overtaken Acts of by misfortune, and fraternized with them in Santiago as soon as the capitulation was signed. Other acts of courtesy to the vanquished won the good will of the Spanish soldiers. Captain Evans, of the Iowa, refused to take the proffered sword of Captain Eulate, of the Vizcaya, and Captain Phillips, of the Texas, would not let his men cheer over the defeat of a brave foe. A Spanish private soldier in a public letter which was published as the army embarked said to the Americans: "You fought us as men, face to face, with great courage, a quality we have not met with during the three years we have carried on this war against a people without a religion, without morals, without conscience, and of doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but shot their noble victims from ambush and then immediately fled. . The descendants of the Congos and Guineas, mingled with the blood of unscrupulous Spaniards, and of traitors and adventurers these people are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty; for they will find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern civilized humanity." Most American soldiers shared this opinion of the Cuban army, who did not aid in the battles fought in their behalf, but overran our commissaries, consumed supplies, and pilfered whatever arms or other valuables were left unguarded. To the American they were a rabble beneath his contempt. He did not take into consideration the TROPICAL DISEASE 803 effects of the long struggle on the Cubans. The guerrilla warfare to which necessity reduced them bred the rudest habits and political ideas, and the opportunity for pillage attracted persons The Cuban for whom a life of regular labor had little charm. But no Soldiers. one can deny to them endurance and patriotism. If their hatred of Spain approached the frenzy of barbarism, it was the natural product of a tyranny which had stamped out the better feelings of the heart. Warfare. The campaign brought home to Americans the problems of modern warfare. It was evident that the magazine rifle and smokless powder opened a new era in fighting battles. It took 6500 Ameri- Lessons of cans three hours to carry El Caney, defended by less than 600 men with the modern arms; and at San Juan Hill the same result was evident. The lesson of this is that war is increasingly difficult and bloody and ought to be the less lightly undertaken. This unpleasant fact is somewhat balanced by the larger percentages of recoveries among the wounded. The new bullet makes a smoother wound than the old leaden ball. Thus healing is easier, and the improvement in surgery and hospital efficiency greatly increases the success of treatment on the battlefield. Of the 1000 Americans wounded at Santiago, less than one per cent died. Shafter's army suffered greatly through lack of foresight in assembling the necessary equipment, and the commissary was not adequate for the demands so suddenly made upon it. Complaint was made of the beef, and serious charges were preferred "An Army against those whose duty it was to purchase it. The cents." wagon trains were not sufficient at first to transport the supplies from the landing point to the lines, and the medicines were inadequate. The men's spirits fell with the impression that they were the victims of incompetency. They were not acclimated to service in the tropics, the fatigues and hardships in the trenches overwhelmed them, and by the end of July seventy per cent of the army were suffering from malarial fever. In the language of the commander it was "an army of convalescents." August 3 the general officers assembled with his consent, prepared a statement of the conditions, and suggested that the troops be removed to Montauk Point, Long Island. Shafter concurred with this recommendation in a separate report on the same day. Next day the officers' statement was given to the press before it reached Washington. This "round robin," as it was popularly called, caused needless alarm throughout the country and sent a shock of terror to many a fireside. Making it public was pronounced a breach of discipline, for which Roosevelt holds Shafter responsible. August 4 the order for removal was given by the secretary of war, and by the end of the month all the troops were out of the island, their places being taken by the newly raised immune regiments. Montauk Point proved too |