forth in previous reports, and the Commission has stated in that connection what, in its opinion, is the proper remedy. We certainly believe that existing laws should be so amended that railway managers who desire to observe them can do so without risk of sacrificing their property."1 The Commission may mediate, report, advise, investigate, order - all good things in themselves and sometimes very effective; but when it comes to the vital point of enforcing right rules of action it is absolutely helpless in practice, irrespective of what theoretical analyses of the law may attribute to it. To repeat an earlier statement, the Commission may recommend everything and do nothing. Neither in the federal law, nor in the laws of a single state, nor in the laws of all the states collectively does there exist adequate power to protect the railways against each other, on the one hand, or the public against the railways on the other. In view of such a situation, amendments to the Interstate Commerce Law are imperative. Several of these are indispensable; with respect to others, compromises might well be resorted to, or they might be omitted altogether, if thereby the work of bringing into existence an efficient law can be facilitated.

The changes contemplated in the Cullom Bill 2 are enumerated differently by different persons,

1 Fifteenth Annual Report (1901), p. 6.

2 Bill, S. 1439, 56 Cong., I Sess. A bill to amend an act entitled "An Act to Regulate Commerce," etc. This bill has not yet been

varying in number from several to nineteen,1 depending upon individual classifications and judgment. The centre of the "railway problem " has always been the question of rates, and it is but natural that the nucleus of the proposed amendments should consist of provisions governing rates. Under the present Interstate Commerce Law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Commission has no power to prescribe a rate for the future. The Commission has power to pass upon the absolute and relative reasonableness of a particular rate and, if the rate is found unreasonable, order a reduction or a change in the relations of rates. This order can be enforced through the courts. "Now the actual history of these suits shows that it has required between three and four years to arrive at a conclusion.” 2 Let us assume three years as the average. Suppose a certain rate of $1.25 is pronounced unreasonable, and that $1 is considered reasonable. The latter the Commission cannot prescribe under the present law, but it can order a reduction of the former. A recalcitrant manager satisfies the order of the Commission by reducing the rate a fractional part of a cent, after three years of litigation in the courts. Even at the rate of five cents per order, it would taken up by the present Congress. A similar bill was introduced in the preceding Congress by Senator Cullom.

1 Blanchard, testimony before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce (1900), p. 382.

2 Commissioner Prouty, testimony before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce (1900), p. 37.

require fifteen years to establish the reasonable rate. But long before this result may have been achieved new contingencies may have arisen, and a rate which at first appeared reasonable may be most unreasonable under the changed circumstances. Practically immediate obedience to orders is the only manner in which carriers and shippers can be protected. A delay of some duration, or even of a week, may change the situation enough to make future changes relatively valueless to the complainant. Here, as in so many other cases, we are again confronted by the relentlessness of the third proposition, there exists no power capable of compelling prompt obedience. "Promptness," which consumes years and which affects interests based upon short periods of time, is an abuse of the English language. The Cullom Bill provides a remedy: "If after a full hearing it is determined that any party complainant is entitled to an award of damages under the provisions of this Act for a violation of its provisions, the Commission shall make an order directing the carrier to pay to the complainant the sum to which he is entitled on or before a day named. If, after such hearing, it is determined that any carrier is in violation of the provisions of this Act, the Commission shall make an order directing such carrier to cease and desist from such further violation, and shall prescribe in such order the thing which the carrier is required to do or not to do for the future to bring itself into conformity with the provisions of this Act; and in

so doing it shall have power (a) to fix a maximum rate covering the entire cost of the service, (b) to fix both a maximum and minimum rate, or differential in rate, when that may be necessary to prevent discrimination under the third section, (c) to determine the division between carriers of a joint rate and the terms and conditions under which business shall be interchanged when that is necessary to an execution of the provisions of this Act, (d) to make changes in classification, (e) to so amend the rules and regulations under which traffic moves as to bring them into conformity with the provisions of this Act."

The foregoing enumeration of powers shall not exclude any power which the Commission would otherwise have in the making of an order under the provisions of this Act. An order not for the payment of money shall be termed an administrative order. "Every order shall fix the date when it is to take effect, which shall in no case be less than ten and ordinarily not less than thirty days from the service of such an order upon the carrier. Such order shall be forthwith served by mailing to any one of the principal officers or agents of the carrier at his usual place of business a copy of the report and opinion of the Commission, together with a copy of the order, and the registry mail receipt shall be prima facie evidence of the receipt of such order by the carrier in due course of mail."

Perhaps the most important feature of this section is the power which it gives to the Commission

to prescribe what "to do or not to do for the future" in order to bring about a line of action in harmony with the law. What follows are essentially consequences and conditions. Charters and

earlier laws took care to prescribe maximum rates, which were frequently placed so ridiculously high that practically no railway manager would ever think of charging them. Minimum rates were rarely prescribed, and differentials never. It is otherwise with the proposed law. The establishment of minimum and differential rates is at present of infinitely greater consequence than the prescription of maximum charges. The power of the Commission in determining divisions of through rates is likely to do away with one of the sources of discriminations.

All legislation rests upon the assumption of a reasonable purpose, and the prevalence of good sense among administrators of the law. Unless one is willing to attribute to the Interstate Commerce Commission the lack of a reasonable purpose, as well as love of fair play and justice, and of ordinary good sense, the opposition to the "ratemaking powers" contemplated in the proposed law is at once unwarranted and fallacious. Nothing but abstract dialecticism and jugglery with "transcendental" words can lead to the unreasonable conclusion that such a power over the rate will vest the Commission with authority to establish the market price of a commodity or service (transportation) in an arbitrary manner, and place the