of freight carried under the present system, and it is by no means improbable that the number of commodity rates necessary under a national system of classification would be smaller than that now in existence. The testimony is all but unanimous that commodity rates have been unduly extended. An experienced railway official of high rank stated to the writer not long ago that some day a Napoleon would arise in the railway world who would "demolish, with a heavy club," all the vast and needlessly complex classification structures, and substitute for this historical agglomeration a simple classification supplemented by a reasonable number of commodity rates. That the task of elaborating a national classification is not an easy or simple one is obvious; but that the task is not beyond the ability of men of capacity is equally obvious, and one can discover no insuperable obstacles in the way of the Commission's undertaking this work in conference with railway men.1

1 It is not desirable to enter into the details of the principles and problems of classification. However, two important disadvantages inherent in the present system should not be overlooked. (1) The unjust discriminations which occur in territories where the classifications overlap each other. For instance, the Official applies to Chicago and the Mississippi River, and the Western from Chicago and the Mississippi River; and in the territory between Chicago and the Mississippi numerous complaints of injustice from different classifications of the same articles have arisen. The Official applies on traffic from Chicago to Norfolk and Richmond; the Southern applies on through traffic from Chicago to Wilmington and other Carolina cities, and wide disparities in rates to competing Carolina and Virginia towns are found to be due to this cause. (2) The

The provisions of the Cullom Bill as to railway accounting are worthy of notice. The Commission is given discretionary power to prescribe forms of accounts. This has already been done to a considerable extent, and much progress has been made, moreover, toward uniformity in annual reports. The Commission is to have access to all accounts at all times, and may employ experts to do this work. Some railway men favor this provision, while others oppose it chiefly on the ground that it gives outsiders access to information which can be used against the road. This objection does not seem well taken unless we are again to assume lack of good judgment and fidelity in the examiner. There is no reason to suppose that the examiners will not be men of highest ability and integrity. Supervision of railway accounting may prevent improper management of stock and bond issues a matter which past railway legislation has generally neglected; and, in addition, the inspection of accounts might become an efficient method of stopping rebates. There is, perhaps, no single feature of railway evils which is more difficult to handle than this, and even the inspection of books need not lead to an undue optimism with respect to a final solution.

inability to fix joint through tariffs on an article not classified the same in two classifications, and where the local rates are added to make the total through charge. An example is the through traffic crossing the Mississippi, on which rates east and west of that river, based on two classifications, are combined.

The subject of agreements among railways is less adequately provided for in the Cullom Bill. If the history of competition in railway development the world over proves anything conclusively, it establishes the futility of competition as a workable basis of railway operation and administration. While a certain amount of competition may always persist and bring about improvements in the service, speaking generally, competition in railway affairs has failed at nearly every point, and any legislation which rests upon the doctrine of competition among railways must inevitably fail. A prudent course of action would recognize the inadequacy of competition and accept a reasonable amount of freedom for carriers in making agreements among themselves, subject to the supervision of the Commission. The agreements contemplated in this connection are more comprehensive than pooling arrangements, which are only a species of which the other is the genus. The history of railway pooling, however, does not afford a single forcible argument against granting to railways the privilege of coöperating in any manner which seems expedient to them, provided such cöoperative arrangements are based upon contracts properly scrutinized and supervised and enforcible in the courts. Hence a provision legalizing organizations like the former Joint Traffic Association and permitting agreements among railways on the eight or more different subjects which have hitherto been the object of railway agreements, would appear to

be desirable. Clearing-house arrangements should also be facilitated.

The standing which, by the Cullom Bill, is to be given in the courts to decisions and proceedings of the Commission remedies one of the most unfortunate weaknesses in the present statute. Time and again the case before the court has been made, through the introduction of new facts, an entirely different one from that before the Commission. The proposed law makes this impossible. "The proceedings certified from the Commission, together with any additional testimony taken as above, shall constitute the record upon which the case shall be heard by the Circuit Court."

With respect to fines for violation of the act, a clearer distinction should, perhaps, be made between fines on the offending person and fines on the guilty corporation. It seems a gross injustice to mulct a man for doing that which corporate management may compel him to do. Personal fines may be wholesome in such cases as making false entries, under-billing, etc., but these should not be too heavy. The bulk of the pecuniary loss following an infraction of the law should fall upon the corporation. Heavy fines, often repeated, would have an appreciable influence on dividends, and this would immediately touch the pockets of the stockholders and bondholders who, in turn, would be transformed into an army of remonstrators working toward a reduction in the number of fines, and a better observance of the law.

The inclusion in the Cullom Bill of the act in relation to testimony before the Interstate Commerce Commission, passed February 11, 1893, is a matter of convenience and does not affect anything vital in the measure.

In the light of the facts presented in this book it would seem both desirable and necessary that the increase in power contemplated in the Cullom Bill should be granted. However, if Congress does not see fit to do this, it is to be hoped that an end will be put to the present delay in the execution of orders, and that the unscrupulous manager will no longer be permitted to impose his code of ethics upon the great majority of conscientious and just railway officials.

The vigorous protests which have recently been made by several prominent railway officials against an increase of the powers of the Commission, on the ground that the present law is adequate if only the Commission will properly use the power vested in it, carry much weight because of the high standing of the authors of these protests. Yet the writer has been unable to find any escape from the conclusions presented in this chapter, and nothing but an entirely new collection of facts, differing in import from those now available, could, it seems, warrant a modification of these conclusions.