cation for the high position to which he was so suddenly called.

Mr. Roosevelt in this history of our navy says: "There were no better seamen in the world than the American Jack; he had been bred to his work from infancy, and had been off in a fishing dory almost as soon as he could walk. When he grew older he shipped as a merchantman, or whaler, and in warlike times, when our merchant marine was compelled to rely pretty much on itself for protection, each craft had to be handled well; all that were not were soon weeded out by a process of natural selection of which the agents were French picaroons, Spanish buccaneers, and Malay pirates. It was a rough school, but it taught Jack to be both skilful and self-reliant."

In June, 1897, in addressing the naval cadets he repeated Washington's warning: "To be prepared for war is the most effectual means to promote peace," and with great emphasis he uttered these words:

"All the great masterful races have been fighting races. Cowardice in a race, as in an individual, is the unpardonable sin."

About this time, a year before our clash of arms with Spain, he said: "The enemies we may

have to face will come from over the sea; they may come from Europe, or they may come from Asia. Events move fast in the West; but this generation has been forced to see that they move even faster in the oldest East. Our interests are as great in the Pacific as in the Atlantic, in the Hawaiian Islands as in the West Indies. Merely for the protection of our own shores, we need a great navy; and what is more, we need it to protect our interests in the islands from which it is possible to command our shores and to protect our commerce on the high seas."

He early became impressed that war with Spain was inevitable, and to prepare for it he infused life, vigor, snap and energy into every branch of the service.

He hastened the work upon new ships and repairs on old ones. He encouraged recruiting the navy to its full strength and increased the supply of coal at every station. He personally inspected the war-vessels and neglected nothing which would add to naval efficiency.

Senator Cushman K. Davis said:

"If it had not been for Roosevelt we would not have been able to strike the blow that we did at Manila. It needed just Roosevelt's energy and promptness."

The records of the Department, February 25, 1898, show this confidential cablegram from Roosevelt to Commodore Dewey: "Order the squadron, except Monocacy, to Hong-Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war with Spain your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands.

orders."

Keep Olympia until further

I saw Mr. Roosevelt many times during this trying period and like all others with whom he came into contact, I was deeply impressed by his earnest, convincing arguments.

When war was actually declared, he said: "My work here is done. I must get into the fight myself."

It would extend the scope of this article too far for me to more than allude to the correspondence between our distinguished Secretary Long and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, in which he was urged to withhold his resignation and remain in the Department where he was doing such valuable service; but he had determined his course of duty, and in May we find him with a commission for himself as lieutenant-colonel, and with a

colonel's commission for the then almost unknown Dr. Leonard Wood, en route to Texas to raise what was popularly known as Roosevelt's Regiment of Rough Riders, and officially as the First Regiment of United States Volunteer Cavalry. He only demanded good arms for his men and the chance to get them against the enemy. The rest to be left in his hands.

When it became apparent that the troops at Tampa would compose the first expedition of active operations, Roosevelt, then far off in Texas, burdened the telegraph lines with dispatches until orders reached him to go with his fine regiment and become a part of the cavalry division which I commanded at that place. Learning the hour of his arrival, I met him with staff-officers at the train, expecting that the regiment would need much after their long journey. Roosevelt, Colonel Wood and other officers were all in fine spirits, and assured me they had everything and that they would be comfortable in the cars that night. The next day I put them into camp, and in an hour the entire regiment was out upon drill.

It was here that it was my privilege to enjoy my greatest intimacy with this young officer.

This was very close, as their brigade commander, General Young, was at Lakeland, thirty miles distant, with his other two regiments, and, therefore, the Rough Riders reported direct to me, their division commander.

Both Roosevelt and Wood urged me to frequent inspections, to be present at their drills, to examine into their equipment and administration, and they frequently came to me, generally together, laying before me their methods of drill, discipline, etc. They were anxious to be assured if their methods were the best, and that they be corrected if any change or improvement could be suggested. They had tactics and army regulations constantly in hand, and I was surprised to see how thoroughly they had become informed upon all that pertained to their duties as regimental commanders.

June 7 came, and with it Admiral Sampson's telegram: "If ten thousand men were here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet."

It was in the quiet darkness of night that an officer of General Shafter's staff came to my tent