fied from acting, and are absent from the court-house. One of the assistant judges was compelled during a criminal trial, when the charge had been commenced, but not completed, to leave the court-house for his home on account of the pain caused by an attack of pleurisy. Held, a legal disqualification, authorizing the presiding judge to complete his charge in the absence of the assistant. State of Vermont v. Blair. Opinion by Royce, J. INVALID. MARRIED WOMAN-COVENANTS BY, IN DEED-WHEN - The principle of law that whatever interest or title the grantor acquires in the granted premises, subsequently to the execution of the deed, he having conveyed with covenants of warranty of title, inures for the benefit of the grantee, does not apply to a married woman joining in a deed with her husband. Hence a married woman is not estopped from foreclosing a mortgage acquired by inheritance against one holding a subsequent mortgage on the same premises, given by her husband, and she joining with him. She is not liable in damages for the breach of her covenant. Goodenough v. Fellows. Opinion by Powers, J. RIGHTS OF PLEDGEE. The pledgee of commercial paper, in the absence of any power of sale by contract, cannot sell such paper, but it is his duty to collect the same, and apply enough of the proceeds to pay his debt, and return the balance to the pledgor. If the pledgee of a promissory note, under a power of sale conferred on him, makes a bona fide sale to one capable of buying, the sale will pass the title to the note beyond the pledgor's reach, although it is sold for less than there is due upon the same. Where the maker of a note pledged for a debt by the payee negotiates with the pledgee for its purchase at the amount due the latter, which is much less than the face of the note, and the maker is informed of the time of the sale, while the pledgor is not, and the maker becomes the purchaser at a formal public sale, and receives the note, this will not be regarded such a sale as the law requires, but rather as a compromise between the pledgee and the maker of the note. The pledgee of a note has the right to collect the same of the maker, but not to compromise with him, and take less than is due on the note. There may be cases where the debt is not well secured that the pledgee may take less than is due, and surrender the note, but he cannot do this where the debt is well secured. See Union Trust Co. v. Rigdon, 93 Ill. 458; Illinois Sup. Court, May 14, 1881. Zimpleman v. Veeder. Opinion by Craig, J. (98 Ill. 613.) NATIONAL BANK-USURY BY-RENEWAL NOTES.— Interest in excess of the legal rate, received by a National bank, although taken in the renewal of a series of notes, cannot be applied by way of set-off or payment in a suit upon the last of the series. In such case however the bank caunot recover the illegal interest, although such interest has been finally incorporated in notes bearing legal rates. Neither can the bank recover any interest upon such renewal notes from the date the interest has been reduced to the legal rate. Barnett v. National Bank, 98 U. S. 555; Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. 533; The Kimball, 3 Wall. 37; Walker v. Bank of Washington, 3 How. 62; Campbell v. Sloan, 62 Penn. St. 481; First National Bank of Uniontown v. Stauffer, 1 Fed. Rep. 188. U. S. Circ. Court, W. D. Pennsylvania, May 10, 1881. Farmers and Mechanics' Bank of Mercer v. Hoagland. Opinion by Acheson, D. J. (7 Fed. Rep. 161.) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-FRAUD AS A DEFENSEORDER OF EVIDENCE. When the maker of a negotiable note proves that the instrument had its origin in fraud, or was fraudulently put in circulation, it is incumbent upon the holder, before he can recover, to prove that he received it bona fide, before maturity and for value. The proper order of proof in such cases is for the plaintiff, after defendant has offered his evidence of fraud, to meet it by evidence of bona fides on his part. He is not required, however, to prove that he had no knowledge of the specific facts which impeach its original validity; but may make general proof that he received it before due, bona fide and for value. It will then be for defendant to prove that plaintiff had actual notice of the specific facts; and if he fails in this plaintiff must recover. Citing Hamilton v. Marks, 63 Mo. 167; Daniel on Neg. Instr., §§ 815, 819. Missouri Sup. Court. Johnson v. McMurray. Opinion by Hough, J. (To appear in 72 Mo. Rep.) INSURANCE LAW. LIFE POLICY-ONE PROOF OF DEATH SUFFICIENT TO ONE COMPANY - WAIVER OF DEFECTS IN PROOF. — When two policies are issued by an insurance company upon the same life, proof of death, in compliance with the conditions of one of the policies, is sufficient. When proofs of death are defective and not in conformity with a policy, it is the duty of the company requiring them, to notify the one making them of the defect. If it does not do so it waives the defect. The rule in this respect was accurately laid down in Ætna Fire Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 16 Wend. 385. "Good faith on the part of the underwriters requires, that if they mean to insist upon a mere formal defect of this kind in the preliminary proofs, they should apprise the insured that they consider them defective in that particular, or put their refusal to pay upon that ground, as well as others, so as to give him an opportunity to supply the defect before it could be too late; and if they neglect to do so, their silence should be held a waiver of such defect in the preliminary proofs, so that the same shall be considered as having been duly made according to the condition of the policy." To the same effect are Insurance Co. v. Schreffler, 6 Wright, 188; McMasters v. Ins. Co., 25 Wend. 379; 16 id. 401; Insurance Co. v. Lawrence, 10 Pet. 507; Rogers v. Ins. Co., 6 Paige, 583; Lewis v. Ins. Co., 52 Me. 492; Miller v. Ius. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 268; Savage v. Ins. Co., 4 Bosw. 1; Blake v. Ins. Co., 12 Gray, 265; Noyes v. Ins. Co., 30 Vt. 659; Norwich v. Ins. Co., 6 Blatchf. 241; Francis v. Ins. Co., 6 Cow. 404; Angell on Ins., § 244; O'Niel v. Ins. Co., 3 Comst. 122; Francis v. Ins. Co., 1 Dutch. 78; Schenck v. Ins. Co., 4 Zabriskie, 447; Vos v. Robinson, 9 Johns. 192. Pennsylvania Sup. Ct., Jan. 24, 1881. Girard Life Insurance Co. v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York. Opinion by Paxson, J. NATURE OF RELATION OF POLICY-HOLDER TO COMPANY-NOT PARTNER AND NOT ENTITLED TO AC COUNTING.- - An action against a solvent life insurance company for an accounting is not maintainable by policy-holders. Policy-holders are not partners in the company but only creditors. In St. John v. American Mut. Life Ins. Co., 13 N. Y. 38, it is said: "An insurance upon the life of an individual is a contract by which the insurer for a certain sum of money or premium proportioned to the age, health, profession or other circumstances of the person whose life is insured, engages that if such person shall die, within the period limited in the policy, the insurer shall pay the sum specified in the policy according to the terms thereof, to the person to whose favor such policy is granted. I am not aware of any principle of law that distinguishes contracts of insurance upon lives from other ordinary contracts, or that takes them out of the operation of the same legal rules which apply to and govern such contracts. Policies of insurance are choses in action; they are governed by the same prin THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. Q. B., 244; Stewart v. Greenock Mar. Ins. Co., L. R., ciples applicable to other agreements involving pecuniary obligatious." In People v. Security Life Ins. Co., 78 N. Y. 114, it is said: "They who pay their money for insurance are no more jointly interested or in any sense partners than the depositors in a bank. The depositors swell the assets of the bank and also its liabilities, and they have a common interest that the bank shall keep its funds so as to be able to discharge * * * The fund proits liabilities, and that is all. duced by the payment of all the premiums does not in any sense belong to the policy-holders, but belongs exclusively to the company, and the policy-holders are interested in it in the same way only that the creditors of other corporations are interested in its funds." The claim of policy-holders upon the theory of partnership was repudiated even in a mutual life insurance company. Cohen v. N. Y. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 610. See, also, Taylor v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 59 How. Pr. 468. It is only as a judgment creditorings, the one being an imputation of suspicion only, that a policy-holder can obtain relief. Belknap v. North Am. Ins. Co., 11 Hun, 282. New York Sup. Ct., Special Term, July 21, 1881. Bewley v. Equitable Life Assurance Society. Opinion by Larremore, J. -COMPANY MAY SET UP ULTRA MARINE POLICY VIRES.- - An insurance company is not estopped from setting up the fact that a contract of marine insurance made through its agent is ultra vires, though its agent had led the other contracting party to believe, and he did believe, that the company had power to make it, and though no pretense was set up by the company or its agent that the contract was ultra vires until a loss thereunder was known by all parties to have occurred. United States Circ. Ct., E. D. Missouri, Jan. 4, 1881. Webster v. Buffalo Insurance Co. Opinion by Treat, D. J. (7 Fed. Rep. 399.) RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. CRIMINAL LAW CHARGE INDUCED - LARCENY - PAYMENT OF OVER not sustain an action for slander. Where such words admit fairly, and in their natural sense, of two mean the other of guilt, the sense in which they were uttered should be left to the jury. The innuendoes not declaring that the words were spoken with the intention of imputing to the plaintiff a felony, and not importing to enlarge the meaning of those words, held, that the prefatory averments which only professed to give the motives of the defendant could not be substituted for those innuendoes whereby the plaintiff undertook to give the meaning of the words spoken. Nov. 26, 1880. Simmons v. Mitchell. Opinion by Sir Robert P. Collier, P. C. 155. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. GOULD'S LAW CATALOGUE. Catalogue of Law Books published and for sale by William HE principal defect in this book is the modesty of BY THREATS. The prosecutrix page. It is a great deal more than it purports engaged the prisoner to grind scissors, and paid him when they were ground. She then handed him six knives to grind. He ground them and demanded 58. 6d. for them, the ordinary charge being 1s. 3d. She refused to pay 5s. 6d. The prisoner then threatened her, and said he would make her pay, and ultimately, in consequence of her fears, she gave the prisoner 5s. 6d. The prisoner was indicted for larceny of the 5s. 6d., and the chairman on the trial directed the jury, that if the money was obtained by frightening the owner, the prisoner was guilty of larceny. The jury having convicted, this court, on the authority of Reg. v. McGrath, L. R., 1 C. C. R. 205, upheld the conviction. Regina v. Lovell. Crown Cas. Res., March 5, 1881. Opinion by Lord Coleridge, C. J. 44 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 319. LOSS OCCASIONED BY INSURANCE -FIRE POLICY THE FELONIOUS ACT OF THE WIFE OF THE ASSUREDAn insurance company RIGHTS OF THE INSURER. granted a fire policy to S., and during the currency of the policy S.'s wife feloniously burnt the property insured. The company, not admitting any claim on the policy, brought an action against S. and his wife for the damage done by the act of the wife. Held, first, that the action could not be maintained, as the insurer has no rights other than those of his assured, and can enforce those only in his name and after admitting the claim on the policy. Secondly, that the action for the felony if it were maintainable was maintainable without showing that the felon had been prosecuted. Semble, that a felonious burning by the wife of the assured, without his privity, is covered by the ordinary fire policy. Cases referred to. Simpson v. Burrill, L. R., 3 App. Cas. 279; Randall v. Cockran, 1 Ves. Sen. 98; North of England Ins. As. v. Armstrong, L. R., 5 to be. It is mainly the work of Mr. N. C. Moak, and FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS. A Treatise on the Law of Judgments, including all final de- 64 FRIDAY FOR HANGMAN'S DAY.' Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Is there any reason why the judges should select Friday for "hangman's day?" The human race is superstitious. This manifests itself in almost every conceivable way; few men or women are said to be entirely free from it, and from the effect of early education as to days, houses, vessels, seeing the new moon first over the left shoulder, etc., etc. The judges of the Supreme Court ought not to foster this superstition by making an almost invariable practice of sentencing criminals convicted of murder to be executed on Friday. In my acquaintance a respectable lawyer, under the influence of prejudice, avoided the commencement of any new business on Friday. There are many things which must be done on Friday. Becoming a mother cannot be adjourned, and there is no reason why the day of the nativity of one equal seventh of mankind should be clouded by a cruel old custom sanctioned by judicial authority. Are not Friday-born people entitled to relief? Let the judges appoint some other day of the week for the execution of the sentence "by hanging of the convict by the neck until he be dead." EGBERT WHITAKER. SAUGERTIES, N. Y., July 30, 1881. A QUESTION OF CITIZENSHIP. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: A., a native of New York, removes to Texas in 1834. He leaves one child with its relatives; the child, a minor, refusing to go to Texas. The New York child arrives at maturity, marries and dies in New York. The father died in Texas while she was still a part of the republic of Mexico. Did this New York child take the status of its father, or did it remain a citizen of New York, that of its origin? ANON. SHADE TREES IN VILLAGE STREETS -OTHER QUES TIONS. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: In 22 Alb. L. J., page 479, appears the following: "The charter of an incorporated village gives the directors (trustees) power to lay out, alter, repair and improve the streets, highways, lanes and alleys within the bounds of said village, and to cause the same to be guttered and curbed. A street in the village with the paved way for teams and sidewalks for footmen, guttered and curbed between the two, has shade trees of twenty years' growth, or more or less, standing in the sidewalk near the gutter. Have the adjoining proprietors any right to the shade trees standing on the sidewalk, which the village authorities are bound to respect? Can the village directors, under the power given them by the statute, cut the shade trees down, for the sake of widening the wagon track, and contracting the sidewalk, or to straighten a bend in the gutter?" I have seen no reply, and answer it as follows: The word "highway is said to be the genus of all public ways, and includes the streets of a city or village. Regina v. Saintiff, 6 Mod. 255; Brace v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 27 N. Y. 271; Thompson on Highways (1st. ed.) 6. A street is a road in a city or village. 27 N. Y. 271, above cited; Bouvier's Law Dictionary. Sidewalks are a part of the public streets, designed for the use of those who travel on foot. Wallace v. The Mayor of New York, 18 How. Pr. 169; S. C., 2 Hilt. 440. The directors have the power under the statute of making and improving streets and sidewalks, and the power to straighten the same. The directors caused the shade trees to be cut down for the alleged purpose of contracting the sidewalk, straightening the gutter, widening the paved way for teams, and in this way improving the street. In solving the question the test must be whether it was an improvement to the street in view of public use and convenience, to make the alteration, and whether in making the alteration, the shade trees were necessarily removed, and if they were, the right of the adjoining proprietors to the shade trees yields to public use and requirement. If the cutting of the shade trees was not thus required, the adjoining proprietors had rights in them which the village directors were bound to respect, and which they could not violate without becoming liable for the injury. The directors had a right to do such acts, and could only become liable for an abuse of the power conferred upon them. If the alteration was manifestly not an improvement, or if the alteration was an improvement and the rewill lie for the injury. If the trustees acted from moval of the shade trees was not necessary, an action malice, or from improper motives, exemplary damages ought to be awarded. This must necessarily be the answer to the question above propounded. I close by asking another question. One owns a house or a hotel on Chatham street or the Bowery, in New York city, worth one hundred thousand dollars. An elevated railroad is afterward put up and in operation. The street is darkened, the roar and racket made by the trains at the front of the house is a nuisance, reducing the value of the property one-quarter or one-half. What redress has the owner? If he has none, does it not follow that private property may be taken for public use without compensation? Still further, what security is there against the taking of any and all private property for some public use? All it needs is a legislative act and justification under it, upon the alleged ground that it is for the common good. It is Communism rampant. Are not our millionaires its pioneers? EGBERT WHITAKER. SAUGERTIES, N. Y., Aug. 8, 1881. THE NOTES. HE American Law Review for August contains the following leading articles: Liability of officers acting in a judicial capacity, II, by Arthur Biddle; Why should not a decedent's real estate descend and be administered like personalty? by Wm. Reynolds; Subjection of the State to law, by Roger Foster. The American Law Register for July contains the conclusion of Charles Chauncey's article on Contempt of Court, and an article on Freehold Qualification of Jurors, by William S. Brackett. Also the cases of Ditcham v. Worrall, on ratification of infant's promise to marry, with note by Edmund II. Bennett; Davis v. Howell, on payment of individual creditors out of partnership assets, with note by Henry Wade Rogers; Allerton v. Chicago, on municipal power to exact a license fee from a street railway company, with note by Adelbert Hamilton.- The total depravity of types made us say last week that Mr. Justice Clifford was appointed to the Federal Supreme Court bench in 1838, instead of 1858. Much is said now-a-days of the ignorance of juries; but in Penn. Co. v. Hensil, 70 Ind. 569, the court thought the jury "over-instructed," inasmuch as "nineteen instructions were given at the request of the appellee, four were given by the court on its own motion, and twenty-four were given at the suggestion of the appellant." The Albany Law Journal. THE ALBANY, AUGUST 20, 1881. CURRENT TOPICS. THE Reverend Mr. Dilk is holding a brisk controversy with a correspondent of The Nation on the subject of divorce statistics in New England. Some time ago we ventured the surmise that the extraordinary number of divorces in Connecticut, Vermont and Massachusetts was due in a considerable measure to emigration from this State. Mr. Dilk does not agree to this, and thinks this cause could not account for more than "ten or fifteen per cent." Why he should not agree to it, or why he agrees to it in this precise ratio, he does not satisfactorily explain. It seems to us the most natural and probable thing in the world. To some extent we know it to be true. Having only one cause for absolute divorce here, and there being half a dozen or so in these other States, it is inevitable that discontented people will seek the laxer communities. Being put to the trouble of going from home for a divorce, they naturally go as short a distance as possible. So they go to these States rather than to the distant west. This is the custom of tramps. If one State makes stringent laws against them they will turn up in a more hospitable State, and do just as little tramping as possible to find such a State. Speaking of tramps - at the recent session in Boston of the Society of Charities and Corrections, Mr. Sanborn read an interesting paper showing that tramps are decreasing. He says: "Three years ago (July 1, 1878) we had by actual count 25,597 public paupers in Massachusetts, and among them 349 vagrants, while the number of vagrants lodged at poor-houses and station-houses in each month was counted by thousands. This summer (July 1, 1881) the aggregate of public paupers having been reduced below 19,000 - a falling away of more than twenty-five per centum in three years — the vagrants reported are now but 150, or only twofifths as many as three years ago and these almost all in the city station-houses-for tramping in the country towns of Massachusetts is almost unknown. The whole number of tramps lodged in the country poor-houses in a whole year does not now exceed the number who were formerly lodged there in a single fortnight. Yet it is to be remembered that within the three years spoken of the population of our State has increased not less than 125,000 — and that immigration has never been so large as within the past two years. The same thing has been taking place, so far as we can hear, throughout the country, until we have in the United States at this moment the smallest number of public paupers ever seen among civilized communities in an equal population of 50,000.000." VOL. 24.- No. 8. But on the other hand the insane are increasing, according to the same authority. He estimates that among the older communities of the northern and eastern States there is now one insane person to every four hundred persons, and in Massachusetts, where "for some reason or other the proportion is even greater than this," one person out of every three hundred and fifty is insane. In Massachusetts they have precise returns, up to the first of July, showing the whole number of the poor fully supported at certain dates, and the number among those who were insane; and they have had these returns more or less complete for twenty-seven years, or since the first of October, 1854, at which time the population of Massachusetts may be taken to have been 1,100,000. Now, while there were in October, 1854, 5,450 in-door poor, of whom but little more than a thousand were insane, in October, 1864 (the whole number of the poor remaining the same), more than 1,600 of them were insane; in 1874, when the number had increased to only 5,734, about 2,200 of them were insane; and now (in July, 1881) the whole number of in-door poor being about 7,800, the number of those who are insane is upward of 3,000. That is to say, while the whole number of the in-door poor supported in Massachusetts at a given date has increased in twenty-seven years about forty per centum (the population meantime having increased more than sixty per centum), the number of the in-door poor who are insane has increased more than two hundred per centum. Mr. Sanborn thinks the number of insane has increased throughout the whole country, during the last twenty years, out of proportion to the advance in population. So too the superintendent of Ward's Island asylum, New York, reports an annual increase of one hundred in his care. Has the perihelion any thing to do with this? The case of Kingsbury v. Whitaker, 32 La. Ann. 1055, is very entertaining. The holding was as follows: Partial insanity does not disqualify from making a will; a will made in a lucid interval by a person habitually insane is valid; and where there is nothing unreasonable on the face of the will of one habitually insane, it will be presumed to have been in a lucid interval. The testator, Galen Melvin Bowditch, of Massachusetts, settled in Louisiana in 1830, and accumulated a considerable property. After the civil war, "during the damaging administrations which controlled the destinies of our State" (as the court put it), his property became reduced. The court describe the result as follows: "The circumstances, coupled with the character of his associations, and the habits contracted at the Balize, mainly his too free indulgence in ardent spirits, preyed upon his mind, and rendered him, as he says in one of his letters to his favorite sister, Mrs. Fiske, irascible, sad and despondent. Under these exciting causes he became subject to delirium tremens, manifested by paroxysms of rage and violence bordering upon madness, and producing temporary or intermittent in sanity. These attacks rendering him intolerable forbidden to purchase; fourth, abolition of meetand at times dangerous, he was frequently arrestedings of creditors, except when called in special and confined, sometimes in jail and three times in cases by the court; fifth, allowing an immediate different insane asylums." On a visit to Massachu- and informal discharge where there is no property setts he had a bad attack of this sort, and one of or none but exempt; sixth, reduction of fees of offihis relatives, the Rev. Mr. Dowse, put him in the cers to the ordinary standard; seventh, using the Worcester Insane Asylum. After he got out, Dowse present machinery of the courts; eighth, adherence tried to put him in again, and to deprive him of the to the old law of insolvency; ninth, abolition of care of his property. This excited Mr. Bowditch's compositions; tenth, denying involuntary proceedenmity toward the minister, whom he styled an ings except in case the indebtedness is as much as "orthodox thief," and he made his will, leaving $5,000; eleventh, discharge of honest bankrupts, out the Dowse flock, and giving all to his poor sis- without regard to amount of assets or assent of ter, Mrs. Fiske. Ile referred to the Dowses as creditors, and denying discharges to all others. On "d -d s." What is meant by "s" is left to con- the whole, we think this is the worst scheme yet; jecture. Whether it means "skins," or "skunks,” rather worse than Judge Hughes', ante, 41; q. v. or "sinners," or "simpletons," or whether it is a Under Judge Hammond's scheme there seems to be misprint or misreport, is left to conjecture. There little use for any bankrupt law. is no mystery however about the adjective, and inasmuch as the Rev. Dowse was "orthodox," there seems a peculiar propriety in the use of the objurgation. In Dowse would understand what it meant. the testator's attacks, he had a "mania for picking from the streets cigar stumps, rags, garbage and other stuff, and carefully storing the same in his room as valuables." But his craze appeared to be only in connection with his excess in potations. His letters satisfied the court that he "was not only not an idiot, an imbecile, or a confirmed maniac, but that he was a man of more than ordinary intelligence, of considerable learning, and with commendable facility of writing, a close observer of men, things, and of passing events, and of strong and ardent convictions on business, politics, political economy, and on many other subjects." In 1874 he wrote as follows, from Ashland, Mass.: "Since I came here last every thing seems to be so different, so improved, that the only way I can account for it is this: when I was here before I was half drunk all the whole time, and could not see beauties and improvements. There has been immense alterations and changes in the city of Boston and vicinity. The roads are free of stones, houses prettily painted, with little and big flower gardens, blooming with flowers, I think they look so nice. I am now sitting in my sister's little parlor, so called. * * * My The partisan newspapers have begun a mischievous gabble about the president's "inability," and the consequent duty of the vice-president to assume the government. This sort of talk can only be in the interest of somebody who has not got an office and wants one. The vice-president is a man of good sense and honor, and will not be moved by these " in the appeals. There is as yet no "inability meaning of the Constitution. That "inability" supposes duties to be performed, the president's incapacity to perform them, and consequent detriment to the public service and public interests. contingency has arisen. No one has pointed out any important duty which has presented itself and is left undischarged. The wheels of government still move by their acquired momentum. they are in danger of stopping it will be time to talk about a successor to the president. The Constitution does not intend that every time the president is laid up by sickness for six weeks the vicepresident is to step in, but means an "inability" either permanent, or temporary and detrimental. sister's little grand-daughter brings me my slippers, ON a glass of water, and says: 'God bless Melvin.' come Judge Hammond, of the United States Circuit Court, in his answer to the inquiries of the congressional committee in respect to a new bankrupt law, advocates, first, the abolition of the registers, and devolving their duties on the clerks, and commissioners and masters in chancery; second, abolition of assignees, and devolving their duties on the marshals or receivers; third, the immediate conversion of the assets into cash, the bankrupt to be NOTES OF CASES. No such When N the question of the necessity for demand of payment of a note at the specified place of payment, as between maker and holder, remarked upon ante, 82, a direct adjudication sustaining Lazier v. Horan, may be found in Bank v. Zorn, South Carolina Supreme Court, 1881, 12 Rep. 155. The court there said: "The English commercial law, when strictly applied and enforced, seems to require that demand shall be made at the place of payment, when specified in the note, either on the day of payment or at some future time, and without this no default arises on the part of the maker for non-payment. The American doctrine, however, is not so rigid; demand is not a precedent condition here, and suit may be brought against the maker under that doctrine without presentment or demand at the place mentioned, subject, however, to the right of the maker to prove by way of defense that on the day and at the place specified he had the neces |