Earll v. People, 73 id. 329. In Gray v. People, 26 III. 34, in reply to the objection that had there been urged in argument that the testimony of the accomplice was uncorroborated, it was said, this is no objection," and that whether the evidence produced to confirm the accomplice is satisfactory or not is a question for the jury to determine. See, also, Commonwealth v. Savory, 10 Cush. 535; Commonwealth v. Bosworth, 22 Pick. 397; Regina v. Stubbs, 33 Eng. L. & Eq. 551. In Rex v. Hastings, 7 C. & P. 152, Lord Denman said: "1 consider, and I believe my learned brothers agree with me, that it is altogether for the jury, and they may, if they please, act upon the evidence of the accomplice without any confirmation of his statement. But we would not, of course, be inclined to give any great degree of credit to a person so situated." See, also, Joy on Ev. Accompl, 3 and 16. The same doctrine is followed in State v. Potter, 42 Vt. 495; People v. Costello, 1 Denio, 83; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326; Johnson v. State, 2 id. 652; Dawley v. State, 4 id. 128; State v. Stebbins, 29 Conn. 463; State v. Watson, 31 Mo. 361; Sumpter v. State, 11 Fla. 247. Illinois Sup. Ct., May 14, 1881. Collins v. People of Illinois. Opinion by Scholfield, J.

-

FALSE PRETENSE WHAT NECESSARY ΤΟ CONSTITUTE. To sustain an indictment under the statute for obtaining goods by false pretense, there must be a false representation of a subsisting fact, etc. State v. Phifer, 65 N. C. 321. The statement of an opinion, even if false, will not sustain such an indictment. To say that the eyes of a horse are sound is merely the expression of an opinion, but to say that there never has been any thing the matter with the eyes of the horse," is the statement of a fact, which if false is within the statute and indictable. North Carolina Sup. Ct., January, 1881. State of North Carolina v. Hiffner. Opinion by Ash, J. (84 N. C. 751.)

PLEADING - OBSCENE LIBEL. It is indictable to introduce obscene pictures into a school, and the indictment need not describe the picture particularly. It is sufficient to allege the introduction of an obscene picture to the corruption of public morals, etc. Tennessee Sup. Ct., October, 1880. State of Tennessee v. Pennington.

TRIAL CONFESSION, WHAT CONSTITUTES. — - Confession in a legal sense is, in effect, an admission of something which proves, or tends to prove, that the party making it was himself connected with the alleged crime, in a criminal or questionable manner; hence, admissions which tend to criminate a third party are not within the rules of law that exclude confessions

induced by promises and hope of favor. Vermont Sup. Ct., August Term, 1881. State of Vermont v. Curr. Opinion by Barrett, J. (52 Vt. 37.)

INSURANCE LAW.

FIRE POLICY-NOTICE OF LOSS-WAIVER.-(1) Notice to the local agent of a fire insurance company by whom the insurance was effected, in a few days after such loss, and by him communicated immediately to the company, satisfies the requirement of the policy that persons sustaining loss should "forthwith" give notice thereof to the company. (2) Where, shortly after the fire, the adjuster of the company visits the scene of the

January, 1881. Argall v. Old North Star Insurance Co. Opinion by Smith, C. J. (84 N. C. 355.) LIFE POLICY PARTIES TO ACTION ON POLICY INTENT CONDITIONS FALSE ANSWERS BY AGENT ESTOPPEL. — (1) Where a life policy of insurance contains an express promise and agreement to pay the sum insured to the "assured, his executors, administrators or assigns, ninety days after due notice and proof of the death" of the assured, the executrix of the assured is the proper party to bring suit upon the same, and a subsequent provision in the policy that the assured and their children will not change the rule. It sum insured is for the express benefit of the wife of the will be found that in every case cited from this court, where the beneficiaries have been permitted to recover in their own names, the sum insured, when the loss should occur, had been specifically made payable to such beneficiaries, as was the case in the Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Foster, 90 I. 121. (2) Interest is recoverable on the amount of a life insurance policy from the time it is due and payment is refused. (3) Where the assured makes a full and complete statement of all facts that materially affect the risk, and the agent of the company, acting in its behalf in preparing the application, of his own accord writes false answers to the usual questions propounded, to be signed by the applicant, with the advice to him that the omitted facts are immaterial, and the assured in good faith adopts the application as prepared, the company will be estopped from denying its liability on the policy after receiving premiums, when loss may occur. Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. McKee, 94 Ill. 494; Andes Ins. Co. v. Fish, 71 id. 620; Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222; Miller v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 216. Illinois Sup. Ct., March 21, 1881. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Robinson. Opinion by Scott, J. (98 Ill. 324.)

MARINE POLICY -PARTIES TO ACTION FOR SUB1.0GATION-ACTION BY COMPANY FOR NEGLIGENCE — ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION. Certain insurance companies, under a contract with the owner of a cargo, issued to him a policy of insurance upon the same. The owner of a barge contracted with the owner of the cargo to receive and deliver the cargo at a port of destination, and having received the cargo, the barge owner contracted with a tow-boat to have the barge towed. By the negligence and fault of the tow-boat loss and took an assignment of the claims. Held, (1) the cargo was lost. The insurance companies paid the

under such circumstances the owner of the cargo could maintain an action against the tow-boat for the loss. The City of Hartford, etc., 97 U. S. 323; Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Philadelphia & H. S. Co., 23 How. 209; Steamer Franconia, 3 Fed. Rep. 402; The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302. (2) That the insurance companies, by the payment of the loss and assignment of the rights of the insured, became subrogated to such rights. 2 Pars. Mar. Law; Hall v. Railroad Co., 13 Wall. 367; Desty's Admiralty, 264. (3) That an action by the insurance companies to recover for the loss occasioned by negligence is not an action upon contract. (4) That such action may be maintained in admiralty in their own names, although no privity may have existed between them and the tow-boat. May on Ins. 553; Propeller Monticello v. Morrison, 17 How. 153; Insurance Co. v. C. D., 1 Wood, 72. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. Ohio, (7 Fed. Rep. 226.)

offer of compromise, and afterward the company furnishes to the assured blank proofs of loss, which are filled up in the presence of its officers, it is not error to leave it to the jury to infer, in the exercise of their best judgment, a waiver of strict proof of loss. Collins v. Ins. Co., and Willis v. Ins. Co., 79 N. C. 279, 285, cited and approved. North Carolina Sup. Ct.,

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

CLUB — RULES GOVERNING INTERFERENCE OF COURT WITH ACTION OF CLUB. —The rules of a club provided that in case the conduct of any member, either in or

out of the club-house, should, in the opinion of the committee, or of any twenty members of the club who should certify the same in writing, be injurious to the character and interests of the club, the committee should be empowered (if they deemed it expedient) to recommend such member to resign, and if the member so recommended should not comply within a month from the date of such communication being addressed to him, the committee should then call a general meeting, and if a majority of two-thirds of that meeting agreed by ballot to the expulsion of such member, his name should be erased from the list, and he should forfeit all right or claim upon the property of the club. D., a member of the club, sent a pamphlet which reflected on the conduct of S., also a member of the club, to S. at his official address, such pamphlet being inclosed in a cover on which was printed "Dishonorable conduct of S." This being brought to the attention

of the committee, they called upon D. to resign, being of opinion that his conduct was injurious to the character and interests of the club. D. not having resigned, a general meeting was duly called, at which the requisite majority voted in favor of his expulsion. On an action by D. to restrain the committee from excluding him from the club, held, that the court had no right to interfere with the decisions of clubs with regard to their members except in the following cases: first, if the decision arrived at was contrary to natural justice, such as the member complained of not having an opportunity of explaining his conduct; secondly, if the rules of the club had not been observed; thirdly,

if the action of the club was malicious and not bona fide. The plaintiff having had an opportunity of explanation, the rules having been duly observed, and the action of the club having been exercised bona fide and without malice, the judgment of Jessel, M. R., dismissing the action (41 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 490) was affirmed. Semble, that even if the decision of the club had been erroneous, but given bona fide and in accordance with the rules, the court would not have interfered. Cases cited, Labouchere v. Earl of Wharncliffe, 13 Ch. Div. 346; Induwick v. Snell, 2 Mac. & G. 216, 221. Ct. of App., Feb. 1, 1881. Dawkins v. Antrobus. Opinions by James, Brett and Cotton, L. JJ., 44 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 557.

MEMO

STATUTE OF FRAUDS -SALE AT AUCTION RANDUM ON TWO PAPERS. At a sale by auction, plaintiff was declared the purchaser, and the following memorandum was added to the conditions of sale, and handed to the plaintiff: "The property duly sold to Mr. S., butcher, Pinxton, and deposit paid at close of sale. H. M., auctioneer." At the same time the auctioneer gave the plaintiff the following receipt: Received of Mr. S. the sum of 211., as deposit on property purchased at 4201., at Sun Inn, Pinxton, on the above date. Mr. C. Pinxton, owner. Received by H. M., 29th March, 1880. H. M." The conditions contained no description of the property sold. Posters describing the property to be sold had been previously published, but there was not one of such posters in the room at the sale. In an action by purchaser against vendor for a declaration that the two documents signed by the auctioneer constituted a contract, and for specific performance, held, first, on the authority of Long v. Millar, 41 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 306; L. R., 4 C. P. Div. 450, that the two documents signed by the auctioneer might be taken together; secondly, that the word "property" was not a sufficient description of the thing sold; thirdly, that the poster, or parol evidence, could not be brought in to supply the description. Action dismissed. Cases referred to, Ogilvie v. Foljambe, 3 Mer. 58; Wood v. Scarth, 26 L. T. Rep. 87; Sale v. Lambert, L. R., 18 Eq. 1; Potter v. Duffield, id. 4; Rossiter v. Miller, L. R., 3 App. Cas. 1140. Ch.

THIS

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

15TH NEVADA REPORTS.

THIS volume contains but few cases of general interest. Among them are the following: State v. Ah Sam, p. 27. A statute "to regulate the sale or disposal of opium, and to prohibit the keeping of places of resort for smoking or otherwise using that drug," is not unconstitutional as embracing more than one subject. To "resort means to go once. State v. Foley, p. 64. A pardon may be granted after the offense is fully expiated. One convicted in another State of an infamous offense is thereby disqualified from testifying in Nevada. Ex parte While, p. 146. A criminal judgment of a justice of the peace rendered on Sunday is void. Thompson v. Powning, p. 195. A newspaper publisher cannot excuse a libel because it was an item of news sent by and published under the name of a contributor. There is a great deal of dissent shown in this volume, and dissent in a court of three judges is a rather serious matter. (Published by A. L. Bancroft & Co., San Francisco.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Might it not be well to call the attention of the Troy Times to Halstead v. Seaman, 82 N. Y. 27? It fully sustains your pointed criticism of the Times' article. The parties in that case submitted their controversy to arbitrators, stipulating that "the arbitration should be conducted and decided upon the principle of fair and honorable dealing between man and man." Upon the hearing two of the arbitrators held that this clause limited them to passing upon the statements of the parties only; and refused to permit Halstead to call witnesses to disprove Seaman's statements. After this action of the arbitrators, Halstead ceased to see "the wisdom of keeping out of the clutches of lawyers and law courts," and straightway betook himself to the "tom-fooleries of the law." As the result of this shortsightedness he has obtained a decision of the Court of Appeals that the award of the arbitrators should be set aside; and is now in a fair way to have his rights properly adjusted. Seaman, on the other hand, is unquestionably suffering from the same chronic disgust with "lawyers and law courts," that so badly affects the Times man. B.

UTICA, N. Y., August 13, 1881.

TAXATION OF MORTGAGES.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

I have awaited with interest your exposure of the trick proposed by the Atlantic writer, for avoiding the taxation of mortgage loans by taking deeds instead of mortgages, giving back leases with covenants to reconvey, etc. In your brief comment of Aug. 6th, however, you fail to call attention to the legal effect of all such transactions. Are not conveyances of real property which are given as security for loans invariably held in equity to be mortgages, whatever may be their form? And have not the courts long since established that even the statute of frauds shall not be invoked to exclude parol evidence of the real nature of the transaction, notwithstanding the terms of the written contract? Carr v. Carr, 52 N. Y. 251.

Now when the lender is called upon to list his credits for taxation how shall he avoid listing a mortgage of this kind without simply lying about it? If I buy a horse can I escape paying taxes on the animal by having it described in the bill of sale as a cat?

If "the highest legal talent" to whose "scrutiny' this dodge was submitted meant simply that it affords adequate security for a loan without spreading upon the records complete proof that the transaction is a loan, thus enabling the lender to perpetrate a fraud on the revenue with somewhat less liability to detection, very well; but that it is a "safe and effectual" method of evading consequences of lying and perjury may, I hope, be doubted.

Respectfully.

DANIEL FISH.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., August 8, 1881.

[Undoubtedly a deed absolute on its face may be shown between the parties to be a mere mortgage; but has a creditor of the grantor the same privilege? At all events the public would hardly go into suits of this description.—ED. ALB. L. J.]

PLEADING CONTRACT AND FRAUD.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Perhaps a young practitioner should have such faith in the soundness and consistency of the Court of Appeals, such veneration for that distinguished tribunal, that the inclination to doubt or question any of its decisions ought never to be present. However, the examination of authorities preparatory to argument leaves me rather at a loss to understand what the court means by what it says. Perhaps, Mr. Editor, you will know.

In the case under consideration there was evidently a misjoinder of causes of action, though contained in a single statement in the complaint, but to which for some reason no objection was taken. The facts appear to be these: The complaint, in a single statement, contains all the elements of a cause of action for fraud, and provided the allegations of fraud, etc., can be ignored, also one for breach of contract (warranty).

At the trial the contract only was proved, and on motion therefor, plaintiff was nonsuited, on the ground that these allegations of fraud, etc., gave the action the character of one for fraud, and that failing to make out such a case, he could not abandon that claim and recover for breach of contract. This doctrine seems to be that of Ross v. Mather, 51 N. Y. 108. Also, 57 id. 421. But a recent case, Neftel v. Livingston, 77 N. Y. 96, citing Conaughty v. Nichols, 42 id. 83, seems to hold otherwise and substantially to establish the rule that if in any view or theory of the facts proved on the trial a party has a right to recover or a defense, as the case may be, the action or defense is to be sustained, without regard to what matters may have been included in

the allegations of the statement. While to me this looks just and equitable and in accord with the rules and spirit of the Code, is it not in conflict with the case of Ross v. Mather, and cases following it? And is its effect not to overrule them? G. H. P.

NEW YORK, August 9, 1881.

A QUESTION OF GRAMMAR. Editor of the Albany Law Journal :

I have taken the JOURNAL from its first number to date, and have the several volumes bound in good law calf, and have perused its contents, always with pleasure, and I hope with profit; and because of the few errors of law, or forms of expression that I have found upon its pages, I call your attention to the following, as we always take pleasure in finding imperfections in our usually perfect friends.

On page 102, volume 24 (No. 6), in a very just criticism of some foolish remarks quoted from the Troy Times, you say, among other things, "Of three arbitrators, two are always selected partisans of the respective claimants, and the third is always a man whom these two respectively expect to overawe, corrupt, mystify, or flatter into their way of thinking." Do the two expect to overawe, etc., the third into their way of thinking? The two have no common 'way of thinking," to which the third can be brought; but each of the two expects to overawe, etc., the third to his way of thinking. After all, you may find I am as far out in my grammar as the Times certainly was in its policy. LECTOR.

SAGINAW, MICH., August 9, 1881.

[We think our grammar is right. The word “respectively " was inserted on purpose to avoid what our critic complains of.-ED. ALB. L. J.]

The lawyer's legitimate fee, says Judge Cooley, is payable irrespective of the result, and he is supposed to occupy a position from which he can contemplate the controversy with a desire that the correct rule of law shall be applied, and the truth be expressed in the judgment, whether the result to his client be favorable or unfavorable. This is a statement which would probably give rise to strong opposition, even from lawyers of the most pure and upright character. Lord Brougham would certainly not have been content to adopt Judge Cooley's view, nor is it necessary to do so in order to express condemnation of the "no cure no pay" system. The conclusion to which Judge Cooley arrives is, that if poor persons need assistance to enforce their rights, and are unable to pay for it, a lawyer ought to prefer to give assistance as a matter of charity, rather than place himself in a position antagonistic to his duty and the interest of his client. Probably this is the only safe way of deciding the question. London Law Times.

- say, in six months, as he declared. If he is right in this interpretation, we are wholly opposed to the scheme. No man who ever lived is fit to practice law after only six months' study. The most brilliant student needs the lapse of at least three years, for the maturing of his faculties as well as for the acquisition of legal principles. Again, if the resolution dispenses with a practical clerkship of at least a year in an attorney's office, we are opposed to it. On these points there seems to be some vagueness. The resolution was adopted without the least consideration or debate.

Mr. Baldwin, of Connecticut, for the committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, answered a conundrum given out last year, as to whether a land patent, issued but not delivered, could be revoked, by citing a recent decision of the Federal Supreme Court in the negative. He very properly observed that the solution of such legal questions is quite outside the proper scope and purpose of the association. We are glad to say that this suggestion was received with applause. The same idea was suggested by the report of Mr. King, of Iowa, for the committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure, as to the power of Congress to vest the State courts with jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases. The association wastes its time in considering such topics. It was not devised for the purpose of answering particular law questions for the individual enlightenment of members, nor to wrestle with constitutional questions, especially when they are so perfectly settled as the one last above alluded to. When will the association settle down to the actuali

ties and exigencies of the times? A movement in this direction was made by the adoption of a resolution for the devising of a plan to relieve the appellate courts from the pressure now upon them. This is the sort of business that the association ought to devote itself to. Let us suggest, too, the consideration of the live and important questions of delays in litigation, the modification of the jury system, the propriety of lawyers prosecuting causes on speculation, codification, and cheaper justice. These are topics that come home to the business and bosom of the whole community.

The Cramer case in Connecticut bids fair to prove as interesting a study of circumstantial evidence as the Hayden case - that is, if there proves to be any mystery about it. The offering of a number of rewards has already given the idea that it is a case of murder, and two young men have been shut up in jail on the charge of having murdered the girl, not only without any proof divulged as yet that they murdered her, or had the slightest motive to murder her, but without any proof divulged as yet that the girl was murdered. If the doctors shall find poison in fatal quantities in the stomach, then we shall be one step nearer the conclusion of murder, but only one step, because she may have committed suicide. If the doctors shall find in addition that she was pregnant, or if it shall be proved that she thought herself pregnant, another step toward

the conclusion of murder will have been taken, but not a conclusive step, for the girl may still have committed suicide, and this condition may have been her motive. A good deal more must be proved before the young men, or either of them, can be hanged for her murder. Her pregnancy might possibly (not very probably) induce the young unmarried man who had produced it, to take her life, but still it must somehow be proved that they did take her life. The possible motive alone will not dispense with such proof. If after all, it should turn out that she was drowned - as she might very naturally and accidentally have been after drinking ten glasses of wine, or as she may very possibly have taken her own life in remorse after such a debauch- then all this popular clamor will fall very flat. At all events, it is already evident that it is not a case over which to grow very sympathetic or effusive. The girl seems to have been very light of behavior, and while her fate is sad, she must bear her own share of blame. Men will sin as long as pretty girls will help them, and it is a false sentiment in society that would absolve the pretty girls. On the other hand we have no sympathy with the wild young rakes who were her boon companions. The way of the transgressor is hard, without distinction of sex.

In the recent death of Judge Ames and Judge Colt, of Massachusetts, and Judge Seymour, of Connecticut, we lose sight of long familiar and honored names. Judge Ames had retired from the bench after twenty-one years' service. Judge Colt cut short his own career in a fit of melancholy and distraction, evidently brought on by overwork.

These men did much to adorn the Massachusetts bench, and to afford a standing refutation of the allegation that the bench has degenerated in modern days. The sad ending of Judge Colt is regarded with a respectful sorrow. How distraught must that bright intellect have become, when it was weighed down by the conviction that its late decisions were "all wrong!" In connection with the resignation of Judge Ames it was wisely remarked, that "the public is, to a great extent, unconscious how deeply indebted it is to those judges who, maintaining the ancient high reputation of the judiciary, administer justice and dispose of questions touching all the tenderest and most delicate relations in life so as to give general satisfaction; or how intolerable life might become if these duties were performed in a less adequate or less scrupulous manner." Judge Seymour was once chief justice, and has been pronounced the leader of the State bar in his time. It is due to such men that at least from the bar, and during their lives, they shall receive the recognition and acknowledgment due to their merits. Let not the lawyer postpone his tribute until the death of the judge whom he honors and confides in. The judge may well say, with Halleck:

"And if, in whispering my name,
There's music in the voice of Fame,
Like Garcia's, let me hear it !"