ciples upon which common-law offenses rest. It is not so much a question whether such offenses have been so punished as whether they might have been.

What is a common-law offense? The highest authority on this point is Blackstone. In chapter 13 of volume 4 of Sharswood's edition, it is thus defined: "The last species of offenses which especially affect the Commonwealth are those against the public police or economy. By the public police or economy I mean the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the individuals of the State, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood and good manners, and to be decent, industrious and inoffensive in their respective stations. This head of offenses must therefore be very miscellaneous, as it comprises all such crimes as especially affect public society and are not comprehended under any of the four preceding series. These amount some of them to felony and others to misdemeanors only." The learned author then proceeds to define certain offenses of both classes, which are among the crimes against the public police or economy. The felonies I will omit. The misdemeanors are: (1) Common or public nuisances, of which a large variety are given, commencing with obstructions to public highways and ending with common scolds. (3) Sumptuary laws. (4) Gaming. (5) Destroying game. These as the text shows are but illustrations. A large number of these and other common-law offenses are now and have for many years been regulated by statute in England. But in most instances the statute is merely declaratory of the common law; the object being to define the crimes with greater accuracy or to increase the punishment.

The above quotation from Blackstone is in harmony with other approved text writers. Bishop, in his work on Criminal Law, vol. 1, §§ 911 and 922, says: "The government requires its subjects to do more than simply abstain from attempting its overthrow. It requires them to give, when called upon, their active assistance to it, and at all times to refrain from casting obstructions in the way of its several departments and functions. Therefore every violation of these duties being sufficient in magnitude for the law to regard is criminal. *** We see it to be of the highest importance that persons be elected to carry on the government in its various departments, and that in every case a suitable choice be made. Therefore any act tending to defeat these objects, as forcibly or unlawfully preventing an election being held, bribing or corruptly influencing an elector, casting more than one vote, is punishable under the criminal common law." Mr. Wharton, in his work on Criminal Law, vol. 1, § 6, places the giving of more than one vote at an election as among the misdemeanors at common law. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in two cases, has recognized the same doctrine. The first was Commonwealth v. Silsby, 9 Mass. 417, which was an indictment charging that the defendant did "willfully, fraudulently, knowingly and designedly give in more than one vote for the choice of selectmen of the said town of Salem at one time of balloting." After conviction the defendant moved in arrest of judgment that there was no statute covering the offense. It was said by the court: "There cannot be a doubt that the offense described in the indictment is a misdemeanor at common law. It is a general principle that where a statute gives a privilege and one willfully violates such privilege, the common law will punish such violation. In town meetings every qualified voter has equal rights and is entitled to give one vote for every officer to be elected. The person who gives more infringes and violates the rights of other voters, and for this offense the common law gives the indictment. The other case is Commonwealth v. Hoxey, 16 Mass. 385. The defendant was charged with disturbing a town meeting, as

sembled to make choice of town officers for the political year then ensuing, and that the said defendant "intending as much as in him lay to prevent the choice of said selectmen, according to the will of the electors and to interrupt the freedom of election, unlawfully and disorderly did openly declare that the old selectmen should not be chosen, and attempted repeatedly to take from the box, which contained the ballots of the electors, the votes of the electors," etc. The defendant pleaded guilty to the indictment and moved in arrest of judgment "because the said indictment purports to be grounded upon a statute law of the Commonwealth; whereas there is no such statute in the State making the facts set forth in the indictment an offense against the Commonwealth, and because the facts set forth in the indictment do not amount to an offense at common law." The court, after admitting there was no statute to meet the case, proceeds to say: 'The remaining question is, do the facts charged amount to an offense at common law? On this question we entertain no doubts. Here was a violation and rude disturbance of the citizens lawfully assembled in town meeting, and in the actual exercise of their municipal rights and duties. The tendency of the defendant's conduct was to a breach of the peace, and the prevention of elections necessary to the orderly government of the town and due management of its concerns for the year. It is true that the common law knows nothing perfectly agreeing with our municipal assemblies; but other meetings are well known and held in England, the disturbance of which is punishable at common law as a misdemeanor. In this Commonwealth town meetings are recognized in our Constitution and laws, and the elections made and business transacted at these meetings lie at the foundation of our whole civil policy. If then there were no statute prohibiting disorderly conduct at such meetings, an indictment for such conduct might be supported." While the court put this case partly upon the ground that the defendant's conduct tended to a breach of the peace, it is evident the principal reason was the interference with the rights of the electors, which, as the learned judge truly said, "lie at the foundation of our whole civil policy," and it may be safely assumed that every fraud upon the ballot tends directly to a breach of the public peace, if not to revolution and civil war.

We are of opinion that all such crimes as especially affect public society are indictable at common law. The test is not whether precedents can be found in the books, but whether they affect the public police or economy.

It needs no argument to show that the acts charged in these indictments are of this character. They are not only offenses which affect public society, but they affect it in the gravest manner. An offense against the freedom and purity of the election is a crime against the nation. It strikes at the foundation of republican institutions. Its tendency is to prevent the expression of the will of the people in the choice of rulers and to weaken the public confidence in elections. When this confidence is once destroyed the end of popular government is not distant. Surely if a woman's tongue can so far affect the good of society as to demand her punishment as a common scold, the offense which involves the rights of a free people to choose their own rulers in the manner pointed out by law is not beneath the dignity of the common law, nor beyond its power to punish. The one is an annoyance to a small portion of the body politic, the other shakes the social fabric to its foundations.

We are of opinion that the offenses charged in these indictments are crimes at common law. We regard the principle thus announced as not only sound but salutary. The ingenuity of politicians is such that offenses against the purity of elections are constantly

liable to occur which are not specifically covered by statute. It would be a reproach to the law were it powerless to punish them.

It follows from what has been said that it was error to quash the indictments.

The judgment is reversed in each case and a procedendo awarded.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

ACTION TO RECOVER MONEY PAID ON CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LANDS-PARTY IN DEFAULT MAY NOT MAINTAIN - TENDER OF DEED-PAROL ADDITION TO SEAL. CONTRACT UNDER Plaintiff's assignor was vendee in a contract under seal for the purchase of real estate. Defendant was the vendor. The contract called for the payment of $2,000 on the day of its making, and that sum the vendee then paid. There was no time or place named in the contract for the performance of any other part of the agreement, though the vendee was to make further considerable payment of money and to give a bond and a mortgage on the lands, and the vendor was to give a deed for them. The parties met however on the first day of April, then next, with a view to perform. The vendor then produced the deed, told the vendee that he had it and was ready, laid it upon the table and told the vendee that it was there. The vendee was not ready to perform, and asked further time to get ready thereto. The parties, by writing, not under seal, on the contract, agreed upon the 1st day of May, then next. On that day they met. The vendor had his deed, told the vendee that he was all ready, and laid it upon the table. The vendee was not ready and so stated, saying that he could not get the money; could not get the place; that he was not ready, and asked for more time. The vendor replied that he should not give him another day. The parties did no more on that day. They did not meet again for the purpose of performance, nor did either afterward offer or demand performance. The vendor afterward sold the lands to another person and kept the $2,000, to recover which this action was brought. Held, that the action would not lie. The plaintiff could not sustain it on the ground that there was no tender of a deed, so as to put the vendee in default and entitle the vendor to rescind and keep the money paid. Although as a general rule where the vendee in such a contract has performed his part of it up to a given period, he cannot be put in default for non-performance further without a tender to him of a deed and a demand for what more is to be done by him (Leaird v. Smith, 44 N. Y. 618; Johnson v. Wygant, 11 Wend. 48) and tender means physical production of the deed and reaching out with words of offer of it to the vendee. The rule is sometimes stated less strictly, namely, that there must be proof of tender or of readiness or willingness to convey, or that there must be performance or something equivalent to it. Beecher v. Conradt, 13 N. Y. 108; Carman v. Pultz, 21 id. 547. A refusal to accept a formal tender, if made, excuses from making it (Blewett v. Baker, 58 id. 611), or performance may be waived. Nelson v. Plimpton F. P. El. Co., 55 id. 480; Bakeman v. Pooler, 15 Wend. 637. Though rigid rules are better than uncertain (Dunham v. Jackson, 6 id. 34), the law does not ask the doing of a vain thing. In this case the vendor was prepared and the vendee refused to complete, knowing this, and that the vendor would give no more time than that day. The agreement of the parties to meet on the 1st of May was not the alteration of a sealed contract by one not under seal. The sealed contract was silent as to the time and place of meeting. See Dominick v. Michael, 4 Sandf. 374; Havens v. Patterson, 43 N. Y. 218. In the latter case it is declared that it is never permitted either at

law or in equity for one to recover back money paid on an executory contract that he has refused or neglected to perform. See, also, Ketchum v. Evertson, 13 Johns. 359; Stephens v. Beard, 4 Wend. 604; Page v. McDonald, 55 N. Y. 299. Judgment affirmed. Lawrence v. Miller. Opinion by Folger, C. J. [Decided Oct. 4, 1881.]

CONTRACT-CONSTRUCTION OF― WHAT IS NOT PARTNERSHIP - PRACTICE-NO APPEAL TO COURT OF APPEALS FROM INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT. - (1) By an agreement between W. and the firm of M. & S. for the manufacture and sale of a medicinal compound, the firm was to be the general agents of W. for the sale of the compound, W. agreeing to furnish the goods to the firm for twenty years and to allow them as commissions fifty per cent of all the net proceeds of all sales thereof. If he should desist from manufacturing the compound during the agreed time, the firm was to have the sole right to manufacture and sell it upon paying fifty per cent of the proceeds, exclusive of all expenses whatever. It was also agreed that when a specified amount should have been paid W. from the sales, the recipe and process for manufacturing the compound was to belong to W. and the firm in equal shares of one-half each, and to their heirs and assigns forever. The sum agreed was paid W. from the sales. In an action by the assignee of W. against the firm for an accounting, held, that the firm was not entitled to deduct as expenses sums embezzled by its agents or employees, appointed for the sale of the compound, on the ground that W. and the firm were partners in the manufacture and sale of the compound. Mass. Life Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 49 N. Y. 668. It was not the intention of the parties to the agreement that they should be partners. (2) There is no provision of law which authorizes an appeal to this court from an interlocutory judgment or from an order affirming such judgment. An appeal may be taken to the General Term from such a judgment (Code Civ. Pr., § 1349), but it cannot be reviewed by appeal to this court until after final judgment has been rendered. Code Civil Pr., § 190, subd. 1, § 1336. Appeal of plaintiff dismissed and order affirmed. Walker v. Spencer. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

[Decided Oct. 4, 1881.]

CRIMINAL LAW-INDICTMENT FOR DEALING IN LOTTERY TICKETS - DUPLICITY. — An indictment charged that R. 'did unlawfully and knowingly offer to vend and to sell, and to barter and to furnish, and to supply and to procure, and to cause to be furnished and procured to and for one Authony Comstock, a certain paper and instrument purporting to be a ticket of a certain lottery. Held, that the indictment was not assailable for uncertainty, repugnancy or duplicity. It did not charge two separate offenses of a sale to Anthony Comstock and a sale to some third person for Anthony Comstock. A sale to him might also be for him; that is, for his use and benefit. Even if such a construction was not permissible, the indictment charges not a sale but an offer to sell to and procure for Anthony Comstock the lottery ticket. It was the illegal offer, the prohibited temptation forbidden by the statute that was alleged. Such offer was a single offense, and none the less so because it embraced several things, each and all of which were illegal. Judgment affirmed. Reed v. People of New York. Opinion by Finch, J.

[Decided Oct. 11, 1881.]

WITNESS-DECEASED PARTY-WHEN LIVING PARTY MAY TESTIFY.-H., a party defendant in this action on a former trial, was examined and cross-examined as a witness, giving material evidence bearing upon the inception and consideration of a note. He died before the last trial of the case and upon that occasion

his testimony upon the former trial was read in evidence. The direct examination was read in behalf of Meyer, also a defendant. Among the questions asked was what K., an indorser, gave him for the note. H. replied that K. gave him nothing, but added, not in response to the question, "but I paid for the note to Mr. Meyer." This statement was material to the plaintiff and adverse to the theory of the defense. Plaintiff also read his own cross-examination of H., wherein H. explained this statement so as to make a distinct statement that Meyer was indebted to H. in the amount of the note, for which consideration the note was given. Held, that under the exception in Code Civ. Pr., § 829, Meyer was entitled as a witness to contradict the statement of H. Judgment reversed and new trial granted. Potts v. Meyer. Opinion by Finch, J.

[Decided Oct. 11, 1881.]

CONVICTED OF CRIME NOT COMPETENT IN CRIMI

NAL ACTION UNDER CODE CIV. PR., § 832, BEFORE 1879 -PROOF OF CONVICTION. -(1) The provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, section 832, as amended in 1877 and 1878, but before the amendment of 1879, that "a person who has been convicted of a crime or misdemeanor is, notwithstanding, a competent witness, but the conviction may be proved for the purpose of affecting the weight of his testimony," did not apply to criminal actions, so as to make one convicted of a felony a competent witness therein. This Code was intended to apply only to civil actions and proceedings except when otherwise provided. See Explanatory Act, Laws 1876, ch. 449, (2) The testimony of such a witness, without objection at the time, to his conviction and sentence, and that he has not been pardoned, is sufficient. To render the objection that the record should be produced to establish the conviction, etc., available, it must be taken when the evidence is offered and when it is capable of being obviated, otherwise it will be deemed waived. See, as to the proof of conviction, Hilts v. Colvin, 14 Johns. 182; King v. Inhabitants of Castell, 8 East, 77; Newcomb v. Griswold, 24 N. Y. 298. In Priddle's case, Leach Cas. Cr. Law, No. 204, a witness was asked on his examination on his voir dire, whether he had not been convicted of a conspiracy and seutenced to Newgate for two years, and answering without objection in the affirmative, his testimony was rejected. Judgment reversed and new trial ordered. Perry v. People of New York. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

[Decided Oct. 11, 1881.]

chase, stating that the title was clear, was also estopped. U. S. Circ. Ct., W. D. Pennsylvania, July 31, 1881. McBane v. Wilson. Opinion by Acheson, D. J.

MARITIME LAW - STATUTORY REMEDY FOR INJURY TO EMPLOYEE ON STEAMBOAT.-The remedy given by United States Revised Statutes (§ 4493), for an injury to an employee on a steam-vessel is merely cumulative, and does not exclude the right to any other remedy for such injury which may be given by the general admiralty law. Brown v. The Cage, 1 Wood, 404. U. S. Dist. Ct., Oregon, Sept. 8, 1881. The Clatsop Chief. Opinion by Deady, D. J.

NEGLIGENCE -INJURY BY RAILROAD TRAIN TO TRAVELLER AT PRIVATE CROSSING- DUTY OF COMPANY AND TRAVELLER. - In an action against a railroad company for the death of plaintiff's intestate, who was killed by defendant's train at a private crossing, instructions to the jury that although there was no statutory obligation which required the railroad company to ring a bell when approaching a private crossing, the jury might find it was negligence to omit to do this when running at a high rate of speed, at a time when the view of the train was so obstructed by cars on a side track as to render the use of the crossing peculiarly hazardous; that a railroad company ordinarily has the right to run its trains at any rate of speed it thinks proper, but that the condition of the crossing might impose some restrictions upon this right, and under the circumstances the jury might predicate negligence upon excessive speed; that one using such crossing must use all his faculties to ascertain whether or not he could do so safely; that one has the right to assume that the company would use more than ordinary care in approaching a crossing so obstructed, held, to be unexceptionable. Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161; Cordell v. N.Y. Cent. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 119; Johnson v. Hudson River R. Co. 20 id. 65; Newson v. New York Cent. R. Co., 29 id. 383; Liddy v. St. Louis R. Co., 40 Mo. 507; Langhoff v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 19 Wis. 489; Hegan v. Eighth Avenue R. Co., 15 N. Y. 383; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Ogier, 35 Penn. St. 60, 72; Kellogg v. New York Cent. R. Co., 79 N. Y. 72. U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D. New York, Sept. 1, 1881. Thomas v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co. Opinion by Wallace, D. J. PATENT INFRINGEMENT - DAMAGES -MUST BE PROVED — WHERE BUT ONE ELEMENT IN MACHINE COMPOSED OF SEVERAL INFRINGED. — When a patent covers but one of many features of a machine, the gains on the whole machine cannot be reckoned as

COURT ABSTRACT.*

SUBJECT TO set-off.

ATTORNEY'S LIEN - An attorney's lien upon a judgment is subject to any existing right of set-off in the other party to the suit. Gager v. Watson, 11 Conn. 168; Ex parte Lehman, 59 Ala. 631; Wright v. Treadwell, 14 Tex. 255; Currier v. Railroad Co., 37 N. H. 223; Mohawk Bank v. Burrows, 6 Johns. Ch. 317; Porter v. Lane, 8 Johns. 357; Nicoll v. Nicoll, 16 Wend. 446; Hurst v. Sheets, 21 Iowa, 501. U. S. Circ. Ct., Iowa, July 16, 1881. National Bank of Winterset v. Eyre. Opinion by McCrary, C. J. ESTOPPEL-BETWEEN PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS OF LAND. - In an action brought by a subsequent purchaser for the recovery of land, held, that a prior purchaser is estopped from asserting his title, where, to the inquiry of such subsequent purchaser, whom he knew to be bargaining with the original owner for its purchase, he denied all interest in it. Held, also, that a judgment creditor of the prior purchaser, who urged such subsequent purchaser to pur* Appearing in 8 Federal Reporter.

arising from the use of the special device or element claimed by such patent. Seymour v. McCormick, 16 How. 490; Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 626; Cawood Patent Case, 94 U. S. 710. Where a machine is composed of several elements, only one of which infringes a patent, the others making the whole a complete and operative mechanism, being covered by patents in which the complainant has no interest, or are public property, the complainant cannot recover profits made by the use of such parts, even in combination with his device. The complainant must show his damages by reason of the infringement by evidence. They must be proved, and not jumped at. They are not to be presumed. Philp v. Nock, 17 Wall. 460; Blake v. Robertson, 94 U. S. 733. Where the defendant shows by affirmative proof that his machine derived no increased value in the market from the use of the infringing element, the complainant can only recover nominal damages. U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D. Illinois, July, 1881. Calkins v. Bertrand. Opinion by Blodgett, D. J. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REPEAL- JURISDICTION-OF SUITS BY AND AGAINST NATIONAL BANKS. —(1) An earlier statute is only repealed by a later one

when their provisions cannot be reconciled. A later statute which is general and affirmative in its provisions will not abrogate a former one which is particular or special. An exposition of a statute which will revoke or alter by construction of general words a previous general statute should not be adopted where the words may have their proper operation without it. The act of Congress, March 3, 1875, "to determine the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States, to regulate the removal of causes from the State courts, and for other purposes," did not repeal subdivision 10, section 629 of the Revised Statutes. (2) Circuit courts have jurisdiction over suits by or against National banks without regard to the questions in controversy. Where there are two districts in a State a National bank may bring a suit not of a local nature in the Circuit Court of the one in which it is located, against two or more defendants, one or more of whom reside in the other district, if one of them resides in the district in which suit is brought. Cases referred to: Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738; Foss v. First Nat. Bank of Denver, 1 McCrary, 474; Bank v. County of Douglas, 3 Dill. 298; Bank of Bethel v. Pahquioque Bank, 14 Wall. 395. U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D. Missouri, Sept. 22, 1881. Third National Bank of St. Louis v. Harrison. Opinion by McCrary, J.

GEORGIA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. OCTOBER 4, 1881.

BY -FOR SERVICE

THE

CONTRACT MONTH. If a servant be employed for five months at a specified rate per month, payable monthly, and pending the employment he be wrongfully discharged, he may in his option sue at the end of each month, and a recovery for one month will be no bar to a suit at the end of the next month. Isaacs v. Davis. Opinion by Crawford, J.

LIMITATION-ACTION FOR DIVORCE. While lapse of time between the occurrence of a ground for divorce and the application therefor may be considered by the jury, and if not satisfactorily explained may be good ground for refusing the divorce, yet the statute of limitations does not apply to bar such actions. Especially would the statute not apply to the ground of willful and continued desertion. Mosely v. Mosely. Opinion by Speer, J.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-RIGHT OF, TO PASS ORDINANCE FOR SEIZURE AND SALE OF STRAY ANIMALS.

The charter of a municipal corporation contained a power to the council to pass all necessary rules, regulations and ordinances they might deem advisable in relation to dogs, hogs, horses, mules, and any other stock straying at large within its corporate limits; also the power to abate nuisances and a general police power. Held, that they were empowered to pass an ordinance requiring stray cattle to be impounded, and after being advertised for five days, sold, unless the owner should claim them and pay charges. Semble, that a like right would accrue under the general police power alone. It makes no difference that the owner of the stock is a non-resident. Mayor of Cartersville v. Lanham. Opinion by Crawford, J.

SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IN WAREHOUSE DELIVERY. - An owner of cotton left it with a warehouseman for sale, leaving also the warehouse receipt, on presentation of which alone the cotton was deliverable; the agent of certain buyers contracted for the purchase of the cotton, indorsed on the receipt the price and his initials, and returned it to the warehouseman for the purpose of collecting the purchaseprice from the buyers. The warehouseman would not have delivered the cotton until paid for. Before presentation of the receipt the warehouse with the cotton

still in it burned. Held, that the title had not passed to the purchasers. Sparrow v. Pate. Opinion by Speer, J.

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- ELECTION TO PUBLIC OFFICE NOT A CONTRACT. - D. was elected to the office of recorder of the city of W. for a term prescribed by the city charter, which also authorized as a compensation for performing the duties of such office "such sums as the common council may allow." At the time of D.'s election the salary of his office was fixed at $250 per annum; during his term it was reduced to $150 by the common council. Held, that the reduction was authorized, and was not in violation of the constitutional prohibition as to impairing the obligation of a contract. Nothing seems better settled than that an appointment or election to a public office does not establish contract relations between the person appointed or elected and the public. The leading case of Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402, has been universally regarded as having settled that question; and it has been followed by decisions in numerous cases. The salary or other compensation is therefore at the discretion of the legislative authority of the State, or of such other authority as the Legislature has seen fit to entrust it to. This was indirectly recognized in Chapoton v. Detroit, 38 Mich. 636. See, also, Cooley's Const. Lim. (4th ed.) 336, note. Officers are created for the public good at the will of the legislative power, with such powers, privileges and emoluments attached as are believed to be necessary or important to make them accomplish the purposes designed. But except as it may be sustained by the Constitution the Legislature has the same inherent authority to modify or abolish that it has to create; and it will exercise it with the like considerations in view. Whoever accepts a public office must accept it with this principle of constitutional law in view; and if his compensation is reduced below what seems to him reasonable, it may be a hardship, but it is not a legal wrong. The legislative power is ample, and he is supposed to know when he takes the office that it is liable to be exercised. The legislative power to determine the compensation in respect to this office has been delegated to the common council, and that body has exercised it. This is conclusive. City of Wyandotte v. Drennan. Opinion by Cooley, J.

OF OTHERS.-(1) When no defense is put in except the general issue, the language of a libel may be shown to fairly bear a mitigated sense. But when a libel is justified generally the doctrine is well settled that so far as the justification is concerned, it is justified as applied or explained by inuendoes, and therefore there is no justification made out by the evidence unless the facts are proven true as alleged in the declaration, and with the meaning there averred, unless with the aid of the colloquium such meaning is repugnant. Townsend on Lib. & S., §§ 212, 214, 215, 357, and notes; Bissell v. Cornell, 24 Wend. 354; Fidler v. Delavan, 20 id. 57; Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56; Gage v. Robinson, 12 Ohio, 250; Helsham v. Blackwood, 5 L. & Eq. 409; Lewis v. Clement, 3 B. & Ald. 702; 1 Chit. Pl. 433; Weiss v. Whittemore, 28 Mich. 366; Cresinger v. Reed, 25 Mich. 450; Bailey v. Kalamazoo Pub. Co., 40 id. 251. Unless every material item of defamation is established the plaintiff must recover his damages for so much as is not fully justified. The truth of one part cannot deprive him of his action for that which is not shown to be true. (2) No doctrine is better settled than that a person has no more right to put in