curtailed and made dependent upon the will of the King or his officers. Upon the sovereignty of Spain being expelled from the island of Porto Rico this limitation upon the right of the owner to transfer departed with the deposed sovereignty. The provisions of the Spanish law authorizing cities and towns to own and convey land and other property are in harmony with the political institutions of the United States and are continued in force in Porto Rico. The provisions of the regulations of the Crown of Spain that the right to transfer and convey can be exercised only by and with the consent of the King of Spain or his officers are not in harmony with the political institutions of the United States, but are odious thereto and incompatible with the changed condition in Porto Rico. Therefore such regulations are no longer in force in that island. Therefore the municipalities thereof may alienate the land and other property owned by them in accordance with the provisions of the Spanish law relative thereto, saving and excepting the provisions requiring the assent or consent to such alienation by the Crown of Spain or its officers.

While the authority of the officers of the Crown of Spain to direct and control the action of municipalities in these matters has ceased, the local officers of the municipalities are not without restraint in the exercise of their rights. By reason of the character of the provisional government existing in Porto Rico, the military authorities of the United States now in charge of said government are a part of the municipal government as well as the general government. Being a part thereof their action must be had in this and other matters. The extent of their powers in Cuba is set forth by Attorney-General Griggs as follows (see letter to Secretary of War, July 10, 1899):

Cuba, however, is now under the temporary dominion of the United States, which is exercising there, under the law of belligerent right, all the powers of municipal government. In the exercise of these powers the proper authorities of the United States may change or modify either the form or the constituents of the municipal establishments; may, in place of the system and regulations that formerly prevailed, substitute new and different ones. Upon this line the same authorities exercising sovereignty over the island have the power to provide the methods, terms, and conditions under which municipal improvements, which relate entirely to property belonging to the municipality or held by it for public use, may be carried on. The old provisions of the Spanish law may be adopted, so far as applicable, or they may be entirely dispensed with and a new system set up in their place. (22 Op. 528.)

The proceedings required in granting a franchise or concession by a municipality under the Spanish laws are (in general) as follows: The promoter presents a general project. If approved by the municipal council he prepares detailed plans and specifications. These being approved, their commercial value or price is fixed by appraisement. Advertisement is made that a concession or franchise for the execution of said plan will be sold to the highest bidder or the bidder offering the terms and conditions most favorable to the city, bids to be

received at a given time and place. Bids must be in writing and accompanied by 1 per cent of the estimated cost of the project. The original promoter has the privilege of being substituted for the best bidder. If he declines to be substituted, the original bidder must pay him the appraised value of the plans and specifications. The successful bidder then deposits 3 per cent of the estimated cost of the project as a guaranty of good faith, and the franchise is granted. The Spanish laws do not authorize municipal franchises which are exclusive or perpetual. They permit the use of streets or other public property in a prescribed manner for a designated purpose. With the exception of the provisions relating to the authority exercised by the officers of the Crown, said laws are in harmony with the political institutions of the United States. Relieved from the controlling influence of the Crown officials and subjected to the restraint of the provisional government now in charge of civil affairs in the island, said laws furnish an excellent means and method for disposing of municipal franchises and the regulation thereof. The provisions of said laws are known and understood by the inhabitants and officials of the municipalities. Their enforcement would create no animosity. The relief afforded by freeing the exercise of municipal right from the dictation of the officers representing the Spanish sovereign would be universally understood and therefore more highly appreciated than if the old law were abrogated and a new law substituted.

Without determining the questions discussed in the foregoing report the Secretary of War decided to continue in force the provisions of Executive order dated December 22, 1898 (G. O., 188, A. G. O., 1898), until Congress, by appropriate legislation, should provide for the exercise of authority by municipalities and other political subdivisions in Porto Rico.

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF FERMIN SAGARDIA, AN INHABITANT OF PORTO RICO, FOR COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES OCCASIONED BY HIS PROPERTY BEING STOLEN, INJURED, AND DESTROYED BY ROBBERS INFESTING THE LOCALITY OF HIS RESIDENCE.

[Submitted November 23, 1899. Case No. 1087, Division of Insular Affairs, War Department.] The amount demanded by this applicant is $24,345. It is not claimed that the loss was occasioned or the damages inflicted by the United States troops, agents, or representatives. It is admitted that the loss was occasioned by robbers and bandits. Therefore the facts are not sufficient to constitue a claim for lawful damages or equitable relief in favor of the applicant and against the Government of the United

States or the military government now in charge of civil affairs in Porto Rico.

The military governor of the island reports that "there are a considerable number of claims similar to this." The military governor further says in his report herein: "The statement has been made that the aggregate of these losses in Porto Rico may reach several million dollars."

It is readily perceived that if a solvent government undertook to reimburse the inhabitants of its country for losses occasioned by theft and other unlawful or criminal acts of lawless persons, the bona fide claims would soon aggregate millions of dollars, while the mala fide claims would be limited only by the cupidity of claimants and the credulity of the government officials. But such indemnity is not afforded by any government either in time of peace or war. That such is the rule must certainly be known among the people of Porto Rico. If a contrary rule should be adopted it would of course be very gratifying to those who have suffered losses of this character and to those who would willingly perpetrate a fraud upon this Government which would benefit them financially, but the proposition involved is as preposterous as the results of such adoption would be deplorable. The claim should be rejected.

General Davis in his indorsement herein says:

If it is desired that any investigation be made as to the extent of these losses, etc., instructions are requested.

The investigation of such claims gives them a certain dignity and leads the claimant to expect favorable action and induces others to make similar claims. This should not be tolerated, much less encouraged.

The officers of the United States Army and other persons engaged in the conduct of the affairs of the provisional government of Porto Rico should not be employed in the useless task of investigating claims of this character. General Davis manifestly entertains this view and will doubtless be pleased to learn that this Department sustains it.

The action of the War Department on this claim was as follows: DECEMBER 1, 1899.

SIR: Referring to the claim of Fermin y Sagardia for reimbursement of the amount of alleged losses occurring through the depredations of robbers and other criminals, submitted by your reference of September 30 last, I have the honor to invite your attention to the inclosed copy of an opinion of the law officer, Division of Customs and Insular Affairs, which is approved by this Department.

Very respectfully,

Brig. Gen. GEO. W. DAVIS,

Military Governor of Forto Rico, San Juan, P. R.

G. D. MEIKLEJOHN, Assistant Secretary of War.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF RAMON MARTI Y BUGUET, A NATIVE OF TARRAGONA, SPAIN, WHO DIED AT BEAZ, SANTA CLARA, WITHOUT LEAVING A WILL.

[Submitted March 19, 1900. Case No. 1075, Division of Insular Affairs, War Department.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your request for a report on the above-entitled matter, and in pursuance thereto I have the further honor to submit the following:

On July 2, 1899, a Spanish subject named Ramon Martí y Buguet, a native of Tarragona, Spain, died, intestate, at Beaz, Santa Clara, Cuba, leaving an estate the value and amount of which does not appear in the papers filed herein.

On the 15th of July the Spanish consul at Cienfuegos, having learned of the death of Martí, addressed a letter to the judge of Santa Clara, requesting that his consulate be permitted to administer upon the estate of the intestate. The Spanish consul based his request on article 44 of the alien law, put in force in the island of Cuba while Spanish dominion prevailed therein. (Translation of article 44 hereto attached, marked "Exhibit A.")

The court refused to comply with the request of the Spanish consul, and the estate was administered upon in accordance with the laws regulating the administration of estates of deceased natives of the island. The court at Santa Clara based its refusal to comply with the request of the Spanish consul upon two grounds:

First. That it was not made to appear that the deceased had declared his intention, before a court of record, to continue his allegiance to the Crown of Spain, and therefore must be adjudged to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which he resided at the time of his death.

Second. That under Article XI of the treaty of peace with Spain ́ (1898) Spaniards continuing to reside in the island of Cuba remain subject, in civil and criminal matters, to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country in which they reside, in accordance with the ordinary laws in force therein, in the same manner as citizens of the country. The Spanish minister at this capital called the attention of the Government of the United States to this matter by letter to the Secretary of State. The Spanish Government, being unwilling to concur in the decision of the court at Santa Clara, requested the Government of the United States to annul the orders made regarding said estate by the judge of that court.

The State Department transmitted said letter to the War Department. In the letter of transmittal the honorable Secretary of State says:

The Department commends the note to your early and, if possible, favorable consideration, in view of the apparent soundness of the ground on which the Spanish minister's contention rests.

The matter was referred to Major-General Brooke, then in command in Cuba, for a report thereon. Major-General Brooke referred the matter to his secretary of justice, who reported in favor of sustaining the action of the court of Santa Clara.

Upon assuming command in Cuba Major-General Wood referred this matter to the new secretary of justice, who reported that he agreed with the report made by his predecessor and recommended that the action of the court of Santa Clara be sustained.

The matter is now presented to this Department for final determination by the Secretary of War.

I am of opinion that the judge of the court at Santa Clara was right in proceeding to administer upon this estate, but wrong in his conclusion that the deceased, by failing to declare before a court of record that he intended to adhere in allegiance to the Crown of Spain, must be held to have renounced such allegiance.

When the Government of Spain, in order to end the unhappy condition of war, determined to withdraw its dominion from the island of Cuba and submit the island and its inhabitants to the custody of the United States, it was not unmindful of the fact that many persons residing in the island desired to continue their allegiance to the Crown of Spain. The Spanish Government very properly desired to protect and preserve the personal and property rights of such residents. The Government of the United States, with equal propriety, consented to this laudable undertaking; hence arose the provisions of the treaty of peace in regard thereto, found in articles IX, X, and XI, which are intended to guarantee to Spanish subjects remaining in the islands certain rights and privileges. These articles are as follows:

ARTICLE IX.

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance, in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside. The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.

ARTICLE X.

The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.

ARTICLE XI.

The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil, as well as criminal, to