Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in WartimeThe relationship between military leaders and political leaders has always been a complicated one, especially in times of war. When the chips are down, who should run the show -- the politicians or the generals? In Supreme Command, Eliot Cohen examines four great democratic war statesmen -- Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion -- to reveal the surprising answer: the politicians. Great states-men do not turn their wars over to their generals, and then stay out of their way. Great statesmen make better generals of their generals. They question and drive their military men, and at key times they overrule their advice. The generals may think they know how to win, but the statesmen are the ones who see the big picture. Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion led four very different kinds of democracy, under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. They came from four very different backgrounds -- backwoods lawyer, dueling French doctor, rogue aristocrat, and impoverished Jewish socialist.Yet they faced similar challenges, not least the possibility that their conduct of the war could bring about their fall from power. Each exhibited mastery of detail and fascination with technology. All four were great learners, who studied war as if it were their own profession, and in many ways mastered it as well as did their generals. All found themselves locked in conflict with military men. All four triumphed. Military men often dismiss politicians as meddlers, doves, or naifs. Yet military men make mistakes. The art of a great leader is to push his subordinates to achieve great things. The lessons of the book apply not just to President Bush and other world leaders in the war on terrorism, but to anyone who faces extreme adversity at the head of a free organization -- including leaders and managers throughout the corporate world. The lessons of Supreme Command will be immediately apparent to all managers and leaders, as well as students of history. |
From inside the book
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Page 7
To understand why, at the deepest level, these statesmen did not delegate war
fighting to the generals, one turns to Clausewitz's famous dictum, that war is
merely the continuation of politics by other means. But by this he has something
far ...
To understand why, at the deepest level, these statesmen did not delegate war
fighting to the generals, one turns to Clausewitz's famous dictum, that war is
merely the continuation of politics by other means. But by this he has something
far ...
Page 8
Although Clausewitz fully recognizes the power of war untrammeled to
overwhelm political rationality — by ... The Clausewitzian view is incompatible
with the doctrine of professionalism codified by the "normal" theory of civil-military
relations.
Although Clausewitz fully recognizes the power of war untrammeled to
overwhelm political rationality — by ... The Clausewitzian view is incompatible
with the doctrine of professionalism codified by the "normal" theory of civil-military
relations.
Page 22
Clausewitz asserts that "War has a way of masking the stage with scenery
crudely daubed with fearsome apparitions,"18 an observation as true for those in
the highest headquarters as for those in the field. The history of warfare reveals
many ...
Clausewitz asserts that "War has a way of masking the stage with scenery
crudely daubed with fearsome apparitions,"18 an observation as true for those in
the highest headquarters as for those in the field. The history of warfare reveals
many ...
Page 207
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What people are saying - Write a review
Review: Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime
User Review - Brendan Mcbreen - GoodreadsA tremendously rich and balanced discussion on the benefits of civilian leadership over military forces. Cohen's Supreme Command should be read by both national leaders and military leaders. Read full review
SUPREME COMMAND: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime
User Review - KirkusStrategy analyst Cohen challenges the view that wars are best fought by military technicians without civilian interference.Those who maintain that Vietnam would have been an American victory if only ... Read full review
Contents
| 1 | |
| 15 | |
CLEMENCEAU PAYS A VISIT | 52 |
CHURCHILL ASKS A QUESTION | 95 |
BENGURION HOLDS A SEMINAR | 133 |
LEADERSHIP WITHOUT GENIUS | 173 |
THE UNEQUAL DIALOGUE | 208 |
APPENDIX THE THEORY OF CIVILIAN CONTROL | 225 |
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | 249 |
NOTES | 253 |
INDEX | 279 |
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Common terms and phrases
Allied American Arab arms army attack battle Ben-Gurion Britain British campaign Carl von Clausewitz Chiefs of Staff Churchill Churchill's Civil civil-military relations civilian control civilian leaders Clausewitz Clemenceau coalition commander in chief conduct Confederate conflict Dana David Ben-Gurion decision defense enemy example fact Ferdinand Foch fight Foch Foch's France France's French front German Grant Gulf Gulf war Haganah Halleck high command historians Huntington Ibid important Iraqi Ismay Israel Israel Defense Forces Israeli Jerusalem Jewish Jews Joint Chiefs Joseph Hooker less Lincoln matters ment mili military advisers military leaders Mordacq offensive officers operations organization Palestine Palmach Petain politicians president prime minister problem professional remarked role secretary senior served soldiers Stanton statesmen strategy subordinates tary telegraph theory of civil-military tion Union United University Press USMA victory Vietnam wartime Winston Winston Churchill World World War II Yadin Yigal Alon yishuv York Zionist
Bibliographic information
| Title | Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime |
| Author | Eliot A. Cohen |
| Edition | reprint |
| Publisher | Simon and Schuster, 2012 |
| ISBN | 074324222X, 9780743242226 |
| Length | 304 pages |
| Export Citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |