Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in WartimeSimon and Schuster, 2012 M04 17 - 304 pages “An excellent, vividly written” (The Washington Post) account of leadership in wartime that explores how four great democratic statesmen—Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion—worked with the military leaders who served them during warfare. The relationship between military leaders and political leaders has always been a complicated one, especially in times of war. When the chips are down, who should run the show—the politicians or the generals? In Supreme Command, Eliot A. Cohen expertly argues that great statesmen do not turn their wars over to their generals, and then stay out of their way. Great statesmen make better generals of their generals. They question and drive their military men, and at key times they overrule their advice. The generals may think they know how to win, but the statesmen are the ones who see the big picture. Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion led four very different kinds of democracy, under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. They came from four very different backgrounds—backwoods lawyer, dueling French doctor, rogue aristocrat, and impoverished Jewish socialist. Yet they faced similar challenges. Each exhibited mastery of detail and fascination with technology. All four were great learners, who studied war as if it were their own profession, and in many ways mastered it as well as did their generals. All found themselves locked in conflict with military men. All four triumphed. The powerful lessons of this “brilliant” (National Review) book will touch and inspire anyone who faces intense adversity and is the perfect gift for history buffs of all backgrounds. |
From inside the book
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Page xi
... World War II by looking at how the United States has waged war under far less effective leaders than those studied here. A final chapter attempts to draw more generalized lessons for contemporary democracies, and for students of ...
... World War II by looking at how the United States has waged war under far less effective leaders than those studied here. A final chapter attempts to draw more generalized lessons for contemporary democracies, and for students of ...
Page xiii
... World War II that their war experience would enable them to "read man's doings in the past with far greater understanding than if they had spent these years in sheltered academic groves."2 Morison' s students, like the master himself ...
... World War II that their war experience would enable them to "read man's doings in the past with far greater understanding than if they had spent these years in sheltered academic groves."2 Morison' s students, like the master himself ...
Page 1
... World War II; President Ronald Reagan made a corporate tycoon his chief of staff in 1985; in the early 1990s, Sears Roebuck, an ailing giant, looked to the chief logistician of the Gulf War to help it turn around. Frequently enough the ...
... World War II; President Ronald Reagan made a corporate tycoon his chief of staff in 1985; in the early 1990s, Sears Roebuck, an ailing giant, looked to the chief logistician of the Gulf War to help it turn around. Frequently enough the ...
Page 10
... World War II, for example, the British War Cabinet found itself called upon to make decisions on matters as minute as whether certain trans-Atlantic convoys should travel at thirteen as opposed to fifteen knots, because although their ...
... World War II, for example, the British War Cabinet found itself called upon to make decisions on matters as minute as whether certain trans-Atlantic convoys should travel at thirteen as opposed to fifteen knots, because although their ...
Page 12
... war. Allowing for the differences in time and nationality, there is a kernel of truth here. Yet the ultimate ... World War II that "It is always right to probe."16 "THE SURPRISING CAPACITY OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE FOR ERROR" A fictional general ...
... war. Allowing for the differences in time and nationality, there is a kernel of truth here. Yet the ultimate ... World War II that "It is always right to probe."16 "THE SURPRISING CAPACITY OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE FOR ERROR" A fictional general ...
Contents
1 | |
15 | |
CLEMENCEAU PAYS A VISIT | 52 |
CHURCHILL ASKS A QUESTION | 95 |
BENGURION HOLDS A SEMINAR | 133 |
LEADERSHIP WITHOUT GENIUS | 173 |
THE UNEQUAL DIALOGUE | 208 |
APPENDIX THE THEORY OF CIVILIAN CONTROL | 225 |
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | 249 |
NOTES | 253 |
INDEX | 279 |
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Common terms and phrases
Allied American Arab arms army attack battle Ben-Gurion Britain British campaign Carl von Clausewitz Chiefs of Staff Churchill Churchill's Civil civil-military relations civilian control civilian leaders Clausewitz Clemenceau coalition commander in chief conduct Confederate conflict Dana David Ben-Gurion decision defense enemy example fact Ferdinand Foch fight Foch Foch's France France's French front German Grant Gulf Gulf war Haganah Halleck high command historians Huntington Ibid important Iraqi Ismay Israel Israel Defense Forces Israeli Jerusalem Jewish Jews Joint Chiefs Joseph Hooker less Lincoln matters ment mili military advisers military leaders Mordacq offensive officers operations organization Palestine Palmach Petain politicians president prime minister problem professional remarked role secretary senior served soldiers Stanton statesmen strategy subordinates tary telegraph theory of civil-military tion Union United University Press USMA victory Vietnam wartime Winston Winston Churchill World World War II Yadin Yigal Alon yishuv York Zionist