Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in WartimeSimon and Schuster, 2012 M04 17 - 304 pages “An excellent, vividly written” (The Washington Post) account of leadership in wartime that explores how four great democratic statesmen—Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion—worked with the military leaders who served them during warfare. The relationship between military leaders and political leaders has always been a complicated one, especially in times of war. When the chips are down, who should run the show—the politicians or the generals? In Supreme Command, Eliot A. Cohen expertly argues that great statesmen do not turn their wars over to their generals, and then stay out of their way. Great statesmen make better generals of their generals. They question and drive their military men, and at key times they overrule their advice. The generals may think they know how to win, but the statesmen are the ones who see the big picture. Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion led four very different kinds of democracy, under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. They came from four very different backgrounds—backwoods lawyer, dueling French doctor, rogue aristocrat, and impoverished Jewish socialist. Yet they faced similar challenges. Each exhibited mastery of detail and fascination with technology. All four were great learners, who studied war as if it were their own profession, and in many ways mastered it as well as did their generals. All found themselves locked in conflict with military men. All four triumphed. The powerful lessons of this “brilliant” (National Review) book will touch and inspire anyone who faces intense adversity and is the perfect gift for history buffs of all backgrounds. |
From inside the book
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Page xiv
... conflicts. It turned out, rather to my own surprise, that in their fundamental challenges for civilian leaders the two kinds of war diverge less than one might expect. Extreme circumstances, including war for the most essential national ...
... conflicts. It turned out, rather to my own surprise, that in their fundamental challenges for civilian leaders the two kinds of war diverge less than one might expect. Extreme circumstances, including war for the most essential national ...
Page 3
... conflict characterized by civilian interference in the details of warmaking, the other a model of benign operational and tactical neglect by an enlightened civilian leadership, seem to confirm the value of a bright line drawn between ...
... conflict characterized by civilian interference in the details of warmaking, the other a model of benign operational and tactical neglect by an enlightened civilian leadership, seem to confirm the value of a bright line drawn between ...
Page 6
... conflict themselves were changing and gathering speed. One might suggest that a second communications revolution is now upon us, in which a further quantum increase in the amount of information that can be distributed globally has ...
... conflict themselves were changing and gathering speed. One might suggest that a second communications revolution is now upon us, in which a further quantum increase in the amount of information that can be distributed globally has ...
Page 7
... conflict with military men. When one reads the transcripts of Ben-Gurion's furious arguments in 1948 with the de facto chief of staff of the new Israel Defense Forces — Yigal Yadin, a thirty-two-year-old archaeologist who had never ...
... conflict with military men. When one reads the transcripts of Ben-Gurion's furious arguments in 1948 with the de facto chief of staff of the new Israel Defense Forces — Yigal Yadin, a thirty-two-year-old archaeologist who had never ...
Page 8
... a war having commanded for any length of time forces comparable to those assigned them on the outbreak of a conflict; hence they are almost always unproved. It often falls to the political leadership to determine 8 SUPREME COMMAND.
... a war having commanded for any length of time forces comparable to those assigned them on the outbreak of a conflict; hence they are almost always unproved. It often falls to the political leadership to determine 8 SUPREME COMMAND.
Contents
1 | |
15 | |
CLEMENCEAU PAYS A VISIT | 52 |
CHURCHILL ASKS A QUESTION | 95 |
BENGURION HOLDS A SEMINAR | 133 |
LEADERSHIP WITHOUT GENIUS | 173 |
THE UNEQUAL DIALOGUE | 208 |
APPENDIX THE THEORY OF CIVILIAN CONTROL | 225 |
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | 249 |
NOTES | 253 |
INDEX | 279 |
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Common terms and phrases
Allied American Arab arms army attack battle Ben-Gurion Britain British campaign Carl von Clausewitz Chiefs of Staff Churchill Churchill's Civil civil-military relations civilian control civilian leaders Clausewitz Clemenceau coalition commander in chief conduct Confederate conflict Dana David Ben-Gurion decision defense enemy example fact Ferdinand Foch fight Foch Foch's France France's French front German Grant Gulf Gulf war Haganah Halleck high command historians Huntington Ibid important Iraqi Ismay Israel Israel Defense Forces Israeli Jerusalem Jewish Jews Joint Chiefs Joseph Hooker less Lincoln matters ment mili military advisers military leaders Mordacq offensive officers operations organization Palestine Palmach Petain politicians president prime minister problem professional remarked role secretary senior served soldiers Stanton statesmen strategy subordinates tary telegraph theory of civil-military tion Union United University Press USMA victory Vietnam wartime Winston Winston Churchill World World War II Yadin Yigal Alon yishuv York Zionist