Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in WartimeSimon and Schuster, 2012 M04 17 - 304 pages “An excellent, vividly written” (The Washington Post) account of leadership in wartime that explores how four great democratic statesmen—Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion—worked with the military leaders who served them during warfare. The relationship between military leaders and political leaders has always been a complicated one, especially in times of war. When the chips are down, who should run the show—the politicians or the generals? In Supreme Command, Eliot A. Cohen expertly argues that great statesmen do not turn their wars over to their generals, and then stay out of their way. Great statesmen make better generals of their generals. They question and drive their military men, and at key times they overrule their advice. The generals may think they know how to win, but the statesmen are the ones who see the big picture. Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion led four very different kinds of democracy, under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. They came from four very different backgrounds—backwoods lawyer, dueling French doctor, rogue aristocrat, and impoverished Jewish socialist. Yet they faced similar challenges. Each exhibited mastery of detail and fascination with technology. All four were great learners, who studied war as if it were their own profession, and in many ways mastered it as well as did their generals. All found themselves locked in conflict with military men. All four triumphed. The powerful lessons of this “brilliant” (National Review) book will touch and inspire anyone who faces intense adversity and is the perfect gift for history buffs of all backgrounds. |
From inside the book
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Page 2
... professionals who have expertise and experience that dwarf their own, but politicians dealing with generals in wartime face exceptional difficulties. The stakes are so high, the gaps in mutual understanding so large, the differences in ...
... professionals who have expertise and experience that dwarf their own, but politicians dealing with generals in wartime face exceptional difficulties. The stakes are so high, the gaps in mutual understanding so large, the differences in ...
Page 4
... professionals, much like highly trained surgeons: the statesman is in the position of a patient requiring urgent care. He may freely decide whether or not to have an operation, he may choose one doctor over another, and he may even make ...
... professionals, much like highly trained surgeons: the statesman is in the position of a patient requiring urgent care. He may freely decide whether or not to have an operation, he may choose one doctor over another, and he may even make ...
Page 8
... professionals. The selection of and dismissal of generals is one such activity. Generals rarely enter a war having commanded for any length of time forces comparable to those assigned them on the outbreak of a conflict; hence they are ...
... professionals. The selection of and dismissal of generals is one such activity. Generals rarely enter a war having commanded for any length of time forces comparable to those assigned them on the outbreak of a conflict; hence they are ...
Page 9
... professional or firm to handle a task, politicians must select dozens, even scores. Often enough they cannot know that the next man they pick will be any better than his predecessor, for all alike are inexperienced at the task before ...
... professional or firm to handle a task, politicians must select dozens, even scores. Often enough they cannot know that the next man they pick will be any better than his predecessor, for all alike are inexperienced at the task before ...
Page 10
... professionals could not agree. Divided among themselves not merely by opinion but by professional background, military leaders often differ sharply about the best course of action. Ben-Gurion, for example, had to arbitrate between the ...
... professionals could not agree. Divided among themselves not merely by opinion but by professional background, military leaders often differ sharply about the best course of action. Ben-Gurion, for example, had to arbitrate between the ...
Contents
1 | |
15 | |
CLEMENCEAU PAYS A VISIT | 52 |
CHURCHILL ASKS A QUESTION | 95 |
BENGURION HOLDS A SEMINAR | 133 |
LEADERSHIP WITHOUT GENIUS | 173 |
THE UNEQUAL DIALOGUE | 208 |
APPENDIX THE THEORY OF CIVILIAN CONTROL | 225 |
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | 249 |
NOTES | 253 |
INDEX | 279 |
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Common terms and phrases
Allied American Arab arms army attack battle Ben-Gurion Britain British campaign Carl von Clausewitz Chiefs of Staff Churchill Churchill's Civil civil-military relations civilian control civilian leaders Clausewitz Clemenceau coalition commander in chief conduct Confederate conflict Dana David Ben-Gurion decision defense enemy example fact Ferdinand Foch fight Foch Foch's France France's French front German Grant Gulf Gulf war Haganah Halleck high command historians Huntington Ibid important Iraqi Ismay Israel Israel Defense Forces Israeli Jerusalem Jewish Jews Joint Chiefs Joseph Hooker less Lincoln matters ment mili military advisers military leaders Mordacq offensive officers operations organization Palestine Palmach Petain politicians president prime minister problem professional remarked role secretary senior served soldiers Stanton statesmen strategy subordinates tary telegraph theory of civil-military tion Union United University Press USMA victory Vietnam wartime Winston Winston Churchill World World War II Yadin Yigal Alon yishuv York Zionist