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to disturb the balance of power between them," and rendered it morally obligatory on the United States, as the strong but disinterested friend of all its sister states, to exert its influence " for the pres ervation of the national life and integrity of any one of them against aggression, whether this may come from abroad or from another American republic." The "peaceful maintenance of the status quo of the American commonwealths" was, said Mr. Blaine, "of the very essence of their policy of harmonious alliance for self-preservation, and is of even more importance to Mexico than to the United States." It was the desire and intention of the United States, by moral influence and the interposition of good offices,"" to hold up the republics of Central America in their old strength and to do all that may be done toward insuring the tranquillity of their relations among themselves and their collective security as an association of allied interests, possessing in their common relationship to the outer world all of the elements of national existence." In this "enlarged policy," said Mr. Blaine, the United States confidently asked the cooperation of Mexico, while any contrary movement on her part directly leading to the absorption in whole or in part of her weaker neighbors would be deemed "an act unfriendly to the best interests of America." Mr. Morgan was instructed to bring these views to the attention of Mr. Mariscal, and to intimate that the good feeling between Mexico and the United States would be fortified by a frank avowal that the Mexican policy towards the neighboring states was not one of conquest or aggrandizement, but of conciliation, peace, and friendship. Mr. Morgan had an interview with Mr. Mariscal on July 9, 1881, and acquainted the latter with the purport of his instructions. Mr. Mariscal insisted that it was Mexico that had cause to complain against Guatemala and not Guatemala against Mexico. Further interviews were held, with the result that Mr. Morgan, in a dispatch of September 22, 1881, suggested that unless the United States was prepared to announce to Mexico that it would, if necessary, actively preserve the peace, it would be the part of wisdom to let the matter remain where it was. Negotiations on the subject," said Mr. Morgan, "will not benefit Guatemala, and you may depend upon it that what we have already done in this direction has not tended to the increasing of the cordial relations which I know it is so much your desire to cultivate with this nation."

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In an instruction to Mr. Morgan of November 28, 1881, Mr. Blaine declared that to leave the matter where it was was simply impossible, since it would not remain there. The United States had sought to compose the differences between the two countries, which differences would become more aggravated if they were not ended. Information, said Mr. Blaine, has been received that Mexican troops had been ordered to the disputed boundary line. The United States did

not pretend to direct the policy of Mexico, and the Mexican government was of course free to decline the counsel of the United States, no matter how friendly. But it was necessary that the United States should know distinctly what the Mexican government had decided. It was useless, and apparently would be irritating, declared Mr. Blaine, "to keep before the government of Mexico the offer of friendly intervention, while, on the other hand, it would not be just to Guatemala to hold that government in suspense as to whether there was a possibility of the acceptance of the amicable mediation which we have offered." Mr. Morgan was therefore to seek an interview with Mr. Mariscal and urge upon him the peaceful solution of existing differences, and, if he should find it to be practicable, to suggest a limited arbitration. Should the Mexican government decline this "friendly intervention," Mr. Morgan was to state that he accepted this decision as one undoubtedly within the right of Mexico to make; but he was to express the regret of the United States if it should be found that the powerful Republic of Mexico was unwilling to join in maintaining and establishing the principle of friendly arbitration of international differences on the continent of America. Mexico and the United States, acting in cordial harmony, could, said Mr. Blaine, induce all the other independent governments of North and South America to aid in fixing this policy of peace for all the future disputes between the nations of the Western Hemisphere. In concluding the instruction, Mr. Blaine adverted to an intimation made by Mr. Mariscal that President Barrios, of Guatemala, was endeavoring to obtain the influence of the United States towards furthering his ambition of forming a consolidation of the Central American republics. With reference to this intimation, Mr. Blaine declared that the union of the Central American states appealed to the sympathy and judgment of the United States; that this was no new policy, but one which the United States had for many years urged upon those republics. If, said Mr. Blaine, an inference was to be drawn from Mr. Mariscal's language that the prospect of a Central American union was not agreeable to the policy of Mexico, and that the friendly attitude of the United States towards such union rendered unwelcome the "friendly intervention" which had been offered, this fact would only deepen the regret at Mexico's decision, and compelled him (Mr. Blaine) "to declare that the government of the United States will consider a hostile demonstration against Guatemala for the avowed purpose, or with the certain result of weakening her power in such an effort, as an act not in consonance with the position and character of Mexico, not in harmony with the friendly relations existing between us, and injurious to the best interests of all the republics of this continent." The United States, added Mr. Blaine, "will continue its policy of peace

even if it can not have the great aid which the cooperation of Mexico
would assure; and it will hope, at no distant day, to see such concord
and cooperation between all the nations of America as will render
war impossible." Mr. Morgan was directed to leave a copy of this
instruction with Mr. Mariscal.

Señor Ubico, Guatemalan min. to Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, June 15, 1881,
For. Rel. 1881, 598; Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Morgan, min.
to Mexico, No. 138, June 16, 1881, For. Rel. 1881, 766; same to same.
No. 142, June 21, 1881, id. 768; Mr. Morgan to Mr. Blaine, No. 232,
July 12, 1881, id. 773; same to same, No. 273, Sept. 22, 1881, id. 806,
809; Mr. Blaine to Mr. Morgan, No. 198, Nov. 28, 1881, id. 814.
See, also, a pamphlet entitled, "Difficulties between Mexico and Guate-
mala. Proposed mediation of the United States. Some official docu-
ments. New York, 1882."

While the United States would not look with favor on any "schemes of
aggrandizement" by which “the individuality of any of the states
of Central America would disappear in civil turmoil or conquest,"
yet it would view with approbation "such an intimacy of union
between the states of Central America as would not only secure their
domestic interests but render them outwardly strong against the rest
of the world." (Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Logan, min. to
Cent. Am., No. 53, confld., March 4, 1880, MS. Inst. Cent. Am. XVIII.
73.)

It appeared upon investigation that the particular point that prevented a friendly arrangement between Guatemala and Mexico was the calling into question by the former of Mexico's title to the State of Chiapas, including the territory of Soconusco. On December 31, 1881, Mr. Morgan, under further instructions of the Department of State, made a formal tender to the Mexican government of the “good offices" of the President of the United States and of his services as arbitrator. Mr. Mariscal, on March 20, 1882, replied that the Mexican government found it impossible to discuss or submit to arbitration the question of her rights to this portion of her territory, but would agree to arbitration if the Guatemalan government would expressly exclude Chiapas and Soconusco. On this basis the preliminaries of a treaty of settlement were signed at New Nork on August 12, 1882.

Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Montúfar, Guatemalan min., June 5, 1882, For. Rel. 1882, 326; Mr. Montúfar to Mr. Frelinghuysen, June 15, 1882, id. 328; Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Montúfar, June 27, 1882, id. 330; Mr. Montúfar to Mr. Frelinghuysen, July 21, 1882. id 330; Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Montúfar, July 24, 1882, id. 331; Mr. Romero, Mex. min., to Mr. Frelinghuysen, Aug. 14, 1882, id. 437; Mr. Cruz, Guatemalan min., to Mr. Frelinghuysen, Oct. 14, 1882, id. 332.

"ART. XXII. The United States will aid by their good offices, if desired, in securing the union of the five Central American republics under one representative government, and the reorganization of the

said republics in one nationality being accomplished, the Central American republics shall have the same rights and bear the same obligations as Nicaragua has and bears by virtue of this treaty."

Frelinghuysen-Zavala Treaty, Dec. 1, 1884, between the United States
and Nicaragua, unratified; Sen. Doc. 291, 55 Cong. 2 sess. 10.
The treaty was signed by Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, and
General Joaquin Zavala, ex-President of Nicaragua.

The consular agent of the United States at Johannesburg was directed to render to John Hays Hammond and other American citizens arrested by the Boers on charges of rebellion in connection with the Jameson raid "all possible aid and protection." Simultaneously, the American ambassador in London was instructed to apply to the foreign office, with a view to obtain the good offices of the British representatives in South Africa. In compliance with this request the British high commissioner was instructed to see that the persons in question received all proper protection and assistance.

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Mr. Olney, Sec. of State, to Mr. Catchings, M. C., Jan. 25, 1896, 207 MS.
Dom. Let. 349.

By way of friendly good offices, you will inform British minister for foreign affairs that I am to-day in receipt of a telegram from the United States consul at Pretoria reporting that the government of the two African republics request the President's intervention with a view to cessation of hostilities, and that a similar request is made to the representatives of European powers. In communicating this request I am directed by the President to express his earnest hope that a way to bring about peace may be found and to say that he would be glad to aid in any friendly manner to promote so happy

a result."

Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. White, chargé, tel., March 10, 1900, MS.
Inst. Gr. Br. XXXIII, 364.

The British government replied that it could not accept the "interven-
tion" of any power in the contest. It is obvious that the Boer
request was not happily phrased, the use of the word "intervention "
affording a ready ground of declination.

See, as to this incident, S. Doc. 222, 56 Cong. 1 sess.

II. NONPOLITICAL INTERVENTION.

1. PROTECTION OF CITIZENS.

§ 912.

The most usual, indeed it may be said that the ordinary, ground of intervention is that of the protection of the citizens of a country against wrong or injustice in another land. Such wrong or injustice

may result either from the positive action of a government or from the omission to extend such protection as is due under the circumstances. Formal intervention is extended by a government in such cases only in behalf of its own citizens, and in respect of acts which occurred while they held the relation of citizens. The wrong done to a government in the person of its citizen is not transferred to another government by his naturalization as a citizen of the latter.

"Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the care and protection of the Federal government over his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government. Of this there can be no doubt, nor that the right depends upon his character as a citizen of the United States. All rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign nations, are dependent upon citizenship of the United States and not citizenship of a State."

Miller, J., Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 79, 80.

"If his property was captured by the United States, under circumstances which entitled him to require its restoration, the law of nations gave him the right to prosecute his claim through his own government for the loss he sustained. That right was not taken from him by the abandoned and captured property act. It was open to him from the first moment of the capture. All he had to do was to induce his government to assume the responsibility of making his claim, and then the matter would be prosecuted as one nation proceeds against another, not by suit in the courts as matter of right, but by diplomatic representations, or, if need be, by war. In such cases it rests with the sovereign against whom the demand is made to determine for himself what he will do with it. He may pay or reject it; he may submit to arbitration, open his own courts to suit, or consent to be tried in the courts of another nation. All depends upon himself.' United States v. Diekelman, 92 U. S. 520."

Young . United States (1877), 97 U. S. 39, 67.

"When a diplomatic representative is satisfied that an applicant for protection has a right to his intervention, he should interest himself in his behalf, examining carefully into his grievances. If he finds that the complaints are well founded, he should interpose firmly, but with courtesy and moderation, with the authorities in his behalf and report the case to the Department of State for its further action, if any be required."

Printed Instructions to Diplomatic Officers of the United States (1897),
$ 170.

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