he expressed the opinion that it would be bad policy to attempt to press it at that time. On April 12, 1867, he reported that Mr. Wells had been trying to sell the claim to a Brazilian, and that he supposed a purchaser had been found. On the 1st of the following October, however, he reported that he had settled the claim for a certain amount in bills of exchange on London, but stated that all over a certain proportion was to be paid to the Brazilian purchasers of the claim. It further appeared that he had brought about the settlement by threatening to break off diplomatic relations. On December 7, 1867, Mr. Seward, in acknowledging the receipt of certain bills of exchange, said that Mr. Webb's course had shown “much energy and sagacity," but that, if the settlement was brought about in consequence of the transfer of the claim to Brazilians, this circumstance would "certainly have weakened the moral and annulled the legal right" of the United States further to interfere in the matter. Mr. Seward also observed that the ground of complaint was that the judge who condemned the vessel was actuated by fraudulent motives; but that as Mr. Wells was removed from the consulate at St. Catharines for improper official conduct, the Department deemed itself bound to scrutinize any transaction with which he was connected, and that the proceeds of the bills of exchange would not be paid to him till further information should have been received as to the transfer of the claim to Brazilians. On January 17, 1868, Mr. Seward submitted the case to the Attorney-General, with a request for an opinion as to whether the Brazilian Government was justly responsible for damages resulting from the alleged corruption of the judge at St. Catharines. Accompanying his letter there was a report from the examiner of claims of the Department of State, who held that the claim was groundless and that its settlement established a dangerous precedent. The examiner of claims also stated that Mr. Webb had rejected an offer of arbitration by the Brazilian Government. Mr. Webb's conduct was also made the subject of a formal complaint by that Government. He himself admitted that the case had created a strong public feeling in Rio against the United States and the American minister. December 29, 1871, Mr. Akerman, Attorney-General, sent to Mr. Fish an opinion in which he took the ground that the Brazilian Government was not responsible, and that, if the charge of corruption against the judge at St. Catharines was established, redress should be sought in the courts of Brazil. It appears that no definite information was possessed by the Department of State as to the disposition of the proportion of the money which was to have been paid to the Brazilian purchasers of the claim. Mr. Webb stated that the money had been paid over to them, but gave no further information on the subject. The Brazilian minister at Washington stated that his Government had paid to Mr. Webb, besides the £5,000 sent by him to Washington, the sum of £9,252, making in all £14.252. By the diplomatic and consular appropriation act of June 11, 1874 (18 Stat. 70), the sum of $57,500, or so much thereof as might be neces sary, was appropriated "for repaying to the Government of Brazil money erroneously claimed by and paid to the United States." For the diplomatic correspondence in the case, see S. Ex. Doc. 52, 43 Cong. 1 sess. For the opinion of Attorney-General Akerman, see 13 Op. 553. "I have to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 34 of the 16th December last, in relation to the detention under judicial authority of the schooner Indian of Galveston, Texas. The court in this instance may have been very much mistaken, of which there is no evidence, but it is to be presumed that any error into which it may have fallen will be corrected upon appeal to the superior tribunals. When it is found that manifest injustice in a plain case has been sanctioned by the court of last resort, then and not till then, can we call upon the executive branch of the Mexican Government to redress the wrong. I need not say to you that a judicial court can not make reparation in damages for any error into which it has fallen, and that it is a principle vital to that independence of the judiciary which this Government cherishes as an invaluable safeguard for the rights and liberties of the subject, that judges should not be held personally re sponsible for errors of judgment. They may be indictable for the malicious usurpation of power or malicious exercise of real authority at the suit of their own Government, but private parties, whether domestic or alien, can in general sustain no action against them for their official proceedings." Mr. J. C. B. Davis, Assist. Sec. of State, to Mr. Chase, consul at Tampico, See, to the same effect, Mr. Hunter, Second Assist. Sec. of State, to Mr. MS. Dom. Let. 385. "The Department might not be able to coincide with the view expressed in your dispatch to the effect that the Government of Guate mala might be held responsible for wrongs resulting from the corrupt conduct of one of its judges. It is understood to be a well established principle of public and municipal law that no government is answerable to a party who may have suffered from the corrupt conduct of its public officers. It is, however, unnecessary to discuss this question at length now as the Department has reached the conclusion that no just grounds exist for the diplomatic interference of this Government." Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Logan, min. to Central America, No. 136, 1 Proceedings were taken in the District of Columbia for the condemnation of certain property for the use of the Government of the United States. The property was condemned and the amount of its appraised value paid by the Government into court according to law. A claim was subsequently made against the United States, and in support of the claim it was contended that the money was paid over by the court to persons who were not entitled to it. Held, that, even assuming that the money was erroneously paid over, the United States could not be held responsible for it. "The courts of the United States," said the court, "are in no sense agencies of the Federal Government, nor is the latter liable for their errors or mistakes; they are independent tribunals, created and supported, it is true, by the United States; but the Government stands before them in no other position than that of an ordinary litigant. It had discharged its entire liability by the payment into court, and was not entitled to notice even of the order for the distribution of the money. If the Attorney-General had appeared, it might have been charged that he was a mere interloper, and that only the owners of the land were interested in the distribution of its proceeds." United States v. Dunnington (1892), 146 U. S. 338, 351. 4. SANITARY MEASURES. § 1003. See supra, § 191, as to quarantine. In the latter part of 1894 a disease thought to be cholera (afterwards found to be diarrhea-cholera) appeared in the valley of Parahyba, State of Rio, Brazil. In consequence, traffic over the railroad from Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo was suspended, and several lots of watermelons from the interior were seized by order of the sanitary authorities of the State of São Paulo and destroyed. The watermelon producers of São Paulo, among whom were many Americans, were thus prevented from disposing of their crops. Early in 1895 these producers filed claims with the State government of São Paulo, and, as the claims were not paid, they appealed to their own governments for diplomatic interposition. In August, 1896, the Department of State held that the measures taken by the authorities of São Paulo were justified under the circumstances, and that an indemnity could not be demanded for the Americans involved. The Department suggested, however, that there might be ground for equitable relief and directed the American legation to lay the matter before the Brazilian Government in that sense. The Brazilian Government answered that, the claims having been administratively denied, the claimants must seek their remedy in the courts. In view of this answer the Department of State, in March, 1897, instructed the Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Thompson, min. to Brazil, No. 350, In each of these instructions it was stated that if citizens of other 5. TARIFF CHANGES. § 1004. As to the power of taxation, see supra, §§ 183, 184. Claims were made by certain American merchants against the Spanish Government for the refund of duties which they were compelled to pay in 1845 on property shipped to Cuba on the faith of a decree issued by the Cuban authorities on October 7, 1844, which the Spanish Government afterwards refused to sanction and which, pending the voyages of the vessels to Cuba, was rescinded. In 1860 a convention was concluded at Madrid for the settlement of the claims for the sum of $128,635.54. This convention was submitted to the Senate of the United States, which, on March 5, 1860, declined to approve it. Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Colquitt, Nov. 8, 1884, 153 MS. Dom. Let. 160; Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Frye, Feb. 17, 1886, 159 MS. Dom. Let. 98. With reference to complaints of citizens of the United States who had purchased sugar and molasses in Porto Rico with the intention of exporting them, of a decree of the captain-general of that island imposing a duty of three dollars a hogshead on sugar and fifty cents a hogshead on molasses, to take effect immediately, Mr. Fish said that when important changes in the fiscal regulations of foreign countries were made they were usually prospective in their operation, so that they might have no injurious effect on previous transactions. This rule he considered to have been lost sight of in the decree in question. and he requested the Spanish minister at Washington to convey to the captain-general of Porto Rico and also to the Spanish Government the expectation that "amends will be made for any losses which citizens of the United States may have sustained, or may incur, in consequence of the unusual terms of the decree referred to." Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Lopez Roberts, Span. min., April 3, 1869, An American form at New York shipped, on August 25, 1894, a cargo of flour and other previsions to San Juan, Porto Rico, the reci procity agreement with Spain under section 3 of the McKinley Act then being in force. When the cargo arrived at San Juan the reciprocity agreement had come to an end, and the authorities declined to assess the duties under it. The firm in question protested against the action of the authorities in imposing without due notice in advance the heavier duties on the cargoes, and appealed to the Department of States for relief. The Department held that, as the new tariff act of the United States, commonly known as the Wilson-Gorman Act, which went into operation at midnight of August 27-28, 1894, repealed the legislation under which the reciprocity agreement was concluded, and as the basis of reciprocal treatment then disappeared the United States could not claim the continuance of the agreement nor contest the right of the Spanish Government to treat it as cancelled from that day and hour. "Our own legislation," said the Department, "took effect immediately on the act becoming a law, and without formal notice or other knowledge of its provisions and effects than could be obtained from the publicity given to it during the ten days before it became a law." Mr. Uhl, Act. Sec. of State, to Messrs. Flint & Co., Sept. 11, 1894, 198 MS. As to the refund of duties levied under the tariff act of August, 1842, 6. DEBASEMENT OF THE CURRENCY. § 1005. "Many citizens of the United States complain that contracts entered into with the Spanish Government for metallic money have been discharged to their very great loss in depreciated paper. 66 The injustice of this is manifest. Between discharging a debt by paying one-half its nominal amount, and the whole of its nominal amount possessing only one-half its real value, there is no difference. "To your remonstrances heretofore made on this subject, we observe that the minister of His Catholic Majesty has only replied— the absolute right of a sovereign nation on its own territory. "This right we mean not to question or impair. But coextensive and coeval with it, is the privilege of a foreign friendly nation, to complain of, and remonstrate against, such acts of sovereignty as are injurious to its citizens or subjects. This privilege we mean respectfully to exercise. "In contracts entered into by individuals with a sovereign power there exists no tribunal to enforce their performance. For this the good faith of the sovereign is alone relied on. This is held sacred, H. Doc. 551-vol 648 |