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war had destroyed. Held, that the railroad company could not be charged by the United States with the expense.

United States v. Pacific R. R. Co., 120 U. S. 227.

The rule, in Congressional cases for war damages, is that allow ance will be made only for property taken to be used, and at its val to the Government, not for property taken to be destroyed, or for damages which the owner suffered by reason of the taking. But, in cases of religious and charitable institutions, Congress has adopte a different rule as to the measure of damages, viz, to allow for the value of a building as a building.

Presbyterian Church at Murfreesboro v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 339.
As to the Bowman Act, 22 Stat. 485, see Heflebower v. United States.
21 Ct. Cl. 228; Beasely v. United States, id. 225; Carter r. United
States, 23 id. 326; Conrad v. United States, 25 id. 433.

"The duty of making compensation to individuals, whose private property is thus sacrificed to the general welfare, is inculcated by public jurists, as correlative to the sovereign right of alienating those things which are included in the eminent domain, but this duty must have its limits. No government can be supposed to be able, consistently with the welfare of the whole community, to assume the burden of losses produced by conquest, or the violent dismemberment of the state. Where, then, the cession of territory is the result of coer cion and conquest, forming a case of imperious necessity beyond the power of the state to control, it does not impose any obligation upon the government to indemnify those who may suffer a loss of property by the cession."

Wheaton Int. Law, pt. iv. § 2.

General Halleck, after citing the above (1 Baker's Halleck, 256) says: "The history of the State of New York furnishes a strong illustration of this rule of public law. The people of the territory now composing the State of Vermont separated from New York and erected that ter ritory into a separate and independent State. Individual citizens whose property would be sacrificed by the event, claimed compensation of New York. The claim was rejected on the ground that the independence of Vermont was an act of force beyond the power of New York to control, and equivalent to a conquest of that territory.”

of

In December, 1870, Prussian troops took forcible possession of and scuttled six British colliers in the River Seine, near the port Rouen. When the facts became known, the British minister at Berlin, under instructions of Earl Granville, declared to the Prussian Government that the Government of Her Britannic Majesty could not "but consider the seizure and sinking of these vessels to be altogether unwarrantable, and the firing upon them, if it took place, a matter which requires the fullest explanation."

This complaint was communicated to Count Bismarck, then chancellor of the North German Confederation, who immediately gave to the British Government, through the Prussian minister at London, the following assurance, accompanied with an expression of regret :

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We sincerely regret that our troops, in order to avert immediate danger, were obliged to seize ships which belonged to British subjects. We admit their claim to indemnification, and shall pay to the owners the value of the ships, according to equitable estimation, without keeping them waiting for the decision of the question who is finally to indemnify them. Should it be proved that excesses have been committed which were not justified by the necessity of defence, we should regret it still more, and call the guilty persons to account."

At an early day there was paid to the British Government an indemnity of £7,073 6s. 5d., the precise amount fixed by the British Board of Trade.

61 Brit. & For. State Papers, 575, 577, 578, 611.

"I have the honor to inform you that, in conversation with a wellinformed person in high position here, I have learned that the German Government have from time to time since the French war favorably considered the claims of German citizens who have suffered from the acts of German soldiers, or from the necessities of military strategy, and that such claims were still occasionally received, but that none were paid where the damage or loss was from acts of the French army. The generality of the successful claims were in Alsace-Lorraine.

"About three years ago I ascertained, in reply to similar private inquiries, that the German Government had paid no claims from foreigners for damages, except one for some coal barges, belonging to British subjects, which were sunk for strategic purposes, and the claim for which was sent through the British embassy in Paris, and immediately paid in cash."

Mr. Everett, chargé at Berlin, to Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, No. 309, April 3, 1882, MS. Desp. from Germany, in reply to Department's No. 304, March 21, 1882.

It was represented that certain citizens of the United States were ordered by the Spanish military authorities to build forts and other defensive works on their plantations in Cuba, as well as to contribute large sums to the construction of military works elsewhere. "Such arbitrary acts of force," said the Department of State, "which compel private individuals to give up their property or to expend such money and labor for the Spanish Government, and to do that service. which a government in general performs at the public expense, can in no respect be called taxation, and cannot be justified in time of

peace, nor will it be doubted that if enforced they will give rise to a valid claim for compensation and indemnity.”

Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Mantilla, Spanish min., Jan. 11. 1876. MS. Notes to Span. Leg. IX. 414. See, also, supra, § 540, IV. 20-21. The exactions here referred to were incidents of the Ten Years' War in Cuba, 1868-1878. The statement that they could not be justified “in time of peace" referred to Spain's contention that war in the international sense did not exist.

See, in connection with the foregoing note of Mr. Fish to Mr. Mantilla, the instruction of Mr. Fish to Mr. Cushing, May 22, 1876, supra, § 183, vol. 2, p. 65.

By law No. 10 of the Colombian Congress of August 31, 1886, it was provided that all claims presented by foreigners against the Govern ment of the Republic for loans, supplies, expropriations, or damages arising out of the late rebellion in that country should be considered by the executive power, acting through the minister of foreign relations, who should decide in each case "according to the rules established by common law and the law of nations." Where a claimant was dissatisfied, he was to be allowed to appeal to the law courts for a decision. The law declared that the nation should "not be absolutely responsible for the damages and exactions suffered by foreigners on account of rebels." The alien and neutral character of the claimant was required to be proved as a preliminary to the determination of his claim. The right of foreigners to present claims under the law was limited to one year from the date of its promulgation. All contracts were declared to be presumptively fictitious which were concluded between foreigners and disaffected citizens subsequently to the promulgation of the resolution issued by the secretary of foreign relations on February 13, 1885, in conformity with article 12 of the civil code. The rebellion was considered for the purposes of the law as existing from September 18, 1884, to September 30, 1885. The executive power was authorized to make regulations for the execution of the law.

In an instruction to the American legation at Bogotá October 13. 1886, Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, referring to the foregoing law. said:

"It is a settled principle of international law that a sovereign can not be permitted to set up one of his own municipal laws as a bar to a claim by a foreign sovereign for a wrong done to the latter's subjects; and you are consequently to take the ground in all discussions with the Government of Colombia that the statute adopted by Colombia on the 31st of August, 1886, is regarded by the Government of the United States as in no way whatever qualifying or limiting the obligation of Colombia to the United States for injuries inflicted on citizens of the United States when in Colombia."

By decree No. 602, of October 11, 1886, the President of Colombia promulgated regulations for the execution of the law of August 31. By this decree it was declared that the Government should not be responsible for damages caused by rebels, except where the following conditions concurred: (1) When the damages were caused by regular forces acting in obedience to the orders of a known chief, and not when caused by fugitive bands or by guerillas in bodies of less than fifty men; (2) when the injury was inflicted by violence or at least against the will or without the consent, express or implied, of the injured person; (3) when the injury was done for the indispensable maintenance of the rebels, and (4) when, in addition to the three foregoing conditions, the injury was inflicted "within the limits prescribed by morals and civilization."

Mr. King, chargé, to Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, No. 70, Sept. 11, 1886, For. Rel. 1887, 245; Mr. Bayard to Mr. King, No. 53, Oct. 13, 1886, id. 247; Mr. King to Mr. Bayard, No. 83, Oct. 27, 1886, id. 247.

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4. CLAIMS FOR EMBARGOES.

§ 1035.

Art. VII. of the treaty between the United States and Brazil of Dec. 12, 1828, stipulates that the citizens of the contracting parties shall not be liable to any embargo, nor be detained with their vessels, cargoes or merchandise or effects, for any military expedition, nor for any public or private purpose whatever, without allowing to those interested a sufficient indemnification." It was held that the Brazilian imperial authorities were not liable in damages under this article for detaining an American vessel so as to prevent her from going to an interior port which was in the hands of insurgents, but that they were so liable for detaining her when this justification had ceased.

Moore, Int. Arbitrations, V. 4615-4617. See, also, Mr. Forsyth, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hunter, chargé d'affaires to Brazil, No. 45, March 13, 1839, MS. Inst. Brazil, XV. 57.

During the insurrection in Cuba from 1868 to 1878, numerous claims were presented by the United States to Spain on account of the embargo or confiscation of estates of citizens of the United States, the release or return of which estates had been directed by the Spanish Government. A number of these claims came before the mixed commission under the agreement between the United States and Spain of February 11-12, 1871, and some of them continued to be pressed after the commission had ceased to exist. Damages were claimed by the United States (1) for the failure of the Cuban authorities to execute the orders of the Spanish Government for the

release of the estates, (2) for the rents and profits received by Spain during the detention of the property and admitted to be in the handof that Government, and (3) for the detention of the property. O July 12, 1873, the Government of Spain published a decree admitting the illegality of the embargoes, and on the 7th of November, in the same year, the minister of the colonies telegraphed to the captaingeneral at Havana an order for the restoration of some tweney-five estates prior to the 30th of that month. On February 9, 1876, order were repeated by the Spanish Government for the restoration of the property of four of the American citizens, and other and similar orders were issued at still later dates. As late as November, 1888. the Spanish Government agreed to pay $1,500,000 in the case of one of the claimants, Antonio Maximo Mora, and the money was paid in

1895.

See, as to the embargoed estates claims, Moore, Int. Arbitrations, IL
1025, 1035; IV. 3754.

See, also, Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Foster, min. to Spait.
May 3, 1883, For. Rel. 1883, 773.

As to the case of Mora, see For. Rel. 1894, Appendix I. pp. 364–450; For.
Rel. 1895, II. p. 1163, et seq.; S. Ex. Doc. 175, 52 Cong. 1 sess.; S. Ex.
Doc. 115, 53 Cong. 2 sess.; S. Ex. Doc. 10, 53 Cong. 3 sess.; and infra
§ 1055.

As to the points of law involved in the embargoed estates claims, see,
particularly, Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II. 1032, 1035–1036,

By a decree of the governor-general of Cuba of January 24, 1896. a general requisition was ordered of horses and mules for military service, and provision was made for their appraisement. No reference appeared in the decree to the treaty rights of aliens, and in due time reports were received of the taking in districts controlled by the Spanish power of horses and mules belonging to citizens of the United States, in some cases with appraisement of their value, in others by arbitrary seizure without receipt or appraisement. Besides, "wanton aggressions upon the property of citizens of the United States by the Spanish soldiery, professing to act under the express orders of their commanders," were reported, for which no warrant was found in any decree. For example, it was averred that. although abundant fodder was near at hand, the Spanish cavalry encamped at certain points had "cut off the tops of growing sugar cane upon plantations known to be owned and operated by citizens of the United States, thus not only destroying the crop, but killing the plants from the roots." No appraisement or tender of value appeared to have accompanied "this spoliation of private alien property.'

By article 7 of the treaty between the United States and Spain of 1795 it was "agreed that the subjects or citizens of each of the

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