with England's arbitrary occupation of the disputed territory between Venezuela and British Guiana; the question how

"Few, if any, official utterances of the century have had such general and lasting influence. When the Message was published in London it received universal commendation. Said one of the journals: 'We shall hear no more of a Congress to settle the fate of the South American States;' another: 'It is worthy the occasion and of the people destined to occupy so large a space in the future history of the world.' Mr. Canning's biographer, in recording the effect of its publication in Europe, says that, coupled with the refusal of England to take part in the proposed Congress to discuss Spanish-American affairs, it effectually put an end to the project. Mr. Brougham, the English statesman, said: “The question with regard to South America is now disposed of, or nearly so, for an event has recently happened than which no event has dispensed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude over all the freemen of Europe; that event, which is decisive on the subject in respect of South America, is the message of the President of the United States to Congress.' It is further reported that the South American deputies in London were wild with joy, and South American securities of every sort rose in value.' "The manner in which it was received in the United States was described by Mr. Webster, in a speech delivered in the Senate three years later, as follows: 'It met, sir, with entire concurrence and hearty approbation of the country. One general glow of exultation, one universal feeling of gratified love of liberty, one conscious and proud perception of the consideration which our country possessed, and of the respect and honor which belonged to it, penetrated all bosoms.' (3 Webster's Works, 178.) An undue share of credit has been assigned to Mr. Canning for the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, and to him has even been ascribed the origin or first suggestion of the idea. But it has been seen that fifteen years before, President Jefferson had set forth the policy in much broader terms than those contained in Canning's proposal to Rush. The published diplomatic correspondence shows that Secretary Adams was fully informed as to the designs of the Holy Alliance, and that six months before that proposal was broached he had given instructions to our Minister in Spain to make known at the proper time that our government would oppose any forcible intervention in American affairs or the transfer of any of the Spanish possessions to the European powers. Canning's proposal went no further than a protest against the transfer of any of the colonies to other powers, which was much narrower than Monroe's message; and the correspondence makes it plain that Great Britain was wholly influenced by a desire to retain and enlarge its trade and by its jealousy of France."

See also, as to effect of announcement and extracts from European publications, Professor McMaster's Origin, Meaning and Application of the Monroe Doctrine, Philadelphia, 1896.

The Monroe Doctrine has been asserted on numerous occasions between the time when it was first enunciated as a principle of American international diplomacy until its recent reaffirmance at The Hague un

ever was finally, on our insistence, referred to the Arbitration Tribunal, which has recently rendered its award, and

der the style of "Traditional policy of the United States in regard to American affairs."

The occasions upon which it has been asserted can be divided into two classes. First, when it has been asserted in regard to the efforts of European powers to obtain a foothold or to increase their colonial possessions in North, South or Central America; second, when it has been asserted in regard to the relations between the United States and other republics of the Western Hemisphere, and the right of the United States, as the most powerful Government in America, to regulate affairs for the purpose of maintaining peace and averting the evils of war. A few of these instances only can be referred to in this note. The reader is referred for a more detailed history of the application of the Monroe Doctrine to the authorities referred to at the end of this note; special reference is made at this point to Professor Freeman Snow's Treatise on American Diplomacy, published in 1894, over two hundred pages of which are devoted to a critical review of the Monroe Doctrine in its various aspects both as to origin and application, and which has greatly aided the author in making his own investigations in regard to this subject.

THE PANAMA CONGRESS.

Within a very brief period after the Monroe Doctrine was enunciated occasions arose for its practical application. In 1826 invitations were extended by some of the South American Republics to the United States to meet representatives of the other Republics in a Congress which was to be held at Panama to effect a general union of all the Republics. It was suggested that the Congress would consider, amongst other things, the desirability of "combining the forces of the Republics, to free the Islands of Puerto Rico and Cuba from the yoke of Spain . . to take measures for joining in a prosecution of the war at sea and on the coasts of Spain, and to determine whether these measures should also be extended to the Canary and Philippine Islands." These objects were wholly beyond the objects, desires or rights of the United States, and were entirely inconsistent with one of the other objects stated in the call for the Congress; to wit, "to take into consideration the means of making effectual the declaration of the President of the United States, respecting any ulterior design of a foreign power to colonize any portion of this continent, and also the means of resisting all interference from abroad with the domestic concerns of the American Governments." President John Quincy Adams, Mr. Monroe's successor, however accepted the invitation and stated in a message to Congress that ministers on the part of the United States "would be commissioned to attend at those deliberations and to take part in them so far as may be compatible with that neutrality, from which it is neither our intention nor the desire of the other American States that we should depart."

The president had power to appoint commissioners, but the appropria

thus amicably settled a question which for a quarter of a century has threatened from time to time to plunge at least three countries into war.2

2 See reference to Lord Salis- | bury's letter in footnote 1 to § 52, pages 107-8.

tion for their expenses had to be made by Congress. When the special message was sent to the Senate nominating Richardson C. Anderson and John Sergeant as envoys to the Congress, a resolution was at once offered as follows: "Resolved, That it is not expedient at this time for the United States to send any ministers to the Congress of American nations assembled at Panama."

While this resolution was pending in the Senate, the following resolution was introduced in the House: "Resolved, That in the opinion of this House, it is expedient to appropriate the funds necessary to enable the President of the United States to send ministers to the Congress at Panama."

The appropriation finally passed Congress, and commissioners were appointed; on account of the delay, however, our representatives did not actually participate in the meeting. The Congress met at Panama, but without accomplishing any actual results; it adjourned to meet at Tacubaya the following year, but no adjourned meeting was held, and as Professor Snow says in concluding his chapter on this episode, “Thus ended the first attempt to form an alliance of American states. The Monroe Doctrine was forgotten for the time; and the Spanish-Americans were left to work out their destiny in their own way, and to acquire by long training in the school of experience the capacity for self-government which they lacked at that time."

The details of the entire history of the Panama Congress are very interesting, and, according to a note in Professor Snow's article (page 312) the following documents contain a complete history of the conference. "The documents and details of the Panama Congress are given in full in the 4th volume (Historical Appendix) of the proceedings of the International American Conference. See also: Lyman's Diplomacy of the United States, II., 467; American Review and Whig Journal, January, 1846; A. W. Young: American Statesman, 352; Am. State Pap. VI., 834-910; Benton's Debates, VIII.; Benton's View, I.; Webster's Works, III., 178; Niles's Register."

OTHER CONGRESSES OF AMERICAN REPUBLICS.

There have been a number of American congresses since the attempt to hold one in 1825-26.

Professor Snow refers to them as follows: (1) The Congress of Lima, 1847; (2) the Continental Treaty of 1856, which to some extent showed "a spirit of hostility to the United States," resulting from the Walker expeditions into Central America; (3) the Congress of Lima, 1864; (4) proposed Congress of Panama, 1881; (5) the proposed Congress at Washington, 1882; the International American Conference, 1890.

§ 55. Spain, Cuba, and the Monroe Doctrine. In 1852, when we had reason to suspect that Spain contemplated a

TRANS-ISTHMIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

The Monroe Doctrine has always been asserted by the United States in regard to the right of transit over the Isthmus of Panama and through the territory of Nicaragua, and in fact generally as to any trans-Isthmian communication.

Reference to this will be found in Professor Snow's book, page 326, in Lindley Miller Keasbey's Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe Doctrine, ex-Secretary of State John W. Foster's Century of American Diplomacy, and Tucker's Monroe Doctrine.

In connection with trans-Isthmian communication, however, so far as Great Britain is concerned, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850 is considered by some as a modification of the Monroe Doctrine; but although that treaty created a joint protectorate between this country and Great Britain as to a trans-Isthmian canal, under certain then expected conditions which up to this time have never materialized, it did not weaken the right of the United States to prevent the extension of British dominion in Central America, as was evidenced by the firm position which was asserted and maintained in regard thereto by Mr. Webster.

Particular reference in this respect is made to Mr. Keasby's chapter "the Central American Imbroglio," in which he says that the Monroe Doctrine was asserted with the result that Great Britain was obliged to withdraw from her protectorate over the Mosquito Coast. See also the history of Central American Complications with Great Britain in Government Document, 1856, Central American Affairs and the Enlistment Question.

RELATIONS WITH CUBA.

The relations of the United States and Cuba have always been more or less affected by the Monroe Doctrine. In 1852 France and England suggested that those powers and the United States should enter into a joint disavowal of ever intending to acquire the Island of Cuba; this the United States refused to do. On the contrary, those powers were informed that events might necessitate the acquisition of Cuba by the United States, but whether that were so or not, under no circumstances would this country permit any other country to take possession of that island.

On December 1, 1852, Secretary of State Edward Everett, wrote identic notes to Great Britain and France, in which he expressed the position of the United States as follows (1 Wharton's Digest, § 60):

"The United States, on the other hand, would, by the proposed convention, disable themselves from making an acquisition which might take place without any disturbance of existing foreign relations and in the natural order of things. The Island of Cuba lies at our doors. It commands the approach to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes the shores of five of our States. It bars the entrance of that great river which

transfer of Cuba to some other power, we gave notice at once that no such transfer would be permitted.1 On the

$ 55.

1 For an extended history of the foreign relations of the United States affecting Cuba, see: Cuba

and International Relations, by James Morton Callahan, John Hopkins Press, 1899.

drains half the North American continent, and with its tributaries forms the largest system of internal water communication in the world. It keeps watch at the doorway of our intercourse with California by the Isthmus route. If an island like Cuba, belonging to the Spanish Crown, guarded the entrance of the Thames and the Seine, and the United States should propose a convention like this to France and England, those powers would assuredly feel that the disability assumed by ourselves was far less serious than that which we asked them to assume. The opinions of American statesmen, at different times and under varying circumstances, have differed as to the desirableness of the acquisition of Cuba by the United States. Territorially and commercially it would in our hands be an extremely valuable possession. Under certain contingencies it might be almost essential to our safety. Still for domestic reasons, on which in a communication of this kind it might not be proper to dwell, the President thinks that the incorporation of the island into the Union at the present time, although effected with the consent of Spain, would be a hazardous measure; and he would consider its acquisition by force, except in a just war with Spain, should an event so greatly to be deprecated take place, as a disgrace to the civilization of the age." (Mr. Everett, Sec. of State, to Mr. Crampton, Dec. 1, 1852, MSS. Notes Gr. Brit. See Mr. Everett and the Cuban Question, by Mr. Trescot, 9 South, Quar. Rev., new series, April, 1854, 429. For Mr. Everett's views in full, see 1 Wharton's Digest, § 72). Mr. Everett, on December 3, 1852, wrote again to Mr. Crampton as follows:

"To enter into a compact with European powers to the effect that the United States, as well as the other contracting powers, would disclaim all intention, now or hereafter, to obtain possession of Cuba, would be inconsistent with the principles, the policy, and the traditions of the United States." 1 Wharton's Digest, § 60. (Mr. Everett, Sec. of State, to Mr. Crampton, Dec. 3, 1852, MSS. Notes, Gr. Brit.; see also 1 Wharton's Digest, § 72.)

See also the authorities cited in section 60 of Wharton's Digest under the head of Intervention in Cuba, including extract from President Filmore's third annual message in 1852.

As to the present relations of Cuba and the United States and the effect of the Monroe Doctrine thereon, see §§ 106 et seq., chap. III, post.

MEXICAN INTERVENTION.

One of the most notable instances of the application of the Monroe Doctrine was in 1861-1865 during which period Louis Napoleon attempted to establish a monarchy in Mexico under French protection.