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JAMES A. HALEY, FLA., CHAIRMAN

OY A. TAYLOR, N.C.

AROLD T. JOHNSON, CALIF.
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZ.
PHILLIP BURTON, CALIF.
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, WIS.
PATSY T. MINK, HAWAII
LLOYD MEEDS, WASH.
ABRAHAM KAZEN, JR., TEX.
ROBERT G. STEPHENS, JR., GA.
JOSEPH P. VIGORITO, PA.
JOHN MELCHER, MONT.
TINO RONCALIO, WYO.
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, N.Y.
JOHN P. SEIBERLING, OHIO
HAROLD RUNNELS, N. MEX.
ANTONIO BORJA WON PAT, QUAM

RON DE LUGO, V.I.

BOB ECKHARDT, TEX.

GOODLOE E. BYRON, MD.

JAIME BENITEZ, P.R.

JIM SANTINI, NEV.

PAUL E. TSONGAS, MASS.

ALLAN T. HOWE, UTAH

JAMES WEAVER, OREG.

BOB CARR, MICH.

GEORGE MILLER, CALIF

THEODORE M. (TED) RISENHOOVER,

OKLA.

JAMES J. FLORIO, NJ.

[blocks in formation]

STAFF DIRECTOR

LEE MC ELVAIN

GENERAL COUNSEL

MICHAEL C. MARDEN
MINORITY COUNSEL

Mr. William Anders, Chairman
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Anders:

Recently the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment
has received correspondence indicating concern with regard
to sabotage of shipments of spent fuel. The assertion is
made that conventional explosives could readily be used
to cause the release from shipping casks of substantial
quantities of radioactive materials.

I would appreciate your informing the Subcommittee
as to the extent to which the Commission believes such
sabotage to be a threat, that steps taken to prevent it,
and additional regulations being considered for promulgation
in this area.

Sincerely,

Morris K. Udall, Chairman
Subcommittee on Energy and
the Environment

UNITED BY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF THE
CHAIRMAN

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

MAR 19 1976

Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman

Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
U. S. House of Representatives

Dear Chairman Udall:

In your letter of February 17, 1976, you asked whether conventional explosives could readily be used to sabotage shipments of spent fuel.

This issue was recently addressed in testimony prepared by the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for presentation during Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearings on the Wolf Creek Generating Station proposed by Kansas Gas and Electric Company and Kansas City Power and Light Company. The Wolf Creek testimony was not presented because the intervenors withdrew their contention on this issue. Nevertheless, I have enclosed a copy in the hope that it will satisfactorily answer the Subcommittee's questions on this matter. The testimony includes the following conclusions:

1. The design features that enable the shipping
casks to withstand severe transportation
accidents (e.g., multiplicity of heavy steel
shells, a thick, dense gamma shield, a water
jacket and sacrificial impact absorbers) also
enable the casks to withstand attack by small
arms fire and explosives. The staff has
concluded that it would require extraordinary
skills and uncommon materials to breach the
inner vessel.

2. The tight packing of the fuel element (s) in the cask, the difficulty in removing the cover (s), and the level of radioactivity of the exposed fuel militate against any introduction of explosives into the cask with the intent of propelling the fuel out of the container(s).

3.

A massive rupture of the cask is considered to be an incredible event.

4.

5.

6.

A possibility exists that a small bore penetra-
tion into the inner vessel could be made. In
this case, however, the radiological consequences
would be relatively small.

It is the staff's opinion that for quick, lethal
action a saboteur is more likely to choose any
one of a large number of other, much more readily
available, types of hazardous shipment--such as
explosives and chemical agents--to accomplish his
purpose. The dispersion of the radioactive material
contained in spent fuel shipping casks using the
scenarios discussed above is inefficient, costly,
dangerous to the criminal or saboteur, requires a
high degree of technical and scientific knowledge,
is uncertain in its consequences, and, because of
the delayed action or radioactive effects, less
than feasible for an immediate threat to life.

A release of solid, non-volatile radioactive
materials, were it to occur, would contaminate
the vehicle and nearby ground. The resulting
hazard, although dangerous and long lived would
be restricted to the immediate vicinity of the
transport vehicle.

Accordingly, current regulations are considered adequate for the protection against sabotage of shipments of spent fuel, and no additional regulations are currently being considered.

If we can be of further assistance, please advise.

Sincerely,

William A. Anders
Chairman

JAMES A. HALEY, FLA., CHAIRMAN

TOY A. TAYLOR, H.C.

AROLD T. JOHNSON, CALIF.
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZ.
PHILLIP BURTON, CALIF.

ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, WIS.
PATSY T. MINK, HAWAII
LLOYD MEEDS, WASH.
ABRAHAM KAZEN, JR., TEX.
ROBERT G. STEPHENS, JR., GA.
JOSEPH P. VIGORITO, PA.
JOHN MELCHER, MONT.
TENO RONCALIO, WYO.
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, N.Y.
JOHN P. SEIBERLING, OHIO
HAROLD RUNNELS, N. MEX.
ANTONIO BORJA WON PAT, QUAM
RON DE LUGO, V.I.

BOB ECKHARDT, TEX.

GOODLOE E. BYRON, MD.

JAIME BENITEZ, P.R.

JIM SANTINI, NEV,

PAUL E. TSONGAS, MASS.

ALLAN T. HOWE, UTAN

JAMES WEAVER, OREG.

BOB CARR, MICH.

GEORGE MILLER, CALIF.

THEODORE M. (TED) RISENHOOVER,

OKLA

JAMES J. FLORIO, N.J.

JOE SKUBITZ, KANS.
SAM STEIGER, ARIZ.
DON H. CLAUBEN, CALIF.
PHILIP E. RUPPE, MICH.
MANUEL LUJAN, JR., N. MEX.
KEITH SEBELJUS, KANS.
ALAN STEELMAN, TEX.
DON YOUNG, ALASKA
ROBERT E. BAUMAN, MO.
STEVEN D. SYMMS, IDAHO

JAMES P. (JIM) JOHNSON, COLO.
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, CALIF.
VIRGINIA SMITH, HEBR.
SHIRLEY N. PETTIS, CALIF.

Mr. William Anders

Chairman

COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

March 5, 1976

Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Anders:

COPY

STAFF DIRECTOR

LEE MC ELVAIN

GENERAL COUNSEL

MICHAEL C. MARDEN
MINORITY COUNSEL

Testimony received by February 26 and 27 by the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment implies existing systems in the nuclear industry are not capable of providing protection against threats which the NRC seems to consider plausible. In light of this, I believe the NRC should immediately either require an upgrading of security system quality or clarify its position concerning the nature of the threat.

In

I also urge you to increase the level of fines imposed for violations of safeguards regulations. I am skeptical of the rationale presented by Mr. Case at the February 27 hearing. an answer to Congressman Tsongas who expressed concern that fines were too low, Mr. Case said:

"No, sir. It is not the fine that is the real penalty. The real penalty is the public notoriety and the public pressure. That is one of the things that results from NRC imposing these fines, a lot newspaper publicity and that by far is a more expensive penalty on the company."

I would appreciate your earliest response.

Sincerely,

Morris K. Udall

Chairman, Subcommittee on
Energy and the Environment

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