programs is very small and at this time is largely in vault storage.

Each firm licensed to possess specified quantities of highenriched uranium or plutonium (substantially less than the amount necessary to make an explosive device) must comply with published safeguards requirements. A copy of these regulations (10 CFR Part 73) is attached hereto. One of these requires that a physical protection plan be submitted to the NRC for approval. The plan must demonstrate how the licensee will protect his plant against sabotage and the strategic materials in his possession against theft. The NRC promulgates regulations and imposes license conditions to make it clear to the licensee what he is expected to do in order to obtain and keep a license. Summarizing these requirements briefly, the NRC safeguards program requires that the licensee employ safeguards measures in depth, including on-site armed guards with access to law enforcement agencies; intrusion alarms backed up by structural barriers; access controls over limited access areas; exit searches; and material control and accounting.

Theft of plutonium by an employee would be extremely difficult to accomplish. As I mentioned earlier, most of the material now present in the private sector is in vault storage and essentially inaccessible to a lone insider. The material not in storage is handled or processed in enclosed, sealed containment or glove box process lines. Individuals are not allowed to work unobserved in areas housing these process lines, nor can a single individual make an authorized removal of material from such lines. If, under the scrutiny of his fellow employees, an individual is able to circumvent these measures, remove material, and conceal it on his person, he would still be subject to an exit search. As a check on the performance of safeguards, bi-monthly inventories are conducted to assure material has not been stolen.

An outside intruder must either force an entry at an access point which is manned by an armed guard or attempt covert entry. To gain entrance covertly, the intruder must surmount the fence line where intrusion alarms are located and the walls of the building housing the nuclear materials. Such buildings present significant delay times to anyone attempting to breach them since they are of substantial construction.

Any time strategic quantities of special nuclear material are shipped, plans are made before the shipment takes place. Routes are chosen to bypass areas of natural disaster or where civil disorder might occur. The shipment is picked up at the shipper's plant at a pre-arranged time by the convoy personnel, including armed guards, responsible for carrying and protecting the shipment. The material itself has already been assayed and placed into a safe container with tamperindicating seals attached. During the shipment no intermediate stops are made to pick up or drop off other cargo. Periodic radio-telephone calls are made to report progress of the shipment. After arrival at the receiver's plant, the seals are checked, the nuclear material is unloaded and NRC and the shipper are notified. Within a short time of receipt, the receiver assays the material to verify the quantity of nuclear material shipped.

The NRC is continuously upgrading its safeguards requirements and has under consideration several changes to its present regulations to further protect against theft. One of these changes, relating to in-transit security, has been issued for public comment. 39 Fed. Reg. 40036. It would require greater numbers of armed guards to accompany certain shipments of strategic material. A regulation change to require an NRC security clearance for employees in certain job functions involving access to strategic material is now being developed by the NRC staff.

If

NRC has a program of inspection and enforcement to ensure that licensees comply with its safeguards requirements. items of noncompliance are found, the licensee is expected to take prompt corrective action. If the situation warrants it, the NRC can assess a civil penalty and/or modify, suspend or revoke a license for failure to comply. For example, civil penalties were imposed on two licensees for failures to make timely implementation of upgraded safeguards requirements made effective in 1974.

In attempting to assess the present level of the threat posed by possible theft of special nuclear material, some historical perspective is necessary. Prior to 1970, threat of public harm as related to licensed nuclear facilities was considered primarily in terms of industrial sabotage which could endanger the public health and safety through dispersal of radioactive material. A panel of experts reviewing

safeguards for the AEC in 1967 also expressed some concern that a black market might develop for low-enriched uranium. But the Atomic Energy Commission rejected the contention that licensed facilities should be required to maintain safeguards capable of withstanding a military attack, and that determination was upheld in court in Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778 (C.A.D.C. 1968).

In the 1970-74 period, greater emphasis began to be given to the possibility that a terrorist group might attempt to steal an amount of special nuclear material sufficient to fashion a crude nuclear explosive in order to achieve its ends, be they political, social, or financial. Two factors which directed increased attention to this consideration were the increase in terrorist violence and the possibility that plutonium might play a larger part in the fuel cycle for power reactors. Reacting to this concern, the AEC significantly strengthened its jafeguards regulations. Additional requirements were pullished for public comment in February 1973 and issued in effective form in November 1973, with industry being required to meet them by the spring of 1974. Improvements have been made in safeguards on a continuous basis since that time.

In the past year, my office and other elements in the Commission have conducted and have on-going extensive studies dealing with the problem of threat. We have utilized expert contractors and consultants, and our people have worked extensively with others in Federal, state, and local law enforcement communities. Keeping in mind that in over 20 years of industry utilization of nuclear materials, not one member of the public has been injured by the theft and subsequent misuse of such materials, I believe the threat of nuclear material theft or sabotage can be characterized today as follows:

There is no information available to us which indicates that any group is planning an act of theft or sabotage against the licensed nuclear industry at this time.

Nevertheless, there is a continuing potential for insiders to execute malevolent acts or to provide assistance to outsiders in the execution of acts which could harm the public.

Furthermore, there are organizations with malevolent intent which could develop the capability to carry out operations against the licensed nuclear power industry. Our studies have concluded that there is evidence to support the possibility that present threat groups may be highly motivated and diciplined, well equipped and financed, well trained, and well prepared to execute the tasks they have selected.

Historical data on the size of terrorists groups indicates that terrorists assault groups larger than six persons are not likely to be formed. We have examined over 4000 incidents of terrorism and other antisocial behavior and were able to find 1271 cases where the number of perpetrators could be identified. The number of incidents involving groups of more than six persons account for only about 2.5 percent of the cases. Groups with as many as twelve persons have been very rare. By far the largest percentage (86%) involved groups of three persons or fewer.

There have been no instances of armed attack on United States nuclear facilities in the 20-plus years they have been operating. We have records of the types of violence and threats of violence which the licensed nuclear industry has experienced. These records show that during the three-year period after 1969, there were increasing numbers of bomb threats, hoaxes against power reactor sites and associated industry and education facilities, along with other acts of harassment. Since 1972, there has been a fairly constant number of hoaxes. In concert with other government agencies we are continuing to record and examine such incidents, in order to track the data, observe whether trends are developing, and analyze such trends to determine their relevance, if any.

The exact threat then, to summarize, cannot be predicted with confidence, since it is an inherently uncertain problem and history is an unsure guide to the future. By its very nature, the assessment of this threat is much more judgmental that the kinds of risk assessments the NRC is able to make with respect to reactor safety questions. In this regard, I believe that your "maximum credible threat" concept, which you would analogize to quantifiable safety assessments, is unsound.

My assessment of the threat, based on currently available evidence, expert opinion and our collective judgment is that an attack on nuclear facilities would likely stem from a relatively small number of persons, possibly aided by an insider. Present nuclear industry security measures are expected to deter most attacks and to prevent the success of such attacks as are attempted. It should be noted that the nuclear industry has customarily taken the approach of going beyond the normal precautions taken elsewhere in society in facing uncertain contingencies. The same conservative approach is being taken in nuclear safeguards, to the extent that we believe the total safeguards system for the industry, including on-site and off-site security forces, can protect against theft or sabotage attempts by groups larger than those thought to constitute the most likely threat. Concerns about the adequacy of safeguards properly tend to focus more on possible future wide-scale use of plutonium than upon its present limited use. The question of whether low-enriched uranium fuel for commercial reactors might be supplemented in the future with recycled plutonium is under consideration. The Commission's procedures for resolving this complex issue were announced recently. 40 Fed. Reg. 53056. If, after the careful review now in progress, this is allowed to occur, plutonium will be recovered from spent reactor fuel and processed into mixed uranium/plutonium reactor fuel. The advent of wide-scale plutonium recycle would increase the quantities of this material handled in the private sector. For planning purposes, design threat levels and safeguards measures to protect against them are being evaluated in a safeguards supplement to an environmental impact statement on plutonium recycle. This safeguards supplement is scheduled for release by the Commission for comment some time this spring. Public hearings will be held on the supplement before any final decision is reached. Your organization will have the opportunity to participate in those proceedings.

Use of Federal guard forces to perform safeguards functions has been considered in an intensive NRC study specifically required under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. While the study report, which is to be submitted to Congress in the near future, is not yet in final form, the NRC does not envision recommending at this time any major change in the allocation of guard responsibilities between the Federal and private sectors, contrary to your suggested deployment of U.S. Marshals.