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knowledge, equipment, materials and other items used at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. In providing for exceptions to this law, the authors have required that Congress expressly approve of the proposed transfer of nuclear materials, technology, etc.

H. R. 8282, and its identical bills, expands on the notion of limiting peaceful nuclear exports to nations which have ratified the NPT by allowing the conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA or Euratom as a substitute for NPT ratification. These bills would prohibit the NRC from licensing or authorizing the export, or ERDA from engaging to allow the export, of nuclear fuel or nuclear technology to any country which:

--is not a party to the NPT and which develops either an enrichment or reprocessing plant without concluding an agreement with the IAEA or Euratom (which are parties) by which all its present and future nuclear facilities are made subject to safeguards established by either agency against diversion of nuclear material, or

--furnishes or agrees to furnish uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing plants to countries not party to the NPT.

These prohibitions would be waived if the President determines that the national security interests of the U.S. would best be served by the issuance of such license or authorization and provides this written determination to Congress at least 90 days prior to the issuance of such license or authorization.

H. R. 8342 is identical to H. R. 8282 except that it would require the Presidential determination of national security interest to lie before Con

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These bills focus on a specific type of importing country, one which is

a potential supplier of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing equipment. U.S. concern about this aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle is due to the fact that reprocessing equipment is vital to the extraction of plutonium from spent nuclear reactor fuel, and plutonium is an essential ingredient of nuclear explosives. Highly enriched materials are also essential to bomb manufacture.

Two similar bills to further reduce the risk of proliferation by limiting nuclear nuclear exports to nations which will accept IAEA safeguards for all their nuclear activities by and providing pressure on other states to become party to the NPT are H. Con. Res. 371 and S. Con. Res. 69. The former was the subject of hearings by the House Committee on International Relations in November 1975; the latter was discussed at length by Senator Cranston when he introduced it on October 9, 1975.* Both bills express congressional support for a halt on further transfers of nuclear fuel, technology and equipment to any country which has not accepted International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear programs, or which by January 1976 has not become a party to the NPT if all other major nuclear suppliers agree to a similar halt on such transfers.

Second, the

bills urge an international agreement providing that with respect to any plutonium for peaceful uses resulting from any transfer between countries of nuclear fuel, technology, or equipment, all processing of such plutonium (from its extraction from spent reactor fuel elements through its processing,

* Cf., Congressional Record, October 9, 1975, pp. S18098-18102.

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storage and final fabrication into new fuel elements and their installation into nuclear reactors) will be performed in regional facilities which are heavily protected and guarded under the strictest possible multinational safeguards. In addition, the Senate bill would urge a halt to the production of weapons grade material for weapons under an adequate verification system. Following the implementation of this provision, Congress would further urge the sharing of access to and the product of nuclear enrichment facilities of major nuclear powers with all nations who sign the NPT and accept IAEA safeguards.

Limit Export-Import Bank financing of nuclear exports to non-NPT nations. --Export-Import Bank loans have been used to finance purchases by other nations of U. S. nuclear materials and technology. S. 2329 would amend the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 by adding the requirement that "no loan, guarantee, or other assistance shall be approved by the Bank's Board of Directors for the export of goods, technology, or services involving or relating to nuclear energy production or research in any country which is not a party to the NPT." This requirement would be waived if the President finds that the specific transaction is essential to the national security interests of the U. S. and reports such finding to the Congress at least twenty-five days prior to the date of final approval. Further, no loan, guarantee, or other assistance would be approved by the Bank's Board of Directors for the export of goods, technology, or services relating to nuclear energy or research unless the Bank has informed the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency thereof at least fifty days prior

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This bill represents another affirmation of the value of the NPT and its safeguards provisions, and another means of encouraging nations to sign the NPT.

Resolutions supporting stronger international nuclear export controls and safeguards. --Several resolutions introduced in the Senate and House would urge the President to seek either restraint or a temporary moratorium on the transfer of nuclear technology internationally to provide time to negotiate improved international safeguards. Concern for controlling the export of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology, and prohibiting exports of nuclear equipment and technology to non-NPT nations also appears in these bills.

S. Res. 188 and S. Res. 199 would urge the President to seek an immediate international moratorium on the transfer to non-nuclear weapons countries of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology to permit time for the negotiations of more effective safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability.

H. Res. 609 would express the sense of the House of Representatives that the President should seek agreement from other nations capable of supplying nuclear technology not to transfer such technology to nations which have not ratified the NPT. It would direct the President to urge supplier nations to suspend the transfer of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities and technology to allow time for the negotiation of an agreement to reduce the risk of diversion or theft of nuclear materials.

Requiring the OTA to study safeguards measures for plutonium. --The

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would prohibit the licensing of certain activities regarding plutonium until expressly authorized by Congress, and provide for a comprehensive study of plutonium recycling. As part of this comprehensive study the Office of Technology Assessment would investigate: the risks of the unauthorized diversion or theft of plutonium and the fabrication and use of unauthorized nuclear devices made from it; and the safeguards measures needed to minimize the unauthorized diversion or use of plutonium.