This failure to choose confuses further the debate over nuclear policy and this confusion and indecision adds to the Congress problems in weighing the arguments presented us by the various factions. I believe the following report and hearing record on which it is based will be of considerable assistance to the Congress in understanding the problem of security in the nuclear industry. Sincerely, MORRIS K. UDALL, and the Environment T CONTENTS Page APPENDIXES A. Government Operation of Nuclear Material Transportation System... B. Letter from Hon. Marcus A. Rowden, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Reg- ulatory Commission, to Hon. Morris K. Udall, chairman, Subcom- mittee on Energy and the Environment, dated July 20, 1976------ (V) SAFEGUARDS IN THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR INDUSTRY INTRODUCTION On February 26 and 27, 1976, the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, pursuant to its nuclear oversight responsibilities, held hearings concerning security in the domestic nuclear industry. The hearings were held in consequence of events occurring early in 1976 which called to question the ability of the nuclear industry's security systems to protect against theft and sabotage. Among the events were: Release of a memorandum written by the Director of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Division of Safeguards which contained a statement of concern that currently licensed facilities might not have safeguards adequate against the threat being considered as the basis for planning in NRC safeguards studies. Appearance of failures in the safeguards system at an Erwin, Tenn. facility which handled substantial quantities of highly enriched uranium. A petition by the Natural Resources Defense Council to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission asserting insufficient security and requesting either that security be upgraded or that certain facilities be required to shut down. At the outset, the acting chairman, Congressman Paul Tsongas, stressed the subcommittee's concern that there be public understanding of the safeguards problem: If we are to have nuclear power, it is essential that not only should hazards be small, but that the public be aware of what those hazards are. Mere assurances that everything is all right will not suffice. During the course of the hearing, the subcommittee sought information with regard to the nature of threats against which protection was required, with regard to steps necessary to provide protection against these threats, and with regard to whether the requisite measures were in effect. The purpose was to develop a base for a subcommittee judgment as to the adequacy of security against current and projected threats. This report contains analysis and conclusions based primarily on the February 26 and 27 hearing record and subsequent communications between the subcommittee and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Section I addresses the nature of the threat to security. Section II concerns nuclear reactors' intrinsic vulnerability (or lack thereof) to sabotage. Section III discusses nuclear material accounting and control systems. Section IV discusses safeguards system adequacy. Conclusions are presented in section V. Appendix A addresses the question of Federal •For purposes of this report, "Safeguards" refers to security systems designed to protect against malevolent acts which could lead to release of radioactive substances into the environment. operation of the system which transports materials that could be fabricated into nuclear explosives. Appendix B is an NRC letter responding to a subcommittee request for information with regard to the adequacy of security measures. Unless otherwise noted "hearing record" refers to "Oversight Hearings on Nuclear Energy-Safeguards in the Domestic Nuclear Industry"; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, 94th Congress, 2d session, February 26 and 27, 1976, serial No. 94-16, part VI. |