191 U. S. Argument for Respondent. v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 2 C. C. A. 459; 51 Fed. Rep. 689; United Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 27 C. C. A. 42; 82 Fed. Rep. 406; Kohen v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Assn., 28 Fed. Rep. 705; Misselhorn v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Assn., 30 Fed. Rep. 545; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519, 530; Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Assn., 183 U. S. 308. The equitable jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States was properly invoked and exercised, under the special circumstances of this case, because respondent did not have a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law as such remedy is understood in the Federal courts. It could not itself institute any legal proceeding there, nor could it freely remove to that court any legal proceeding brought against it in the state court. Its constitutional right to have, through removal, any controversy at law with petitioner adjudicated in a Federal court had been hampered, embarrassed, and practically destroyed by an Illinois statute. The remedy at law which is a bar to equitable relief in a Federal court must exist on the law side of the same court. Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 466, 470; Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505, 514; Root v. Railway Co., 105 U. S. 189, 216; Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 44 Fed. Rep. 310; Bank of Kentucky v. Stone, 88 Fed. Rep. 383, 391; Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 680, 688; Watson v. Sunderland, 5 Wall. 74, 79; Rich v. Braxton, 158 U. S. 375, 406; Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 215; Sullivan v. Portland, etc., R. R. Co., 94 U. S. 806, 811; Drexel v. Berney, 122 U. S. 241, 252; Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338, 349; Allen v. Hanks, 136 U. S. 300; Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 79, 95; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, 12; Smith v. American Nat. Bank, 32 C. C. A. 368, 376; 89 Fed. Rep. 832; Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 44 Fed. Rep. 310, 315. The Illinois statute against removals is doubtless repugnant to the Federal Constitution and void, along with the agreement not to remove required by it. Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186; Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202; Gal Argument for Respondent. 191 U. S. veston, etc., Railway v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 496, 502; Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 111; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 255; Chattanooga R. & C. R. Co. v. Evans, 14 C. C. A. 116, 120; 66 Fed. Rep. 809, 814; Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. M'Nall, 81 Fed. Rep. 888; Mut. L. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Boyle, 82 Fed. Rep. 705; Commonwealth v. E. Tenn. Coal Co., 30 S. W. Rep. 608 (Kentucky); Commonwealth v. Jellico Coal Min. Co., 30 S. W. Rep. 611 (Kentucky); Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Barton, 183 U. S. 24, 25. Doubtless respondent might, upon learning of the action at law brought against it, have abandoned its bill and removed the action at law to the Federal court, but that course would have been fraught with danger, for a controversy with the state superintendent of insurance, and an attempted revocation of respondent's license, would have been certain to follow. Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 466; Root v. Railway Co., 105 U. S. 189, 216; Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505, 514; Smith v. Am. Nat. Bank, 32 C. C. A. 368, 376; 89 Fed. Rep. 832; Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 44 Fed. Rep. 310, 315; Bank of Kentucky v. Stone, 88 Fed. Rep. 383, 391. As respondent did not have the proper remedy at law in the Federal court, it is immaterial whether respondent had such a remedy in a state court. The equitable jurisdiction of the Federal courts does not depend, and cannot be made to depend, upon the adequacy of proceedings at law in the state courts. Bean v. Smith, 2 Mason, 252; 2 Fed. Cas. 1143, 1150, case 1174; Breeden v. Lee, 2 Hughes, 484; 4 Fed. Cas. 50, case 1828; Mayer v. Foulkrod, 4 Wash. Cir. Ct. 349; 16 Fed. Cas. 1231, case 9341; Coler v. Board of Commissioners, 89 Fed. Rep. 257; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cornell, 110 Fed. Rep. 816; Nat. Surety Co. v. State Bank, 120 Fed. Rep. 593, 602; Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 202; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 516. See, also, Stanton v. Embry, 46 Connecticut, 595. Jurisdiction and procedure of the Federal courts cannot be made to depend upon, nor be controlled by, state legislation and state procedure; otherwise state legislation, by extending legal 191 U. S. Argument for Respondent. remedies, might destroy all equitable jurisdiction on the part of Federal courts. The jurisdiction and procedure in the Federal courts of law and of equity depend upon essential principles and distinctions as understood and applied by the Federal courts themselves. Bean v. Smith, 2 Mason, 252; 2 Fed. Cas. 1143, case 1174; Mayer v. Foulkrod, 4 Wash. Cir. Ct. 349; 16 Fed. Cas. 1231, case 9341; Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212, 222; Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 202; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 516. Nor if that were material did respondent have a plain, adequate and complete remedy in the state courts of Illinois, because it could not have its controversy with petitioner properly decided there in accordance with correct principles of general insurance law as understood and applied by this court, and because it might not have been able to interpose in an action at law the defence that the policy had been procured by fraud. This shows the peculiar value of the right to be in the Federal court. The substantial questions involved are questions of general law upon which the Federal courts exercise their own judgment, independently of state decisions. Carpenter v. The Providence Washington Ins. Co., 16 Peters, 495; 511; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 33; B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368; Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Younger, 2 Cur. 338; 10 Fed. Cas. 495, 500, case 5487; Maier v. Fidelity Mut. Life Assn., 24 C. C. A. 239; 78 Fed. Rep. 566, 572; Washburn & Moen Mfg. Co. v. Reliance Marine Ins. Co., 27 C. C. A. 134; 82 Fed. Rep. 296. This court must consider its views of the principles of general insurance law to be sound, and any contrary views of other courts to be erroneous. This court and the Supreme Court of Illinois appear to differ radically. One or the other must be wrong, and if the Illinois Supreme Court is wrong, then respondent could have had no remedy at all in the state court from the standpoint of this court. Bean v. Smith, 2 Mason, 252; 2 Fed. Cas. 1143, 1150, case 1174. It is settled in this court that a mere solicitor or a local agent Argument for Respondent. 191 U. S. of a life insurance company cannot bind his company, affirmatively or by waiver, through his agreements or knowledge, when plain and appropriate limitations and restrictions upon his authority are brought to the attention of an applicant for insurance by being embodied in the application. Davis v. Mass. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 13 Blatch. 462; 7 Fed. Cas. 141, case 3642; Paine v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 2 C. C. A. 459; 51 Fed. Rep. 689; United Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 27 C. C. A. 42; 82 Fed. Rep. 406; Kohen v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Assn., 28 Fed. Rep. 705; Misselhorn v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Assn., 30 Fed. Rep. 545; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519, 530; Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Assn., 183 U. S. 308. The Supreme Court of Illinois holds that any person who receives applications for life insurance, collects premiums, and delivers policies is authorized to waive a limitation or restriction upon his own authority contained in a policy or in an application, and to waive other provisions of the contract, and to bind the company by agreement or waiver in connection with the act of manual delivery, without regard to the expressed limitations or restrictions; and that court has expressly indicated a disinclination to accept the rule enunciated in the Fletcher case, 117 U. S. 519, and repeated in the Grand View Bldg. Association case, 183 U. S. 308. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schlink, 175 Illinois, 284, 289, 290; Royal Neighbors of America v. Boman, 177 Illinois, 27, 31. Under a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois question exists whether the defense of fraud in procuring an insurance policy, not affecting its manual execution, can be made available in an action at law, or can only be made available in a suit in equity to cancel the policy. Robinson v. Sharp, 201 Illinois, 86; 66 N. E. Rep. 299. The remedy of respondent in a state court of Illinois is, therefore, very far from being "plain" and "adequate" at law. There had been no final and conclusive election to take the commuted value of the policy, and the possibility of a multi 191 U.S. Argument for Respondent. plicity of suits, or number of successive suits, against respondent for separate annual installments under the policy was additional ground for invoking the jurisdiction of a court of equity. Illinois Statutory Provisions concerning the "Administration of Estates," Washington v. L. & N. Ry. Co., 136 Illinois, 49, 56; Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 215; Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 347, 352; Bank of Kentucky v. Stone, 88 Fed. Rep. 383, 392; Town of Springport v. Teutonia Sav. Bank, 75 N. Y. 397. Resort to equity was further sustainable on the ground that respondent might lose important evidence through lapse of time. Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 215; Schmidt v. West, 104 Fed. Rep. 272; Fuller v. Percival, 126 Massachusetts, 381; 2 Story's Eq. Juris. § 700. Under the circumstances the discretionary jurisdiction of a court of equity to cancel an instrument obtained by fraud was properly exercised. 2 Joyce on Insurance, §§ 1674-1680; 2 May on Ins. § 573; 2 Story's Eq. Juris. §§ 693, 700; Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. § 912; Bromley v. Holland, Coop. 9, 21; The Prince of Wales, etc., Assn. Co. v. Palmer, 25 Beav. 605; British Equitable Assur. Co. v. Great Western Ry. Co., 20 Law T. 422; S. C., 38 L. J. (1869) N. S. 132, 314; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Pearson, 114 Fed. Rep. 395; Union Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 123 Fed. Rep. 312. See, also, cases cited by petitioner. Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616; Life Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S. 780; Home Ins. Co. v. Stanchfield, 1 Dill. 424; 2 Abb. U. S. 1; 12 Fed. Cas. 449, case 6660. The power of the Federal court to take jurisdiction of the case and the propriety of its doing so were not affected by the commencement of petitioner's action at law in the state court, nor by the prayer for an injunction, which was not taken by the final decree. There was neither actual nor attempted injunction of state court proceedings. The original restraining order was sought against a party, and was properly issued; but the final decree contains no injunction at all, though the Federal |