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constitution, must be single and be expressed in the title of the law; the product may be as diverse as the object requires and finds its expression in the terms of the enactment only. In fine, the title of an act is a label, not an index.” Moore v. Burdett, 62 Id. 163.

There are many cases in our courts illustrating the app!ication of this provision to legislation. It would be profitless to go over them in detail.

In Newark v. Mount Pleasant Cemetery Co., 58 N. J. L. 168, 171, it was said, the evil intended to be guarded against was not the inclusion in one act of more than a single matter, but the inclusion therein of matters not properly related among themselves. See Stockton v. Central R. R. Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 52, 70; Allen v. Board of Education, 81 N. J. L. 135, 141, in which many cases are cited.

We think there is no constitutional infirmity in the title of this statute and therefore this ground of attack must fail.

It is next urged that process should have been served on the chief fiscal officer of the city of Newark, in the suit between this plaintiff, Grace Gillard, and Andrew Wanzyke, the auto bus owner, that the statute requires it and such failure was fatal to the plaintiff under the statute. The answer to this is, the appellant misconstrues the provision of the statute on which reliance is placed. The statute provides that a power of attorney shall be delivered to the fiscal officer concurrently with the filing of the policy, wherein the auto bus owner shall nominate and appoint the fiscal officer his true and lawful attorney, for the purpose of acknowledging service of any process out of a court of competent jurisdiction, to be served against the insured by virtue of the indemnity granted under the insurance policy filed.

Process to be served against the insured does not mean process to be served against the insurer. This, also, is for the benefit of the person injured, so that the auto bus owner cannot escape the process of the courts. Nowhere in the statute is there any provision providing for service of process on the chief fiscal officer of the city in the original action

VOL. III.

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Gillard v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co. 9.2.1.J.L.

-- -----against the auto bus owner, the insured. This point is without legal merit.

The judgment of the Orange District Court is affirmed, with costs.

CHARLES GILLARD, RESPONDENT, V. THE MANUFACTUR

ERS CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT.

Argued June 4, 1918-Decided September 27, 1918.

The words, injury-damage-loss: in an accident insurance policy

filed under the act of Pamph. L. 1916, p. 283, ch. 130, known as the auto bus or jitney act, include damages to personal property. such as, damage to an automobile,

On appeal from a judgment of the Orange District ('ourt.

Before Justices BERGEN, KALISCH and BLACK.

For the respondent, Arthur B. Seymour.

For the appellant, Pomereline & Laible and Jacob L. Neuman.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BLACK, J. The facts of this case are fully set out in the case of Grace Gillard against the same defendant, in an opinion filed the present term. In this case, however, there is an additional point, not involved in that case, viz., whether the policy of insurance filed by the defendant company covers damages to personal property. We think the contract of insurance is not limited to personal injuries. The words used by the insurance company to express its contract are as follows: Suits, “on account of injuries sustained by any person or persons;" "including suits alleging such injuries and demnanding damages therefor;" "resulting in injuries or death

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9.2 V.J.L. Gillard v. Manufacturers ('asualty Ins. ('o.

-- - ---- -- -- --- --sustained by any person or persons ;" “shall be for the benefit of every person suffering loss, damage or injury as described in this contract or as described in the terms of the act." Pamph. L. 1916, p. 283, ch. 136.

There is nothing to suggest that by the use of the words “injuries," "damages," "loss," personal injuries, damages or loss were only intended; nor do these words in their definition exclude injuries or damage to property. These words nean destruction or impairment of value, injury or harm. Injury means any wrong done or suffered; thus, we speak of an injury or damage to the person, to character or to reputation, as well as to property. 2 Words & Phrases 1812; + Id. 3613; 5 Id. 4232.

Sometimes the word “damage” is used to denote a partial destruction, while "loss" is more properly used to denot? absolute or total destruction.

It is quite true the contract speaks of limiting the liability for one person injured to $5,000, and the statute (Pamph. L. 1916, p. 283, ch. 136, § 2) speaks of “damages on account of bodily injury or death suffered.” If these were the only words used in the contract or statute descriptive of the liability covered by the insurance, there might be some force in the contention that the policy covered only injuries to the person or death suffered.

We think the contract is broad enough to cover damages to personal property.

The judgment is therefore affirmed, with costs.

CASES AT LAW

DETERMINED IN THE

COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS

OF THE

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

MARCH TERM, 1918.

DAISY B. JAMES, APPELLANT, v. DELAWARE, LACKA

WANNA AND WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, MORRIS
AND ESSEX RAILROAD COMPANY, JAMES F. MOORE
AND JOSEPH I. CASE, RESPONDENTS.

Argued March 12, 1918-Decided June 17, 1918.

1. Whether, when a person who enters upon a railroad company's

right of way as a trespasser and proceeds along that right of way until he reaches a public highway over the railroad, which he intends to cross, he then ceases to be a trespasser and becomes a traveler on the highway when crossing the railroad

tracks thereon, quære. 2. The Highway Crossing act of 1909 (Comp. Stat., p. 4238, ch. 35,

§ 36a) is intended for the safety and protection of travelers upon the public highway intending to cross over the railroad company's right of way and tracks, and not for the benefit of those who have gotten upon the right of way and within the safety

gates without approaching them on the highway. 3. The Highway Crossing act of 1909 (Comp. Stat., p. 4238, ch. 96,

§ 366) so far as the safety gates feature thereof is concerned, is intended for the safety and protection of travelers upon the public highway intending to cross over the railroad company's right of way and tracks, and not for the benefit of those who have gotten upon the right of way and within the safety gates without approaching them on the highway.

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