compensation. The question raised was as to whether or not, under the Civil Service law, one so employed as secretary had entered upon a term of employment fixed by law. The question was answered in the affirmative. In construing the County Board act the court found two facts upon which the opinion was made to turn: First, that the board of taxation upon organization was required to employ a secretary; second, that under the statutory scheme, one member of the board went out each year, and a new member took his place. The conclusion followed that the life of the board was accordingly one year, namely, for the period during which the personnel remained unchanged; and that, therefore, the term of office of the secretary was co-extensive with its life. Here the same statutory essentials are present: First, the presiding officer, who becomes ipso facto mayor and director of the department of public affairs, must be chosen at the first meeting after election; second, under the Walsh act, each member of the board so elected serves for a term of four years. In like manner, the conclusion must follow that the life of the board is for a period of four years, namely, for the period during which the personnel remained unchanged, and the choice of the presiding officer is accordingly co-extensive with the life of the board. The cases of Bilderback v. Freeholders of Salem, 63 N. J. L. 55, and Young v. Stafford, 86 Id. 422, are also in point. If that view were not adopted it would follow that the choice of the relator as presiding officer and his service as mayor and as designated director was merely durante bene plucito, and that, without cause or pretext, he might be removed and his duties assumed by another at the whim of his fellow commissioners. Certain express provisions of the statute negative this theory, not only those commented on but others also. For example, if the term were merely for the pleasure of the board, how shall we explain the mandate of the statute which requires that the "annual salary" of the mayor and commissioners shall be fixed by an ordinance adopted by the board immediately after its organization? This is wholly inconsistent with the suggestion that the mayor might be chosen to-day and removed to-morrow. The salary is an annual salary." This looks to permanent service under a fixed term. Again, the act provides, as we have already seen, that "in case of vacancy in the office of mayor," the duties of his office shall be performed by the vice-president of the board, who is the director of the department of revenue and finance. If the position of mayor and presiding officer might be filled, then vacated, and filled again at the will of the board, why does the act provide this complete, sweeping general method of filling the vacancy? This, too, points to permanency, and is wholly inconsistent with the suggestion that the time of service is one which shall endure merely at the pleasure of the commissioners. But again, the office of mayor is traceable back at least "to the commencement of the time of legal memory," or the beginning of the reign of Richard the First. In England the office was sometimes elective, more often appointive, but always for a fixed period. In our own state innumerable statutes will be found creating and controlling the office of mayor, but all, so far as we have been able to ascertain, for a definite and fixed period. With this historical prelude, it is most natural to conclude that the legislature in passing the Walsh act did not contemplate that functions of grave importance and vital public interest should be first exercised and then withdrawn at the will of the members of the governing body. There is nothing in the act to indicate a design to make the office of mayor ambulatory. If the mayor may be removed, as here attempted, after service of two years, then why not after the expiration of two months, or indeed two days? Such a result would rob municipal government. not only of its dignity, but its stability as well. The powers to be exercised by the mayor are important and far-reaching. They appertain not alone to the direct and immediate concerns of the municipal government. They are also extended to kindred affairs which vitally concern municipal life and welfare. The mayor, by virtue of his office, is a member of the library board, under the Library act. Comp. Stat., p. Michaelson v. Wall Township. 92 N. J. L. 3117. He appoints members of the board of education. Comp. Stat., p. 4735. He is ex officio member of the board of school estimates. Comp. Stat., p. 4745. The theory of the Walsh act was that the best form of municipal government was one which would centralize responsibility, that responsibility centralized and individualized could not be shicked or shifted, and that thus those who were immediately responsible for bad government could be directly and individually held to personal accountability. This being the theory of which the Walsh act is the fruit, it would be surprising indeed to find that the legislature formulated therein a scheme by which the individual duty and responsibility of the mayor and director of public affairs might be shifted and changed from day to day by the board. That it did not do. He holds for a term of four years and not merely at the will of the board of commissioners. Judgment will be entered in favor of the relator, with costs. HARRY MICHAELSON, PROSECUTOR, v. TOWNSHIP OF WALL. RESPONDENT. WATSON C. COOPER, PROSECUTOR, V. TOWNSHIP OF FRELINGHUYSEN, RESPONDENT. WILLIAM ROBSON, PROSECUTOR, V. TOWNSHIP OF BLAIRSTOWN, RESPONDENT. Argued June 14, 1918-Decided November 7, 1918. 1. The Local Option Liquor law (Pamph. L. 1918, p. 14) embraces but one object which is expressed in its title. 2. The Local Option Liquor law (Pamph. L. 1918, p. 14), as set forth in its title, is an act to prohibit the sale or offer or exposure for sale or furnishing or otherwise dealing in intoxicating liquor as a beverage in any of the municipalities classified in the act, and the act is not invalidated because the rights of parties manufacturing liquor within those municipalities, but selling, dealing 92 N. J. L. Michaelson v. Wall Township. in or furnishing their products in wholesale quantities to persons outside the limits are preserved by a saving clause in the body of the act. 3. The provisions of section 19 of the Local Option Liquor law (Pamph. L. 1918, p. 14), saving from the operation of the act such municipalities where prohibition is already in force does not render the act unconstitutional as a special act regulating the internal affairs of towns and counties, because, first, there are no towns where prohibition is in force except under acts relating to churches, camp meetings or state institutions and adjoining territory, and second, the saving clause is not a necessary part of the legislative scheme laid down in the act and may legitimately be disregarded if necessary to save its constitutional validity as provided for in section 31 of the act. 4. The Local Option Liquor law (Pamph. L. 1918, p. 14) is not in violation of the provisions of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. 5. A legislative enactment does not fail because in dealing with a fact reasonably capable of ascertainment, such as the number of legal votes cast at a last preceding election, the legislature has omitted to point out the precise method for ascertaining and counting those votes. 6. The hearing upon a petition for an election under the Local Option Liquor law (Pamph. L. 1918, p. 14) is a judicial, or, at least, a quasi-judicial one and the statutory procedure, provided by the act, should be strictly followed, especially as relates to the giving to persons interested, proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. 7. A member of a municipal council does not have such an interest in the result of a local option election as to disqualify him from sitting in judgment on the sufficiency of a petition which he has signed. 8. It is not necessary to the validity of election proceedings under the Local Option Liquor law that the signers of the petition for such an election should append to their signatures the name of the street or road on which they reside, the provision to that effect in the statute being merely directory and mainly for the convenience of the governing body in ascertaining the genuineness and legitimacy of the signatures. On certiorari. Before Justices PARKER and MINTURN. For the prosecutor Michaelson, Charles E. Cook and Robert H. McCarter. For the prosecutor Cooper, Levi H. Morris. Michaelson v. Wall Township. For the prosecutor Robson, William A. Dolan. 92 N. J. L. (Mr. Harry Heher also presented a brief as amicus curiæ.) For the respondents, George S. Hobart, Benjamin F. Jones and Egbert Rosecrans. The opinion of the court was delivered by PARKER, J. These three writs of certiorari bring up for examination and adjudication special elections held in the several townships named, and the proceedings leading up thereto, under and by virtue of chapter 2 of the laws of 1918 (Pamph. L., p. 14) known as the Local Option Liquor law. Attack is made both on the validity of the act itself and on the regularity of the procedure pursued in holding the elections in question. Objection to the constitutionality of the act is made upon several grounds. The first of these to be noticed is that the title of the act is broader than its body and that this invalidates it under the constitutional provision requiring that every law shall have but one object and that shall be expressed in its title. The title of the act is as follows: "An act to prohibit the sale, or offer, or exposure for sale, or furnishing or otherwise dealing in intoxicating liquor as a beverage and the granting of licenses therefor in any town, township, village, borough, city or other municipality (not a county) in this state where the legal voters thereof shall decide by a majority vote in favor of such prohibition or the continuance thereof." The argument made is that this title is equivalent to a statement that the act is to apply in all municipalities of the various classes named, but that in the body of the act at section 19 there is a saving clause providing that nothing in the act shall affect, amend, or repeal any other law which now prohibits within the limits of any municipality, or any portion thereof, either the sale, or offer, or the exposure for sale, or furnishing or otherwise dealing in intoxicating liquor, or the keeping of a place where intoxicating liquor is sold, furnished |