above the said place. At the mouth of the, But it is understood to be objected, 1. [*79 And thereupon, the opinions of the judges of the Circuit Court, being opposed as to the jurisdiction of the court, the question was by them stated, and directed to be certified to this court. Mr. C. J. Ingersoll, for the United States, argued, that by the constitution the judicial power extends to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and Congress is invested with authority to define and punish piracies and other felonies committed on the high seas. The judiciary act of 1789, c. 20, s. 11, gives jurisdiction over these offenses to the Circuit Court. 78*] The act of April 30th, 1790, c. 36, for *the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, s. 12, provides for the punishment of manslaughter committed on the high seas.1 1. The sections of this act commented on in the argument, are as follows: Sec. I. That if any person or persons, owing allegiance to the United States of America, shall levy war against them, or shall adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States, or elsewhere, and shall be thereof convicted, on confession in open court, or on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act of treason whereof he or they shall stand indicted, such person or persons shall be adjudged guilty of treason against the United States, and shall suffer death. Sec. II. And be it enacted, That if any person or persons, having knowledge of the commission of any of the treasons aforesaid, shall conceal, and not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President of the United States, or some of the judges thereof, or to the President or Governor of a particular state, or some one of the judges or justices thereof, such person or persons, on conviction, shall be adjudged guilty of mispri sion of treason, and shall be imprisoned not exceeding seven years, and fined not exceeding one thousand dollars. Sec. III. And be it enacted, That if any person or persons shall, within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, commit the crime of willful murder, such person or persons, on being thereof convicted, shall suffer death. Sec. VI. And be it enacted, That if any person or persons, having knowledge of the actual com within the above section. U. S. v. Pirates, post, 184. To give jurisdiction to the United States courts, it is the river, haven, bay, etc., and not the offense, which must be out of the jurisdiction of the state. U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336. The words "out of the jurisdiction of any particular state" refer to the states of the Union. U. S. v. Pirates, post, 184. The courts of the United States have jurisdiction under the act of April 30, 1790, of a murder committed on the high seas, although not committed on board a vessel of the United States, but a vessel held by pirates or persons not sailing under the flag of any nation. U. S. v. Holmes, post, 412; U. S. v. Klintock, post, 144: 1 Wash. C. C. 463; 5 Mason, 28; 4 Mason, 505; 1 Gallis, 62. Under the statute of 1790, ch. 36, to give the United States courts jurisdiction of the crime of murder, not only the stroke, but the death must happen on the high seas. U. S. v. McGill, 1 Wash. C. C. 463; 4 Dall. 426. The state courts have jurisdiction of offenses committed on the arms of the sea, creeks, havens, basins and bays, within the ebb and flow of the tide, when those places are within the body of a county, in such cases the circuit courts of the United States have no jurisdiction under the act of 1825. U. S. v. Grash, 5 Mason, 290. An offense committed within the mouth of a man That the civil, or Roman law, which is the admiralty code, does not recognize *or de- [*80 fine the offense of manslaughter. To which it is answered, that Congress, having declared that *any person convicted of [*8 1 slaughter shall be punished in the manner provided by the act, the common law may be referred to for a definition of the offense. Neither robbery, murder, mayhem, nor many other offenses, made punishable by the statute laws of the United States, are defined by those laws. The distinctions of homicide, as marked out by the common law, are unknown to the civil or Roman law. But when jurisdiction is given of murder committed on the high seas, etc., to a court of admiralty, the law defining the crime is to be derived from the common, and not from the civil law. It is also objected, 3. 2.-1 Bro. Civ. and Adm. Law, 422; 2 Bro. 460. The United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 626. 4. The United States v. M'Gill, 4 Dall. 426, 429. mission of the crime of willful murder, or other felony, upon the high seas, or within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or other place or district of country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall conceal, and not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to some one of the judges, or other persons in civil or military authority under the United States, on conviction thereof, such person or persons shall be adjudged guilty of misprision of felony, and shall be imprisoned not exceeding three years, and fined not exceeding five hundred dollars. Sec. VII. And be it enacted, That if any person or persors shall, within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or other place or district of country, under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, commit the crime of manslaughter, and shall be thereof convicted, such person or persons shall be imprisoned not exceeding three years, and fined not exceeding one thousand dollars. Sec. VIII. And be it enacted, That if any person or persons shall commit, upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, murder or robbery, or any other offense, which, if committed within the body of a county, would, by the laws of the United States, be punishable with death; or, if any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel, shall piratically and feloniously run away with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandise, to the value of fifty dollars, or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby foreign river, a mile and a half wide, is within the act of Congress. U. S. v. Smith, 3 Wash. C. C. 78; note. to The act of 1790 does not authorize the United States courts to convict for larceny committed on a vesel lying in a foreign harbor, although where the tide ebbs and flows. U. S. v. Jackson, 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 3. Nor for larceny committed on ship lying in a port of one of the United States, although the property was carried on the high seas to another port. U. S. v. Davis, 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 35. In The act of 1835 differs from the crimes act of 1790. Under the act of 1835, if the offense is committed on the high seas, or any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, the court has jurisdiction. the act of 1790, the offense must have been committed in a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state. U. S. v. Lynch, 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 51. Penal statutes to be strictly construed; never extended by implication. Andrews v. U. S. 2 Story, C. C. 202; Ferret v. Atwill, 1 Blatchf. 151; S. C. 4 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 215; U S. v. Starr, Hempst. 469; The Enterprise, 1 Paine, 32; 4 Am. Law Journ. 115. Wheat. 5. 2. That the local jurisdiction of the Chinese | revenue laws of the country where they may empire over the offense charged by the indict- be, are yet in many respects exempted from the ment, if found by the jury to have been com- local jurisdiction. Minor crimes, which do not mitted within its territorial limits, necessarily offend the safety or dignity of the local sovexcludes the jurisdiction of the courts of this ereignty, are usually left to the cognizance of 82] country over the offense. To this ob- the government to whosesubjects the vessel jection, it is answered, that by the principles belongs. Nor does this, in the slightest degree, of universal law, a qualified national jurisdic- affect the eminent domain and sovereignty of tion and immunity extends to the ships of the the foreign nation over its harbors and rivers." ration, public and private, wherever they may But China herself disclaims jurisdiction in such be. As to public vessels, this immunity is un- cases, and renvoys them to the forum of the questionable. And even private vessels, though offending party.3 The offense here, being from the necessity of the case, subject to the *committed by a citizen of the United [*83 hinder and prevent his fighting in defense of his ship, or goods committed to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender shall be deemed taken, and adjudged to be, a pirate and felon, and being thereof convicted, shall suffer death; and the trial of crimes committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought. Sec. IX. And be it enacted, That if any citizen shall commit any piracy or robbery, aforesaid, or any act of hostility against the United States, or any citizen thereof, upon the high seas, under color of any commission from any foreign prince or state, or on pretense of authority from any person, such offender shall, notwithstanding the pretense of authority, be deemed, adjudged, and taken to be, a pirate, felon, and robber, and on being thereof convicted, shall suffer death. Sec. X. And be it enacted, That every person who shall, either upon the land or seas, knowingly and wittingly aid and assist, procure, command, counsel or advise, any person or persons to do or commit any murder or robbery, or other piracy aforesaid, upon the high seas, which shall affect the life of such person, and such person or persons shall thereupon do or commit any such piracy or robbery, then all and every such person, so as aforesaid, aiding, assisting, procuring, commanding. counseling, or advising the same, either upon the land or the sea, shall be and they are hereby declared, deemed, and adjudged to be, accessory to such piracies before the fact, and every such person, being thereof convicted, shall suffer death. Sec. XI. And be it enacted, That after any murder, felony, robbery, or other piracy whatsoever, aforesaid, is or shall be committed by any pirate or robber, every person who, knowing that such pirate or robber has done or committed any such piracy or robbery, shall, on the land or at sea, receive, entertain, or conceal, any such pirate or robber, or receive or take into his custody any ship, vessel, goods, or chattels, which have been, by any such pirate or robbery, piratically and feloniously taken, shall be, and are hereby declared, deemed and adjudged, to be accessary to such piracy or robbery, after the fact; and on conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned, not exceeding three years, and fined, not exceeding five hundred dollars. Sec. XII. And be it enacted, That if any seaman or other person shall commit manslaughter upon the high seas, or confederate, or attempt or endeavor to corrupt any commander, master, officer or mariner, to yield up or to run away with any ship or vessel, or with any goods, wares, or merchandise, or to turn pirate, or to go over to or confederate with pirates, or in any wise trade with any pirate, knowing him to be such, or shall furnish such pirate with any ammunition, stores, or provisions of any kind; or shall fit out any vesel, knowingly, and with a design to trade with or supply or correspond with any pirate or robber upon the seas; or if any persons shall any ways consult, combine, confederate, or correspond with any pirate or robber on the seas, knowing him to be guilty of any such piracy or robbery; or if any seaman shall confine the master of any ship or other vessel, or endeavor to make revolt in such ship; such person or persons, so offending, and being thereof convicted, shall be imprisoned, not exceed ing three years, and fined, not exceeding one thousand dollars. 1. Vattel L. 1, c. 19, s. 216; The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116; Case of Nash alias Robbins, Bee's Adm. Rep. 266; vide Appendix, Note I. * 2.-2 Bro. Civ. & Adm. Law, 468, 484; M'Gill's Case, 4 Dall. 427; United States v. Ross, 1 Gallis, 627; United States v. Smith, 1 Mason, 147; United States v. Hamilton, 1 Mason, 152. 3.-Sir George Staunton's Translation of the Laws of China, 36, 523. The following extracts from this work were read at the argument, and it is thought their insertion here will not be unacceptable to the learned reader: "Offenses committed by foreigners. (*) In gen. eral all foreigners who come to submit themselves to the government of the empire, shall, when guilty of offenses, be tried and sentenced according to the established laws. The particular decisions, however, of the tribunal Lee-Fan-Yuen, (†) shall be guided according to regulations framed for the government of the Mongol tribes. Note (*)"This section of the code has been expressly quoted by the provincial government of Canton, and applied to the case of foreigners residing there and at Macao for the purposes of trade. The laws of China have never, however, been attempted to be enforced against those foreigners, except with considerable allowances in their favor, although, on the other hand, they are restricted and circumscribed in such a manner that a transgression on their part of any specific article of the laws can scarcely occur; at least, not without at the same time implicating and involving in their guilt some of the natives, who thus in most cases become the principal victims of offended justice. The situation of Europeans in China is certainly by no means so satisfactory on the whole as might be desired, or even as it may be reasonably expected to become in the progress of time, unless some untoward circumstance should occur to check the gradual course of improvement. It must be admitted, however, that the extreme contrariety of manners, habits, and language, renders some such arrangement, as that now subsisting for the regulation of the intercourse between the Europeans and the natives, absolutely indispensable, as well as conducive to the interests of both parties. Note (†) This tribunal might be styled the office or department for foreign affairs, but its chief concern is with the tributary and the subject states of Tartary." p. 36. "The foregoing being the substance of the report of the viceroy to his imperial majesty, we have deliberated thereon, and have ascertained that, according to the preliminary book of the penal code, all persons from foreign parts committing offenses, shall undergo trial, and receive sentence according to the laws of the empire. Moreover, we find it declared in the same code, that any person accidentally killing another, shall be allowed to redeem himself from punishment, by the payment of a fine; lastly, we find, that on the eighth year of Kien-Lung (1743), it was ordered, in reply to the address of the viceroy of Canton, then in office, that thenceforward, in all cases of offenses by contrivance, design, or in affrays happening between foreigners and natives, whereby such foreigners are liable, according to law, to suffer death by being strangled or beheaded, the magistrate of the district shall receive the proofs and evidence thereof, at the period of the preliminary investigation, and after having fully and distinctly inquired into the reality of the circumstances, report the result to the viceroy and sub-viceroy, who are thereupon strictly to repeat and revise the investigation. If the determination of the inferior courts, upon the alleged facts, and upon the application of the laws, is found to have been just as to rivers, for which we contend. The case of the United States v. Bevans' does not stand in our way, for the point now in question was not determined in that case. Mr. Sergeant, contra, stated, that the indictment in this case, pursuing the words of the act, charges the offense to have been committed upon the "high seas." It is of no consequence what may be the extent of the power given by the constitution to the government of the Union. The question is, to what extent has the power so given been exercised? It is not necessary, therefore, to enquire whether this was an offense within the admiralty jurisdiction. The only question is, whether it is within the true meaning *of the act of Congress. [*87 The offense in question, if committed at all, was not committed upon the high seas; wheth States upon another citizen, on board a mer84*] chant vessel of this country, lying in the waters of a foreign country, which expressly disclaims jurisdiction of the case, it is dispunishable, unless it be punishable in the courts of this country; and it appears at least questionable whether there is any constitutional power in Congress to punish it, except in the mode already provided for, as an offense committed on the high seas. This brings us to the 3d objection, which is, that the offense was not committed "on the high seas," within the true intent and meaning of the act of April, 1790, c. 36, s. 12. In answer to this objection, it is insisted, that before the adoption of the 85*] present *constitution, the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction extended everywhere on tide waters below low water-mark. The same extension has been given to the admiralty juris-er these terms be considered in their ordinary diction under the constitution." The opposite argument is founded on the expression "high seas," as contradistinguished from that portion of the sea where the tide ebbs and flows, but which is inclosed by head lands, or forms parts of rivers above their mouths. But the celebrated statutes of Richard II., regulating the admiralty jurisdiction, allow the admiral to have cognizance of things done on the sea, "sur le meer," without the addition of high. The stat. 27 Eliz. uses the expression "main sea." The 28 Hen. VIII., c. 15, concerning the trial of crimes committed within the admiralty jurisdiction, uses the terms, "in and upon the sea, or in any other haven, creek, river, or place, where the admiral hath, or pretends to have, power, authority, or jurisdiction." The act of Congress of 1790, c. 9, uses the terms promiscuously, "high seas" (s. 8, s. 9), "the seas" (s. 10), "the sea" (s. 11), "high seas and seas" (s. 12). The term "sea" is water, as contradistinguished from land. The term "high sea" does not necessarily import deep sea; although the classical writers frequently use the correspondent Latin word in that figurative 86*] *sense, as altum æquor, altissimun flumen, etc. It is a common expletive applied, in both languages, to "sea," "road," "crime," and many other things. The contrary acceptation of the term "high sea," would exclude bays, arms of the sea, coves, belts, straits, estuaries, great rivers, and lakes. There is no other limit to the sea, but that where the tide ceases to ebb and flow, whether on the sea-coast or in bays and rivers. Even the English statutes of Richard II., made to restrict the admiralty jurisdiction, and in derogation of its ancient authority, give it cognizance of murders, etc., committed on board great ships in the streams of great rivers below the first bridges. So the French law gives the admiralty the same jurisdiction, and accurate, the magistrate of the district shall, lastly, receive orders to proceed, in conjunction with the chief of the nation, to take the offender to execution, according to his sentence. "In all other instances of offenses committed under what the laws declare to be palliating circumstances, and which are, therefore, not capitally punishable, the offender shall be sent away to be punished in his own country. February, 1808." P. 523. 1. See authorities cited, 3 Wheat. 357, note 4, to United States v. Bevans; De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gallis. 470, note 47. 2.-United States v. La Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297; sense, as used in foreign authorities of the law; as employed in acts of Congress; as used in the act in question; or as expounded by our own judicial decisions. 1. The national character of the ship or vessel in which the offense was committed makes no difference in this case. A public armed vessel is a part of the national sovereign force, clothed with the sovereign character, and, wherever she goes, entitled to immunity. She is subject only to the jurisdiction of her sovereign, and is a part of his territory; is exempt from visitation and search, and governed by such laws as her sovereign may choose to give her. The immunity she enjoys does not depend upon the civil or admiralty law; but, like the privilege of an ambassador, or the immunity of troops on their passage, depends upon the law of nations. Every sovereign may refuse admission, but having admitted, is bound to respect. Still, it does not follow that the courts of her own country have jurisdiction on board of her. Be this as it may, a private ship has no such immunity. On the ocean she is bound to submit to visitation and search. In port she is bound to submit to the local jurisdiction, and entitled to the benefit of the laws of the place. Those who are on board of her incur the obligation *of a temporary allegiance, and are, in [*88 all respects, amenable to the laws of the country in which they are found; to its penal laws especially. The ocean, the high seas, are a common domain; and every ship, private as well as public, is there upon the territory of her sovereign, and amenable to no laws but the laws of her sovereign, and the law of nations. It is from this principle that every nation derives its jurisdiction over the persons on board its ships; the spot they occupy in the common domain is its own territory, and it has a right to give the law to it. 2. The naThe Sally, 2 Cranch, 406; The Betsey and Charlotte, 4 Cranch, 443; The Samuel, 1 Wheat. 9; The Octavia, Ib. 20. 3. See The King v. Bruce, cited 3 Wheat. 371, note 1. 4.-1 Valin, Com. sur l'Ordon., liv. 1, tit. 2; De la Competence, art. 5. 5.-3 Wheat. 336. 6. The United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336, 386. 7. The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116; Speech of Mr. (now Chief Justice) Marshall, in the case of Nash alias Robbins, Appendix, note I. 8.-1 Sir L. Jenkins's Works, 91. tional character of the offender, or of the per- distinction expressly. So, also, we have the son offended, makes no difference; if the crew authority of Lord Hale in many places;" and all had all shipped in England, and been English the authorities agree that the divisum imperium subjects, they would have been equally entitled is only upon the sea-coast. The distinction is to protection, and equally amenable to our also perfectly understood and maintained in laws. If, upon the ocean, or high seas, a for- our own legislation; and the act now in queseigner had been murdered, his death would tion furnishes the clearest recognition of it, as have been equally avenged by our laws. If a will appear by a comparison of the 8th with foreigner on board this ship had committed an the 12th section. In the 8th section, the disoffense, he would equally have been liable. It tinction is made between the "high seas" and is not correct, then, to say that personal juris- "a river, haven, basin, or bay." The latter exdiction is universal as to citizens; nor that it pressions can never, by any fair rule of condoes in no case extend to foreigners. 3. In the struction applied to penal statutes, be transnext place, the extent or true nature of the con- ferred from the 8th to the 12th section. In stitutional power is wholly immaterial in this criminal cases, a strict construction is always case. That instrument had in view, 1st. To to be preferred; and if there be *doubt, [*91 partition powers between the Union and the that is of itself conclusive. In Bevan's case, states. 2d. To distribute powers among the dif- the distinction between the high seas and other ferent branches of the national government. inclosed parts of the sea was not denied by the The judicial power, in its exercise, is subordi- counsel for the United States, and the court nate and auxiliary to the power of Congress. do not even mention it as at all doubtful.' But 89] The whole *jurisdiction has never been it is asked, whether the criminal jurisdiction of exercised. But the principle, in its application the admiralty is not as extensive as the civil? to the very case, has been decided in the case To which it is answered, that the criminal juof The United States v. Bevans. It follows, risdiction depends upon the place where the oftherefore, that the judicial authority is of no fense is committed; the civil, upon the nature avail, unless there be a corresponding power in of the subject; and there can, therefore, be no Congress; that as the judicial authority is un- comparison of their extent. availing without a legislative act, it is to the act of Congress alone we must look for the extent of the jurisdiction. When, therefore, the authority of the judiciary is declared to extend to all cases of "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," it is to be extended only to such cases as Congress have power to provide for. The same power might be exercised through the medium of the state courts, or omitted altogether. It follows, also, most indubitably, that the powers exercised by Congress can receive no illustration from the powers given to the judiciary by the constitution; and we are thus happily relieved from the necessity of exploring the distant speculation of the ancient jurisdiction of the admiralty. 4. What, then, is the true meaning of the terms, on the "high seas," as used in the act of Congress? In their ordinary sense, they mean the open ocean, as distinguished from creeks, rivers, ports, and other bodies of water, inclosed and infraterritorial. The flow of the tide cannot be the true test; for then the sea would flow to the falls of Schuylkill and Delaware, and would comprehend a vessel moored at the wharf. If we re90*] fer to the authorities of the English law, they are clear and uniform. The common lawyers never at any period denied the admir alty jurisdiction upon the "high seas." The civilians claimed a jurisdiction beyond what was conceded to them by the common lawyers, beyond the "high seas;" in rivers, bays, etc. Thus, the very contest, in its origin, admitted that the "high seas" were distinguishable from other waters. The statute 13 Richard II. confined the admiralty to things done upon the "sea." The 15 Richard II. gave it criminal jurisdiction in homicide and mayhem on great rivers, etc. The 27 Eliz. c. 11, is conclusive of the question. Sir Leoline Jenkins makes the 1-3 Wheat. 336, 386. 2.-4 Inst. 136. 3.-4 Inst. 137. 4.-4 Inst. 137. The Attorney-General, in reply, insisted, that although penal laws are to be construed strictly, the intention of the Legislature must gov ern in their construction. If a case be within the intention and reason, it must be considered as within the letter of the statute. This act having been passed by Congress on the first organization of the government, it must have been their intention to make the exercise of their power co-extensive with their jurisdiction; and to punish all the crimes enumerated, in every place within their jurisdiction. The act must, therefore, be construed so as to engraft the words of the 8th section, descriptive of the place in which murder may be committed, on the 12th section, which describes the place in which manslaughter may be committed. After expressing themselves fully in the previous section as to the places in which one of the crimes intended to be punished by the act must be committed, it was natural that the Legislature *should suppose the lan- [*92 guage engrafted into a subsequent section on a subject of the same class. Thus, the 1st section of the act defines the crime of treason, and provides, "that if any person or persons owing allegiance to the United States of America, shall levy war," etc., "such person or persons shall be adjudged guilty of treason," etc. The second section defines misprision of treason, and in specifying the persons who may commit the crime, omits the words "owing alle giance to the United States," and uses without limitation or restriction the general terms "any person or persons." Yet these general terms were obviously intended to be restrained by the words "owing allegiance to the United States," which are used in the preceding section. The crimes of murder and manslaughter are kindred offenses, and are parts of the same 5.-1 Life of Sir L. J. 77. 6.-Hale, De Jure Maris, c. 4; 2 East's C. L. 304; 2 Hale's' P. C. ch. 3. 7.-3 Wheat. 336. general offense of homicide. Congress must have intended to make the same provision for their punishment, as to the places within which they must be committed in order to give jurisdiction to the courts of the Union. Thus, the 3d section of the act describes the places on land in which murder must be committed in order to give those courts jurisdiction of the offense; and the 7th section describes in the very same terms the places on land in which manslaughter must be committed in order to give them jurisdiction. Observe the consequences of a contrary construction as to murder alone. The 9th section extends the guilt of the offenses enumerated in it to a citizen of the United States committing them under color of a foreign commission. But this section, in describ93*] ing the place where the offense may be committed, omits the words "in any river, haven, basin, or bay," and uses the words "high seas" only. It is incredible that it was the legislative intention to distinguish between the same crime, committed under the pretext of authority by a foreign commission, on the high seas, and on the waters of a foreign state, or of the United States. So, also, the 10th section provides, "that every person who shall, either upon the land or the seas, knowingly and wittingly aid and assist, procure, command, counsel, or advise, any person or persons to do or commit any murder or robbery, or other piracy, aforesaid, upon the seas, which shall affect the life of such person, shall," etc. Here Congress cannot have intended to exempt from punishment those persons who shall be accessories before the fact to a murder or robbery committed "in a river, haven, basin, or bay," etc. A similar argument is applicable to the 11th section. As to the 12th section, beside the offense of manslaughter, the other offenses which it enumerates are all accessorial to those mentioned in the 8th. It is, therefore, evidently connected with the 8th. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court: The indictment in this case is founded on the 12th section of the act, entitled, “an act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States." That section is in these words: "And be it enacted, that if any seaman, or other person, shall commit manslaughter on the high seas, or confederate," etc., "such person or persons so offending, 94*] *and being thereof convicted, shall be imprisoned not exceeding three years, and fined not exceeding one thousand dollars." The jurisdiction of the court depends on the place in which the fact was committed. Manslaughter is not punishable in the courts of the United States, according to the words which have been cited, unless it be committed on the high seas. Is the place described in the special verdict a part of the high seas? If the words be taken according to the common understanding of mankind-if they be taken in their popular and received sense-the "high seas," if not in all instances confined to the ocean which washes a coast, can never extend to a river about half a mile wide, and in the interior of a country. This extended construction of the words, it has been insisted, is still farther opposed by a comparison of the 12th with the 8th section of the act. In the 8th section, Congress has shown its attention to the distinction between the "high seas" and "a river, haven, basin, or bay.' The wellknown rule that this is a penal statute, and is to be construed strictly, is also urged upon us. On the part of the United States, the jurisdiction of the court is sustained, not so much on the extension of the words "high seas," as on that construction of the whole act which would engraft the words of the 8th section, descriptive of the place in which murder may be committed, on the 12th section, which describes the place in which manslaughter may be committed. This transfer of the words of one section to the other is, it has been contended, in pursuance *of the obvious in- [*95 tent of the legislature; and in support of the authority of the court so to do, certain maxims, or rules for the construction of statutes have been quoted and relied on. It has been said, that although penal laws are to be construed strictly, the intention of the legislature must govern in their construction. That if a case be within the intention, it must be considered as if within the letter of the statute. So if it be within the reason of the statute. The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment. It is said, that notwithstanding this rule, the intention of the law-maker must govern in the construction of penal, as well as other statutes. This is true. But this is not a new independent rule which subverts the old. It is a modification of the ancient maxim, and amounts to this, that though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. The maxim is not to be so applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words, in their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which the legislature has obviously used them, would comprehend. The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the [*96 words, there is no room for construction. The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a court in departing from the plain meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in search of an intention which the words themselves did not suggest. To determine that a case is within the intention of a statute, its language must authorize us to say so. It would that a case which is within the reason or misbe dangerous, indeed, to carry the principle, chief of a statute, is within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of kindred character, with those which are enumerated. If this principle has ever been recognized in expounding criminal law, it has been in cases of considerable irritation, which it would be unsafe to consider as precedents forming a general rule for other cases. Having premised these general observations, |