not affect estates created before its adoption; dissenting opinion, State v. Mathews, 3 Jones (N. C.), 464, holding an act making it an indictable offense to pass bank bills of certain denominations im pairs contract authorizing bank to issue bills of that denomination; Goodale v. Fennell, 27 Ohio St. 432, 22 Am. Rep. 326, where, after municipality under general statute had contracted for improvements, its power of taxation was restricted; Knighton v. Burns, 10 Or. 551, App., holding a law permitting debts to be cancelled in currency known as 66 scrip," is void as to debts contracted before its enactment; Western Fund Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 182, 72 Am. Dec. 734, where principle was applied to acts of municipality which impaired its contracts; Goggans v. Turnipseed, 1 S. C. 82, 98 Am. Dec. 398, holding statute providing creditor might charge specified interest on open accounts, is invalid as to contracts made before its passage; Taylor v. Stearns, 18 Gratt. 274, where statute stayed collection of debts for a limited period; Bank v. McVeigh, 20 Gratt. 465, where place of payment was changed by law; Homestead Cases 22 Gratt. 288, 292, 12 Am. Rep. 515, 518, where statute increased amount of property exempt as a homestead; State v. Commissioners, 4 Wis. 418, where conditions under which purchases of school lands might be made were changed. Cited in In re Kennedy, 2 S. C. 222, but holding a homestead exemption law is not void as to contracts made before its adoption. See also note on general subject, 10 Am. Dec. 135, 136.

Constitutional law. A statute which so changes the nature and extent of remedies on a contract as to impair the right, is to that extent void, and it is immaterial that the extent of the change in the contract is slight, pp. 75, 84.

This principle is applied in Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 316, 317, 11 L. 145, 149, case of a statute affecting mortgagee's foreclosure rights; Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 327, 330, 332, 12 L. 458, 459, 460, where right of bank to collect notes was impaired; Curran v. State, 15 How. 319, 14 L. 712, where State was made preferred creditor of bank, leaving, in effect, no remedy to other creditors; Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 550, 552, 18 L. 408, 409, and United States v. New Orleans, 17 Fed. 488, where statute restricted municipality's powers of taxation, thereby rendering it unable to pay its outstanding bonds; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 601, 604, 24 L. 796, 797, where statute increasing amount of property exempt from execution was enacted subsequent to contraction of debt; Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 123, 41 L. 98, 16 S. Ct. 1044, holding a statute authorizing redemption after foreclosure, when no such right existed at time contract was made, is void as to such contracts; Nelson v. McCrary, 60 Ala. 310, where statute enlarged homestead exemptions; Edwards v. Williamson, 70 Ala. 152, holding statute relating to collection of taxes, which operated to impair a State's contracts with its creditors, to be inoperative; Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark.

641, where State Constitution cut off all remedy on contracts for sale of slaves; Cohn v. Hoffman, 45 Ark. 385, holding exemption in Constitution as to homestead has no application to debts contracted before its adoption; McCauley v. Brooks, 16 Cal. 30, holding statute requiring claims against State to be approved by board of examiners has no application to claims matured before its enactment; dissenting opinion, Cutts v. Hardee, 38 Ga. 385, where statute permitted evidence to be introduced to attack consideration as to certain contracts made before passage of act; Lott v. Dysart, 45 Ga. 361, where statute imposed certain conditions as to payment of taxes which must be complied with before courts would render assistance to enforce contract; Fisher v. Green, 142 Ill. 94, 31 N. E. 176, where statute operated to deprive mortgagee of right to have property sold under power of sale, and without redemption; Martindale v. Moore, 3 Blackf. 281, holding statute providing mispleading should not render executor personally liable, does not have retroactive effect; Berry v. Ransdall, 4 Met. (Ky.) 294, where legislature sought to limit time for bringing actions, regardless of time when right of action accrued; Collins v. Collins, 79 Ky. 90, 92, applying rule to statute affecting redemptions of real estate sold under order of court; Sabatier v. Creditors, 6 Mart. (La.) (N. S.) 591; also, Lessley v. Phipps, 49 Miss. 799, where amount of exempt property was increased; Rowlett v. Shepherd, 4 La. 94, where statute compelled debtor to pay interest on certain contingency; dissenting opinion, Doughty v. Sheriff, 27 La. Ann. 360, holding statute exempting property from execution has no application to cases where debt was contracted before its passage; Phinney v. Phinney, 81 Me. 461, 10 Am. St. Rep. 269, 17 Atl. 407, 4 L. R. A. 350, and n., time for redemp tion extended; Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 371, where time for redemption was shortened; Coffman v. Bank of Kentucky, 40 Miss. 33, 90 Am. Dec. 314, where "stay laws" operated to take away all remedies for period of two years; Leavitt v. Lovering, 64 N. H. 609, 1 L. R. A. 59, statute providing all payments made within three months before assignment for benefit of creditors shall be void, does not apply to payments of existing contracts; Moore v. State, 43 N. J. L. 206, 39 Am. Rep. 561, where statute operated to create liability which had been barred by statute of limitations; State v. Carew, 13 Rich. 511, 91 Am. Dec. 250, where statute operated to stay execution; State v. Bank, 1 S. C. 78, where act withdrew property of debtor from operation of legal process of creditor; State v. Cardozo, 8 S. C. 81, 28 Am. Rep. 284, where statute diverted money from a fund which State had pledged for payment of its bonds; Nelson v. Allen, 1 Yerg. 383, holding statute allowing defendant in ejectment the value of improvements made upon land, void; Grasmeyer v. Beeson, 13. Tex. 530, where statute took away all remedy; Swinburne v. Mills, 17 Wash. 618, 61 Am. St. Rep. 936, 50 Pac. 491, case of statute requiring a year's stay of sale under foreclosure decree, and requiring: sale to bring within 80 per cent. of appraised valuation, there

having been no such law at time mortgage was given; Peninsular, etc. v. Union Oil Co., 100 Wis. 492, 76 N. W. 361, 42 L. R. A, 332, and Sec., etc., Bk. v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 262, 73 N. W. 35, 39 L. R. A. 575, act enabling debtor by assignment of his property to defeat a levy thereon made within ten days, is invalid as to pre-existing contracts. Other citing cases affirm the syllabus principle without being called upon especially to apply it: Lavin v. Emigrant Bank, 18 Blatchf. 16, 1 Fed. 655, as bearing on question of what constitutes "due process of law;" Limestone County v. Rather, 48 Ala. 447, affirming rule; Thorne v. San Francisco, 4 Cal. 142, quære, whether suspension of remedies, or any part thereof, existing when contract was made, does not impair obligation of contract; Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 10, holding a remedial statute which operates to take away a right is void. Cited generally in dissenting opinion, Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 179, involving constitutionality of stay laws." Affirming rule generally, without specially applying it, Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilm. 277, 46 Am. Dec. 459; dissenting opinion, Scobey v. Gibson, 17 Ind. 578; dissenting opinion, Kennebec Ry. Co. v. Portland Ry. Co., 59 Me. 73. Approved in Grimes v. Bryne, 2 Minn. 96, although the case holds an exemption law intended to operate on debts contracted before its passage, operates only on remedy and is constitutional; also, King v. Hopkins, 57 N. H. 353, 354. Cited generally, without special application of the principle, in McLaren v. Pennington, 1 Paige Ch. 108; in dissenting opinion, People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 563; Eakin v. Raub, 12 S. & R. 366; dissenting opinion, Satterlee v. Matthewson, 16 S. & R. 185. Cited generally in Smith v. Elliott, 39 Tex. 211. See note on constitutionality of stay laws, 6 Am. Dec. 540.

66

Distinguished in New Orleans v. Morris, 105 U. S. 603, 26 L. 1185, holding, under facts, there was no impairment of obligations; Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U. S. 65, 27 L. 653, 2 S. Ct. 245, statute did not affect agreement; Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 88, holding statute complained of does not affect obligation; also cited in dissenting opinion, same case, pp. 102, 105; Colorado Springs Co. v. Cowell, 6 Colo. 79, holding remedy is not affected; Watkins v. Glenn, 55 Kan. 431, 40 Pac. 319, objectionable statute did not have retroactive effect; Tompkins v. Forrestal, 54 Minn. 125, 55 N. W. 814, which deals with method of procedure only; State v. Gilliam, 18 Mont. 107, 44 Pac. 399, 31 L. R. A. 726, statute enlarging redemption time if mortgagee becomes purchaser; State v. Griffin, 66 N. H. 328, 29 Atl. 415, where right to trial by jury was held not to be affected by statute relating to; also, Chadwick v. Moore, 8 Watts & S. 50, 51, 42 Am. Dec. 268, 269, holding statute which suspends remedy for reasonable time does not impair contract to such a degree as to be objectionable; Longbine v. Piper, 70 Pa. St. 380, where construction which would impair right was denied. Distinguished also in Ex parte Penniman, 11 R. I. 346, holding repeal of statute providing stockholders are liable to arrest on execution issued on judgment

against corporation, does not impair contract, but affects remedy merely; Fleming v. Holt, 12 W. Va. 167, holding statute providing that interest shall be allowed on judgments from date rendered, does not affect the contract; Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 591, holding a mortgage stay law" affects the remedy only.

66

Principal and surety.- Agreement between creditor and debtor to alter terms of contract releases surety, p. 85.

Cited and followed in Dey v. Martin, 78 Va. 4.

Compacts between States.- Consent of congress to, is sufficiently indicated, when not necessary to be made in advance, by adoption or approval of proceedings taken under it, p. 87.

Approved in Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 173, 38 L. 676, 14 S. Ct. 788, where congress adopted award of commissioners which had previously been ratified by States interested in.

Constitutional law.- Compact of 1789 between Virginia and Kentucky is not invalid on ground of surrendering inalienable rights of sovereignty, pp. 87, 88.

Constitutional law.- Powers of legislation granted to government of the United States, as well as to State governments, are limited, p. 88.

Cited in Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 370, holding. amendments to Constitution of United States are restrictions on State legislation as well as Federal. Cited, arguendo, in dissenting opinion, Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 66, 12 L. 609.

Constitutional law. Taking property acquired under contract for public use does not impair contract, p. 89.

Cited to this effect, without application, in Piscataqua Bridge v. Bridge, 7 N. H. 68.

Contract is the agreement of two or more persons to do, or not to do, certain acts, p. 92.

Cited to this point in State v. Mayor of New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 716; Fisk v. Police Jury, 34 La. Ann. 45.

Supreme Court has jurisdiction to declare a State law impairing obligation of contract void, p. 92.

Cited to this point in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. 566, 14 L. 269.

Distinguished in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 582, 9 L. 838, where action of State was not directly on contract. Constitutional law.- Prohibition against State laws impairing obligation of contract, embraces all contracts, p. 92.

Cited and rule applied in Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 14 Pet. 413, 414, 10 L. 519, 520, where claims under Spanish grants and treaties were

determined; dissenting opinion, in Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 750, 27 L. 462, 2 S. Ct. 160, and opinion of majority in Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 286, 29 L. 191, 5 S. Ct. 912, where State impaired her own contracts with creditors; New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Co., 115 U. S. 673, 29 L. 524, 6 S. Ct. 264, where State, having granted exclusive franchise, enacted law under which companies could be organized which would impair value of franchise; dissenting opinion, In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 515, 31 L. 233, 8 S. Ct. 188, the majority distinguishing the case and deciding it on other grounds; Hancock v. Walsh, 3 Woods, 363, F. C. 6,012, where State of Texas attempted to annul one of the conditions contained in resolution of annexation; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 77 Fed. 398, where statute changed place of payment of contract; Willis v. Cadenhead, 28 Ala. 474, holding statute of succession and distribution cannot effect separate estate of married woman, created by deed before enactment of statute; McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 63, 4 Am. Rep. 117; also, Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 S. C. 301, where State ordinance provided all contracts should be void, where consideration was slaves or Confederate bonds; Micou v. Tallassee Bridge Co., 47 Ala. 656, holding act incorporating persons to build toll-bridge creates a contract which cannot be impaired by another grant; State v. County Court of Crittenden County, 19 Ark. 364, 373, where purchase of land from State under State law was held to be a contract and within constitutional inhibition; Leach v. Smith, 25 Ark. 252, where statute provided contracts to be paid in Confederate money should be paid in United States currency; Enfield Bridge Co. v. Connecticut Co., 7 Conn. 48, where State granted franchise to company which infringed rights granted to another company; Bailey v. Philadelphia Ry. Co., 4 Harr. (Del.) 401, 44 Am. Dec. 603, where right of action was given for authorized acts already performed; Young v. Harrison, 6 Ga. 154, 156, where legislature passed act annulling charter granted; Winter v. Jones, 10 Ga. 196, 54 Am. Dec. 382, holding an act, providing for resale of lands which had been sold under prior act, void; Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 135, 150, 92 Am. Dec. 64, where statute provided for staying execution on certain contracts; Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilm. 276, 46 Am. Dec. 458, where legislature repealed that portion of statute providing for execution of conveyance by officer making sale for taxes; Edwards v. Jagers et al., 19 Ind. 413, where State Constitution impaired grant of corporate powers; Canal Co. v. Railroad Co., 4 Gill. & J. 129, 146, where State sought to impair compact entered into with corporation and another State; dissenting opinion, Common Council v. Assessors, 91 Mich. 116, 51 N. W. 799, 16 L. R. A. 79, inhibition covers act permitting, as to prior mortgages, mortgagor's property to be seized to pay tax of mortgagee; State v. Young, 29 Minn. 525, 9 N. W. 739, applying principle to constitutional amendment impairing obligation of State's executory contracts; State v. Fry, 4 Mo. 132, applying principle to marriage con